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Abstract 
 
This thesis is about development donor organisations’ enthusiasm for social 
accountability programmes. It argues that when they are based on neoliberal 
conceptions of civil society, they complement and strengthen clientelistic networks. 
They do this by rendering activism a technical exercise, depoliticising it and blinding 
donors to both its democratic and undemocratic potentials. In doing so, they displace 
and, sometimes purposefully, ignore actually existing civil societies’ histories as 
arenas for identity formation, contests and alliances over who gets what, when and 
how. This reduces the prospects of programmes identifying and supporting radical 
forms of political participation that give citizens a say in decisions that affect their 
lives. 
To make this argument, the thesis details research on a voluntary social 
accountability programme in Pakistan. It explores the meanings it was given by 
participants, the processes they engaged in that brought it to life, and the power and 
politics it was embedded in. It also conducts a critical discourse analysis of the idea of 
social accountability in texts from the programme’s donor; the United Kingdom’s 
Department of International Development. It is shown how efforts to translate the 
programme’s ground realities into its donor’s dominant discourses wrote out the 
identities and aspirations of its participants, pushing the more radical to its margins 
and turning the most powerful into its experts. From this, a theory of ‘isomorphic 
activism’ is developed to account for how such programmes' wider democratic aims 
can be undermined whilst still achieving their donors’ desired outputs. 
The challenges the thesis highlights are important given recent calls for development 
programmes to change by whom and how politics is done, whilst granting local 
ownership to participants, reporting their impact and demonstrating value for 
money. They should also be of interest to those concerned by the spread of market-
principles within donor organisations’ ways of working with civil society, and how 
they are welcomed, appropriated or simply ignored on the ground. 
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Glossary 
 
 
Anjuman Mazareen Punjab C Tenants Association of Punjab 
Chadar Literally ‘four walls’, symbolic of social exclusion 
of women  
Biraderis    Kin groups, practising endogamy 
Chardivari    Islamic exclusion of women 
Gora     White man 
Khidemat    Service 
Kacheri kee siyasat   Politics of access to the police and courts 
Kaghaz kaaley karna  Blackening the paper 
Kameen    Servers or artisans 
Khudai Khidmatgar   Servants of God (name of social movement) 
Jajmani Agricultural labour and kinship-based patron-
client system. 
Jajman    Landowner or patron 
Lambardar    Village head responsible for tax collection 
Lotta A small drinking vessel, but used to denote 
someone without a permanent political base 
Madrassa    Islamic faith school 
Mandi    Market 
Mehndi    Stage of wedding ceremonies or henna body art 
Muhajir    Muslim migrant 
Mullah Street level religious leader, often untrained 
Numberdar    Village head responsible for tax collection 
Nawab Muslim prince, later respected powerful 
landowner or local leader. 
Nazim    Elected representative at union council level 
Patwari    Keeper of local land records 
Quaid-i-azam   Great leader 
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Roti, kapra, makan   Bread, clothing, housing 
Sifarish    A favour or job got through personal contacts 
Sahib     Sir 
Salah-o-behbud   Social work 
Samaji karkun   Social worker 
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan  Pakistani Taliban 
Ulema    Qualified religious scholars 
Zakat     Islamic charitable giving  
Zamindar    Aristocratic large landowner 
Zina     Law against adultery / non-marital sexual 
intercourse 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
This thesis began with the problem of why civil society programmes in clientelistic 
states often appear to have so little impact on democracy. I answer that powerful 
development organisations’ attempts to harness the idea of civil society render 
activism a technical exercise, depoliticising it and blinding themselves to both its 
democratic and undemocratic potentials. To make this argument, I explore a 
conceptual gap between visions of civil society as a component in neoliberal models 
of governance and citizenship, and its history as a patchwork of local arenas for 
identity formation, contests and cooperation over who gets what, when and how.1 
This gap reduces the prospects of identifying and supporting ‘radical’ forms of 
democracy that give citizens a say in decisions that affect their lives.2 In some cases, it 
also provides opportunities for powerful actors to capture the opportunities that 
arise from programmes and strengthens anti-democratic processes.  
I show how this gap is being maintained by the contemporary enthusiasm for ‘social 
accountability’ programmes. Social accountability is concerned with raising citizens’ 
voices, with the goal of realising their rights, eliciting responsive governance, 
improving public services and state-society relations. Much of the literature suggests 
that with better information and regular opportunities to engage authorities, citizens 
can raise demands and select their leaders based on their performance (WB, 2003; 
DFID, 2008a; Fox, 2015). It is also often claimed that this will contribute to processes 
that change by whom and how politics is done, thereby, supporting ongoing 
democratising projects. Social accountability, therefore, is the latest in a long line of 
                                                 
1 Lasswell's (1958) definition of politics. 
2 I follow Della Porta and Diani’s (2006:9) exploration of ‘radical democracy’, which, drawing on the work of 
Claus Offe (1985), emphasises interpersonal solidarity, and the importance of ongoing critiques of mainstream 
notions of progress and modernism. I combine this with Block and Somers' (2014:238) suggestion that radical 
democracy entails ‘parliamentary institutions elected on a territorial basis, but it also envisions an extension of 
democracy into the fabric of everyday life’. 
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ways through which donor organisations have sought to approach the interface 
between civil society, development and democratisation.  
Social accountability programmes’ potential to contribute to democratising projects 
in states characterised by clientelism is relatively under-studied and under-theorised. 
This is puzzling given the resources increasingly devoted to such efforts and how little 
is known about such places. Furthermore, there is a lack of literature exploring how 
such ambitions sit alongside donors’ increasing emphasis on producing results that 
represent value for money. To unpick these issues, I show how neoliberal visions of 
governance and citizenship can lead to programmes that are difficult to distinguish 
from and, in some cases, complement clientelism in young democracies such as 
Pakistan. I also explore how these programmes are justified through understandings, 
and renderings, of activism that equate it with the operation of markets. I argue that 
this strips planners and evaluators of the conceptual vocabulary needed to interpret 
how their programmes are embedded in, and realised through, power and politics. 
An exploration of such problems is important given renewed calls for development to 
take the political causes of poverty seriously, and a growing enthusiasm for ‘bottom-
up’, ‘adaptive’, ‘politically smart’ and ‘locally led’ programmes (Ramalingam, 2013; 
Booth and Unsworth, 2014; Derbyshire and Donovan, 2016). It should also be of 
interest to those that argue development organisations seek, yet routinely fail, to 
affect change due to misunderstanding and, in some cases, purposefully ignoring the 
cultures, histories and inequalities of the places within which they work (Ferguson, 
1990; Mosse, 2005; Li, 2007). More generally, the thesis adds to understandings of 
how powerful Western states espouse and attempt to put into practice market-based 
ideologies, and how they are welcomed, appropriated or simply ignored on the 
ground (Peck, 2013; Block and Somers, 2014; Brown, 2015).  
The rest of this chapter outlines the thesis’ motivation, research design and methods, 
and its contributions. It then turns to some key concepts, exploring my 
understandings of them and how they will be used throughout. The introduction 
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concludes with an outline of each chapter, showing how they build the overall 
argument. 
 
Research motivation 
This research puzzle grew from a short study of a widely praised programme – 
Supporting Transparency, Accountability, and Electoral Process (STAEP) – I conducted 
in Pakistan in early 2014 (Kirk, 2014). STAEP built and supported 200 volunteer 
citizens’ groups, called Constituency Relations Groups (CRGs), across the country. 
They focused on identifying local demands and bringing them to the attention of 
state officials and politicians. The study explored the meaning of inclusiveness within 
the programme, which I described as ‘shallow’ as much of the work was undertaken 
by a core group of better educated and wealthier participants within each CRG.  
The study also raised several questions. Firstly, I found that those connected to 
Pakistan’s clientelistic political networks were sometimes involved in the 
programme’s local activities. To paraphrase a senior staff member within the 
programme, had they merely created another layer of intermediaries between 
citizens and the state? Thus, it seemed important to conduct further research 
exploring whether this had occurred and, if so, to ask what the consequences may 
be? Secondly, there were signs that some participants were working with other 
associations and formal political actors and using their connections to publicly 
challenge local clientelistic networks. This accorded with my own, admittedly then 
Eurocentric, idea of civil society and seemed to contribute to STAEP’s stated aims of 
supporting: ‘Democratic processes in Pakistan that are more open, inclusive, efficient 
and accountable to citizens’.3 Nonetheless, such activities often did not clearly 
appear in programme documents describing STAEP and they were rarely emphasised 
as successes by those implementing it on the ground. Thus, I was curious as to why 
                                                 
3 STAEP’s intended impact and outcomes are taken from the log frame used by staff to track its 
progress. 
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processes with the potential to challenge dominant ways of doing politics happened 
on the margins of the programme? 
At the time, I had recently read Bano’s (2012) Breakdown in Pakistan: How Aid Is 
Eroding Institutions for Collective Action. It presents quantitative evidence that 
Pakistani civil society organisations that have received foreign funding rapidly lose 
local legitimacy and their effectiveness is eroded. This happens because the 
payments contravene societal norms that require those working for the public good 
to do so voluntarily and to demonstrate signs of material sacrifice. As Bano points 
out, it is surprising that this is often overlooked by donor organisations considering 
that their own definitions of civil society hold it to be a sphere of not-for-profit, 
voluntary activity for agreed upon public causes (ibid:49). To me and others I had met 
whilst working in Pakistan, STAEP’s voluntary CRGs represented an interesting and 
innovative attempt to address this problem, and I was keen to further explore how 
this played out in practice. 
Whilst undertaking this study, I had also begun to read key texts from what is often 
called the anthropology of development or ‘aidnography’ literature (Ferguson, 1990; 
Escobar, 1995; Mosse, 2005; Li, 2007).4 Their authors showed that programmes need 
not be approached on their own terms or as experiments on foreign populations. 
Instead, they can be seen within their wider contexts and from the perspective of 
those they engaged. Furthermore, they explored how the discourses of powerful 
development organisations interpreted the meaning of progress or improvement, 
and what this made possible and impossible. To me, they presented a convincing 
argument that programmes cannot be disconnected from their planners’ identities 
and interests, nor from their positions within wider, often global, networks of power. 
I wanted to bring a similar sensitivity to my own understanding of the emerging idea 
of social accountability. To do so, I decided to return to the STAEP programme. 
 
                                                 
4 ‘Aidnography’ is Gould’s (2004) label. 
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Research design and methods 
My research design combined a constructivist approach that holds knowledge and 
research data to be socially created, with a post-structuralist interest in how power 
reproduces itself through discourses and how it is challenged in specific social 
settings. This directed me towards powerful development organisations’ discourses 
on civil society and, more recently, social accountability. It also informed my 
revisiting of STAEP with the purpose of exploring a recent civil society focussed 
programme from the perspective of those that took part, unpicking the meanings 
they gave it and the processes it led to.  
To honour this approach, the write up pays attention to how power worked to shape 
what was considered possible by the programme’s planners and what actually 
happened on the ground. This reveals how, despite vastly unequal power relations, 
the programme’s participants ultimately played the leading role in the democratic 
and undemocratic processes that brought it to life. Nonetheless, it also shows how, 
and explores why, their activities were translated back into the donors’ dominant 
discourses.  
The research began with an open-ended qualitative study of the practice of social 
accountability through four of STAEP’s CRGs in the north and south of Pakistan’s 
Punjab province. They were selected through a quantitative analysis of the 
programme’s own activity data that suggested they would be rich research sites. A 
constructivist approach to grounded theory methodology was used to collect data 
through a mixture of semi structured interviews and ethnographic immersion. This 
allowed the research to be driven by emerging questions and hypotheses, with 
themes and social processes explored for their relevance to answering the research 
question. It also called for reflexivity as to my own positionality, biases and 
preconceived notions. Interviews were conducted with both the programme’s 
voluntary participants and those implementing it in partnership with the primary 
donor: The United Kingdom’s Department of International Development (DFID).  
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Following fieldwork, the emphasis switched to exploring DFID’s discourses on social 
accountability. The idea was to interrogate the ensemble of ideas, actors and 
institutions that drive its engagements with the idea and to develop an appreciation 
for how the programme was situated within wider power relations. This was mainly 
done through a critical discourse analysis of the World Bank’s and DFID’s publicly 
available texts that reveal the ideological contests within both organisations. An 
analysis of the programme’s annual reviews was also undertaken to understand the 
link between these wider discourses and the programme’s ground realities, including 
how the latter were translated into the former. To further understand Pakistan’s civil 
society and its relations with donors, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with senior members of Pakistan’s community of professionalised non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs).  
The thesis’ main methodologies – critical discourse analysis and grounded theory – 
are laid out in detail directly before the presentation of the data they gathered. This 
is done to help readers judge their suitability and the plausibility of my 
interpretations. It also allows me to reflexively comment on my use of each. The 
write up follows a logic that first sets the wider context by exploring development 
organisations’ discourses and then zooms down into the practice of social 
accountability on the ground in Pakistan. Thus, it begins with a broad examination of 
civil society theory, moves onto the contemporary idea of social accountability, sets 
the societal context and then explores the STAEP programme. The final chapter 
draws the others’ arguments together, outlines a grounded theory of why civil 
society programmes so often fail to contribute to democracy, and comments upon 
the thesis’ relevance to contemporary literature.   
 
Contributions  
The thesis makes four main overlapping contributions. The first is a critical discourse 
analysis of powerful donor organisations’ ideas of civil society. This updates others’ 
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work that has shown how ideological struggles have shaped the way it has been 
understood and used in programmes (Foley and Edwards, 1996; Howell and Pearce, 
2001; Kaldor, 2003a; Lewis, 2010b). Specifically, I show how these struggles have 
continued in the current enthusiasm for the idea of social accountability. Although it 
has the potential to contribute to development organisations’ ongoing efforts to 
account for the power and politics of the places where they work, I argue that this is 
being eroded by the ascendance of neoliberal models of citizenship and governance. 
They depoliticise the idea of social accountability, conceptualising it as a technical 
exercise undertaken by individual actors operating to market principles. In the 
process, theorists that see civil society as a site for identity formation, political 
conflicts, activism and relationship building are side-lined, and the need for 
deliberative spaces and radical democratising projects is overlooked. Nonetheless, 
the thesis argues that this struggle is still ongoing and that exposing how it is realised 
in programmes can help those that wish to better support actual civil societies. 
The thesis’ second contribution is a case study of a donor supported social 
accountability programme in Pakistan. However, I do not seek to evaluate or judge 
the programme on its own terms. Rather, I situate it within the historical trajectory of 
donors’ activities in Pakistan and I explore it from the bottom up. I show what went 
on within and around the spaces STAEP supported, and the meaning those 
participating within and implementing the programme gave it on the ground. I argue 
this is necessary to uncover how powerful donors’ discourses are met by pre-existing 
social relations, identities and interests. It also takes seriously the social 
accountability literature’s claim to be able to change the way and by whom politics is 
done (Fung and Wright, 2003; Cornwall and Coelho, 2006; Joshi, 2008). Indeed, I 
show that this aim was often undermined by powerful local actors, yet their 
contributions were still translated into official texts that described the programme’s 
ground realities in its donor’s dominant discourses. At the same time, I show why 
activities with the most potential for radical democratic outcomes were pushed to 
the margins.  
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The third contribution is an empirical study of local politics in a young democracy 
characterised by weak formal accountability mechanisms and what the thesis calls 
‘new’ clientelism (defined below). As part of this, it explores the understandings of 
what Pakistanis living in the Punjab often call social work (salah-o-behbud) and how it 
overlaps with development programmes and politics. I show how all require periodic, 
transactional and often personal relationships, and bring to the fore the wider 
ambitions of those that engage in them. This adds to a limited, mostly ethnographic, 
literature on societal associations and political leadership among contemporary 
Pakistani communities. And it accords with a wider literature exploring forms of 
popular politics and clientelism elsewhere in South Asia.  
Lastly, I contribute a grounded theory of ‘isomorphic activism’. It explains how the 
democratic potentials of social accountability programmes in clientelistic states can 
be undermined by powerful local actors able to mimic donors’ reductive neoliberal 
models of civil society for their own ends. Formally put: isomorphic activism occurs 
when elite participants in social accountability programmes use their positions within 
wider clientelistic networks to publicly adopt the form and shape of activism, whilst 
privately appropriating the opportunities programmes promise others to participate 
in public politics. I hypothesize that isomorphic activism is more likely in vastly 
unequal societies, and where programmes offer predefined, quantifiable templates 
of what civil society mobilisation and responsive governance – in short, ‘success’ – 
looks like. I argue this theory is better suited to understanding the pitfalls and 
dangers of social accountability programmes aimed at contributing to democratising 
projects than previous notions of elite capture and control that focus on tangible, 
material benefits. 
The thesis concludes with a wider discussion of donors’ efforts to support actually 
existing civil societies and democratisation. This includes their renewed enthusiasm 
for taking politics seriously and making it work for development. To advance such 
debates, I argue a rethink of what constitutes ‘success’ in donors’ programmes is 
sorely needed. This requires acknowledging the political identities and aspirations of 
participants, and that public relationships – not information and backroom bargains – 
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that span the conceptual society-state divide are crucial to how civil society 
contributes to development. To support this, donors must find ways of minimising 
the operation of power within and around the spaces they support, whilst remaining 
alive to the more creative and unexpected processes they may be able to facilitate. I 
also argue that to be accountable to their participants and learn from their local 
expertise, programmes must find ways of allowing them to be their evaluators.  
Before proceeding, I wish to make a point about the generalisability of my findings 
and about causality or ‘blame’. I do not claim that within every social accountability 
programme there will be exclusions and processes that strengthen antidemocratic 
networks. Rather, I am focussed on the subset of voluntary programmes 
implemented in states with clientelistic politics and an absence of strong formal 
accountability mechanisms. Furthermore, my study should be approached as an 
interpretation of a particular programme, in a particular time and place. Nonetheless, 
by connecting my observations on the ground to wider discourses on citizenship and 
governance, I hope to highlight a general disquiet that others may have about the 
direction in which these sorts of programmes are heading.  
I also do not hold specific actors responsible for the processes I describe. Instead, I 
follow others that argue entire chains of actors – often with the best intentions – are 
enrolled in realising, resisting and representing development programmes in official 
texts, with each more or less invested in their activities, aims and worldviews (Mosse, 
2005; Lewis and D. Mosse, 2006; Li, 2007). Although I do not explore in detail the 
incentives of all of those within the programme’s studied chain, it should be clear 
that I mostly locate the power to shape ways of working and meanings with powerful 
donor organisations, rather than their local partners or the individual staff 
implementing their ideas.  
As they are fiercely debated, the next section outlines my understandings of key 
concepts used throughout the thesis. 
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Civil society  
Civil society theory often describes semi-autonomous spaces beyond the state and 
the market. Thinkers argue these spaces allow citizens to form their identities and 
opinions free from domination by coercive state authorities or economic interests 
(Cohen and Arato, 1992; Young, 2004; Alexander, 2006). Once ready, organised 
groups or their representatives can publicly engage political society and the state in 
contests over the type of lives they want to lead. It is suggested that this repeated 
double movement complements the blunt accountability of elections, spurs more 
equitable policies and contributes to democratisation. For many, this latter goal 
amounts to an ongoing project to empower people to challenge dominant notions of 
progress or development. Such an understanding of civil society urges analysts to 
investigate the arenas within which people organise, who takes part, how 
deliberations among them unfold and the opportunities they have to engage 
powerholders. 
Civil society is defined in this thesis as the actors, institutions and networks of 
voluntary life that are orientated towards deliberative practices and that legitimate 
themselves in terms of publicness.5 This definition suggests that in its ‘ideal’ 
democracy enhancing forms, civil society is characterized by processes in which 
actors and associations voluntarily take part in public deliberations among 
themselves, and with markets, political society and states. Furthermore, to legitimise 
their decisions, they seek to include and, when possible, persuade all those affected 
by whatever opinion or course of action is being debated. When one or more of 
these elements are not present it is likely that actors, associations and their wider 
networks are uninterested in ongoing democratising projects or may even be 
opposed to them. Thus, the thesis understands civil society as a normative goal, an 
aspiration, the achievement of which must be empirically uncovered and judged. 
                                                 
5 This definition is a modified version of that used by Baiocchi et al. (2011:26) for their investigation of how 
participatory budgeting processes ‘bootstrap’ Brazilian democracy.  
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The definition is also premised on the argument that civil society will remain 
romanticised so long as it is strictly thought of as a well-defined, clearly bound and 
unitary reality (Foley and Edwards, 1998; Chandhoke, 2001). Although sometimes 
helpful, the depiction of an autonomous sphere with boundaries between it, the 
market, political society and state that is found in much of the literature risks side-
lining the processes through which actors and institutions thought to belong to each 
interact with, permeate and reconstitute one another. Instead, the ‘relational’ 
sociological definition used here holds that civil societies are better understood as 
embedded in and messily connected to their broader social contexts.  
 
Clientelism 
Clientelism can be understood as the process by which citizens exchange their votes 
or other political rights in return for protection, promised material benefits, 
insurance, credit or access to state services (Scott, 1972; Eisenstadt and Roniger, 
1980). These exchanges take place between people of unequal status, resources and 
power, with clients often partially dependent on patrons. To set it apart from slavery 
or pure coercion, clientelism often contains a sense of voluntarism, obligation, duty, 
tradition, intimacy or even friendship. Indeed, clientelism can be viewed as a 'living 
moral idiom' which describes political communities, modes of leadership and ways of 
following that shape the outcome of elections in much of the world (Piliavsky, 
2014a:4). 
Anthropological interest in clientelism grew in the 1960s and 1970s in 
Mediterranean, Latin American and South Asian peasant studies (Alavi, 1973b; 
Schmidt, 1974; Silverman, 1977).6 It was generally seen through a Marxist lens as a 
form of oppression and/or ideology that enabled elites to control and misuse their 
subjects. Authors argued that it prevents the sort of horizontal networking and 
identity formations characteristic of developmentally orientated class-based politics 
                                                 
6 Clientelism is also often termed ‘patronage’ in the literature. 
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(Bodeman, 1988). An ancillary set of literature has also concentrated on the way 
clientelism links rural communities, isolated regions and social peripheries to elite 
politics at the centre of developing countries (Geertz, 1960; Matrz, 1997; Kenny, 
2015; de Waal, 2015). Its studies often examine the interface between electoral 
politics, traditional modes of choosing leaders and allocating scarce resources, and 
violence.  
Clientelism is perceived to be harmful for both ‘deliberative’ and ‘liberal’ conceptions 
of democracy. The former value broad participation in public deliberations over what 
constitutes the public interest, including opportunities to test the strength of various 
arguments and reach a broad consensus. The latter are concerned with how publicly 
available information and regular voting enables people to punish elites for their 
poor performance or abuses of power. Both suggest that democracy requires 
socialisation into civic-mindedness and notions of the public good. The private, 
market-like exchanges and group loyalties of clientelistic networks encourage their 
members to pool their votes, to bargain for their allegiance behind closed doors and 
to ignore the wider social consequences of their choices. Thus, they interfere with 
both the power of public deliberations and the accountability of leaders.  
Within the literature there is a distinction between what could be called ‘old’ and 
‘new’ types of clientelism (Hopkin, 2006). The old type, more akin to feudalism, 
involved relatively consistent face-to-face exchanges between individual patrons and 
generations of their clients’ families. In return for their services, clients expected 
what is necessary for their own basic survival, especially within non-monetised 
agricultural societies. Thus, the goods exchanged were often food and protection, 
with a moralistic element used to justify this unequal relationship as the natural or 
the God-given way of things.  
In contrast, the new type of clientelism is often found in young democracies. It 
involves powerful intermediaries negotiating with political patrons on behalf of 
different groups for their vote. In return, targetable, excludable goods or services 
that often come from the state such as schools, jobs, access to the bureaucracy and 
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corruptible officials, are expected.7 However, long term allegiances are not required 
as both parties understand the transactional nature of the deal, clients are rarely 
solely dependent on patrons for their survival and there is often less of a moralistic 
element to proceedings. The new clientelism, therefore, is associated with the 
growth of political parties, capitalism, the welfare state, and extensive networks of 
intermediaries between buyers and sellers. The periodic fierce contests it generates 
have also been linked to violence and ‘mafia-politics’ (Blok, 1974; Gunst, 1995; de 
Waal, 2015).  
 
Democratisation 
It is increasingly recognized that most people value responsive and transparent 
governance.8 However, following disappointments over the trajectories of the ‘Third 
Wave’ of democracies established in the 1990s, observers have once again conceded 
that democratisation will take a variety of forms in different contexts (Hashemi, 
2009; Whitehead, 2010; Hobson, 2012; Youngs, 2015).9 Thus, it is now argued that 
Western ideals of governance may not be transferable or even necessarily the best 
path to democracy for developing countries. Such arguments have led to calls for 
more nuanced understandings of how democratisation is shaped by social norms and 
the underlying distribution of power within societies.  
In response, scholars have looked for the minimal conditions for democracy to 
consolidate. Many argue that successful democratising projects require state capacity 
and political freedoms to advance in complementary ways (Diamond, 1997; Graeme, 
2000; Dryzek, 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Too much capacity can cause 
states to turn authoritarian; too little can fragment them into autonomous power 
                                                 
7 A good or service is ‘excludable’ if it is possible to prevent others from benefitting or having access to it. 
8 For example, Wave 6 of the World Values Survey undertaken over 2010-14 suggests that citizens tend to 
believe elections matter for beneficial change. See also the United Nation’s ‘My World, The World We Want 
2015’ survey, which polled over 5 million people worldwide and found that honest, effective government is 
among their top four priorities. http://vote.myworld2015.org/ (Accessed 02.04.16) 
9 In the 1960s and 70s it was normal to talk of ‘African democracies’, ‘Latin American democracies’, and ‘Asian 
democracies’.  
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blocks. For others, democratisation entails an ongoing deliberative ‘process of 
bargaining between the state and organised groups in society’ that fosters legitimate 
institutions and allows them to select their leaders (Unsworth 2007). This enables 
people to pursue ‘their interest with a measure of autonomy from entrenched 
structures of dominance and privilege’ (Jalal, 1995:3). It also assures that citizenship 
is not merely an abstract legal denomination. 
Nonetheless, Tilly (2007) has argued that no actual societies live up to these ideals. 
Thus, democratisation should be viewed as an ongoing process prone to gradual 
increases and rapid decreases. To explain these movements, he states: 
 
‘Democratization never occurs without at least partial realisation of three 
large processes: integration of interpersonal trust networks into public 
politics; insulation of public politics from categorical inequalities; and 
elimination or neutralisation of autonomous, coercion-controlling power 
centres in ways that augment the influence of ordinary people over public 
politics and increase control of public politics over state performance.’ 
(2007:78) 
 
The elimination of autonomous power in the last of Tilly’s three processes refers to 
the notion that statehood requires a monopoly of violence. The idea is that by 
centralising coercive power it can be made subject to public approval, whilst also 
acting as the guarantor of broad and equal participation in politics. In contrast, in 
states with warlords, independent local militias or politically connected mafias, 
violence is often used to control who has a voice and how they vote (Mustafa and 
Brown, 2010; Waal, 2014).  
Tilly’s second process suggests that categorical inequalities that distinguish groups by 
gender, class, religion or caste pose a greater threat to democracy than material 
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inequality.10 This is because they enable some to exclude others from participating in 
public politics, both through informal and formal means. Furthermore, they can lead 
to ‘inequality traps’ that stall particular types of development (Rao, 2006; Heller and 
Evans, 2010). To illustrate, Tilly uses South Africa to show how under apartheid 
legally enforced categorical inequalities prevented non-whites from enfranchisement 
and retarded the country’s development. He also shows how even after the 
debilitating system’s formal end, informal social norms have hampered the ability of 
marginalised groups to have a political voice.  
Tilly’s most interesting process for this thesis concerns his description of 
‘interpersonal trust networks’. They are defined as ‘ramified interpersonal 
connections, consisting of mainly strong ties, within which people set valued, 
consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, 
mistakes or failures of others’ (Tilly 2007:81). As examples, Tilly offers kinship groups, 
religious sects, revolutionary conspiracies, credit circles, trade unions and veterans’ 
associations. For democratisation, these networks, herein clientelistic networks, must 
be partially integrated into public politics or dissolved, and new networks willing to 
have their interest publicly debated formed. Through these processes members 
consent to obligations, such as military service and jury duty, and to paying their 
taxes. In return, they acquire the state’s protection and the confidence that society’s 
collective will – discerned through public deliberations – will be carried out, including 
the ability to hold authorities to account.  
Tilly warns, however, that such processes are far from easy. The danger is that 
clientelistic networks will capture the state and its institutions, or that sensing a 
threat they will withdraw and hoard opportunities for their members. Such outcomes 
reverse ongoing democratising projects. Thus, it is theorized that there are points at 
which clientelistic networks are ‘partially’ integrated into public politics, commit to 
having roughly the same opportunities for expressing their voice as their rivals and 
gain a stake in the state’s performance. To identify and support moves towards these 
                                                 
10 Houle’s (2009) study finds that material inequalities may have little effect on democratic transitions, but that 
they can increase the probability of democratic backslides. 
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points, attention must be given to contextually specific and frequently shifting 
relations between clientelistic networks and public politics. 
 
Neoliberalism  
Neoliberalism’s beginnings have been traced to a group post-World War II European 
thinkers (Harvey, 2005; Jones, 2012). They worried that concessions given to labour, 
such as welfare and rights to unionisation, and ideas, such as planned economies and 
collectivism, were threatening peace and prosperity. They argued that the underlying 
logic of entrepreneurial freedoms and unfettered markets would better secure these 
ends and they set about trying to overturn the period’s Keynesian economic 
orthodoxy. By the 1970s and 1980s they had the ear of incumbent politicians in 
Britain and America that began implementing their ideas. Through a focus on their 
policies, neoliberalism is often framed as a revival of the classical liberal notion that 
the state should only concern itself with enforcing private property rights, external 
aggressors and the provision of a limited suite of public goods. 
In an attempt to add nuance, scholars have since sought to identify what is different 
about this evolving ideology (Lemke, 2001; Amable, 2010; Gershon, 2011). Many 
argue that the neoliberal state must act on behalf of the economy. This does not 
involve it undertaking economic functions, providing more services or redistributing 
wealth. Rather, it means facilitating the spread of market values to every sphere of 
life. Thus, its institutions – from the police, to universities and stock exchanges – 
must propagate and enforce them. Accordingly, the state plays an interventionist role 
in society but not in markets themselves, with its raison d'état and the test of 
legitimacy becoming the creation of enabling environments for economic growth. 
This significantly differs from the liberal ideals of popular sovereignty and a 
minimalist state that guards against the harmful excesses of markets.  
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For their part, ideal neoliberal citizens must make choices based on market 
principles. These include notions of rational self-interest, competition, cost-benefit 
analyses and periodic collective action for the maximisation of individual gains. 
Indeed, neoliberal citizens are always, in every situation or sphere of activity, 
responsible for increasing their own future stocks of human capital. As Lemke ( 
2001:202) puts it:   
 
‘Neoliberalism encourages individuals to give their lives a specific 
entrepreneurial form. It responds to stronger ‘demand’ for individual 
scope for self-determination and desired autonomy by ‘supplying’ 
individuals and collectives with the possibility of actively participating in 
the solution of specific matters and problems which had hitherto been 
the domain of state agencies specifically empowered to undertake such 
tasks. This participation has a ‘price-tag’: the individuals themselves have 
to assume responsibility for these activities and the possible failure 
thereof.’ 
 
This differs from classical liberalism within which people use market principles to 
satisfy a variety of needs in the economic sphere, but may draw upon other value 
systems, such as culture, fraternity or the public good, in the private and public 
spheres. This is why neoliberalism’s proponents are often accused of suggesting that 
citizens must fend for themselves when unemployed or in the wake of disasters, 
whilst big banks – which are part of the architecture needed for markets – receive 
state bailouts to see them through their own crises (Somers, 2008).  
Summarising, the anthropologist Wacquant (2012:72) has argued that neoliberalism 
‘consists of an articulation of state, market, and citizenship that harnesses the first to 
impose the stamp of the second onto the third.’ However, such a move requires that 
ideas – such as the ‘common good’, ‘justice’, ‘legitimacy’, or the ‘stronger argument’ 
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– which cannot be easily quantitated, measured or priced, be considered dangerous 
irrationalities or simply disregarded. This has led to the stronger argument that 
neoliberalism’s proponents are engaged in an attempt to replace political judgement 
or, more simply, politics with economic evaluation (Davies, 2014; Block and Somers, 
2014; Brown, 2015).11  
In this sense, neoliberalism’s critics update Polanyi's (1944) older thesis that Europe’s 
liberal elites had used the state’s power to artificially separate the economy from 
social relations and political contests. Indeed, they go further, arguing that 
neoliberalism requires abandoning the liberal idea of separate economic, social and 
political spheres. In its place methods for governing every sphere of human activity as 
if they occur within a market are called for, creating new techniques, templates and 
prices for what were previously thought of as contested moral or political decisions. 
Many also suggest that neoliberalism is constantly evolving, with its experts finding 
new areas of life to govern with market rationalities and new ways of measuring their 
success at doing so (Foucault, 2008 [1978/9]; Bourdieu, 1998; Ong, 2007; Peck, 2013).  
To illustrate this, Brown (2015) offers a detailed account of how market-based 
understandings of governance and citizenship have spread to America’s higher 
education and legal systems, embedding self-interest, competition and insecurity. 
She argues that this is eroding citizens’ capacities to equally and substantively 
participate in the public sphere. Consequently, a backslide in the quality of 
participation in deliberative public politics has begun and the future of ongoing 
radical democratising projects looks bleak. Her claims rest on the premise that 
democracy can be undone from within, becoming essentially hollowed out, by 
atomised individuals acting competitively, in accordance with best practices and the 
letter of the law. This occurs because market rationalities, techniques and values 
have been imparted to activities and domains where monetary transactions are not, 
and should not be, the primary concern. 
                                                 
11 Block and Somers (2014) prefer the term ‘market fundamentalism’ to neoliberalism to emphasize the lack of 
evidence for market principles being better at organising society than alternatives such as culture, religion or 
democratic deliberations. 
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Such criticisms suggest that neoliberalism should be investigated as a constantly 
updated set of ideas and practices propagated and deployed by powerful 
organisations and states. Indeed, a growing body of sociological and ethnographic 
literature has sought to show how neoliberal ideas are, not always successfully, used 
to reshape, manage and supposedly ‘improve’ populations in diverse settings. Work 
that focuses on Western development organisations’ activities in developing 
countries is reviewed in Chapter Three. Here, it suffices to say that this thesis is 
interested in how far neoliberal ideals of citizenship and governance are being 
resisted, re-appropriated or welcomed in the contemporary enthusiasm for social 
accountability. 
 
Thesis structure 
The next chapter explores how powerful Western donor organisations understood 
and sought to engage civil society in the 1990s and early 2000s. A distinction is drawn 
between the era’s favoured neoliberal version of civil society theory and an 
alternative activist version. Focussing on studies from South Asia, the chapter then 
explores a third body of literature that has investigated how actually existing civil 
societies contribute to, or retard, democratisation.  
Before continuing the inquiry into the use of the idea of civil society, Chapter Three 
reviews the critical aidnography literature which inspired the thesis’ research design 
and analytical concepts. It is shown how its studies juxtapose discourse analyses with 
ethnographies of ongoing programmes to reveal alternative ways of doing 
development.  
Chapter Four undertakes a critical analysis of the ‘social accountability discourse’ in 
key texts from the World Bank and DFID. It shows how the idea largely replaced the 
previous era’s focus on ‘social capital’ with ‘information’ and citizens’ powers to 
‘choose’ their service providers.  
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Chapter Five turns to Pakistan’s experience with democratisation. It shows how elites 
integrate threats to the status quo into clientelistic networks and argues that 
international donor organisations have attempted to create a technically competent, 
corporate and, largely, apolitical civil society.  
Chapter Six justifies the thesis’ use of constructivist grounded theory and provides a 
rationale for the quantitative case selection method. It ends by commenting upon my 
own positionality and biases, and the reality of access and data analysis once I 
entered the field. 
Chapter Seven re-introduces readers to STAEP through DFID’s annual reviews of the 
programme from 2011 to 2015. I argue that these texts should be read as insights 
into how particular actors wished the programme’s ground realities to be 
represented.  
The ethnographic data presented in Chapter Eight shows how the CRGs generally 
functioned through the efforts of their most educated and wealthier members. It is 
also shown how these members secured their groups’ most prestigious successes. I 
unpick what this meant for the programme’s potential to contribute to Pakistan’s 
ongoing democratising project.  
Chapter Nine delves into the meanings that STAEP’s non-elite participants gave to the 
programme. It is shown how participants took the programme’s lessons, techniques 
and aims, and creatively blended them with their own pre-existing identities and 
aspirations. However, it is also shown why outcomes with the most democratic 
potential were ultimately pushed to the margins of the programme. 
Chapter Ten returns to the thesis’ overarching research question: Why do civil society 
programmes in clientelistic states have so little impact on democracy? To answer, the 
chapter draws together the arguments of the previous three chapters and outlines 
the contours of a grounded theory of ‘isomorphic activism’. This connects the thesis’ 
fieldwork findings to the earlier analysis of the social accountability discourse. An 
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argument is then made that a refocus on the micro-politics of clientelistic states, and 
the identities and aspirations of social accountability programmes’ participants, 
would help donors to redefine their notion of what success looks like. To conclude, I 
explore more recent literature on social accountability, commenting upon how far it 
engages with power and politics, and what must be done to ensure it continues down 
this path.  
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Chapter 2 
Civil Society  
 
 
‘At times the concept seems to take on the property of a gas, expanding or 
contracting to fit the analytic space afforded it by each historical or sociopolitical 
setting’ 
(Foley and Edwards, 1996:42) 
 
 
This chapter shows how the amenability of the idea of civil society has allowed it to 
be used by powerful organisations in different models of development. To illustrate, 
it identifies a mid-1990s divergence between a radical activist and a tame neoliberal 
version of civil society theory. The former is characterised by a depiction of civil 
societies as semi-autonomous spaces for identity formation, with the potential for 
public deliberations to lead to radical democratising projects. The latter by a belief in 
the ability of a density and plurality of voluntary civic associations to cultivate the 
sorts of norms or culture needed to support good governance and market-orientated 
states. Although both strands have been heavily critiqued, I argue that the neoliberal 
version came to dominate Western development organisations’ approaches to civil 
society. The chapter concludes by exploring a third body of literature that would also 
inform the emerging idea of social accountability in the early 2000s. It investigated 
how actually existing civil societies form relations with states that support 
development. In the process, it re-introduced the necessity of and frameworks for 
understanding contests between unequal social groups, bringing issues of power and 
politics back into understandings of civil society.  
 
Debating the good life and the state of nature 
For the ancient Greeks and Romans civil society was political society. Its purpose was 
deliberations over the shape of the ‘good life’ and the inculcation of civic virtues 
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(Barker, 1946). This was understood to take place within and among men’s social 
fraternities, and through formal mechanisms such as citizens’ assemblies. 
Participation in these activities formed an overarching rule-governed politike koinona 
(political community) or polis (city-state). Thus, Aristotle suggested that through 
them men become ‘political animals’ or ‘homo-politicus’.12 
In the 17th century the liberal thinkers Hobbes and Locke argued that civil society 
arises from people’s collective need to protect themselves from the state of nature; a 
condition in which no legitimate political authority rules and insecurity is rife. Thus, 
civil society was depicted as an arena within which men exchange their natural 
freedoms for agreed upon laws. For Hobbes, the primary object was security, whilst 
for Locke it was liberty and private property. Either-way, through consent to a ‘social 
contract’ a state-like central authority, or ‘Leviathan’ in Hobbes’ terms, could be 
established to enforce them. 
The Enlightenment thinkers Smith, Ferguson, Paine and Kant worried that the 
modern division of labour within commercial society would encourage atomised and 
alienated individuals to pursue their self-interest through violence and despotism 
(Keane, 1988). This can be broadly understood as the fear that homo-economicus 
(rationally acting, self-interested, economic man) would limit the space for homo-
politicus. To address this, they argued that individuals can learn sentiments such as 
love, kindness, generosity, humour and respect through interactions and bargains 
made within civil society. To do so, they suggested people must form a plurality of 
associations, including charitable groups, clubs and professional bodies, independent 
from the state, which they gave the role of protecting commerce, trade and property. 
Developing these ideas, Hegel framed civil society as ‘the achievement of the modern 
world’ or, put another way, a sphere in which the potential of creative and 
enterprising individuals could be realised (quoted in: Comaroff and Comaroff, 
1999:3). However, he also argued that civil society is wracked by egoism, power 
differentials, class inequalities and prone to disintegration (Keane, 1988b:50-52). To 
                                                 
12 Aristotle limited this description to ‘free’ men, excluding women, children and slaves.  
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address this, Hegel argued for the authority of a constitutional monarchy or state, 
and surveillance by its officials. He also  suggested through their participation in 
‘public opinion’ forming mechanisms, such as public forums and political parties, 
members of civil society could both legitimise and ward against over-intrusions by 
the state and its officials.  
By the mid-19th century, therefore, civil society was generally understood as an 
arena for socialisation into civic values and debates over notions of the good life. 
Moreover, it was given the role of safeguarding against domination by economic 
actors or a despotic state. The state, for its part, was depicted as the guarantor of this 
life through negotiated consent to laws and, increasingly, mechanisms that allow 
citizens to participate in governance. Accordingly, it was generally understood that 
the state and civil society inter-penetrated one another to ensure balance.  
 
Political contests, ideologies and democracy 
Marx’s focus on power complicated depictions of the civil society-state relationship 
(Baker, 1998; Young, 2002). He critiqued the illusion of freedom created by Hegel’s 
conceptual distinction between the two and sought to show how power affects 
outcomes within both. This led him to argue that European states are largely 
subordinate to society’s dominant capitalist classes and that civil society’s 
deliberative forums are the tools they use to reproduce their power. This challenged 
the Enlightenment thinkers’ optimism over the role of private property and markets, 
which Marx thought would eventually be abolished by a revolutionary proletariat and 
replaced with communism. Moreover, it had real world implications for the way in 
which intellectuals on the political left, in Europe and elsewhere, viewed their 
struggles.    
Writing in the early 20th century, the Italian communist Antonio Gramsci was 
concerned with why the type of popular revolutions witnessed in Russia had not 
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occurred in Italy. He argued that the church, in collusion with economic elites, was 
encouraging people to accept and internalise their subordination - effectively 
constituting notions of the ‘common sense’ - in return for rewards in the afterlife 
(Gramsci, 1999). To address this, he depicted civil society as the location of a radical 
long-term ‘war of position’ or hegemonic struggle, with ongoing non-violent contests 
to mould individuals’ mindsets and state institutions. To conduct this fight, he called 
for ‘exceptional qualities of patience and inventiveness’, alongside ‘enormous 
sacrifices by infinite masses of people’, with ‘organic intellectuals’, supported by civic 
associations and social movements, leading the way. Fought in such a manner, 
Gramsci believed deliberative contests within civil society ‘slowly builds up the 
strength of the social foundations of a new state’, and creates ‘alternative institutions 
and alternative intellectual resources’ (Cox, 1983:165).  
Whilst these debates animated Europe in the mid-20th century, the rediscovered 
writings of French theorist Alexis de Tocqueville were enshrining associations as the 
bearers of civic virtues in the American psyche.13 Having travelled through the young 
nation in the early 19th century, Tocqueville argued that civic associations were the 
forces sustaining its ‘great democratic revolution’ (Tocqueville, 1981:vol.1). He saw 
them as training grounds for participation in public politics that make citizens ‘feel 
the obligations which they are bound to discharge towards society and the part they 
play in its government’. Alongside associations he championed a strong constitution, 
the uniformity of laws, an independent judiciary, and political associations. Thus, for 
Tocqueville, American exceptionalism relied on both procedural or formal, and 
substantive or informal, democracy realised through an active citizenry.14  
Two World Wars and the Cold War somewhat interrupted the development of these 
arcs of civil society theory. As shown in the next section, it was not until the 1970s 
                                                 
13 Tocqueville never used the words ‘civil society’, only ‘associations’. 
14 American exceptionalism refers to the United States’ self-perception as a uniquely free nation founded on 
democratic ideals and personal liberty. Substantive democracy is often contrasted with procedural democracy, 
with the latter referring to the holding of elections, and the former as encompassing all the formal and informal 
institutions that work to check abuses of power by states (Rakner et al., 2007:6-7). 
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and 80s that dissidents in Eastern Europe and Latin America put Marx, Gramsci and, 
to a lesser extent, Tocqueville’s contributions into practice.15  
 
Under totalitarianism 
Confronted with military dictators and totalitarian communist regimes, Eastern 
European and Latin American intellectuals outlined a vision of civil societies as 
refuges for globally connected social movements.16 They were to offer ‘islands of 
civic engagement’ from which citizens could retreat from oppressive states, and 
activists could call on the international community to put pressure on their 
governments for greater freedoms and rights (Pearce, 1997; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; 
Kaldor, 2003b). To understand why this idea was so powerful, it is necessary to 
further explore the strategies of these dissident theorists. 
Disillusioned with politicians’ attempts to reform their party-states from above and 
frustrated by failed revolutions, they variously described themselves as engaged in 
‘antipolitics’, ‘living in truth’ or as concerned with the construction of a ‘parallel polis’ 
(Havel, 1985; Michnik, 1985). Broadly viewed, the shared idea was to delegitimize 
overbearing regimes and ‘put politics in its place’ before re-engaging political society 
(political party workers, politicians, state authorities etc.) and participating in 
formalised democratic procedures (Konrád, 1984:92). The first stage of this strategy 
called for the creation of autonomous spaces - sometimes termed ‘third spheres’ of 
social action outside of the state or market – that could be home to a multitude of 
voluntary self-help associations (Wolin, 1993). Within these spaces debates over the 
proper role of morality, ethics and civic virtue could take place. In turn, these debates 
would lead to agitation, bottom-up pressure and the use of political opportunity 
structures provided by international linkages to expose the contradictions of 
                                                 
15 Albeit with Eastern European intellectuals seldom directly referencing the communist thinkers (O’Donnell 
and Schmitter, 1986; Baker, 1998:98) 
16 Tarrow (1998:4) has defined social movements as ‘collective challenges, based on common purposes and 
social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities’. 
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oppressive states.17 Through such actions these states would 'begin withering away 
and dying off, to be replaced by the new structures that have evolved from below' 
(Havel, 1985:80).  
In this sense, these theorists identified civil society as a sphere for politics, but not 
the politics practiced by communist states or the capitalist West. Rather, to 
paraphrase Havel (1985) they sought an: 
 
‘anti-political politics: that is, politics not as the technology of power and 
manipulation [...] but politics as one of the ways of seeking and achieving 
meaningful lives [...] I favour politics as practical morality, as service to 
truth, as essentially human and humanly measured care for our fellow-
humans. [...] It is becoming evident that truth and morality can provide a 
new starting point for politics ... Yes, anti-political politics is possible. 
Politics from below. Politics of the people, not the apparatus. Politics 
growing from the heart, not the thesis…’.  
 
This form of politics was not merely designed to seize political power at the top of 
society. It was meant to redistribute power to those operating in spaces or forums 
that subscribe to participatory and communicative democratic norms. Indeed, writing 
long before his presidency (1995-2002), Brazil’s Cardoso argued that:  
 
‘Real democratization will arrive [...] as it is crystallised in the 
spontaneous solidarity of the disinherited. It lives as comunitas, 
experiences of common hardship which form a collective we based on 
                                                 
17 For Tarrow (1998:19), the political opportunity structure denotes ‘changes in opportunities that lower the 
costs of collective action, reveal potential allies and show where elites and authorities are vulnerable’. 
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the same life experience that is transformed only when, through 
molecular changes, the simultaneous isolation of the State and the 
exploiters - which will perish at the same time - comes about’ (Cardoso 
and Font, 2001:149).18   
 
Or, as Bernhard (1993:316-318) illustrates for Solidarity in Poland, the greater goal 
was ‘to affect a radical diminution in the autonomy of state from society by a 
program of democratization that […] made the exercise of state power directly 
dependent upon the support of social forces within civil society’.19  
These thinkers saw civil society’s democratising power as involving a parallel double 
movement; firstly, the creation of autonomous spaces that allow citizens to form 
their identities and opinions free from domination by authorities or vested interests. 
Secondly, as a place from which organised groups or their representatives can engage 
political society and the state in contests over the type of lives they want to lead. For 
some, this would make new forms of democratic politics a possibility, thereby, 
reducing the need for a simplistic return to liberal forms of representative multi-party 
politics (Baker, 1999).  
It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that Kaldor (2003a:8) has called this the ‘activist 
version’ of civil society; Fine (1997:9) refers to it as the ‘the radical type’; and Weigle 
and Butterfield (1992:4) have suggested that what they were doing was akin to 
Gramsci’s war of position. In short, these thinkers aimed at nothing less than a re-
imagination and re-negotiation of the state-society relationship or social contract. 
 
 
                                                 
18 Originally written in 1983, entitled ‘'Associated-Dependent Development and Democratic Theory’. 
19 Bernhard (1993) shows how this idealised Polish model was not precisely replicated elsewhere.  
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Activist civil society theory 
Enthused by these ideas and the ‘Third Wave’ of democratisation in Asia and Africa, 
the 1990s and early 2000s saw theorists embark on a new effort to harness the 
concept of civil society for radical ends (Habermas, 1991; Somers, 1993; Foweraker, 
1995; Young, 2002; Alexander, 2006). Many of the themes common to these efforts 
were captured in Cohen and Arato’s (1992) commanding volume, Civil Society and 
Political Theory. Thus, this section draws upon it to outline the basic contours of an 
‘activist civil society theory’ concerned with the deepening and widening of 
democracy.20  
Deepening refers to the idea that civil society provides a relatively autonomous 
retreat within which citizens can shelter from states and markets, debate previously 
marginalised issues and identities, and brain-storm ways for them to have a say in 
governance. It is connected to the formation of associations and other ways of 
participating in civil society such as social movements. Widening refers to the 
classical focus on the way civil societies can monitor states and markets; challenging 
them when they overstep; and encouraging them to adopt new mechanisms and 
institutions that give citizens a greater voice. In this sense, widening can be thought 
of as the act of turning civil society’s deliberations into actions and policies by 
engaging political society and the state. Cohen and Arato argued that these actions 
require citizens to engage in deliberations with one another and to publicly 
participate in political society (as politically active publics, politicised associations, 
and oppositional political parties) (ibid:109-113).  
Broadly viewed, their thesis rested on three overlapping contributions: Firstly, they 
compared the discourses of civil societies in France, Germany, Eastern Europe and 
Latin America to arrive at the conclusion that they broadly share an ongoing critique 
of unaccountable state power. Furthermore, instead of violent revolution, they all 
                                                 
20 This label refers to an identifiable continuity of ideas; it does not necessarily denote the identity or 
nationality of its main thinkers. 
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favoured gradual structural changes brought about by the energy and ideas of 
deliberating and politically active citizens.  
Their second contribution concerns their description of their work as a ‘political 
translation of Habermasian critical theory’ (ibid:xvii). Accordingly, they gave a central 
role to the ‘public sphere’ in legitimizing modes of governance and commerce. For 
the most part, this refers to their use of Habermas’s theory of communicative action 
to portray civil society as at danger of being colonised by the rational-bureaucratic 
logics of the state and market, which ‘freeze social relations of domination and create 
new dependencies’ (Cohen and Arato, 1992:526). To avoid this and advance 
democratising projects, civil society must influence and temper the state and market 
by entering the public sphere – which stretches across both civil and political society 
– and participating in democratic ‘rational-critical debate about public issues 
conducted by private persons willing to let arguments and not statuses determine 
decisions’ (Calhoun, 1992:1). In this ideal, inequalities between participants in 
deliberations are bracketed or put aside and the strength of the better argument 
shapes society.  
Their third advancement was to suggest that social movements with broad appeal 
are at the forefront of many democratising projects as they are most able to operate 
across divides that separate civil society, political society, the market and state. This 
gives them an unrivalled ability to introduce marginal identities to the public sphere, 
challenge hegemonic norms and engage in the politics of influence. Furthermore, 
where structural inequalities prevent democratic deliberations, social movements 
can carry out acts of civil disobedience as a reaffirmation of popular sovereignty and 
of the ‘self-limiting radicalism’ of civil societies that have turned their back on violent 
revolution (Cohen and Arato, 1992:567).  
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Critiquing activist civil society theory  
The ideas of these thinkers undoubtedly went some way towards spreading interest 
in civil society’s emancipatory potential. Nonetheless, it is possible to discern two 
overlapping critiques of activist civil society theory. These critiques – which may more 
accurately be thought of as efforts at refinement – challenged its utility as a tool for 
describing actual civil societies, particularly in unequal societies, and sought to 
further develop frameworks with which to understand or evaluate the prospects of 
ongoing democratising projects.  
The first critique involves apprehension that activist theory dangerously ‘privileges 
civil society over all other moments or spheres of social life, on the grounds that civil 
society furnishes the fundamental conditions of liberty in the modern world’ (Fine, 
1997:9). The concern is that civil society is increasingly seen as an unquestionable 
good and the state or market as its antitheses. Indeed, it was argued that the era’s 
definitions of civil society often painted simplistic images of a sphere of activity un-
problematically instilling democratic values (Baker, 1998:7). Accordingly, analysts 
were in danger of losing sight of the potential pitfalls of civil society depicted by 
theorists such as Hegel and of forgetting Habermas’s description of how it can be 
colonised by other, often anti-democratic, forces.  
To address this, critics sought to highlight the role of ‘uncivil’ groups in civil societies. 
Among others, they have called for more attention to be given to mafias, religious 
extremists, groups with loyalties based on kingship or caste, nationalists, and 
brotherhoods of the sort found in militaries and secret societies (Mamdani, 1996; 
Keane, 1996; Tempest, 1997; McIlwaine, 1998). The problem is not always that such 
groups break the law or rely upon coercion to achieve their aims; it is that they 
generally decline to have their ideas and interests publicly debated. Indeed, their 
hierarchical natures, pre-given identities and immutable intra-group social ties 
obstruct and limit the sort of deliberative, negotiated and gradual democratising 
projects that activist civil society theory champions.  
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It has also been argued that the greatest threat to democracy may come from the 
‘insecurity, rootlessness, arbitrariness, and perhaps even the social cannibalism that 
have come to be associated with many post-transition liberalized societies' 
(Whitehead, 1997:111). This refers to the democratic principle that even sections of 
society with little to no interest in the wider good or participation in democratic 
deliberations have a vote. This gives them the ability to bend democratising projects 
to their own ends, and, in some cases, to stall or reverse them when their power is 
threatened. The election victories of anti-democratic Islamist parties in some of the 
Arab Springs countries, such as Egypt or Tunisia, are illustrative. To account for this, 
attention must be paid to how different groups or associations within civil society 
contribute to or block democratising projects, and to when what appears to be 
normal participation in the public sphere amounts to a long-run movement away 
from democratic principles.  
The second overlapping debate concerns the possibility of an inclusive public sphere 
in which citizens can form their identities and have a say in events that shape their 
lives. This is what Benhabib (1997:2) refers to when she writes: ‘disquiet about the 
public sphere is at bottom anxiety about the viability of democracy in modern, 
complex, multicultural, and increasingly globalised polities.’ Indeed, for consensus 
through democratic deliberations Habermas (1984) suggested that laws must ensure 
that the correct communicative procedures are followed. However, there has 
arguably never been a constitution or law that could enforce an inclusive public 
sphere within which power is bracketed and disputes won through the strength of 
argument alone. Furthermore, holding any real life deliberative forums to such 
demands would surely paralyse them to the point of breakdown (Benhabib, 1990).  
Accepting this, critics have argued that we must uncover how inequalities are 
realised through informal institutions and non-discursive practices, or embedded in 
hidden dependencies – a problem that is particularly acute in societies fragmented by 
class, caste or gender (Fraser, 1990; Young, 1996; Sanders, 1997). This amounts to an 
effort to ‘unbracket inequalities in the sense of explicitly thematising them’ through 
no-holds-barred debate and various communicative mechanisms such as voting, 
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agreed upon rules of argumentation or defined spaces for marginalised groups 
(Fraser, 1990:64). Doing so should help those participating in or trying to reform the 
public sphere to partially account for power asymmetries. It may also go some way 
towards negating the ability of dominant groups or institutions to set the terms of 
debate in spaces nominally marked out for free deliberations (Young, 2001). 
It has also been suggested that the formation of multiple public spheres can afford 
subordinate groups a measure of relative freedom within which to formulate their 
own issues and identities, and to hone their arguments (Fraser, 1990; Keane, 1995; 
Mansbridge, 2000; Calhoun, 2011). Sometimes termed a ‘subaltern counter-politics’, 
this allows for a grace period before citizens and associations enter the wider public 
sphere to engage one another, political society and the state.  
As these discussions suggest, the answer to the dilemma of civil society’s 
undemocratic potential and the practical impossibility of a Habermasian public 
sphere is not to dismiss such ideas as idealism. Rather, it is to adopt a focus on the 
power relations and inequalities that affect the agency of those seeking to 
participate. To begin to operationalise such an approach, Schudson (1994:543-544) 
suggested focussing on the internal (e.g. educational opportunities), institutional 
(cultural norms, political parties and electoral procedures) and informational (e.g. 
free press and open government) resources available to civil societies; whilst, Offe 
(1997) suggested analysts must explore the ‘micro-foundations of democratic 
politics’, which he conceptualised as citizens’ civic competence, and the background 
conditions and institutional frameworks that sustain them.   
 
Civil society, development and democracy 
So far, it has been argued that an activist version of civil society theory emerged in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Nonetheless, by the mid-1990s much of the enthusiasm 
over the idea was waning. Alongside the rise of oligarchies in former Soviet Bloc 
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countries, one party states in parts of Africa and corruption in Latin America were a 
cause for concern. At the same time, the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) – 
broadly, the shrinking of state welfare services, the deregulation of economies and 
the opening of domestic markets to global investments – promoted by the Western 
backed neoliberal Bretton Woods institutions as policies for developing countries 
were increasingly argued to retard growth, hit the vulnerable the hardest, and 
dangerously destabilise societies (Nelson, 1990; Leftwich, 1993).21  
In response, the West’s politicians, donor agencies and international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs) began to look for new policy agendas and 
complementary on the ground activities, with many finding their answer in an 
emphasis on ‘good governance’ (Carothers and de Gramont, 2013). At its core, good 
governance was posited as the provision of technical assistance to developing 
countries’ state institutions that would enable them to adopt forms, practices and 
laws developed in the West. This encompassed mainstreaming the principles of ‘New 
Public Management’, which involves the application of market principles to the 
administration of the state, including encouraging competition among service 
providers and the positioning of citizens as the state’s customers (Manning, 2001). As 
we will see in Chapter Four, these ideas fed into powerful Western development 
organisations’ understandings of accountability (Hood, 1991; Pierre, 2009). During 
this era, some Western powers and INGOs also began to suggest that countries were 
more likely to develop and less likely to pose security threats if they embraced 
human rights and decentralised electoral democracy (Hyden, 1997; Manor, 1999).  
Sometimes termed the ‘post-Washington Consensus’, this signalled a relaxing, 
although by no means the challenging, of the dominant neoliberal belief in the ability 
of unfettered markets to drive development. Indeed, following a hiatus throughout 
the 1980s and much of the 1990s, the state and politics were partially brought back 
into development organisations’ worldviews due to their perceived ability to ‘provide 
                                                 
21 The Bretton Woods institutions contemporarily denote the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Trade Organization.    
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institutions that make markets more efficient’ (WB, 2002:99).22 Foreign experts and 
properly trained bureaucracies were positioned to impart the laws and techniques, 
and to help maintain the institutions central to good governance. Financial assistance 
became conditional on decentralisation and improvements in quantifiable sets of 
performance indicators (Pender, 2001). Citizens and private firms within developing 
countries were accorded roles as the co-producers of public goods, which the state 
was to gradually stop providing. Whilst civil society organisations, such as unions and 
professional associations, were encouraged to become the facilitators of 
employment markets (Cammack, 2002). To prepare populations for these changes, 
governments were encouraged to make efforts to get ‘societies to accept the 
redefinition of the state’s responsibilities’ (WB, 1997:3).23  
At the same time, ‘participation’ – broadly understood as involving citizens in the 
planning and implementation of development programmes so as to draw on their 
local knowledge and gain legitimacy – rapidly became the newest development 
buzzword (Brett, 2003; Alejandro Leal, 2007). At the strategic level, this involved 
studies to capture the ‘voices of the poor’, the rise of the poverty agenda and efforts 
by the Bretton Woods institutions to encourage domestic ownership of Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (Hickey, 2008).24 At the programmatic level, a host of new 
methodologies, such as Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRA), Participatory Learning 
and Action (PLA), Appreciative Inquiry (AI), Community Based Needs Assessments 
(CBNA) and Stakeholder Analyses, were offered as how to guides for involving 
donors’ recipients in programmes. Participation also became the way to ensure 
‘sustainability’, ‘empowerment’, ‘equality’, and ‘democracy’, and, thereby, to avoid 
the corruption and irrelevance thought to have marred previous generations’ 
development initiatives.  
                                                 
22 Following calls in the 1980s to ‘bring the state back in’ to conversations around development (Evans et al., 
1985). 
23 The Bank’s 1997 report also encouraged governments to prevent citizens from voting for the reversal of 
privatisation using constitutional reforms (WB, 1997:148).     
24 ‘Voices of the poor’ was the title of a World Bank report calling upon development practitioners to seek out 
the perspectives of marginalised groups (Naraya et al., 2000).  
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The favoured in-country partners for these activities were the non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) that donors had been working with throughout the 1980s to fill 
the gaps in service delivery left by under-performing states or those shrinking due to 
SAPs (Edwards, 1998; Lewis, 2001). Labelled ‘civil society’, NGOs were given the 
additional task of organising citizens into groups that could be consulted by 
governments, donors and INGOs. To support these sessions, participants were often 
given trainings on how to read proposals, budgets and contracts. Nonetheless, in the 
1990s these efforts were relatively minor in scale, only accounting for around 5 
percent of all American foreign development assistance (Carothers and de Gramont, 
2013:64). Furthermore, participation was not seen as a step towards extending civil 
and political rights. Instead, most donors explicitly steered clear of framing this suite 
of activities as political; instead preferring to talk of ‘good governance’ or, at most, 
the benefits of ‘democratic governance’.   
To theoretically justify this emerging focus, many development organisations looked 
to Robert Putnam and his colleagues’ reformulation of the concept of social capital 
(Putnam et al., 1993; Putnam, 1993, 1995). It became the ‘missing link’ between civil 
society, good governance, economic development and democracy (WB, 1997). 
Accordingly, the chapter now turns to their work and the influence of what I term 
‘neoliberal civil society theory’ on development. 
 
Neoliberal civil society theory 
In Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Putnam and his 
colleagues (1993) used a mixed methods study to identify the causes of Italy’s 
bifurcation into a civil and institutionally competent North, and an uncivil and 
institutionally incompetent South. Their bold argument rests on twenty years of data 
collected after the introduction of reforms in the 1970s and a historical explanation 
for the observed differences. By its end, they claim to be able to explain variations in 
the regions’ economies and levels of democratisation.  
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To do so, they argued that differences between the North and South could be 
discerned through the density, direction and type of allegiances and alignments in 
society. In the former, ‘weak ties (like acquaintanceship and shared membership in 
secondary associations)’ and ‘horizontal’ patterns of organisation cut across social 
cleavages, leading to ‘norms of reciprocity’ and the stockpiling of generalised ‘trust’ 
(ibid:174-175).25 This gave rise to mutually reinforcing, virtuous spirals of ‘brave 
reciprocity’ that were theorised to be the bedrock for the economic development 
and democratic governance the region enjoyed. In the South, however, ‘strong’, 
‘vertical’ ‘interpersonal ties (like kinship and intimate friendship)’ retarded local 
government, economic development and, ultimately, democracy. Thus, the South 
was described as trapped in a ‘vicious cycle’, with clientelistic relations, corruption, 
greed, low-levels of political participation, and a scepticism of democratic principles 
(ibid:115).   
In conclusion, ‘social capital’ was posited as the responsible independent variable. 
Cultivated by associations within civil society, it was said to consist of the ‘networks, 
norms and trust that facilitate action and cooperation for mutual benefit’ (ibid:35-
36). Stocks of social capital across Italy, and through time, were measured via 
newspaper readerships, voting in referenda, and the density of voluntary cultural 
associations and sports clubs.  
The claim that for ‘political stability, government effectiveness, and even for 
economic progress social capital may be even more important than physical or 
human capital’ struck a chord among many Americans (ibid:183). Indeed, the 
depiction of voluntary civic associations as incubators of essential moral virtues and 
as able to solve problems independently of the state was akin to Tocqueville’s well-
known description of America democratic exceptionalism. It also fitted other popular 
American discourses such as culturalist narratives of the contemporary atrophy of 
                                                 
25 The focus on horizontal ties builds on the foundational work of Granovetter (1973). 
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associational life peddled by conservative communitarians (Cohen, 1997; Skocpol, 
1997).26  
Social capital was also appealing to many development agencies and international 
organisations. As Howell and Pearce (2001:6) argued, its amenability to attitudinal 
surveys offered them ‘a specific output that could be observed in civil society 
strengthening programmes and made these programmes more convincing to sceptics 
within donor organisations’. At the same time, its suggestion that trust built up within 
and between civic networks reduces the transaction costs of collective action 
borrowed from a language and set of ideas common to neoclassical economists. This 
allowed many of its proponents to frame civil societies as markets, with informational 
deficits or distortions hampering macro- economic and political outputs (Fine, 2001). 
Many sociologists also argued that social capital gave them opportunities to discuss 
their insights and concerns within powerful organisations, including the notoriously 
market orientated World Bank (Bebbington et al., 2004). It is perhaps unsurprising, 
therefore, that Putnam’s work was the most cited in the 1990s (Fine, 2001:19). 
Despite the widespread enthusiasm, it is notable that Putnam et al. (1993) were far 
from certain about the possibility of inorganically cultivating social capital in different 
contexts. On the one hand, they used the idea of ‘path dependency’ to argue that 
societies with pre-existing high or low stocks of social capital often become locked 
into self-reinforcing institutional and, thereby, developmental trajectories.27 Whilst 
on the other, they suggested that the main lesson from Italy is that ‘institutional 
history moves slowly’ (Putnam et al., 1993:184). Furthermore, directly addressing 
programmes seeking to support civil society, they noted that ‘local organisations 
‘implanted’ from the outside have a high failure rate’ [sic] (ibid:91). 
 
                                                 
26 Communitarianism has been described as a ‘distinctive and time-specific’ political philosophy, positioning 
itself as a third way between the state and market, left and right (Frazer, 2000:178).  
27 Path dependence suggests that the institutions that rise following critical historical junctures, such as after 
wars or economic shocks, play a key role in shaping and constraining future developmental trajectories (North, 
1990).    
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Critiquing neoliberal civil society theory 
Despite its favour amongst powerful development organisations, neoliberal civil 
society theory’s use of social capital has faced several criticisms, both as an imprecise 
theoretical concept and for the damage its embrace by powerful actors has done to 
understandings of civil society. Indeed, for many, it is a distraction from the task of 
conducting contextually specific investigations of actual civil societies, their 
relationships to other spheres of social life and, therefore, the ways they contribute 
to development.    
In the late 1990s two high-profile journals devoted critical issues to social capital. The 
first, from World Development, began from the premise that all societies have stocks 
of social capital; the challenge is scaling them up (Evans, 1996; Ostrom, 1996; Heller, 
1996; Lam, 1996; Burawoy, 1996; Fox, 1996). The second, from the Journal of 
International Development, sought to both expand and challenge the range of 
developmental outcomes that could be expected from these stocks (Fox, 1997; Beall, 
1997; Putzel, 1997; Harriss and Renzio, 1997).  
Many of these critics began by showing what had been omitted from or added to 
contemporary conceptualisations of social capital. In doing so, they drew upon 
Bourdieu (1977, 1986) for whom membership in, often exclusive, identity groups, 
associations or networks builds up social capital. Social capital, therefore, should be 
understood as a person or groups’ durable or institutionalised mutual relationships. 
Once accumulated, he argued it can be reinvested or exchanged for other types of 
capital, such as economic (material resources) and cultural capital (education, skills 
and intellectual capacities). Bourdieu (1991) also developed an idea of political 
capital, conceptualised as a variant of social capital ‘that is derived from the trust 
(expressed in a form of credit) that a group of followers places’ in leaders 
(Schugurensky, 2000:4). He suggested that it can be used or cashed-in to mobilise 
supporters and direct them towards desired ends. 
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Bourdieu (1977) portrayed societies as consisting of a range of overlapping, yet also 
relatively autonomous, ‘fields’, such as the educational, political or sporting fields. He 
argued that each field has its own forms of knowledge, rules and practices. Actors 
within a given field struggle to attain the same goal, such as academic accreditation 
or votes using their stocks of cultural, economic and social capitals. However, they 
are limited by relations of power and their own ‘habitus’, which roughly equates with 
their understandings of their field’s rules and the potential to subvert them.28 
Furthermore, he showed that reinvesting or exchanging types of capital to gain a 
better position within a particular field can be a risky endeavour. For example, one’s 
investments may not be recognised or reciprocated, as when a gift is rejected or a 
claim to a position of authority dismissed.  
Bourdieu (1986) sought to show how those, herein termed elites, already endowed 
with large reserves of different types of capital have distinct advantages. Most 
importantly, they can combine their reserves into symbolic capital, which they use to 
conceal when they are converting one type of capital into another. For example, the 
educational system appears to reward natural abilities through awarding 
qualifications. However, it often enables those that begin with significant reserves of 
economic and cultural capital to have their privileged positions publicly legitimated 
and institutionalised through accreditation. In the process, their starting advantages 
are often ‘disavowed’, washed over or made to appear inconsequential (ibid:262). 
Elites also often appropriate and misuse social capital collectively owned by the 
groups they belong to. In Bourdieu’s words, networks and exclusive clubs always 
contain ‘the seeds of an embezzlement or misappropriation of the capital which they 
assemble’ (ibid:251). 
Through such processes, elites enjoy unrivalled access to new opportunities to 
further accumulate types of capital, as well as to set the rules of the game or field for 
others. This is often done through imposing and naturalising distinctions, categories 
                                                 
28 It has been suggested Bourdieu slips into economic determinism and is, thereby, only able to explain the 
maintenance of the status quo and subordination (Alexander, 2003). I side with those that argue this is an 
unfair critique which misunderstands ‘habitus’ as purely unconscious and ignores his later work on cultures 
(Potter, 2000; Gartman, 2007). 
55 
 
and divisions within the groups and amongst the wider populations to which they 
belong. This diverts attention away from elites’ actions and motives, and reduces the 
prospect of holding them accountable. Thus, symbolic capital can help elites entrench 
and legitimise subordination. This is what is meant by Bourdieu’s frequent references 
to ‘symbolic violence’. 
Understood in this manner, social capital often becomes an important element in the 
reproduction and maintenance of societal inequalities. Indeed, Bourdieu was 
sceptical of the potential for its accumulation to lead to broader progressive 
outcomes. Moreover, he argued that its transferability and usefulness is generally 
limited to the ‘field’ within which it is cultivated. His ideas also suggest that less 
privileged actors, merely by trying to improve their situations, often legitimate the 
rules of the game within oppressive fields. In the process, they unwittingly contribute 
to structural forces that limit their lives.  
Bourdieu’s work poses a problem for social capital’s depiction as an easily 
transferable developmental resource and its proponents’ suggestion that all good 
things go together; dense associational life, economic activity and broad political 
participation. Putzel (1997) argues, therefore, that we must acknowledge that in 
some cases ‘what has been good for capitalism at given points in history […] has not 
been good for democracy and vice versa’. Agreeing with the activist literature, 
Ostrom (1997) suggests that there is a potentially ‘dark side’ to social capital. 
Furthermore, it is unlikely that newspaper readership, voting levels, and the density 
of associations can provide an indication of whether this dark side or something 
beneficial to society is being cultivated.  
It is in this sense that Putzel (1997:941) has suggested that there is a need ‘to 
carefully distinguish between what might be seen as the mechanism of trust (the 
operation of networks, norms etc.) and the political content and ideas transmitted 
through such networks and embodied in such norms’. To illustrate, he used the 
example of Chinese diaspora communities in South-east Asia that have built strong 
networks to survive abroad and facilitate intra-community trade. But for whom there 
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is little evidence of an interest in including or engaging with indigenous communities, 
let alone advancing wider democratising projects.  
Putnam and his colleagues have also been criticised for their reading of Italian history 
(Foley and Edwards, 1998; Hooghe and Stolle, 2003). Most notably, Tarrow (1996) 
reveals that the North’s socialist and Catholic parties adopted political strategies that 
relied upon mutually supportive vertical relationships with civic associations. 
Similarly, Foley and Edwards (1996) draw upon Perlmutter’s (1991) work to suggest 
that the North’s civic associations, including its sports and cultural clubs, were 
organised by and for political parties. Whilst Sabetti (1996) has shown how Southern 
Italy suffered from external and internal colonialism, which helped maintain a feudal 
economy and prevented the growth of strong civic associations. These re-readings 
suggest that relations with broadly supportive political societies and states are 
important for civil societies’ potentials to contribute to developmental aims.  
In support of this, a review of forty-five empirical studies using the concept of social 
capital concluded that it should be treated as a dependent variable, with the ‘social-
structural’ factors that determine its potential for economic or democratic 
development uncovered (Foley and Edwards, 1999). The authors suggested that this 
would move the idea away from its more normative uses by political scientists and 
economists. It would also go some ways towards replacing the era’s misguided focus 
on ‘access to’ networks, with efforts to understand the ‘quality and quantity of 
resources’ different networks can mobilise and the ends they can pursue.  
Viewed together, these criticisms pose two overarching problems for social capital: 
Firstly, that it champions the benefits of horizontally organised civic associations for 
development, whilst largely ignoring their mobilising ideologies, their willingness to 
engage others, and the resources they can draw upon. Secondly, that it overlooks 
how civil society’s own development may be affected by its vertical connections to 
political society and the state. Indeed, in many contexts it may be that social capital is 
as much the product of pre-existing developmentally orientated states, as it is the 
missing link for development. 
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Building upon this, Harris (2002:12) argued that social capital:  
 
‘serves the political purposes of depoliticising the problems of poverty 
and social justice and, in elevating the importance of ‘voluntary 
association’ in civic engagement, of a painting out the need for political 
action. ‘Social capital’ is thus a weapon in the armoury of the anti-politics 
machine’.  
 
Here Harris means that the idea of social capital enables issues of class, power, 
political conflicts and structural inequalities to be written out of development (Foley 
and Edwards, 1997). In their place, technical solutions can be offered that focus on 
tinkering with the form and density of impoverished populations’ associations.  
Going further, Fine (1999) argued that social capital’s focus on civil society as a 
remedy to underdevelopment served the function of taming the then emerging 
literature on the ‘developmental state’. This needed to done because it suggested 
that states should pay leading roles in addressing the structural inequalities that 
retard equitable development through macro-economic planning, redistribution and 
protectionist policies; activities that the neoliberal Bretton Woods institutions have 
traditionally rallied against.29 As part of this taming, Fine (2007) has suggested that 
the sociologists that used social capital to engage the World Bank were ultimately co-
opted into its institutional imperatives and interests, thereby, eroding the concept’s 
critical edge.  
The idea of social capital has also been critiqued for enabling outsiders to equate civil 
society in developing countries with organisations that resemble Western ideas of 
associational life (Chandhoke, 2001). This has led some donors to overly focus on 
                                                 
29 The idea of the developmental state has roots in studies of East Asian nations such as South Korea and 
Taiwan (Amsden, 1989; Wade, 1990).  
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NGOs that can represent themselves through Western communicative and 
professional frameworks, or that uncritically champion their ideals such as free 
markets. At the same time, groups with more political or cultural aims, such as 
unions, peasants’ movements and religious organisations have been side-lined. 
Commentators have since argued that this amounts to an – more or less conscious – 
effort to depoliticise or tame foreign civil societies (Jenkins, 2001; Kaldor, 2003b). 
To further explain these trends, Foley and Edwards (2001:8) suggested that the 
perversion of Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1988) in the 1990s’ social capital 
literature was particularly detrimental: 
 
‘Bourdieu and Coleman’s conceptions of social capital take the analogy 
with financial capital seriously, seeing it as instrumental in the flow of 
goods and services to individuals and groups. Putnam, by contrast, has 
popularised a notion of social capital that ties it to the production of 
collective goods such as civic engagement or a spirit of cooperation 
available to a community or nation at large’.30  
 
This allowed social capital to morph from a context specific property that people use 
for personal or group gain, to something that is owned by society and 
unproblematically scaled up to developmental outcomes. In this sense, social capital 
theorists were accused of removing the ‘social’ from their arguments through an 
appeal to economics’ universalisation of the idea of ‘capital’. This amounted to an 
                                                 
30 Coleman (1988) used social capital to provide social explanations for rational choice theory, thereby, allowing 
him to reject the more extreme forms of individualism it can entail. He argued that those within a social capital 
generating structure, such as a family, association or network, can access stocks of it alongside other 
individually held capitals such as skills (human capital), tools (physical capital), or money (economic capital). 
Thus, he did not subscribe to the idea of social capital as widely generalizable trust. 
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attempt to wash-over the postmodern insight that concepts need to be historically 
and socially grounded (Fine, 2002:797).  
As these debates over social capital continued, critical commentators also began to 
suggest that participatory development had become another tool in the anti-politics 
machine (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Williams, 2004). As with social capital, the idea 
had its roots in an older, more overtly political, literature that had gradually been 
side-lined in favour of top-down approaches to the formalised consultations, and the 
inclusion of civil society representatives in project planning and implementation. This 
transformed participation from an organic process with the potential to enable 
citizens to debate the meaning of development and challenge the structures that 
underpin poverty, to a technical box ticking exercise carried out by planners keen to 
show they have the ‘buy-in’ of local populations. Indeed, Kothari (2005:442) 
lamented the ‘appropriation, technicalisation and subsequent mainstreaming’ of 
participatory approaches as they have been depoliticised by a development industry 
obsessed with process rather than politics’. Accordingly, those working on the ground 
were often found to be blind to how power affects participatory processes, and how 
it can reproduce itself in the consultative forums set up by development programmes 
and pushed by the good governance agenda (White, 1996; Conning and Kevane, 
2000; Brett, 2003). 
Pearce (1997) Baker (1999) went further, arguing that the idea of civil society had 
had its radical potential eroded. They suggested that ‘scientific’ theorists of 
democratic transitions were advocating for the demobilisation of the mass of 
politically active citizens once they had seized liberalising opportunities in previously 
authoritarian states (Linz and Stepan, 1989; Dahrendorf, 1990; Lewis, 1993). And they 
insinuated that some commentators were portraying politicised associations and 
radical democratising projects as potentially destabilising. They also argued that the 
democratic consolidation literature was championing a view of civil societies as 
merely responsible for aggregating and raising limited demands to responsive 
political parties and state institutions (Valenzuela, 1992; Schmitter, 1995).  
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These ideas amounted to a functionalist portrayal of civil society and an 
institutionalist view of democratisation. Nonetheless, with social capital as their 
methodology, they were argued to have been embraced by powerful development 
organisations. This left little room for the nuanced debates being had by the activist 
strand’s theorists, including their understanding of civil societies as places for identify 
formation and radical critiques of the status quo. In their place, development 
organisations focussed on supporting a plurality and density of horizontally organised 
civic associations in the assumption that they would contribute towards the 
accumulation of developmental norms and the consolidation of democratic 
institutions.  
The criticisms of development’s embrace of social capital remind us that the 
ontologies and methodologies deployed by theorists and practitioners are rarely 
objective, value-free tools. Furthermore, those that adopt popular ideas and 
hegemonic discourses to be accepted by the mainstream may find that they 
unwittingly lend themselves to reductive solutions to problems rooted in power and 
politics.  
 
Actually existing civil societies 
During this era, researchers were also undertaking studies of actually existing civil 
societies’ roles in ongoing developmental transitions (Heller, 1996; Abers, 1998, 
2002; Fox, 2007). They often began from the conclusion of Rueschmeyer et al's 
(1992:50) vast comparative study that ‘it was not the density of civil society per se’ 
that supported successful democratic transitions, ‘but the empowerment of 
previously excluded classes aided by this density’. Accordingly, many sought to bridge 
the activist and neoliberal theorists’ notions of civil society by bringing power, social 
norms, identity, politics, history and the wider context back into focus. This section 
briefly overviews literature within this stream focussed on South Asia. It ends by 
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outlining a framework that will be used in Chapter Five to investigate dynamics in 
Pakistan.  
Fitting into what Woolcock (1998:167) calls the ‘comparative institutionalist 
literature’ on developmental states, Heller (1996) documented how the Indian state 
of Kerala had supported a vigorous and dense network of civic associations, including 
cultural clubs and educational movements focussed on the provision of public 
goods.31 It had also instituted welfare programmes, nationalised a large percentage 
of the economy, and created regular opportunities for public deliberations with the 
political opposition and wider civil society. These complementary processes had led 
to social development indicators that are unrivalled elsewhere in India and almost on 
par with developed countries.  
To explain this, Heller argued that following independence from Britain Kerala 
identified its most pressing challenge as overcoming the particularistic and exclusive 
demands India’s feudal and caste-based society makes on its states.32 This was begun 
by the incumbency of the Communist Party of India and sustained over the following 
decades through social movements linked to competitive mass party politics. The 
latter required successive governments (communist or otherwise) to be broadly 
responsive to popular demands (e.g. land-reforms, welfare programmes and labour 
laws) that broke down patron-client relations and loosened the grip of powerful 
vested interests on decision making. In turn, the raising of, and acquiescence to, 
these demands gradually changed Keralans’ dominant political identities from those 
based on caste to ones based on class.  
Over time, these processes led state and society to understand and permeate one 
another, and they democratised ever greater areas of life. For example, trade union 
and party members came to control traditionally hierarchical panchayats (village 
governance institutions), and new forums were created to negotiate ‘class 
compromises’ between workers, the state and enterprise. Individuals also regularly 
                                                 
31 The foundational authors of this literature are  Amsden (1989), Wade (1990) and Evans (1989). 
32 Here Heller alludes to the work of Brass (1990) and Migdal (1988) on how strong, yet fragmented, societies in 
liberal democracies can contribute to over politicised and demand laden weak states. 
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moved between civil society, including numerous NGOs, political society and the 
state. This gradually made local governance institutions more meritocratic and, as 
subsequent studies have shown, responsive to the needs of citizens (Heller et al., 
2007). It also tempered civil society’s more militant tendencies, thereby, making 
Kerala attractive to investors.  
Heller’s story seemed to suggest that all good things can go together. However, 
compared to Putnam’s and his colleagues’ (1993) depiction of Northern Italy, it 
included identities, power, politics and the state in its list of things. As Heller 
(1996:1057) argued; a ‘high degree of associationalism in and of itself cannot explain 
the structural transformations that have unscored Kerala’s social development’. 
Rather, the ‘redistributive thrust of Kerala’s social development has carried with it a 
direct attack on traditional structure of power [and entails] a fundamental 
realignment in the balance of class forces’.  
Commenting on this study and others from this era, Evans (1996:1119) argued that a 
‘synergy’ between state and society based on ‘ties that cross public-private divides’ is 
as important for developmental outcomes as horizontal ties between civic 
associations.33 These ties create opportunities for the co-production of public goods 
and services, and for citizens to hold authorities to account when they fail to deliver 
on their promises. Indeed, Evans (1989) had long argued that the ‘embedded 
autonomy’ - situations in which developmental states retain enough ties with their 
societies to understand their problems and needs, and to feel obliged to work on 
them, combined with enough distance not to be captured by special interests - is 
central to maintaining developmental relations. 
To begin to understand how these relations might be engineered, Evans (1996:1124-
29) argued analysts must examine the relative weight of endowments left to each 
society. Drawing upon Bourdieu, he conceptualised social capital as an endowment 
that resides in civil society; and robust, efficient bureaucracy as an endowment of the 
                                                 
33 Granovetter (1985) argued that all economic action is embedded in social relations and that development 
brought a change in the kind, not the degree, of embeddedness.  
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state. Moreover, he argued that in much of the developing world stocks of social 
capital are not the key constraining factor. Instead, the problem is scaling up or 
connecting the networks that give rise to social capital with political society and the 
state in ways that positively affect developmental outcomes.  
Evans (2002) has also called for research that uncovers the ‘myriad concrete 
relationships of mutual support that connect communities, NGOs and social 
movements with individuals and organisations inside the state who put a priority on 
livelihoods and sustainability’. He suggests that these relations are likely to be part of, 
and to develop through, cycles of conflict and cooperation among rival societal 
groups, and between citizens and the state. Moreover, political associations, 
oppositional political parties and social movements are likely to be at their centre.  
Evans has recently added that deliberative and participatory institutions at different 
levels of governance can ensure the flow of information that can support the efficient 
allocation, and the co-production, of pubic goods (Heller et al., 2007; Baiocchi et al., 
2011; Heller, 2012). Furthermore, these institutions can go some way towards 
addressing power inequalities between citizens, political society and the state. 
Elsewhere, Heller (2008) has drawn upon Sen’s (1999) capabilities approach and the 
institutional turn in comparative political economy to argue that to survive in a 
globalised economy developmental states must build institutions that encourage 
participatory democracy, thereby, cultivating ever greater and broader ties to civil 
societies.34 
 
Contentious mobilisations  
 
Other observers of South Asia’s civil societies have emphasized how they differ from 
those in Europe and, in the process, thrown doubt on the universalism of some 
                                                 
34 For comparative institutional political economy literature see -North (1990), Rodrik et al. (2002) and 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) 
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strands of Western theory (Dunn and Hann 1996; Lewis, 2001; Kaviraj and Khilnani 
2009). Amongst them, Chatterjee (2004) drew upon fieldwork among Kolkata’s slums 
to describe how popular politics operates in ‘most of the world’ (as his book’s title 
puts it). He argued that the needs and demands of poor and marginalised citizens are 
often communicated through vertical relationships between community 
representatives or leaders, and large employers, government officials and politicians. 
When these relationships do not yield the desired results, communities can engage in 
illegal activities such as siphoning off public utilities or squatting on public land. Some 
may even resort to violent protest.  
Chatterjee argues that state authorities do not always meet such practices with 
coercion and oppression. Nor do they officially recognise the marginalised groups’ 
demands and accord citizens their full rights. Instead, they often unofficially 
accommodate them through targeted payments and development programmes, or 
by turning a blind eye to their ongoing illegal activities. This requires the state to 
make frequent exceptions to normal stipulations that citizens pay taxes, have proper 
documentation and are law-abiding. Authorities do this because even the most 
marginalised population groups in post-colonial democracies have valuable votes 
which they can trade with politicians for concessions; transactions which Chatterjee 
frames as a distinctively subaltern form of democratisation. 
To illustrate, Chatterjee shows how the leaders of squatters’ associations constantly 
reinvent the bounds of community to demonstrate their strength to political patrons. 
He argues that ‘communities’ are the terrain upon which negotiations, struggles and 
compromises between such groups play out in the post-colonial world because 
resource strapped states cannot afford to fairly distribute public goods across their 
entire populations. Through such means, Chatterjee contends that the ‘politics of 
democratisation’ does not occur in civil society, which is a label he only applies to 
small groups of metropolitan, usually wealthy, corporate elites that subscribe to 
Western norms (ibid:282). Rather, it takes place in the ‘much less well-defined, 
legally ambiguous, contextually and strategically demarcated terrain of political 
society’.  
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Chattterjee’s notion of ‘political society’ shines light onto the actual political practices 
of South Asia’s poor and marginalised.35 In the process, it highlights how 
democratisation is unlikely to conform to the ideals championed by Western 
theorists, and that people and associations are more likely to devise contentious or 
illegal strategies that are suited to the inequalities and lopsided distributions of 
power that animate post-colonial states. In this sense, Chatterjee encourages 
investigations of where and how negotiations between citizens, different types of 
authority and the state take place. Nonetheless, some have sought to refine his ideas 
and others have questioned their utility for grasping the prospects of widening and 
deepening ongoing democratisation projects. Their overlapping criticisms take two 
main forms:  
The first holds that Chatterjee collects to much activity – from community 
associations, political parties, social movements, protests and illegal action – under 
his notion of political society, thereby, making it imprecise, whilst unjustifiably 
reducing civil society to the limited domain of Westernised corporate capital. This 
Marxian binary cannot adequately account for how actual civil societies are both 
shaped by and shape markets and the state. It also ignores the arguments of older 
theorists such as Hegel that civil societies are a creative melting pots and Gramsci 
that they are battlegrounds for different classes. In doing so, Chatterjee overlooks 
how civil societies can combine norms, idioms and practices from elsewhere with 
those already familiar to them to create hybrid institutions which enable citizens to 
raise their voices. Indeed, Chatterjee’s contention that Western civil society theory is, 
for the most part, an imposed or alien concept unsuited to the reality of post-colonial 
states appears to dismiss the creativity of those he studies.  
Mannathukkaren (2010) uses an analysis of Kerala’s mid-1990s devolution scheme to 
add empirical weight to this critique. It shows how interactions between civic 
associations, corporate capital, political parties and the state gradually changed the 
                                                 
35 For reasons stated later, in the rest of the thesis my use of political society is not in Chatterjee’s sense. 
Instead, as with the activist civil society theorists, I use it to denote those connected to or formally involved in 
party politics. 
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character of all in ways that have challenged patron-client relations. At the same 
time, he reveals that elements within Keralan civil society colluded with others in 
political society and the state to capture the local spoils of the scheme, such as 
government construction contracts and new elected positions of authority. 
Mannathukkaren’s point is that neither outcome, developmental or negative, would 
have occurred without power-laden struggles, cooperation, creations and 
interpenetrations that blur Chatterjee’s harsh distinction between political and civil 
society. Accordingly, more complex and nuanced understanding of post-colonial 
politics are required to explain its various outcomes. 
The second broad criticism holds that rather than shedding light on how South Asia’s 
poor contribute to wider ongoing democratising projects, Chatterjee’s (2004) notion 
of political society describes their survival strategies. Thus, by valorising the ‘squalor, 
ugliness and violence of popular life’, Chatterjee fails to fully grasp the ‘dark side’ of 
local politics that forces the poor to rely on intermediaries located within patronage 
networks (ibid:74). Ultimately, this severely curtails the prospects of identifying and 
supporting radical democratising projects that could truly transform their condition.  
To illustrate how this occurs, Gudavarthy and Vijay (2007) present a study of three 
villagers’ associations’ struggles for justice in a pollution affected area of Andhra 
Pradesh, India. Caused by local industries ignoring environmental standards, the 
decades long pollution had degraded farmland, closed ancillary businesses, and made 
some areas uninhabitable. When the associations raised the issue with authorities 
they faced, sometimes violent, coercion by the police and organised mafias. At the 
same time, the polluting industrialists and their political allies used local 
intermediaries to mobilise counter associations and protests, often also offering 
villagers bribes, targeted development projects and income-earning opportunities.  
Gudavarthy and Vijay document how over-time the villagers came to accept these 
sorts of targeted, limited ‘strategic’ demands as the ‘politics of the possible’ 
(ibid:3052). Many gave up on activism aimed at realising the sorts of structural 
changes needed to halt the environmental damage. Some leaders also accepted low-
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level positions in parties allied with the industrialists and desperation caused new 
generations to increasingly accept the livelihood opportunities they provided. 
Surveying these changes, Gudavarthy and Vijay argue that ‘strategic politics’ has a 
‘long-term impact on the community life itself - on the trust, social fabric, social 
relations, and solidarity amongst the people of a community’ (ibid:3057). And they 
conclude that Chatterjee’s example of Kolkata’s squatters’ associations winning 
concessions from the state is an anomaly and that they probably only won 
concessions because they did not directly challenge major vested interests. In this 
sense, political society and its associations are better understood as mechanisms for 
limited survival strategies, rather than as drivers of ongoing democratising projects.  
Further unpicking the sub-continent’s sub-national politics, Berenschot (2014) argues 
that India’s poor voters are often connected to politicians by a class of brokers which 
he terms ‘political fixers’.36 He defines them as ‘intermediaries who use political 
contacts and knowledge of official procedures to help citizens, particularly the poor, 
deal with state institutions’. And he argues that they help to explain why Dalits in 
Gujarat vote for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) that has traditionally worked against 
their interests.  
Berenschot’s research shows how the mechanisation of Gujarat’s agrarian economy 
and insecure livelihoods in urban areas created room for fixers connected to the BJP 
to cultivate Dalits’ votes. However, he distinguishes between fixers that can be more 
accurately described as ‘party workers’ and those that are ‘social workers’. Although 
both divert scarce developmental resources and job opportunities to their clients 
through their connections to low level state officials and elected politicians, social 
workers that have proved their ability to mobilise votes in previous elections are 
more able to switch political allegiances should their political patrons fail to deliver. 
This gives them a measure of leverage over politicians which Berenschot argues 
makes contemporary patron-client relations less immediately exploitative than those 
                                                 
36 He sought to build upon an older literature that, before Chatterjee (2004), depicted such fixers as the 
‘lubricants’ or ‘enablers’ of India’s democracy (Reddy and Haragopal, 1985; Manor, 2000).  
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described by the older literature discussed in Chapter One (Scott, 1972; Eisenstadt 
and Roniger, 1980).   
Despite this, Berenschot (2014) ultimately concludes that what India’s poor classes 
gain through their relations with political fixers in terms of their ability to influence 
the implementation of state policies and resources at the local level, they trade for 
their capacity to have a substantive voice in the drafting of policies at the macro 
level. This means that they have few prospects of influencing or challenging the 
structures that contribute to their poverty, nor can they change the overall 
distribution of power. This assessment of India’s patronage politics is shared by 
Harris-White (2003) for whom fixers and their clients contribute to a ‘shadow-state’ 
that perpetuates an inegalitarian, oppressive and, sometimes, violent polity. Their 
continued presence requires domestic reformers and concerned outsiders to work 
hard to identify parts of civil society that are interested in challenging, rather than 
maintaining, the status quo. 
Shah’s (2010) ethnography of rural elites in Jharkhand, India, further explores the 
idea that a layer of intermediaries mediates marginalised groups’ relationships with 
the state. It shows how they often use their positions to appropriate the state’s 
resources and climb further up the hierarchical ladders of politicised patronage 
networks. Nonetheless, Shah situates intermediaries’ ambitions within local ‘moral 
economies’ that hold what appear to be corrupt practices (e.g. taking cuts, paying 
unofficial commissions and diverting development projects) to outsiders to be locally 
legitimate ways of furthering one’s material and social status.37 Furthermore, they 
are widely regarded as a means of ensuring that the state’s resources are put to 
locally appropriate ends, rather than those thought up by bureaucrats that rarely visit 
Jharkhand.  
Shah argues, however, that this local moral economy ultimately maintains rural 
elites’ grip on power. Indeed, it arose as the region’s political economy gradually 
                                                 
37 The argument that contemporary Indian patronage politics retains an important ‘moral’ dimension has also 
been recently made by Piliavsky (2014b). 
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changed from one based on agriculture and the domination of landowners, to one 
based on jobs and services provided by the state. Faced with this challenge, 
landowning elites propagated a discourse amongst lower castes that portrays the 
state as alien, oppressive and, when necessary, best engaged through intermediaries 
or patrons. This caused Jharkhand’s landless Adivasis to focus their energies on 
resurrecting and protecting a morally and spiritually superior ‘sacral polity’, thereby, 
leaving unaccountable rural elites to interact with the secular state from which they 
appropriate the bulk of resources. Accordingly, Shah concludes that Chatterjee’s 
(2004) idea of a democratising and developmental ‘political society’ requires stronger 
ethical standards that can account for the debilitating inequalities between, and 
norms prevalent amongst, India’s poor.38  
Many of these more critical authors begin from the premise that South Asian post-
colonial states can be described as ‘patronage democracies’ which Chandra (2007:86) 
defines as systems within ‘which the state has a relative monopoly on jobs and 
services, and in which elected officials enjoy significant discretion in the 
implementation of laws allocating the jobs and services at the disposal of the state’. 
Within them, it is the very poor, especially in urban areas, that occupy the most 
precarious positions because they have few independent means of accessing state 
officials, institutions or politicians. Accordingly, they make a ‘Faustian bargain’ with 
local intermediaries and, by extension, their political patrons that puts aside 
collective actions that might challenge the status quo in exchange for social safety 
nets that allow them to weather unforeseen economic and social shocks (Wood, 
2003:468). 
  
South Asia’s CBOs and NGOs  
 
de Wit and Berner (2009) use research from three Indian cities’ state welfare 
programmes to show how community-based organisations (CBOs) and NGOs play 
                                                 
38 See Chapter Two for a discussion of Chatterjee’s (2004) notion of ‘political society’.  
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often play a role in maintaining this bargain. They suggest that vertical patronage 
relations link CBOs that have accumulated political capital and NGOs with cultural 
capital to politicians that, in return for votes, can ensure that some, albeit a small 
proportion, of programmes’ resources reach the poor. However, they argue that as 
NGOs must compete for lucrative contracts from these politicians and, in turn, CBOs 
court their favour to implement them within their communities, these organisations 
cannot easily challenge their patrons’ wider policy directions or ideologies. They also 
argue that CBOs are rarely the representatives of the communities they publicly claim 
to be. Instead, they are more often vehicles for kin or identity-based interest groups 
that have little interest in widening or deepening democracy. And their leaders often 
disband them once an opportunity to accrue benefits has been exhausted. 
Their findings place further doubt on Chatterjee’s (2004) idea that community 
associations are the drivers of democratisation in South Asia. Indeed, they add to 
others’ arguments that the idea of the ‘community’ – which is often understood by 
Western development organisations to be a geographically demarcated population 
with shared interests – reveals little about how the poor are organised by 
intermediaries in developing countries (Cornwall and Eade, 2010). Accordingly, their 
research reminds others that they should not take the representativeness or goals of 
civic organisations at face value. 
Authors have also explored the role of civil society organisations in Bangladesh 
following its independence from Pakistan in 1971 (White, 1999; Karim 2001; Devine, 
2006; Lewis and Hossain, 2008). Many begin by noting the influence of foreign 
donors and the rise of professionalised NGOs. Such is their prevalence that by the 
mid-1990s the World Bank (1996:5) reported that NGOs were operating in 78 percent 
of villages and that one third of the population had accessed their assistance. 
Nevertheless, following initial optimism over their potential to provide humanitarian 
relief and engage in advocacy, some observers began to question their 
representativeness and their wider roles.  
71 
 
The former concern centred on how foreign funding enabled some NGOs to operate 
with little local legitimacy amongst, and accountability to, those they claimed to 
serve. It was also pointed out that many worked through personal and particularistic 
lines, with founders from powerful families or those engaged in party politics using 
them to provide favours and dish out the state’s or donors’ resources as patronage 
(Devine, 2006; Lewis and Hossain, 2008). The latter concern focussed on how NGOs 
providing services and engaging in advocacy were blurring the distinction between 
themselves, oppositional parties and the state in the minds of ordinary people 
(White, 1999; Karim 2001).  
On the one hand, therefore, the NGOs activities were often found to be far removed 
from the open, impersonal, and pluralistic cultures promoted by the Western 
development organisations that were increasingly funding them. Whilst on the other, 
NGOs, particularly those delivering services and dominating the public sphere, were 
accused of reducing politicians’ incentives to serve their citizens. Towards the end of 
the 1990s authors also highlighted donors’ rising preference for those organisations 
that subscribed to the depoliticised norms of the good governance agenda, with 
some worrying that this was reducing the resources and space for other types of 
public spirited associations, such as religious bodies, women’s collectives or diaspora 
groups. 
In a series of articles, Lewis (2010a, 2017) has further charted the evolution of 
Bangladesh’s NGOs. He shows how a mixture of clientelism, poor leadership, state 
oppression and donor taming has resulted in a depoliticization of the sector, reducing 
the ability of many previously radical NGOs to challenge elites. To illustrate, he has 
followed the histories of several large NGOs established after independence. Despite 
initially being under military rule, many managed to carve out space for themselves 
by working on humanitarian and disaster response. Influenced by Paulo Freire’s 
(1970) writings, some also began to spread awareness of rights, educate the poor as 
to the structural causes of their condition and, albeit with limited success, mobilise 
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them into advocacy groups. These activities contributed to the movement for the 
restoration of democracy in the 1980s (Uddin, 2006).39 
However, after a return to elections in 1991, many of these NGOs were integrated 
into political parties’ patronage networks, whilst others simply atrophied due to a 
lack of local legitimacy and charismatic leaders that failed to incubate talented 
successors. Then, in the early 2000s, continuing advocacy efforts by larger NGOs and 
accusations of political bias sparked a backlash from the ruling party and its Islamist 
allies. It took the form of registration procedures and regulations designed to curtail 
criticisms of the ruling elite. These controls were combined with rewards for those 
that confined themselves to service provision. NGO staff were also violently harassed 
and popular vocal leaders arrested.  
Fearing their access would be curtailed, previously protective foreign donors often 
shied away from supporting the targeted NGOs. Furthermore, they began to favour 
those that would not overtly challenge the state and that accorded with their 
conceptual models of civil society organisations as vehicles for depoliticised service 
delivery. These moves were accompanied by a renewed focus on funding 
programmes that could relatively quickly report measurable changes in 
developmental indicators, rather than those that sought longer running norm or 
structural changes.  
Viewed together, these commentaries on Bangladesh show how within semi-
authoritarian states the internal dynamics of individual organisations, the nature of 
wider political relations, and international actors’ ideas and activities can combine to 
weaken, depoliticise and co-opt civil societies. Yet, Lewis (2017) has also highlighted 
how principled NGOs may be able to avoid such outcomes. In Bangladesh, this has 
been achieved by those that have largely rejected donor funding, remained outside 
of political patronage networks, focussed on mobilising and building the skills of 
marginalised groups, especially women, and sought to horizontally connect local level 
                                                 
39 Although many were heavily criticised for not declaring their support for the movement. 
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organisations. For many, the hope is that such activities will leave them ready to seize 
opportunities to further democratising projects as and when they arrive. 
To summarise, the reviewed investigations of South Asia’s civil societies reveal how 
they can differ from the templates laid out by Western theorists. For example, they 
suggest that ongoing political struggles and the creative processes they engender can 
lead to new activities and type of associations with the potential to drive 
democratising projects. However, they also show that people and communities can 
be connected to politicians and the state in ways that deliver them benefits, whilst 
maintaining debilitating status quos or eroding their own ability to participate in 
politics. Nonetheless, aside from Chatterjee (2004), most of the reviewed authors do 
not see a need to dismiss or relegate the idea of civil society. Instead, they call for 
nuanced studies of political dynamics in post-colonial, vastly unequal and, 
sometimes, oppressive clientelistic states.  
 
A framework for analysing civil societies 
 
Developed from his research on Mexico, Fox's (2007) relational framework can help 
analysts wishing to pursue this research agenda.40 It aims to account for how actors 
and institutions belonging to different conceptual spheres - civil society, political 
society, the state and international sphere - interact with, permeate, support and 
constrain one another. Thus, it understands the evolution of civil societies as an 
ongoing process embedded in broader social and political dynamics, rather than 
assuming they will follow the trajectories documented in other states. It also moves 
beyond normative conceptualisations of social capital that suggest it will 
unproblematically contribute to developmental outcomes by grounding the idea in 
rich historical and relational analyses. It has three overlapping area of focus: 
                                                 
40 Although beyond the scope of this thesis, Lewis (2013) documents a rise in literature investigating how 
contemporary authoritarian states co-exist with civil societies, often tolerating their associations and service 
provision as long as they do not challenge them in public sphere. 
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Firstly, ‘political opportunity structures’ that result from contests between elites that 
effect civil society’s capacity to mobilise. As Fox contends: ‘Associational life does not 
unfold in a vacuum’ (ibid:56). Even within semi-authoritarian regimes, reformist elites 
can provide frameworks, such as through transparency, cooperation, resources or 
legislation, within which civil societies grow. Whilst others can use their command of 
the state’s services and its coercive apparatus to shut them down. Reformists and the 
international community, therefore, must often also protect nascent civil societies 
from the predation, capture by or oppression of others.  
The second centres on the ‘social energy’ of motivated civil society activists and the 
organisations willing to bear the, often high, start-up costs of mobilisation. Here Fox 
(2007) purposively confronts the idea - found within Putnam and his colleagues 
(1993) work on Italy - that historical legacies constrain the evolution of civil societies 
in a path-dependent manner. Instead, as with the remoulding of caste- and class- 
based identities in Kerala, the suggestion is that even within unfavourable contexts 
societal leaders can introduce or craft new ideas, associations and institutions to 
challenge the status quo (Evans, 1996; Abers, 1998).  
The last building block, ‘scaling up’, concerns Evan’s (1996) observation that most 
societies have large stocks of social capital and that the challenge is cultivating 
horizontal and vertical network that use it developmental aims. This involves 
connecting groups within civil society with sympathetic actors within political society, 
the state and international sphere. Once networked, civil societies theoretically pool 
resources and become harder to subordinate. Thus, analysts must be on the lookout 
for developmental networks that span multiple levels of governance and state-
society divides.  
This framework is drawn upon in Chapter Five’s analysis of Pakistan’s civil society and 
Fox’s more recent work focussed specifically on social accountability explored in the 
thesis’ conclusion. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined three sets of literature that explore civil society’s perceived 
roles in development. Although grounded in liberal theory and influenced by the 
experiences of dissidents, the activist version was critiqued for overlooking the ‘dark-
side’ of civil societies. This led to research agendas that sought to uncover how 
power permeates civil society and the public sphere, and the factors which could 
hold-back or support radical democratising projects. Despite this, it was shown that a 
neoliberal version of civil theory came to dominate thinking within some powerful 
Western development organisations in the late 1990s. By placing Putnam and his 
colleagues’ (1993) version of social capital at its centre, it introduced a focus on the 
density of horizontally organised voluntary civic associations. It also suggested that 
the stocks of trust they accumulate would unproblematically drive the reforms 
needed for good governance. This largely removed the role of ideas, identities, 
power, political contests and the state from analyses. Indeed, many speculated this 
was the goal.  
Focussing on studies from South Asia, a third set of literature was explored that has 
sought to bring back into the idea of civil society issues of identify formation, power 
inequalities and messy political contests. It suggests that in some places broad 
participation in public life and coalitions that straddle the society-state divide have 
been key to challenging forms of clientelist politics and kick-starting developmental 
cycles. But it also warns that democratisation is often patchy across any given 
context, and likely to be mired by setbacks and reversals, and that the history and 
nature of citizens’ associations and vertical society-state relations must be 
investigated within each context to understand their potential to contribute to wider 
democratising projects. The chapter concluded by outlining a framework that is used 
later in the thesis to do this.  
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Chapter Three 
Aidnography  
 
 
‘The development discourse does change extraordinarily fast […] it is amazing how 
things come and go’. 
(Senior NGO Staff Member)41 
 
 
Before continuing the thesis’ inquiry into powerful Western development 
organisations’ use of the idea of civil society, this chapter conducts a review of recent 
critical literature investigating their wider activities. It argues that fruitful research 
occurs when organisations’ meta- and policy- discourses are juxtaposed with 
ethnographic investigations of the programmes they support. Such investigations can 
reveal the work that discourses do in terms of legitimising particular ways of seeing 
the world and acting within it, including their potential to uphold or challenge 
debilitating status quos. They also remind us that despite their evident material and 
symbolic advantages, development’s grand orientating ideas rarely remain intact or 
fulfil their intended consequences once they are put into practice. The chapter’s 
conclusion argues that researchers adopting discourse analyses should draw upon 
more rigorous methodologies to help them uncover the struggles within, and the 
potential alternatives to, dominant modes of doing development. 
 
Development practice  
Critical studies of development as practiced by international organisations and their 
in-country partners have a long history (Crewe and Axelby, 2012; Gardner and Lewis, 
2015). Until the mid-1990s many researchers used individual projects or programmes 
                                                 
41 Interview with Senior NGO Staff Member 3 24.08.15 
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as their units of analysis.42 They often framed development as a top down 
undertaking, or as something done to a population, group or sector by others. They 
also portrayed developers as outsiders, unfamiliar with the needs, institutions and 
cultures of those they sought to develop. Accordingly, ethnographies documented 
how programmes fail or have unintended consequences due to the ignorance of 
planners. And they routinely concluded with a list of reasons why anthropologists 
and those being developed should be consulted throughout programmes lifespans. 
Although it is beyond the scope of the thesis to review this older literature, this 
section uses three brief examples to set the scene for the questions and methods 
authors began adopting in the mid-1990s. 
Amongst the older style of study, van Schendel’s (1981) retrospective examination of 
a rural cooperative based livelihoods programme in Bangladesh, called the ‘Comilla 
experiment’, is emblematic. It showed how the programme was initially praised as a 
potentially replicable model of inclusive development that engaged the poor and 
marginalised to address rural inequalities. However, subsequent ethnographic 
evidence suggested that the lending groups it created were gradually dominated by 
the same wealthy villagers that they were designed to challenge. Furthermore, many 
marginalised participants, such as jobless women, only engaged with the 
programme’s activities to accrue the per diems it offered. Despite this, the 
programme was rolled out to additional locations in the mid-1960s and adopted by 
the government as a major initiative to combat rural poverty in the 1970s.  
In search of the root causes of these outcomes, van Schendel shows that the 
programme’s planners and managers mostly engaged with the village through its 
elites. Furthermore, when they did consult the poor they dismissed their scepticism 
of the programme’ activities as down to their ‘limited horizons’ and ‘peasant 
fatalism’. Instead, they trusted that their own brand of ‘enlightened optimism’ was 
enough to ensure it would be a success. In conclusion, van Schendel argues that the 
programme’s emphasis on greater rice yields, cooperatives and skills trainings were 
                                                 
42 I use ‘programmes’ going forward as criticisms of the idea that development can be cultivated through 
bounded ‘projects’ has caused many organisations to portray themselves as engaged in programmes. 
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inappropriate to the context and ultimately side-lined opportunities to challenge the 
structures sustaining rural poverty in Bangladesh. 
Porter et al’s (1991) book, Development in Practice: Paved with Good Intentions, 
critiqued Kenya’s Magarini resettlement scheme (1973-1989). The authors drew 
upon first-hand knowledge gained from working on it and by conducting appraisals of 
its internal planning documents, including cost-benefit analyses, evaluations and 
logical frameworks. This allowed them to show how the Australian and Kenyan 
governments ignored early indicators of its inappropriateness. Indeed, the 
programme appears to have arisen from the former’s desire to increase its national 
profile in Africa and an assumption that its experts had a comparative advantage in 
dryland farming techniques, rather than a wide search for addressable local 
problems. Furthermore, as it evolved, mistakes were made – such as the use of 
destructive farming machinery to make up for a shortage of labour – that could have 
been avoided if the Giriama people it sought to resettle had be consulted. Eventually 
managers brought in local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to add a 
participatory element to the programme and to ensure the sustainability its activities, 
but the authors’ show how the feedback managers received was largely ignored. 
To explain their findings, Porter et al critique the wider international development 
sector, arguing that it is characterised by a ‘control-orientation’ that wrongly believes 
it can account for the infinite number of variables likely to affect programmes. 
Although sometimes suited to technical challenges, such as road or bridge building, 
this orientation requires more complex socio-economic programmes to ignore the 
historical and political structures that have given rise to whatever problem they set 
out to address. Furthermore, they show that as cracks begin to appear in 
programmes, managers often down-play them and press-on due to incentives that 
reward professionals that can rigidly stick to blueprints and milestones crafted in 
national or foreign capitals. Alongside regularly consulting those programmes seek to 
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help, the authors recommend that development must be wholly reinterpreted as a 
‘on going, adaptive and therefore diverse process’ (sic) (ibid:199).43  
Other ethnographers were not simply content with conducting retrospective studies. 
Instead, they offered development practitioners guides as to the sorts of questions 
they should ask when planning or evaluating a programme. By exploring how 
development programmes look from the perspective of the developed, Mair (1984) 
argued that anthropological analyses can provide information on what is needed and 
what can be built upon within the societies programmes seek to steward. She 
suggested that knowledge of the nature of the economy, kinship and land rights 
ought to be sought by planners, and issues such as equality, urbanisation and 
resettlement carefully considered. Mair hoped that this would challenge the era’s 
ethnocentric assumptions about women’s roles in economic activity and reveal how 
the benefits of the sort of modernity favoured by developers can be unevenly 
distributed. Despite offering many examples of programmes’ failures to do this and 
even jesting that their intended beneficiaries are often considered by critical 
observers to be the ‘victims’, Mair’s advice reflected the generally optimistic mood of 
the 1980s that saw programmes as worthy endeavours that were in need of 
anthropological nuance (ibid:11).  
In sum, critical studies of development programmes before the 1990s largely 
confined themselves to examining programmes and their stated aims. They often 
used a mixture of ethnographic evidence, programme materials and recorded 
blunders to show what they had missed about life in the places they were 
undertaken. Some pointed towards the lack of care from distant politicians and the 
professionalisation of the sector as a cause, whilst others lamented that 
anthropological knowledge was only sought once things had gone wrong. 
Accordingly, it was often argued that with better understandings of local cultures and 
the adoption of participatory methods development programmes could improve the 
lives of those they touched. Few, therefore, questioned the ideologies underpinning 
                                                 
43 As is clear from this thesis’ conclusion, it is striking how little the conclusions of contemporary studies differ. 
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development programmes or the organisations implementing them, even less delved 
into the nature of the relationship between developers and those to be developed.   
 
Post-development  
In the early 1990s a growing number of authors inspired by post-structuralism began 
approaching and deconstructing development as a discourse (Sachs, 1992; Hobart, 
1993; Latouche, 1996). Broadly, they argued that the dominant development 
discourse continues the historical practice of powerful Western states and 
organisations constructing notions of the ‘Third World’ and ‘underdevelopment’ to 
justify their interventions. Some even suggested that development practice must be 
abandoned as an outdated, unfair and ultimately harmful enterprise. As explored 
later, their writings caused controversy and were heavily critiqued. Nonetheless, their 
contributions have since been grouped under the label of ‘post-development’ and 
they have had a lasting effect on critical development studies.  
To make their arguments, many of the post-development authors used Foucault’s 
(1979, 1981) ideas to portray development as an instance of ‘power-knowledge’. 
Foucault (1979:27) argued that:  
 
‘Power and knowledge directly imply one another […] there is no power 
relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor 
any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time 
power relations.’  
 
In this sense, discourses can be understood as ways of constituting permissible 
knowledge, including objects and subjects, and the power relations that govern their 
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behaviour. This idea was explored in Foucault’s ‘archaeological’ studies which 
outlined how discursive formations – understood as systems of rules – emanating 
from modern institutions, such as prisons, clinics and asylums, have made particular 
statements about objects, people and the wider world possible, and others 
impossible (Foucault, 1972). This led Foucault to accord discourses a central role in 
constructing, constraining and ordering modern societies, including outlining 
identities and social relations.  
Building upon this in his ‘genealogical’ work, Foucault (1979) set about explicitly 
linking societal and institutional discourses to specific practices or techniques – such 
as interviewing, counselling, categorising, measuring or grading – that make 
populations ‘visible’ to governments, and sustain and legitimise constraining ‘regimes 
of truth’. He also introduced the idea of ‘biopower’ to capture how dominant 
discourses focussed on an entire population’s or group’s ‘conduct of conduct’ are 
internalised, causing individuals to effectively ‘discipline’ themselves, and patrol their 
own and one another’s utterances and behaviours (Foucault, 1979, 1981, 1982).  
This led Foucault (1991:91) to propose that the modern exercise of government – 
which he termed ‘governmentality’ – is not simply a matter of the coercive power of 
a sovereign or state over others. It also encompasses the population’s internalisation, 
and pursuit, of ends that are convenient for both the rulers and the ruled, such as 
‘the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its 
wealth, longevity, health, etc.’ Ends that are often collected under the label of 
‘development’. 
Governmentality, therefore, is a productive exercise of power that discursively 
constitutes its subjects, encouraging them to take part in the reproduction and 
maintenance of the relations that govern them.44 Nonetheless, this agency does not 
imply that individuals can easily identify, challenge or change existing discourses or 
the relations they support. Rather, Foucault argued that dominant discourses are 
                                                 
44 As Sarup (1989:87) argues, power for Foucault is ‘much more ambiguous, as each individual has at his or her 
disposal at least some power’.  
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adept at making themselves invisible by normalising themselves, isolating individuals 
and producing ‘docile bodies’. The implication is that power is at once dispersed and 
inescapable, whilst being most insidious and effective when it manages to hide itself 
within received wisdom or common-sense pronouncements and practices.  
The post-development’s authors adopted Foucault’s genealogical approach to trace 
modern development discourse to President Truman’s Four Point doctrine, which 
they argued articulated what would become the prevailing views of poverty, 
inequality and progress following World War II (Sachs, 1992; Esteva, 1991; Rist, 
1997).45 For them, this amounted to a new strategy and related set of concepts with 
which Western powers could legitimise their interests, including the spread of 
extractive forms of free market capitalism. Central to this, neo-classical economists’ 
concern with rationality and market equilibriums were argued to be the techniques 
for categorising, measuring and, supposedly, improving the lives of those living in 
developing countries. To embed these discourses, alternative ways of understanding 
relations between the West and the rest, such as through the prism of colonialism or 
the destructive sides of capitalism, were made invisible or, in Foucauldian 
terminology, deemed ‘abnormal’. 
Amongst these authors, Escobar’s (1995) book, Encountering development: the 
making and unmaking of the Third World, was seminal. He argued that 
development’s discourses and the practices they support are rooted in Western 
economic, political and cultural thought. Thus, they often dismiss or silence complex 
local histories, cultures and ways of seeing the world, and they wash over developing 
countries’ interconnections with and dependencies upon developed countries. This 
entails a ‘colonialization of reality’ that prevents any objections to development by 
internalising powerful countries’ and organisations’ visions in the minds of their 
subjects; understood as both the developers and those being developed (ibid:5).  
                                                 
45 Abrahamsen (2000) traces the study of developmental discourses to Said’s (1979) exploration of how 
European texts created representations of the Orient that justified colonialism.  
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Although he dismisses the idea of an organised conspiracy, Escobar’s argument 
strongly suggests that the purpose of development’s discourses is the maintenance 
of the domination of Western states over their former colonies. Indeed, he was, in 
part, attempting to address the orientalism of development organisations and, in 
part, to revive and update the out of fashion critiques made by dependency theorists 
that enjoyed popularity in the 1960s and 1970s (Said, 1979; Pieterse, 2000). For 
many, therefore, the post-development authors’ use of discourse analysis definitively 
undermined the notion that development is something that is neutrally or fairly done 
by one party to another, and it called for a radical rethinking of the role of powerful 
development organisations and the states that back them. 
Nonetheless, the early post-development authors were heavily criticised for their 
emotive portrayal of development’s discourses as totalising, and for failing to 
acknowledge the very real debates and differences of opinion within and among 
development organisations (Lehmann, 1997; Corbridge, 1998; Peet, 1999; Pieterse, 
2000). At best, these tendencies amount to moralistic grandstanding that neglects 
the material aspects of poverty and overlooks how development’s discourses play 
out on the ground. At worst, they encourage a dangerous relativism, strip 
development’s subjects of their agency and romanticise local cultures (Kiely, 1999; 
Storey, 2000). This has led some critics to question the ability of the post-
development authors’ approach to reveal anything useful, including potential 
alternatives to dominant ways of understanding development (Graaff, 2006; Nustad, 
2008; Kapoor, 2017).46  
 
Aidnography 
Partly inspired by the post-development authors, some ethnographers of 
development practice began to use discourse analyses and Foucault’s ideas to argue 
                                                 
46 For example, Kapoor (2017) uses a Lacanian psychoanalytic lens to argue that some of post-development’s 
most prominent writers subconsciously desire relatively little to change. In his terms, they have ‘surrendered’ 
to global capitalism and given up transformative ‘radical’ politics.    
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that programmes undertaken by states and international organisations are akin to 
‘anti-politics machines’.47 This idea was popularised by Ferguson’s (1990) study of a 
World Bank development programme in Lesotho. He suggested that due to the 
Bank’s experts writing Lesotho’s history, culture, politics and structural location 
within the region’s economy out of their diagnoses, the programme’s well-meaning, 
yet ultimately reductionist, interventions failed. 
To make his argument, Ferguson combined discourse analysis with a nuanced 
ethnography of the Bank’s programme. The enabled him to show that contrary to the 
Bank’s official texts, there was little evidence that Lesotho had been an isolated 
subsistence economy for over 100 years or that its people were unaware of the 
advantages of local cattle markets. Despite this, repeated iterations of the 
programme concentrated on these markets, whilst side-lining evidence that many 
men from Lesotho found regular work in South Africa, and that they kept surplus 
cattle as safe investment funds and to boost their social status. To make the point 
that these were conscious omissions by the bank’s experts, designed to construct 
Lesotho as a typical ‘less developed country’ in need of foreign intervention, 
Ferguson’s study juxtaposed the institution’s texts with widely available academic 
literature that detailed these socio-economic trends.  
Ferguson also argued that the programme had the unintended consequence of 
extending the state’s bureaucratic control. He showed that it built roads and an 
administrative centre that facilitated the state’s apparatus - including a post office, 
police station, and local branches of the Rural Ministry of Development - to gain a 
hold over areas of the country it had little presence in beforehand. This, he argued, 
was a political outcome that was likely to shape the everyday lives of Lesotho’s 
population far more than the programme’s misguided official goals ever could. 
However, he did not comment on whether this was to be welcomed or not. 
                                                 
47 I separate discourses and practices for conceptual clarity, whilst acknowledging that many post-structuralists 
would not.  
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In the search for explanations for the outcomes he documented, Ferguson (1990) 
drew upon Foucault. He pointed to development’s embrace of governmentality; 
which he suggested amounts to the misguided belief that ‘the main features of 
economy and society [are] within the control of a neutral, unitary, and effective 
national government, and thus responsive to planners’ blueprints’ (ibid:72). 
However, his critique was aimed at both the actions of development’s foreign experts 
who believe they can write and then engineer their desired realities into existence, 
and at those that view development as something brought about by states that are 
relatively autonomous from their societies. Thus, he poured doubt on the idea that 
development can be a replicable technical exercise, removed from the unique 
conditions of the places it touches. 
In Ferguson’s wake a new research agenda began to be tentatively mapped out.48 It 
argued that studies must turn the lens on the developers themselves, including their 
thoughts and the ideologies driving the organisations that employ them. However, as 
these institutions are not easily accessed, methods that analyse development’s texts 
– including its wider policy papers, plans, pamphlets and evaluations – were called 
for. Not only would this help researchers to better interpret the data collected from 
fieldwork, it would also begin to address international programmes’ extra-local and 
multi-sited natures by revealing the chains of actors and ideas that enable them. In 
an introduction to a collected volume of such works, Gould (2004) labelled this field 
‘aidnography’.        
Aidnography shares the post-development literature’s conviction that words, 
language and representations have very real impacts on people’s lives. Accordingly, 
many of its authors argue that development’s failures and unintended outcomes 
stem from its tendency to discursively organise the world into developed and 
underdeveloped states and populations. They contend that this is done to denote 
those with the technical expertise to drive transitions towards modernity and those 
in need of their continued ‘trusteeship’ (Cowen and Shenton, 1996). Whilst, on the 
                                                 
48 There is no single statement of this agenda, but Gasper’s (2004) essay is a good introduction. 
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ground, they show that this entails that programmes increasingly focus on the 
everyday conduct of participants and their relations with one another. 
For some aidnographers, this is a continuation of development organisations’ thinly 
veiled attempts to legitimise the domination of the West over the rest in the post-
colonial era. This includes efforts to make developing countries’ populations accept 
of the miseries of structural adjustment programmes, relocations and conflicts that 
have been wrought in the name of their improvement. For the majority, however, 
the greater goal is to show how development’s well-meaning yet reductionist 
ideologies are being appropriated and challenged, and how its programmes can 
improved with alternative forms of knowledge, including the voices and political 
practices of those its organisations aim to help (Simon, 2007; Nustad, 2008). In this 
sense, they are more sympathetic to the professed aims of development 
organisations than the post-development authors. 
In his later work, Ferguson (2011) has also argued that exposing how power 
permeates supposedly technical interventions should not be the endpoint of 
Foucauldian critiques of development. Instead, as Foucault himself argued, there is 
no reason why analysts cannot also reveal how power can be put towards 
progressive or valuable ends.49 This includes discerning how modes of politics 
engaged in by development’s subjects can inspire techniques or ‘arts’ of government 
that offer alternatives to dominant ways of doing development. In this sense, 
Ferguson’s initially pessimistic view of power and governmentality evolved into a 
potentially emancipatory research project. 
In recent years, commentators have argued that aidnography’s use of discourse 
analysis and Foucault’s concepts has matured (Johnson, 2008; Della Faille, 2011; 
Gardner and Lewis 2015). This has given rise to a body of focussed and nuanced 
explorations of the reductive tendencies of development’s most powerful 
                                                 
49 Although he did not detail the method of his genealogies, Foucault did devote an entire chapter in one of his 
early works to ‘change and transformation’ within which he stresses that discourses are far from static 
(Foucault, 1972). He also introduced the idea of ‘reverse discourses’ to describe the way in which subjects can, 
partially, resist their own constitution by adopting the language of dominant discourses (Foucault, 1981:10).  
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organisations and their favoured ways of conceptualising reality. It has also increased 
our knowledge of how their programmes’ ideas and techniques are appropriated or 
resisted on the ground. These insights have been used to highlight the contradictions 
within, and to offer potential ways of improving, the practice of development. As 
they inform the analysis made in this thesis, the chapter now explores some of the 
main contributions from this literature.  
 
Development’s texts 
In an early example of more focussed discourse analyses, Mitchell’s (1995) study of 
the United States Agency for Intentional Development’s (USAID) documentation on 
Egypt showed how it portrayed the country’s agricultural problems as natural 
questions of geography and demography, thereby, ignoring issues of redistribution 
and power. At the same time, the texts imagined the agency ‘as a rational 
consciousness standing outside the country’ (ibid:195). Accordingly, it neglected to 
mention USAID’s own ongoing campaign to get the government to slash grain 
subsidies to increase the competitiveness of American imports; a policy 
recommendation that would have severe ramifications for Egypt’s domestic food 
supplies and income inequality. In this way, Mitchell reminds readers that 
development’s discourses must be understood as situated within, not outside of, the 
domestic- and geo- politics animating the places on which they focus. 
Similarly, Biccum’s (2005) analysis of the United Kingdom’s Department for 
International Development’s (DIFD) in-house ‘Developments’ magazine traces the 
organisation’s self-representations in the late 1990s onwards. She argued that by 
constituting poverty as a threat to the benefits of globalisation, DFID simultaneously 
painted over the role of colonialism in underdevelopment, portrayed neoliberal 
variants of capitalism as the only solution and placed the ultimate responsibility for 
their own betterment on the impoverished peoples of the world. Biccum shows how 
this is achieved by framing poverty as a ‘lack of’ resources or education on the part of 
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the poor, rather than a ‘lack of control over’ the production of resources or 
distribution of public goods. Her study also shows how DFID’s interventions are 
justified through appeals to morality and United Kingdom’s self-interest. This, she 
argues, legitimises the ‘civilising’ mission Western nations have been engaged in 
since colonialism (ibid:1006). 
Although the texts development organisations produce often remain unread, it is 
clear from such investigations that some of them have the ability to orientate the 
wider field (Ravallion and Wagstaff, 2012; Doemeland and Trevino, 2014). This power 
was recently alluded to during the launch of the World Bank’s World Development 
Report 2017 in London. During the panel discussion, the report’s Co-Director 
commented that it ‘basically legitimises bringing these [its own] issues to the table’ 
and adds ‘institutional back-up’ to those looking to set the development sector’s 
agenda.50 Put another way, he was arguing that the Bank’s annual reports are able to 
set the direction and meaning of development for others. In this regard, it is notable 
that the Bank has long seen its role as producing knowledge about development. 
Indeed, it has described itself as the ‘knowledge bank’ since the mid-1990s and 
devotes around 25-30% of its budget to this end (Calkin, 2014).51  
Exploring the Bank’s role in shaping the wider field, a recent paper draws on 
Bourdieu’s ideas to argue that it enjoys great symbolic capital (O’Donovan, 2017).52 
This allows its experts to successfully disguise when they are drawing upon its stocks 
of economic and political capital to introduce new ideas and ways of understanding 
development. Attesting to the Bank’s success in this, textbooks offering broad 
histories of development theory and practice often do so through chronologically 
organised summaries of the Bank’s reports.53 Furthermore, a cottage industry of 
commentators respond, both favourably and negatively, to each new publication it 
                                                 
50 ‘What institutions do countries really need - keynote and panel discussion’. UK launch of the World Bank's 
World Development Report 2017, Overseas Development Institute, 1st March 2017. (Accessed 02/03/2017) 
51 The Bank’s 1998/9 report was called ‘Knowledge for Development’ (WB, 1998). 
52 See Chapter Two for a discussion of symbolical capital. 
53 For examples see - Howell and Pearce (2001) and Carothers and de Gramont (2013). 
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releases.54 This includes the rush by less influential organisations to realign their 
publicly stated aims with the Bank’s latest ways of describing developmental 
challenges. Despite this, rumours about, and evidence of, conflicts during the 
construction of the Bank’s reports occasionally offer rare glimpses into the contested 
nature of their creations. They suggest that the ideas underpinning them are arrived 
at through negotiations between experts and powerful interests, thereby, peeling 
away what could be thought of as the ‘myth’ of their objectivity and political 
neutrality (Wade, 2001, 2002).55  
In recent years, a growing broader stream of literature has sought to trace the 
evolution of popular concepts, such as social capital, neoliberalism, participation and 
poverty, in development organisations’ grand orientating texts (Cammack, 2002, 
2004; Fine, 2010). It shows how each gain in popularity and are stretched so as to 
explain increasingly more areas of social life, only to be dismissed once enough 
commentators point out that the ‘emperor has no clothes on’. This has led to the 
often heard lament that development is littered with the rise and fall of ‘buzzwords’ 
and ‘fuzzwords’ designed to raise support for powerful organisations’ latest policies 
and to obscure details that may undermine their claims to positions of authority 
(Cornwall and Eade, 2010). 
Within this genre, Nielsen et al’s (2014) study of DFID’s discourses around its 
engagement with Rwanda stands out for its methodological rigour. Encompassing 
DFID’s overarching institutional policy statements and its country specific ‘strategy 
papers’ from 1997-2009, it highlights the inherent contradictions between professing 
a desire for democracy and human rights, and the reality of championing economic 
growth under an authoritarian Rwandan government. The study’s long view enables 
it to capture how new discourses are introduced to DFID’s texts as it becomes 
                                                 
54 For example, here are three blog posts from different organisations in the wake of the Bank’s latest World 
Development Report: Kossoff, S. ‘The WDR 2017 on Governance and Law: Can it drive a transformation in 
development practice’. From Poverty to Power Blog. January 31, 2017. (Accessed 28/02/17) Booth, D. ‘Two 
landmark publications from the World Bank and DFID bring ‘good fit’ governance into the mainstream’. 
Overseas Development Institute. 7th February 2017. (Accessed 28/02/17) Levy, B. ‘Two cheers for the (draft) 
2017 Governance and the Law World Development Report’. 21st September 2016. (Accessed 28/02/17) 
55 For Laclau (1990), ‘myths’ are attempts by discourses’ authors to correct disturbances and contradictions 
caused by events that cannot be accounted for by their totalising visions of society.  
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increasingly clear what has been, what cannot and what may be possible to achieve 
on the ground. For example, the texts take a less confident tone that shifts the 
burden of the responsibility for development to recipient nations as discontent with 
globalisation and the results of structural adjustment programmes in Africa and 
elsewhere became clear in the mid-2000s. To do this, the authors show that DFID as 
turned towards the good governance discourse, its texts increasingly ignored the way 
debt servicing severely limits developing countries’ efforts to live up to the agenda’s 
principles.  
The authors show that the mounting contradictions in DFID’s proliferation of 
discourses eventually caused it to justify its aid to Rwanda and the support it gave its 
authoritarian regime through the introduction of a ‘trade-off discourse’ (ibid:64). 
Reminiscent of the ideas propagated by sequentialist democratic theorists, this 
discourse put immediate economic development before democratic freedoms which 
it was argued might jeopardize the purported progress that the country had made 
since 1994’s genocide (Carothers, 2007). In this way, the authors carefully reveal how 
development’s discourses are often forced to adapt as they seek to counter 
mounting contradictions and prove unable to ignore difficult ground realities. 
Other studies have unpacked development’s latest ideas to explore how they spread 
new forms of governmentality. For example, Abrahamsen’s (2000:133) analysis of the 
‘good governance’ agenda in Africa argues that this discourse heralds an 
‘exclusionary’ form of democracy that ‘cannot incorporate the majority of the 
population or their demands in any meaningful way’. This is because its minimalist 
approach to democratisation has largely concentrated on institutional forms, formal 
political rights and procedural multi-party elections, whilst portraying civil society as 
a force that spontaneously arises ‘from the liberalisation of the economy and the 
reduction of the state’ (ibid:65). On the ground, this has meant that support to civil 
society has consisted of ‘nurturing the bourgeoisie and creating an enabling 
environment for business’. At the same time, aims such as the ‘empowerment of the 
people’ have been reduced to devising mechanisms for the co-production of public 
goods by states and private enterprises (ibid:61-65).  
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Abrahamsen suggests, therefore, that development’s discourses can be explored to 
uncover how, since the 1990s, its leading institutions have conflated a minimalist 
notion of liberal democracy and an entrepreneurial conception of civil society, with a 
neoliberal drive to spread markets and reduce the state’s responsibilities. She 
contends that this has created an unsolvable paradox for many African governments 
in that meeting the political demands of indigenous social movements – such as calls 
for redistributive policies – would entail rejecting the economic reforms required by 
their international backers. Doing so would lead to African governments’ own 
downfalls as aid flows cease and foreign investors look for more favourable contexts. 
Abrahamsen concludes, therefore, that in much of Africa democratisation has meant 
the victory of a form of unresponsive and unaccountable form of governance 
favoured by coalitions of domestic economic elites, donor organisations and 
international creditors. In a similar argument, Mkandawire (1998) has suggested that 
good governance and the conditionalities that accompany it create ‘choiceless 
democracies’. 
 
Development programmes 
A more ethnographic stream of literature investigates how development’s 
contemporary discourses play out on the ground in the programmes organisations 
support. For example, Bryant’s (2002) research on environmental NGOs in the 
Philippines explored how governmentality is a defining feature of their activities. He 
showed that by normalising their own discourses around threats to biodiversity, 
foreign and state-backed NGOs persuaded peripheral peoples to view themselves as 
both the problem and solution to environmental degradation.  
For Bryant, this can be understood as part of a wider process in which NGOs have 
been instrumental in constituting the country’s ‘citizens’ since the Philippines’ 
restoration of liberal democracy in 1986. As part of this, environmentally focused 
NGOs have tutored people in the art of patient and peaceful negotiations with the 
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state and outsiders, including transnational corporations. Whilst this undoubtedly 
gave them a voice with which to temper the processes of change occurring around 
them, Bryant argues that their internalisation of outsiders’ discourses and uptake of 
their practices also made an opening for ‘processes of governmentality to intrude 
ever more systematically into the lives of marginalized peoples’ (ibid:287).  
Accrodingly, Bryant understands NGOs as reflecting contradictory processes: On the 
one hand, they promise to represent marginalised people and to empower them to 
challenge the state, including its support for potentially harmful developmental 
schemes orchestrated by global companies. On the other, through imparting their 
discourses and worldviews they ensure that marginalised peoples come to view 
themselves as the problem and, therefore, in need of the state’s stewardship. Put 
another way, the NGOs encouraged them to internalise a form of ‘state control 
through self-regulation’ (ibid:268). In his more recent work, Ferguson set out similar 
ideas by arguing that development organisations and domestic NGOs often collude 
over a form of ‘transnational governmentality’, both by helping to make populations 
visible to states and other international actors, and by spreading new ways of 
conducting themselves and monitoring one another amongst them (Gupta and 
Ferguson, 2002; Ferguson, 2006). 
Li’s (2007:126) influential study of colonial and post-colonial development 
programmes in Indonesia makes similar arguments.56 It shows how the programmes’ 
discourses simplified and depoliticised the problems – including, ‘growing 
landlessness’, ‘high indebtedness’, ‘vulnerability’ and ‘displacement’ – in the places 
their schemes represented. This allowed their planners to make visible and ‘render 
technical’ the challenges they faced, whilst ignoring the potential political causes and 
remedies for poverty and marginalisation.  
Constrained by what could and could not be included within their apolitical 
assessments, Li shows that the programmes became increasingly focussed ‘upon 
                                                 
56 An entire section of the journal Annals of the Association of American Geographers (January 2010) was 
devoted to discussion of the themes in Li’s (2007) book.  
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conducting the conduct of villagers’ or, put another way, intimate social relations at 
the local level (ibid:267). Using Foucault’s idea of governmentality, Li argues that this 
required the villagers to adopt neoliberal governance discourses and practices which 
‘seek to render their target group entrepreneurial, participatory, responsible and 
corruption-averse’ (ibid:16). This encouraged competition among villagers and 
persuaded them to monitor one another’s actions, whilst absolving themselves, 
wider society and the state of any responsibility for poverty reduction.  
This process was well illustrated through Li’s exploration of the discourses deployed 
by the World Bank’s recent Kecamatan Development Project, which sought to use 
participatory practices to empower marginalised Indonesian villagers. Li argues that 
although the project succeeded on its own terms, even reducing measurable 
instances of corruption in local development projects, its focus on the villagers’ 
everyday conduct side-lined any chances of them mobilising to address the structural 
causes of their impoverishment. This taming was initially achieved by locating the 
project outside of the state. Some years later, once participants were socialised as to 
their own responsibility to monitor one another and the neoliberal state’s limited 
obligations the Bank transferred ownership of the project to the government. In this 
manner, the project constituted both responsible neoliberal citizens and a state that 
could never be at fault. Moreover, Li reveals that the apolitical template it spawned 
was exported by the Bank to East Timor and Afghanistan (ibid:278). 
Li also drew upon Gramsci’s idea of hegemonic struggle, touched upon in Chapter 
Two, to trace the extent to which the project’s subjects stayed within or challenged 
the boundaries it set for them. Challenges came from those participants that 
questioned its rules and the limited responsibilities it gave to the state. Thus, the 
project’s reductive discourse both rendered problems apolitical and technical, and 
‘inadvertently stimulated a political challenge’ from the very subjects it sought to 
constitute (ibid:25). In this way, readers are reminded that development’s subjects 
often retain a measure agency with which to reject debilitating discourses despite the 
inequalities between themselves and developers. 
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Similarly, Everett’s (1997) research documented how local and national elites in 
Bogotá, Colombia, sought to use the era’s popular mantras of ‘sustainable 
development’ and community ‘consultations’ to legitimate programmes that would 
benefit them to the detriment of the city’s slum dwellers. However, it also detailed 
how the re-appropriation of these discourses and activism by the slums’ residents 
was able halt some of the elites’ more destructive plans. To do so, Everett draws 
upon Scott’s (Scott, 1987, 1990) work on the variety of, often subtle, ways in which 
marginalised communities organise to resist the blueprints for betterment crafted by 
powerful groups and institutions. He notes that those subject to them are often well 
versed in the false promises and feints of development’s planners, yet they find 
themselves in such unequal positions that overt resistance proves difficult and 
creative alternatives that work within dominant discourses must be sought.  
Robins' (2003) study of the post-apartheid South Africa’s land restitution processes 
also uncovered how local populations variously resist, appropriate or hybridise the 
discourses of NGOs and the state. However, he shows how people’s responses to 
interventions cannot be easily interpreted as either wholesale rejections or as 
endorsements. Instead, they are more often selective appropriations of components 
of development schemes by people that desire control over which aspects of 
modernity they accept. Following others, he argues that through these actions South 
Africans are able to forge ‘indigenous modernities’ that allow them to begin to 
reconcile their own discourses and understandings of development with those 
imposed on them from above (Appadurai, 1991; Gupta, 1998).  
More broadly, Robins (2003) suggests that through careful ethnographic studies of 
actual programmes, analysts will swiftly reject the totalising and agency stripping 
critiques of the post-development authors. This includes dispensing with the idea 
that development’s subjects can be easily understood as either simple ‘docile 
bodies’, ‘depoliticised consumer-zombies’ or ‘revolutionaries’ (Robins, 2003:291-
283). In their place, nuanced investigations of how development plays out on the 
ground in ways that are variously welcomed, rejected and appropriated by ordinary 
people can occur. 
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A recent paper on the instrumentalization of donors’ empowerment discourses by 
participants in AIDS programmes in Malawi and Zambia also reveals how 
development’s fuzzwords can be appropriated (Anderson and Patterson, 2017). 
Through interviews and focus groups, the authors suggest that the malleability of 
donors’ ideas of empowerment means they can be used on the ground to pursue a 
variety of aims which are not necessarily connected to the programmes’ own. For 
instance, those skilled at adopting donor language position themselves as 
interlocutors between the programmes’ implementers and the communities they 
seek to engage. This allows them to monopolise opportunities to court the 
programmes’ resources and pursue future employment opportunities with other 
initiatives. The lack of definition of what counts as success within the programmes 
also allows entrepreneurial participants to portray themselves as empowered 
associations, when they are really hastily put together for visiting programme 
managers. However, the authors’ do not frame these appropriations as deceptions. 
Rather, they argue that the programmes’ own shallow understandings of what 
empowerment may look like within the contexts they work is at fault.  
More broadly, the authors worry that the portrayal of the programmes’ participants 
as the ‘clients’ of its implementing NGOs mimics local understandings of the unequal 
patron-client relationships that structure their communities. They suggest this may 
be reinforcing notions of dependency between less skilled or marginalised 
participants and the programme. They also argue that the emphasis on competitive 
individualism – enabling participants to ‘stand on their own’ – within donors’ 
empowerment discourses undermines the ideas of solidarity and unity that people 
living with HIV often suggest are essential to their social, emotional and material 
survival. In conclusion, the authors argue that further attention must be given to how 
donors’ fuzzwords and buzzwords can stand in tension with more collective aims and 
silence bottom-up alternatives to the problems they seek to address.  
It is with this complexity in mind that Cupples et al.'s (2007) Nicaraguan study 
showed how an alliance between citizens, local municipal leaders and NGOs was able 
to unpick dominant development discourses and to refashion them through 
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‘discursive activism’. To do this, the authors drew on Gramsci’s idea that ‘organic 
intellectuals’ can challenge hegemonic narratives or received common-sense by 
revealing oppressive contradictions. For the alliance’s leaders this entailed 
destabilising the notion that there is an adequately theorised universal model of 
development, with ‘projects’ as its primary technique. As part of this, they argued 
that people’s aspirations for development had not been, and could not be, captured 
in the one-off and limited consultative Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PSRP) 
produced for Nicaragua under the tutelage of foreign experts. And they produced 
their own version of the PSRP as a way to open deliberations with the government 
and its international backers. Through such processes the alliance began to conceive 
of, and practice, development as an ongoing process of pressure, negotiation, 
agreement and social mobilisation. Cupples et al. conclude that their actions remind 
us that development’s discourses are never fully settled. 
Similar findings from elsewhere have been used to argue that outsiders still have a 
valuable role to play in carefully highlighting potential alternatives to current 
dominant ways of doing development (Simon, 2007; Nustad, 2008; McKinnon, 2008; 
Ferguson, 2011; Gardner and Lewis 2015; McKinnon, 2017). For these authors, 
research must go beyond the perverse pleasure of exposing ‘another example of 
neoliberal devastation, or neo-imperialist dispossession, or capitalist exploitation’ 
(McKinnon, 2017:2). In addition, it must begin to uncover how development’s 
subjects strive to forge their own emancipatory paths.  
This requires researchers to examine programmes as potentially rich sites of 
experimentation within which discursive and material appropriations and 
transformations by development’s subjects offer potential solutions to their 
challenges. Of course, such research must first and foremost ensure that the 
outcomes of these experiments do no harm, including investigating who benefits and 
who is excluded from such adaptations. Doing so takes seriously the agency of 
development’s subjects, whilst dismissing the reductive image of development as 
something that is necessarily done by one party to another. 
97 
 
As part of this, others have focussed research on the chains of actors involved in 
implementing, monitoring and reporting on development programmes (Wilson, 
2006; Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Mosse and Lewis, 2006; Mckinnon, 2007). They often 
twin the ideas of ‘translation’ and ‘brokerage’ found within Latour’s (1996) work on 
scientific communities and Francophone Africanist literature on local development 
projects (Bierschenk et al., 2002). Among them, Mosse’s (2005) ethnography of a 
DFID funded participatory programme in India stands out. Specifically, he sought to 
show how development generates:  
 
‘mobilising metaphors (‘participation’, ‘partnership’, ‘governance’) 
whose vagueness, ambiguity and lack of conceptual precision is required 
to conceal ideological differences so as to allow compromise and the 
enrolment of different interests, to distribute agency and to multiply the 
criteria of success within project systems.’ (ibid:230)  
 
Mosse argued that confronted with the reality of implementing programmes in 
developing countries, an ever-expanding pool of terms and concepts is vital for 
development’s ability to justify its interventions and sustain its myths. His role as a 
periodic consultant on the programme he studied gave him a unique position from 
which to make this critique. Accordingly, he outlined how it began in typical fashion 
by representing ‘people and places as embodiments of those development problems 
which are amenable to the donors’ currently favoured apolitical, ‘technical’ 
solutions’, [sic] which, in his programme included both better agricultural technology 
and the era’s fashion for community participation (ibid:61). Yet, he showed how as 
DFID’s wider policy objectives changed due to political events outside of India the 
programme increasingly hired a range of ‘development brokers’, including 
consultants and technical experts, that could ‘translate’ practices on the ground into 
terms that ensured it remained funded.  
98 
 
The study suggests that to be deemed successful development programmes must 
often devote a lot of energy to making outsiders’ privileged knowledge and 
technologies the ‘authors of history’. On the ground, however, favoured ideas such as 
‘participation’ or techniques such as ‘new seeds’ may be understood by participants 
as ‘patronage’ and ‘credit’ (ibid:232). Thus, Mosse highlighted how development’s 
justificatory discourses can constrain and orientate entire chains of actors by 
assigning them varying levels of responsibility for interpreting and representing 
ground realities in ways that accord with the worldviews of the powerful. He 
concluded that:  
 
‘the problem is not that policy is coherent, but that a policy machinery 
fabricates its separation from political economy and that it becomes 
isolated from the local or vernacular to which it is nonetheless materially 
connected through fund flows, information and in other ways’ (ibid:243).  
 
In partial remedy for such fabrications, Mosse argued that further ethnographic 
research that uncovers how developments’ discourses are far from politically neutral 
and how they play out on the ground is needed.   
 
The work of development’s discourses  
The point of the reviewed aidnography authors’ analyses is not to suggest that 
development institutions’ portrayals of the problems afflicting the populations they 
work among are complete fantasy. Rather, it is to show what their discourses can do 
in terms of normalising particular ways of seeing the world and what development’s 
subjects can do to retain a measure of agency over decisions that affect their lives. 
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Before proceeding further, it is worth summarising the major contributions of this 
literature that will be useful for the rest of this thesis. 
Firstly, as the literature’s use of discourse analysis has matured and been connected 
to ethnographic studies of actual programmes, few would now argue that 
development is comprised of a single totalising discourse, able to oppress the agency 
of those it touches. On the one hand, those taking a long view have shown how new 
discourses are added and old ones dropped from the field to enable it to account for 
contradictions and failures as they arise. As we have seen, this is particularly 
discernible where powerful development organisations are unable to confront the 
political causes of the problems they face, and where their interventions have been 
challenged by observers or the populations they hope to help.  
On the other, investigations of programmes have shown how development’s subjects 
can appropriate and resist its discourses. Such appropriations can be carried out by 
actors and organisations with very different ideas of what development looks like. 
Indeed, some may simply wish to use development’s buzzwords and fuzzwords to 
add legitimacy to their own narrow goals. Whilst others may genuinely harbour a 
desire for aspects of modernity championed by states and outsiders. Thus, 
development’s discourses should be thought of as a multitude of overlapping and, 
sometimes, inconsistent and conflicting attempts to legitimise the worldviews and 
practices of both the powerful and not so powerful. This places the idea that contests 
and struggles can be seen within developments’ key texts, and in the how 
programmes play out on the ground, at the centre of research.  
Secondly, the reasons for the depoliticization of development identified by Ferguson 
(1990) have been expanded. Indeed, rather than simply reducing the number of 
variables that development’s planners consider, depoliticization is increasingly 
portrayed as a way to create space for the introduction of outsiders’ favoured modes 
of governance. The reviewed authors have shown that in some cases this transfers 
the responsibility for empowerment and development to the participants in 
programmes themselves. Within the literature, this logic has often been identified in 
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the rise of participatory programmes that concentrate on participants’ micro-social 
relations and modes of conduct. 
For some, this amounts to a marketisation of development in that governance 
becomes the aggregation of numerous transactions among, what are assumed to be, 
rationally competing rights bearing citizen/subjects. It also heralds a neoliberalisation 
of governmentality in that the responsibility for outcomes are transferred to citizens 
who are taught to monitor themselves, one another and, increasingly, the state. As 
will be explored further in the next chapter, it could be argued that through such 
processes development programmes are increasingly rendering politics a technical 
matter of having the proper knowledge, tools and discipline.  
Nonetheless, studies have revealed how those in charge of ‘doing’ development 
often expend considerable energy representing complex ground realities, including 
instances of resistance or failure, in idioms and discourses that are acceptable to 
those higher up the field’s material and ideational food chains. To do this, entire 
networks of actors and institutions that straddle the conceptual divides between 
society, state and the international realm are engaged in authoring development and 
the lives of those it touches. This raises important questions about both what they 
are writing, for what ends, and who they are accountable to. 
 
Limitations of the literature 
In a recent article examining the use of discourse analysis by development 
academics, Ziai (2015:16) points out that although the 1995 edition of The 
Development Reader contained one piece out of 27 using the approach, by 2008 it 
contained nine out of 54 (Corbridge, 1995; Chari and Corbridge, 2008). This suggests 
that the critique of the link between power, knowledge and practices offered by the 
reviewed authors has been largely accepted by development studies’ gatekeepers. 
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Despite this, two important criticisms remain of the contemporary literature’s 
combination of discourse analysis and on the ground research. 
The first, less well addressed criticism, concerns a lack of methodological rigour 
amongst authors deconstructing the field’s discourses. For example, of the works 
reviewed in the this chapter only Nielsen et al's (2014) exploration of DFID’s 
discourses on Rwanda substantially outlines its methodology for analysing the texts it 
covers.57 It has been argued, therefore, that authors’ use of  discourse analysis could 
benefit from grounding within the methodologies and theoretical debates animating 
the wider discipline (Della Faille, 2011). Otherwise they risk being portrayed as 
‘polemicists’ rather ‘than researchers whose ideas come from strongly empirically-
grounded methodology’ (ibid:233). It may also mean they overlook the struggles and 
alternatives within development’s grand orientating texts themselves. Accordingly, 
the next chapter outlines the methodology for its own analysis of what I call the 
‘social accountability discourse’. 
Second, it is notable that studies such as Mosse’s (2006) have relied on development 
organisations providing access to programmes and their participants, often by way of 
authors working on or consulting for them. On occasion, this has created tensions 
between the interpretations of researchers and the programmes’ own ways of 
representing themselves. Indeed, the acceptance of Mosse’s book required 
arbitration between his university and his former colleagues because they argued 
that their work had been unfairly represented. This speaks to the difficulty of 
conducting studies that aim to connect development’s discourses to explorations of 
how actual programmes unfold. It also raises the issue of the researchers’ own claims 
to privileged knowledge and an unbiased position from which to comment. As this 
thesis unfolds, I take time to explore these issues and outline how I have sought to 
account for them. 
                                                 
57 Rist (2002) has outlined his own methodology in Les mots du pouvoir: senset non-sens de la rhetorique 
internationale (Words of Power: Meaning and Non-sense in International Rhetoric) but it is not available in 
English. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how since the post-development authors’ deconstructions of 
development’s dominant discourses, others have combined their use of discourse 
analysis with nuanced ethnographic explorations of how programmes unfold on the 
ground. Often sympathetic to broad aims of the programmes they study, they have 
revealed how they can depoliticise the problems they seek to address and put the 
focus on the conduct of participants. For some, this reduces the space for alternative 
forms of politics and notions of the good life, and it sustains myths about the 
technical solutions to impoverishment and those with the expertise to deliver them. 
Nonetheless, their studies have also shown that the contradictions within 
development’s discourses and programmes create room for observers to criticise 
them and, in some cases, for participants to appropriate their terms and techniques. 
It is within such contradictions and processes that researchers are encouraged to 
look for emancipatory alternatives to how development is done. 
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Chapter Four 
The Social Accountability Discourse 
 
 
‘… neoliberalism transmogrifies every human domain and endeavour, along with 
humans themselves, according to a specific image of the economic. All conduct is 
economic conduct; all spheres of existence are framed and measured by economic 
terms and metrics, even when those spheres are not directly monetised. In neoliberal 
reason and in domains governed by it, we are only and everywhere homo-
economicus.’ 
(Brown, 2015:9-10) 
 
 
This chapter investigates the ‘social accountability discourse’ within key texts from 
the World Bank and the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID). It traces how the struggle between the 1990s activist and 
neoliberal civil society theorists has continued within them. Yet, it also shows how 
since the turn of the century information and citizens’ abilities to choose their service 
providers has increasingly been posited to make up for the deficiencies of both. In its 
extreme form, this entails a vision of civil societies as comprised of atomised citizens 
operating in markets of service providers, and it renders empowerment and activism 
a matter of choosing between a limited number of priced techniques, templates and 
practices. It is argued that this should be understood as part of the ongoing 
replacement of homo-politicus by homo-economicus within contemporary neoliberal 
ideals of governance and citizenship. The chapter concludes that this is reducing the 
perceived need for spaces for identify formation and a deliberative public sphere, 
thereby, limiting the potential of powerful organisations supporting radical 
democratising projects.  
 
Critical discourse analysis 
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The chapter uses critical discourse analysis – understood as both a method and 
theory – to argue that the emerging field of social accountability does not merely 
seek to help the societies it touches but attempts to reconstitute them in its 
neoliberal vision of citizenship and governance. Indeed, fields of knowledge are as 
much about struggles to shape the world and legitimise competing ideologies, as 
they are about understanding reality. In preparation for the analysis, this section 
outlines Fairclough’s (1989, 1992, 2006), and Chouliaraki and Fairclough's (1999), 
critical theories and methodologies that seek to uncover processes of change and 
ideological struggle in texts. 
Although there are several schools, critical discourse analysts start from the premise 
that alongside constituting the social world, discourses are also constituted by other 
social practices.58 Analysts argue that discursive practices are partially shaped by 
forces that are not entirely discursive in character, such as political systems or the 
distribution of resources. This separates them from the encompassing 
poststructuralism of theorists such as Laclau and Mouffe (1985) for whom discourse 
is fully constitutive of the world. It also allows them to avoid the agency constricting 
historical materialism of Marxists that view the economy as deterministic.  
The ‘critical’ element of discourse analysis focusses upon the role discourses play in 
the reproduction of unequal power relations. In a recent work, Fairclough (2016:91) 
describes this as an interest in the semiotic aspects of ‘social wrongs’. Although this 
encompasses the Foucauldian idea that hegemonic discourses produce their subjects 
and objects, critical discourse analysts also call for studies to uncover how discourses 
can challenge wider social orders. To reveal when this may be the case, Fairclough 
proposes that discourses are more or less ideological, with ideologies understood in 
the Gramscian sense as ‘constructions of meaning that contribute to the production, 
reproduction and transformation of relations of domination’ (Fairclough 1992:87, 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999:26).  
                                                 
58 Breeze's (2011) article gives a good introduction to the different schools. 
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This leads critical discourse analysts to argue that discourses’ subjects are ‘capable of 
acting creatively to make their own connections between the diverse practices and 
ideologies to which they are exposed, and to restructure positioning practices’ 
(Fairclough 1992:91). This agency can be uncovered through a combination of the 
systematic analyses of discursive events, such as conversations, newspaper reports, 
scientific texts or political propaganda; and the use of broader social and cultural 
theories that explain the wider, non-discursive, social practices these events are part 
of. In this framing, every text must be thought of as part of a discursive event that 
works in combination with non-discursive mechanisms to either reproduce or 
challenge hegemonic ideologies and, by extension, the wider social order. Critical 
discourse analysts, therefore, argue that they can expose and, in some cases, 
influence the discursive processes that change societies (Wodak and Meyer, 2016:5). 
To visualise these relationships, Fairclough has provided a three-dimensional 
analytical model (Figure 1). It suggests that analyses of discursive events consists of 
three undertakings: description, which involves analysis of linguistic structures at the 
level of the text; interpretation, which involves analysis of the discourses articulated 
in both the production and consumption of the text; and explanation, which involves 
hypothesizing as to whether the event is reproducing or challenging dominant 
discourses, a discussion of which social or cultural theories may explain this, and 
what the wider implications for the prevailing social order may be. Fairclough 
suggests that different research questions will give different weights to each of these 
tasks, and that the order in which they are undertaken will vary. 
 
Figure 1: A model for analysing discursive events (Fairclough, 1992:73)59 
 
                                                 
59 The label is the author’s own, the model is Fairclough’s. 
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For Fairclough (1992:43), the primary aim of analyses is to document hegemonic 
struggles over the ‘order of discourse’, which is understood as the relatively stable 
configuration of all the discourses routinely used within the studied institution or 
social field. Discerning support for or challenges to dominant ideologies requires 
attention to both the linguistic features of texts, and the creative ways discourses are 
deployed and combined within them. In terms of linguistics, Fairclough recommends 
focussing on the text’s choice of ‘vocabulary’, the ‘grammar’ underlying simple 
sentences, whether the text displays ‘cohesion’ through the repetition of words or 
synonyms, and the impression the broad ‘structure’ of the text conveys.  
By describing such features, it becomes possible to say something about what 
processes the text may be engaged in or, put another way, the impression its authors 
are trying to leave on readers. For example, many analysts focus on how texts create 
particular subjects and hide others; and how they subscribe them agency and 
responsibility or take it away through the use of nouns over verbs, or the passive 
voice; processes termed ‘nominalization and passivization’ (Billig, 2008). The text’s 
choice of metaphors is also considered to be of importance for the work it does to 
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emphasize some aspects of the world it describes and to wash-over or exclude 
others. When combined, these elements of texts add to its ideological force.  
Fairclough (1992:84) refers to the mixing of discourses within texts as 
‘interdiscursivity’. He suggests that creative mixes are likely to be a sign of socio-
cultural change. In contrast, conventional mixes indicate the stability of dominant 
ideologies and the wider social order. Thus, analysis often involves documenting the 
introduction of new and the omission of old discourses to an institution or social field 
across a range of texts.  
As part of this mixing all texts draw on other texts and, accordingly, are positioned 
within historical ‘intertextual chains’ (ibid:103). This can be explicit, as in the case of 
referencing, or implicit, as when texts use lexicons and phrases common to other 
texts. Analysts, therefore, must also pay attention to which parts of other texts are 
included, omitted or modified. Drawing these elements out is particularly important 
for those that wish to add weight to their interpretations but are unable to analyse 
the large sample sizes common to teams engaged in corpus linguistics (Verschueren, 
2001).   
For critical discourse analysts, power is always a factor in the production and 
interpretation of texts. Indeed,  
 
‘the seemingly limitless possibilities of creativity in discursive practice 
suggested by the concept of interdiscursivity – an endless combination 
and recombination of genres and discourses – are in practice limited and 
constrained by the state of hegemonic relations and hegemonic struggle.’ 
(Fairclough, 1992:137) 
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To account for power and add to the plausibility of their interpretations, analysts 
must draw upon non-discursive social theories. This involves an attempt to map the 
economic and institutional conditions – or macro contexts - that texts are part of, 
subject to or seeking to challenge. This process helps analysts to ask questions about 
what the ideological, political and social consequences of particular discursive events 
may be. Put another way, it is how ‘the research project is rendered political and 
critical’ (Phillips and Jørgensen, 2002:87). 
Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999:101ff) have argued that a focus on creativity, 
hegemonic struggles and the wider social context can be usefully paired with 
Bourdieu’s idea of ‘fields’ touched upon in Chapter Two. Discursive events within 
which actors (re)articulate various discourses can serve to uphold the status quo 
within particular fields. However, sometimes they challenge it by introducing new 
discourses or through creative formations of existing discourses that bend a field’s 
rules. Thus, discursive events can offer analysts windows onto ongoing struggles 
within fields as actors compete to better their position and to set the rules for others. 
Whether these events have an affect depends on actors’ own reserves of different 
types of capital; cultural, economic, social and political. Furthermore, whether they 
have affects beyond their own fields will be determined by how specific fields are 
inserted into the wider social orders.  
 
Approaching the social accountability discourse 
The rest of the chapter uses Fairclough’s approach to critical discourse analysis to 
guide an interrogation of the social accountability discourse. It asks what roles the 
discourse gives civil society in development, including democratisation, through an 
exploration of key orientating texts from the World Bank and DFID. It suggests that 
the authors’ creative mixing of discourses should be interpreted as signs of ongoing 
ideological struggles. In the conclusion, theories of the wider processes of socio-
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cultural change these struggles are part of are offered to unpick their potential 
consequences.  
Chapter Two’s exploration of the activist and neoliberal streams of civil society 
theory provides the broad background for the emergence of the social accountability 
discourse in the early 2000s. Whilst the aidnography literature reviewed in Chapter 
Three offers clues as to the sorts narrower processes that may be discernible in the 
analysed texts. At the same time, however, steps were taken to assure the analysis 
does not simply confirm the unproblematic continuation of these processes. Thus, it 
uncovers additional processes within the texts, including tensions created by the 
introduction of new discourses and the re-emergence of older ones.  
Critical discourse analysts argue that it is easier to identify ideological struggles by 
analysing a range of chronologically linked texts (Breeze, 2011). However, 
Fairclough’s writings offer few guidelines on constructing a sample. Thus, I take 
inspiration from the aidnography literature’s focus on what Chapter Three called 
‘development organisations’ grand orientating texts’. I am, therefore, interested in 
documents that provide public organisational mission statements, those that could 
be considered institutional think pieces and those which are clear efforts to shape 
wider understandings of particular issues. To select these texts, I have drawn from 
my own knowledge of the field. As this presents the introduction of bias, it is worth 
exploring this decision further. 
In a recent publication, Wodak and Meyer (2016:7) argue that reflecting upon the 
discourse analyst’s position - although rarely done - is important because: 
‘Researchers, scientists and philosophers are not situated outside the societal 
hierarchy of power and status but subject to this structure’.60 Accordingly, it is 
important to comment upon from where I approach the following analysis. Outside 
of academia I have an interest in what can broadly be characterised as left-wing 
politics, which for me includes issues such as the ideologies underpinning welfare and 
inequality. I am also often one of Mosse’s (2004) ‘brokers’ – employed to translate 
                                                 
60 This is why Fairclough’s (2016:106) work highlights his own political leanings. 
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programmes’ realities into development’s dominant discourses. I would argue that 
this has left me with a grasp of the general arguments within the social accountability 
literature and how they are likely to be consumed by people within the wider chain 
of development actors. 
As others have commented upon, however, my political leanings and this ‘insider’ 
positioning makes critically reviewing the social accountability discourse’s key texts a 
challenging process (Mosse and Lewis, 2006; McKinnon, 2017). To add weight to my 
claim to be able to do so, the analysis devotes significant space to probing the chosen 
texts’ intertextuality. Following Ferguson’s (1990) own comparison between World 
Bank’s project reports and the widely available academic literature on Lesotho, this 
approach unpicks what evidence or, more accurately, whose voices and lived 
experiences the texts’ authors consciously choose to emphasize, downplay or omit. 
Thus, other texts and research explicitly referenced by the analysed organisational 
texts are explored to pre-empt the retort that their authors were unaware of 
alternative ways of seeing or understanding the issues they focus upon.  
Attention is also given to the analysed texts’ forewords, introductions, overviews and 
policy recommendations. As Nielsen et al.'s (2014) study shows, these sections 
provide windows onto how powerful institutions want their texts to be received. This 
includes how they see their own roles and what they want others to do in response 
to their latest ideas. Thus, they are rich in ideological material and provide fertile 
ground upon which to make interpretations as to what their texts are trying to do.  
Before proceeding, it should be mentioned that the analysis was undertaken with the 
aid of computer software, both for simple quantitative queries of the texts’ use of 
key words and phrases, and for coding the texts and organising memos. The 
codebook and samples of the coding process are given in Appendix 1. 
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The turn to accountability 
The mixed results of efforts to engage civil societies in the 1990s contributed to the 
creation of a critical movement among development academics and practitioners in 
the early 2000s. It sought to refocus development on empowering civil society to 
engage in public politics, including interacting directly with state institutions and 
politicians (Blair, 2000; Dryzek, 2000; Cornwall, 2002; Fung and Wright, 2003; 
Gaventa, 2003). Its thinkers argued that interventions and governance reforms had a 
greater chance of impact and sustainability if they were partially crafted by citizens 
and were buttressed by popular pressure. Indeed, the emerging idea was that civil 
society could be supported to foster the democratic norms and sustain the political 
will needed for development. This represented a shift from the mid-1990s’ focus on 
participation in projects, to a participation in governance. 
At the heart of this was a renewed focus on decentralisation and substantive 
citizenship (Johnson and Start, 2001; Moore and Putzel, 2001; Leftwich, 2005; Eyben 
and Ladbury, 2006). Thus, the ability of citizens to hold their governments to account 
for the provision of public goods took centre stage. To do this, tentative arguments 
arose that donors should not be afraid to mobilise civil society actors beyond the 
professionalised NGO mould, including traditionally marginalised groups and local 
informal powerbrokers, such as unions, professional associations and religious figures 
(Chandhoke, 2001; Kopecky and Mudde, 2003; Edwards, 2005).  
Underpinning this was a broader effort to move development away from a narrow 
focus on institutional efficiency, markets and economic growth, and towards a 
concern for human rights and citizens’ ‘capabilities’ (Sen, 1999). In this framing, the 
powerlessness that stems from unaccountable governance is a constitutive element 
of poverty and the realisation of promised rights should be among the goals of 
empowerment. Green (2016:16) has suggested that this turn was also partly inspired 
by the ‘colour revolutions’ in Eastern Europe and the role Western European and 
North American development organisations focussed of civil society strengthening 
programmes played in them. 
112 
 
Western development organisations, however, did not drop their interest in ‘good 
governance’ as a means through which states enable markets. Rather, they grafted 
onto it an argument that interventions should encompass efforts to give citizens’ the 
means with which to advocate for better services and reforms. Signalling this change, 
the World Bank (2000:15) suggested that poverty is partly an outcome of 
‘voicelessness and powerlessness’; whilst DFID (2000:18) began to argue that 
‘development involves a process of political struggle over priorities and access to 
resources’. 
As Moore and Putzel (2001) argued, however, major development institutions had 
traditionally only sought to grapple with politics to explain what had gone wrong with 
their interventions. This meant they routinely separated ‘development politics’ from 
‘development management’, and only turned to the former to explain failures in the 
latter (Corbridge, 2005:191). In contrast, the emerging focus on participation in 
governance demanded knowledge of how civil society, political society and states 
engage one another in developing countries. Indeed, it appeared to take the 
arguments of the authors reviewed at the end of Chapter Two that has studied 
actually existing civil societies seriously. 
Given this turn, Carothers and de Gramont (2013) argue in their book, Development 
Aid Confronts Politics: The Almost Revolution, that the first decade of the 2000s 
witnessed the explicit (re)introduction of political goals and methods to the 
development. From this emerged a focus on ‘demand-side’ programmes, of which 
social accountability or, as they were more commonly known in the early 2000s, 
‘voice and accountability’ and ‘accountability and transparency’ programmes were a 
major category. 
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The WDR 2004: mainstreaming social accountability  
Whereas social capital was arguably the Bank's 'missing link' between civil society, 
good governance, economic development and democracy in the 1990s, the 
publication of the World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for the 
Poor went a long way towards replacing it with ‘information’ and ‘choice’ (WB, 2003). 
It is also now considered to be the foundational text for Western development 
organisations’ rethink of the relationship between civil society, service provision and 
accountability (ODI, 2014). Thus, we begin our exploration of the social accountability 
discourse with the WDR 2004. A theoretical discussion of the wider social processes 
animating it will be given following the analyses of all the texts. 
 
Accountability relationships 
Early on the WDR 2004’s authors declare that their ‘economics approach to making 
services work […] is informed by the guidance on participation and empowerment 
that international human rights instruments provide’ (ibid:34). Accordingly, they 
champion the importance of citizens’ ‘voice’ and ‘mobilisation’ for ensuring 
accountable governance. They suggest that accountability operates through two 
main routes (Figure 2): firstly, the ‘short route’ which describes relationships 
between citizens and officials working in governance or service providing institutions. 
For example, a parent-teacher association provides a regular means by which citizens 
can directly engage schools’ staff and local authorities. Secondly, the ‘long route’ 
which focuses on citizens engaging elected representatives who, ideally, respond by 
exerting downward pressure on service providers, dispersing resources, reforming 
governance institutions or enacting new policies.  
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Figure 2: Key relationships of power (WB, 2003:49) 
 
REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT 
 
To activate either route the WDR 2004 argues that rights bearing citizens require 
information on the operation and policies of state institutions. For example, it 
frequently refers to the Ugandan government’s decision to make information on how 
schools’ budgets are spent public as pivotal to the reduction of leakages in the 1990s. 
Thus, poor service provision is portrayed as a problem of informational deficits or 
asymmetries between citizens, service providers and politicians. 
Within the WDR 2004's logic, however, the relative newness of liberal democracy and 
elected representatives are positioned as a leading cause of poor services in many 
developing countries (ibid:5, 54, 81-90, 115). Thus, the long route to accountability is 
depicted as more often than not failing the poor. Four main reasons are offered for 
this: Firstly, the short-sighted voting choices of the poor; secondly, clientelism and 
patronage that distorts accountability relationships between politicians and service 
providers; thirdly, politicians' lack of capacity and technical skills with which to 
monitor state services; and, lastly, politicians’ concerns for equity which can be 
detrimental to the state’s efficiency. Given the complexity of these challenges, the 
report’s emphasis is placed on the short route to accountability. 
 
Constituting market actors 
Alongside information, the WDR 2004 calls for the short route to be activated 
through decentralisation, privatisation and the implementation of user tariffs. This 
mix seeks to depoliticise services and improve citizens’ potential to monitor and 
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choose from a range of providers, thereby, creating a competitive market that 
incentivises reforms. However, the proposed remedies are framed as technical and 
administrative challenges, rather than ones of collective action or politics. This is 
most notable when the WDR 2004 declares that: ‘the long route of accountability 
involves politics’ […] ‘Unlike the short route of accountability between clients and 
providers’ (ibid:78). Put another way, the report frames the society-politician 
relationship as political, whereas the society-provider relationship is deemed 
apolitical. 
Furthermore, even though the report states decentralisation is about the ‘political 
voice’ of the poor, its choice of vocabulary to describe their empowerment leaves the 
reader with few reasons to believe voice should be equated with broad or collective 
political participation (ibid:129). Indeed, the poor are consistently labelled as the 
'clients' of service providers or ‘consumers’ of public goods, building the idea that 
material and categorical inequalities between them and service providers can be 
addressed through 'customer power'. It is also argued that competitive markets of 
state and non-state service providers will allow citizen/customers to 'vote with their 
feet' (ibid:9). In a striking metaphor, the report even compares its ideal service 
provision model to the periodic interactions between sandwich vendors and their 
customers (ibid:47).  
In this sense, once informed, there is little to stop poor people from using the short 
route to accountability to improve service provision (ibid:64). All that is needed is for 
them to conduct themselves as self-interested economic actors. The WDR 2004 
covers the techniques, including citizens’ scorecards, participatory budgeting, and the 
publication of performance indicators, that they can avail themselves of to do this. 
For their part, programme managers are given guides as to which of these techniques 
to deploy within different contexts and for the improvement of different services. 
Nonetheless, the report’s authors warn that even in those contexts that are broadly 
‘pro-poor’, politics must be managed so as to avoid ‘unsustainable populism’ 
(ibid:198). 
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As the report itself suggests, however, this somewhat simplistic model of 
accountability ‘is not reality because it portrays only one direction in the relationships 
between actors. Rather, actors are embedded in a complex set of relationships, and 
accountability is not always the most important’ (ibi:51). Nonetheless, the WDR 2004 
does not devote much time to exploring these relationships. Nor does it reference 
the widely available academic literature that could point readers in the direction of 
relevant phenomenon such as debt bondage, caste systems, or gender norms.61 
Instead, in a turn of phrase that largely closes such discussions, the report’s authors 
talk of the 'sad consequences' of the 'social distance' between clients and providers 
without elaborating what this means (ibid:25).  
In contrast, the WDR 2004 conducts a thorough dissection of poor people’s conduct. 
For the most part, this consists of using terms from neoclassical economics to 
describe poor people's cultures and choices as lacking rationality. For example, the 
choice not to spend on public goods with long term benefits, such as education, is 
described as a 'bias in poor families towards present consumption' (Ibid:31). At 
various points the responsibility for poor service provision is blamed on their ‘lack of 
demand’, which is variously attributed to their gender or civic skills (bid:4). There are, 
however, only a few scattered references to their, perhaps rational, mistrust of the 
state, subordinate social positions or how impoverishment itself can pose a barrier to 
demanding or accessing services. In this regard, it is notable that in one of the few 
places readers get to hear the voice of a poor person they - presumably having been 
socialised into the Bank’s market-based logic - declare: “We will never allow the 
government to again give us free water” (ibid:10). 
 
Professionalised civil society and sceptical democrats 
Within the WDR 2004, 'altruistic' NGOs have a competitive advantage in reaching 
poor people, raising awareness, amplifying their voice and acting as the state’s sub-
                                                 
61 Please see Chapter 2. 
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contractors (bid:104). They are positioned as the linchpins of reform minded 
coalitions that straddle the state-society divide and that exert popular political 
pressure. Beyond NGOs, the WDR 2004 warns of the dangers of unions and interest 
groups that block reforms, take advantage of ill-informed voters, pressure service 
providers to bend the rules, or capture donors’ programmes. In economists’ 
language, such groups threaten to ‘subvert the incentives’ of service providers 
(ibid:97). Yet, where altruistic NGOs are absent, and the historical context is 
unfavourable, the report offers little advice as to how civil society mobilisation occurs 
or can be supported. Instead, a case study from Jamaica is used to suggest that in 
some places donors may have to settle for the ‘benevolent capture' of their 
programmes by more educated or wealthy members of society (ibid:209). 
Although it is argued that the absence of democracy entails 'huge downsides', the 
WDR 2004 retains a scepticism of liberal democracy throughout (ibid:115). This 
extends to worries that the citizens’ groups it recommends setting up or supporting 
could undermine the democratic accountability of local governments. Perhaps as a 
result, the report does not outline a sophisticated model for how accountability 
relationships translate into democratic outcomes. Indeed, it only contains a few lines 
on how donors should support the ‘core political processes and values, such as 
representation, accountability, tolerance, and openness’ required for democracy 
(ibid:210). This leaves readers to draw the conclusion that it is the aggregation of 
numerous accountability relationships - framed as multiple individualised 
transactions within competitive markets - that will leads to democracy. 
It is worth noting, however, that the WDR 2004 often appears hesitant when giving 
its recommendations and regularly highlights the ambiguity of the processes it 
discusses. For example, it argues that decentralisation and information may cause 
voters to base their decisions on performance indicators, or it may simply turn them 
away from politics altogether. For general readers, these admissions may be received 
as encouraging signs of the authors' humbleness in the face of the complex 
challenges they seek to address. Whilst for cynics, they could be interpreted as a 
response to past difficulties the WDRs’ authors have faced when making 
118 
 
recommendations from limited and contested research (Wade, 2002). Yet, as we will 
see in the next section on intertextuality, the Bank’s authors are much more certain 
when describing the factors and mechanisms that led to accountable governance in 
their chosen case studies. 
 
Case studies and intertextual omissions  
The WDR 2004 uses several key case studies to highlight accountability relationships. 
Amongst them is Porto Alegre's participatory budgeting scheme begun in the early 
1990s (WB, 2003:201-202). However, missing from the report’s description is the 
documented effort of the Workers’ Party to organise citizens into associations and, to 
paraphrase a community organiser, the encouragements they were given to 
'politicise the pothole' (Abers, 1998). There is also no mention of how city officials 
reduced the costs of participation by visiting poor neighbourhoods for meetings. 
Furthermore, Abers’ emphasis on how the ensuing political conflicts gradually broke 
down patron-client relations and eroded poor people’s long mistrust of the state is 
absent. In this sense, much of the politics of accountability in Porto Alegre’s scheme 
is missing.  
The case study of Kerala’s impressive human development indicators – overviewed in 
Chapter Two – is similarly reductive (WB, 2003:44-45). In it, the Bank’s authors draw 
upon research from Sen and Dreze (1996), and Dreze and Sen (2002), to compare 
Kerala to Uttar Pradesh, arguing that the success of the former and failure of the 
latter cannot be attributed to the laws they share as members of India’s wider union. 
Instead, they highlight the 'political activism' of Keralans and their high levels of 
literacy (WB, 2004:45-46). They also argue that Uttar Pradesh suffered from 
'clientelist, caste, [and] class-driven politics'. 
Although this explanation appears to be rooted in political processes, it washes-over 
the details other observers have emphasized. For example, it does not describe the 
119 
 
decades long and conflictual process of identity formation – specifically from a caste 
to a class based identity - found in Heller's (1996, 2000) work. Central to this were 
demands for land reforms, social safety nets and workers’ rights, all of which changed 
the structural constraints on poor Keralans and facilitated their participation in 
political forums at multiple levels of governance.  
In contrast, the WDR 2004’s authors appear to take Kerala’s political activism for 
granted and instead focus on literacy rates (WB, 2003:45). This effectively negates 
the hard-won history of synergies between the state’s social movements and political 
parties, and the consistent transfer of ideas from one to another. It also overlooks 
how ‘as politics became synonymous with popular mobilisation’ party leaders 
gradually learnt that they had to be responsive to broad-based demands (Heller, 
2000:509). It is arguable that this allows the report’s authors to side-line discussions 
of the ideologies underpinning mass civil society mobilisation in Kerala. This ensures 
that the case study fits their broader thesis that information is the key variable in 
successful development.  
Perhaps the WDR 2004's most interesting intertextual omissions can be found in the 
setup for its fourth chapter ‘Clients and Providers'. It is worth quoting it in full: 
 
‘This report and this chapter try to give the term “empowerment” a 
precise and concrete interpretation. Speciﬁcally, the chapter discusses 
the potential for poor people to inﬂuence services by:  
Increasing their individual purchasing power.  
Increasing their collective power over providers by organizing in groups.  
Increasing their “capacity to aspire”: allowing them to take advantage of 
the ﬁrst two by increasing the information needed to develop their 
personal sense of capability and entitlement.’ (WB, 2003:54) 
 
120 
 
Here, the report references Appadurai’s idea of the ‘capacity to aspire’ developed 
from his ethnographic research on the cultivation of ‘deep democracy’ among civil 
society activists in Mumbai’s slums (Appadurai, 2001, 2004).62 However, it then 
continues, leaving these ideas unexplored. In the spirit of an intertextual analysis, 
covering them further here may give readers a clue as to why. 
Appadurai (2001, 2004) suggests that due to a host of personal and everyday crises - 
from a lack of access to basic services to illness and predation – poor peoples’ 
political horizons or ideas of the 'good life' can often appear limited to outsiders. 
Nonetheless, he argues that their aspirations must be understood as embedded 
within wider distributional inequalities and normative contexts that constrain what 
can or cannot be publicly said. Indeed, analysts that focus upon, whilst also 
decontextualizing, poor people's more visible demands – such as calls to repair burst 
watermains or provide paved roads – risk losing sight of their broader desires for 
structural changes. An oversight that he warns can lead to the search for solutions in 
the 'science of calculations' and 'market-economics' (Appadurai, 2004). 
Instead, Appadurai argues that an appreciation of how everyday interactions 
between ordinary people and powerholders can gradually change power relations is 
required. Central to this are uncovering and supporting opportunities for poor people 
to deliberate social, economic, and political issues amongst themselves and with 
powerholders in terms that challenge their prejudices. He illustrates this through the 
case of a global network of slum residents headquartered in Mumbai that has 
enabled its members to cultivate a shard identity through internal deliberations. And 
describes how the network’s activists engage World Bank and state officials at 
exhibitions they organise to showcase home-grown solutions to sanitation; 
something he terms the ‘politics of shit’ (Appadurai, 2001:35). In the process, he 
explores their bottom-up development of techniques for collecting data with which 
to hold authorities to account, labelling it a form of ‘governmentality from below’ 
                                                 
62 Confusingly, the WDR 2004 quotes the phrase ‘capacity to aspire’ found in Appadurai’s similar book chapter 
from 2004, yet it only references his paper from 2001. I have confined the majority of my analysis to the paper 
form 2001.  
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(ibid:33). Appadurai concludes that it is only by exploring such interactions that 
analysts can begin to grasp how everyday demands contribute to the deepening of 
democracy. 
Appadurai is also clear about what is at stake when poor people raise their voice. He 
frames the challenge as about supporting them to find a 'way into the public sphere 
and visible citizenship without resort to open confrontation or public violence' 
(ibid:38). To do this, he argues that the first principle should be that no one knows 
more about how to survive poverty and hold the state to account than poor people. 
Thus, rather than outsiders’ monitoring techniques or models of mobilisation, the 
aim should be to horizontally connect poor people’s associations to one another to 
foster an exchange of ideas.  
The second principle concerns a vision of 'politics without parties'. By this, Appadurai 
is not arguing that accountability is apolitical. Rather, the suggestion is that 
accountability requires the poor to seek to work with whoever is in power. Through 
such collaborations, marginalised groups gain opportunities to challenge societal 
prejudices, whilst presenting themselves as a political force to be negotiated with. 
This pragmatic approach includes building relationships with service providers, 
elements of the bureaucracy and politicians, not just monitoring them. It also entails 
a 'complex political vision about means, ends and styles that is not entirely utilitarian 
or functional' (ibid:30).  
Lastly, he uses the example of a slum dwellers’ network to suggest that 'deep 
democracy' is more likely when civil society associations are transnationally 
networked with similar communities in other states. Following an established 
literature on global social movements, this can increase their capacity to operate in 
local contexts.63 Nonetheless, he warns against the ‘projectisation’ and bureaucratic 
demands that arise when entering into partnerships with international donors or 
other funding bodies (ibid:40).  
                                                 
63 See Chapter Two’s section entitled ‘Civil society under totalitarianism’. 
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The WDR 2004 omits these principles. For example, the wider report does not cover 
the importance of horizontal and transnational civil society networks. Nor does it 
point towards the kinds of contextually appropriate opportunities, data or language 
that the poor require to assure their voices are heard by powerholders. Indeed, what 
sets Appadurai's work apart from the WDR 2004 is his attention to how mobilisation 
occurs, the necessity of forming shared identities and challenging debilitating 
prejudices in appropriate vernaculars. He is also unambiguous about the role of 
politics in all accountability relationships.  
 
DFID’s texts 
The chapter’s analyses of DFID’s texts starts from 2006 with an exploration of a White 
Paper (DFID, 2006b) and a report on how the organisation engages civil society (DFID, 
2006a).64 Broadly viewed, the White Paper re-orientates DFID following 2005’s 
international 'Make Poverty History' advocacy campaign; whilst the report provides a 
snapshot of how it perceives civil society at home and abroad. The section then 
moves onto a Briefing Note on accountability from 2008, the next departmental 
White Paper released in 2009, and a 2011 paper on DFID’s approach to 
empowerment and accountability (DFID, 2008b, 2009, 2011a). Together, they reveal 
the organisation’s contribution to the social accountability discourse in the years 
immediately after the Bank’s report and just before its funding of the Supporting 
Transparency Accountability and Electoral Process (STAEP) programme in Pakistan 
examined in the thesis’ second half. 
 
Activist leanings  
                                                 
64 White papers are publicly available policy documents produced by the British Government that set out their 
proposals for future legislation. 
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From the outset, the forewords of DFID’s texts from 2006 take a different tone from 
the WDR 2004. In them, DFID's Secretary of State (an elected politician) frames civil 
society as something that he himself is part of by referencing his participation in the 
Make Poverty History marches. This leads to the suggestion that a globally connected 
civil society must ensure that the promises made in response to the campaign by 
politicians, states and international organisations are kept. The campaign is also 
presented as the latest evidence that politics can make a difference to the lives of the 
world's poor (DFID, 2006b:5). In this manner, civil society is portrayed both as a 
watchdog of the state and as a realm of political activism.65 
What could be called an activist discourse permeates DFID’s early texts. For example, 
the authors of the 2006 report suggest that civil societies 'provide people with the 
space for association, reflection and action.' (DFID, 2006a:5). They argue that from 
such spaces civil society can organise to represent the poor in local and national 
policy forums and contribute to the accountable governance. To illustrate, the £6.6 
million of support DFID gave to a Bangladeshi legal-aid organisation that helps poor 
families claim their land rights is highlighted. The funding is said to have helped the 
programme’s participants find their 'strength in numbers' (ibid:7). To support such 
initiatives, DFID is repeatedly cast as the 'partner' of global and national civil society 
organisations, and as ideally positioned to build their capacities.  
This wide mandate is accompanied by warnings that civil societies consist of a diverse 
range of actors and interests, and that many may not care for the welfare of the 
poor. Nevertheless, echoing Hegel, this complexity is portrayed as one of civil 
society's strengths, allowing it to be a source of innovative solutions to pressing 
problems and the co-producer of vital services with states. Indeed, where possible, 
DFID seems to prefer that states are the producers of public services in collaboration 
with civil society. It also repeatedly opposes users’ fees for basic services such as 
                                                 
65 This framing of civil society builds upon the vision set out by DFID's first Secretary of State and a White Paper 
from 2000 that raised the need for 'a bigger voice for poor people in the determination of government policy' 
(Short, 1999; DFID, 2000:23). 
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education or health, using case studies to argue that they ‘deter’ the uptake of 
services by the poor (DFID, 2006b:53-54).  
The challenge, as DFID’s 2006 White Paper portrays it, is to understand how the 
politics of state-society relations plays out. Thus, donors are encouraged ‘to think 
more politically', including gaining in-depth historical and political knowledge 
(ibid:10). To do this, it is argued that the organisation’s focus is shifting from 
professionalised NGOs to the political roles played by a wider range of civil society 
actors, which by its 2009 White Paper include voluntary groups, the media, trade 
unions, diaspora, faith-based groups, co-operatives and professional associations. 
The importance of engaging civil society organisations that have often been 
marginalised from mainstream funding pots or that may require additional capacity 
building to ensure they can demonstrate their results is also stressed. This, the paper 
suggests, will ensure funding reaches the people that need it most and that they have 
a voice in decisions that affect their lives. However, perhaps in acknowledgement of 
the difficulty of directly engaging in contentious politics, the paper highlights how 
DFID often works through intermediaries, such as INGOs or domestic networks of civil 
society organisations (DFID, 2006a:12). 
In its early texts, therefore, DFID constructs a vision of heterogenous civil societies, 
able to be both ideas factories and partners for developmental states. It even argues 
that that interest groups can themselves be drivers of development (DFID, 2006a:9). 
This contrasts with the World Bank's portrayal of a realm of, ideally, atomised market 
actors empowered to monitor the state and choose from competing providers. 
 
The politics of accountability  
The prefaces of the texts from 2006 also outline DFID's idea of development. Here 
the Secretary draws on Amartya Sen's influential book Development as Freedom and 
its premise that development should enhance the capabilities of the poor, not merely 
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stoke economic growth (Sen, 1999). As part of this, the White Paper enshrines ‘good 
governance’ - defined as the capabilities of states, their responsiveness to their 
citizens and their accountability - as one of DFID’s primary aims. Achieving it is 
framed as about civil societies, political parties, governments and their relationships, 
more than it is about building the right formal institutions. To empirically justify this 
focus, the Paper draws upon Kaufmann’s (2004) quantitative work on governance as 
an intervening variable between civil and political rights, and socio-economic 
development; and it references Sen’s (1981) famous argument that a lack of 
democracy, the absence of a free press and famines are causally related.  
For further empirical support the authors refer to DFID’s ‘Drivers of Change’ studies. 
Initially consisting of 20 country case studies commissioned in 2002/3, this research 
set out to understand the structural and institutional factors framing the political 
contexts within which individuals and organisations organise for good governance. Its 
findings are used to argue that ‘beyond the formal structures of the state, civil 
society organisations give citizens power, help poor people get their voices heard, 
and demand more from politicians and government’ (DFID, 2006b:23). They are also 
used to describe accountability as ‘ultimately’ about ‘the opportunity to change 
leaders by democratic means’ (ibid:20). Later the paper adds that the key ingredient 
is ‘active involvement by citizens – the thing we know as politics’ (ibid:8). It also 
suggests that ‘popular political pressure’ from civil society organisations and the 
media can tackle ‘corruption’, within which DFID includes ‘clientelism’ (ibid:28). 
Readers, therefore, are left in little doubt that DFID sees accountability as a political 
process. 
The clearest elaboration of DFID’s understanding of the relationship between 
accountability, politics and wider democratising projects is found in 2008’s Briefing 
Note. In it DFID fears that people living in democracies created after 1989 may have 
had their ‘hope’ and ‘expectations’ for ‘a better life’ dashed. It is warned that in these 
states everyday governance has ‘generated widespread popular disaffection with 
democracy as it is practised’ [sic] (DFID, 2008:2). For the causes of this democratic 
deficit the Note’s authors cast a wide net, pointing to everything from ‘globalisation’, 
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‘elite dominated party machines’ and ‘patronage-systems’, to the privatisation of 
state services and the informal social norms that sustain categorical inequalities such 
as ‘ethnicity’, ‘kinship’, and ‘gender relations’. They also include a discussion of how 
accountability institutions can fall foul of ‘capture’ and ‘bias’ (DFID, 2008b:10).66 They 
draw on Diamond’s (2002) research to suggest that this will lead to ‘vicious cycles’ in 
which ‘impunity generates impunity’ and the legitimacy of democratic states is called 
into question. 
To address this, the Note recommends uncovering and addressing ‘power relations’ 
at varying levels of governance, with a view to identifying actors from civil society, 
political parties and the state which can help bridge the gaps between poor people 
and decisionmakers. As part of this, it introduces the notion of ‘social accountability’. 
It is described as the ‘informal’ or ‘hybrid’ processes that involve citizens in the 
monitoring of state institutions, including local service providers, and those that 
enable them to participate in public deliberations with authorities. Furthermore, 
social accountability is framed as a relatively ‘new’ idea with the most potential for 
‘innovative’ relationships between ‘state entities and organised groups in society’ to 
emerge in contexts where traditional formal accountability institutions are 
compromised or lacking. Readers are warned that it can be particularly ‘controversial’ 
because it provides opportunities for excluded or marginalised groups to participate 
in governance and ‘state building’. The Note’s authors conclude their discussion of 
social accountability by, in part, attributing the idea to the World Bank’s Social 
Development Department. Although they do not reference specific papers or 
research. 
In short, DFID understands social accountability relationships as embedded in social 
norms, notions of ‘fairness’, and contentious politics. Unlike the World Bank’s image 
of citizens as consumers of services, it is unambiguous in its suggestion that civil 
society must be included in deliberations with both providers and their political 
                                                 
66 Capture refers to situations in which elites divert resources meant for the poor for their own benefit. Bias 
describes those in which elites or the social groups they belong to enjoy undue influence within the decision-
making processes of accountability institutions. 
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masters. Indeed, it views such interactions as central to good governance and 
democracy. 
 
Blending discourses 
Nonetheless, 2008’s Note also began to use many of the economic and market-based 
terms and concepts found within the WDR 2004. For example, it consciously adopted 
the Bank’s framework of ‘principles’ and ‘agents’ that had been borrowed from the 
theoretical literature on the governance of firms (Roberts and Milgrim, 1992). 
Furthermore, it suggested accountability relationships must leave authorities room to 
‘experiment’ and ‘innovate’, whilst ensuring they are under ‘surveillance’ and their 
‘performance’ is ‘monitored’ (DFID, 2008:5-6).  To illustrate the role ‘information’ can 
play in making authorities explain their decisions, it also used the WDR 2004’s 
Ugandan case study of the publication of school budgets. 
By DFID’s 2011 report on ‘empowerment and accountability’ the activists’ language 
of ‘participation’, ‘empowerment’, ‘fairness’, ‘legitimacy’ and ‘transformative social 
and political change’ is repeatedly used alongside concepts from the WDR 2004 and a 
new lexicon from institutional political economy (DFID, 2011). The latter introduced 
ideas such as the need to discern the inclusivity of countries’ underlying ‘political 
settlements’, and the ‘rules of the game’ (ibid:3).67 This way of conceptualising poor 
governance challenged analysts to investigate the balance of power between elites 
within any given context (Di John and Putzel, 2009). Although its related literature 
suggests that informal social norms are important, its goal has mostly been to 
uncover generalizable ‘doorstep’ conditions within which elites are incentivised to 
enter into peaceful coalitions, provide public services, and growth takes off (North et 
al., 2009; Khan, 2010). Accordingly, it harbours an instrumentalist view of civil 
                                                 
67 It is notable that that through its own funding of research centres, such as the Crisis States Research Centre 
at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and the Centre for the Future State at the Institute of 
Development Studies, DFID was instrumental in bringing these ideas to the mainstream and incorporating them 
into its conceptual frameworks. 
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society, portraying it as comprised of groups that elites call upon for support in their 
contests with one another. Thus, it is not overly concerned with accountability 
relationships. In this sense, DFID’s texts from 2008 onwards begin a blending of 
discourses that stand in tension with one another. 
Despite these discourses inclusion, 2011’s report retained a sophisticated 
understanding of empowerment and accountability (see Figure 3). This included an 
attempt to differentiate between different forms of empowerment. In a manner 
reminiscent of Bourdieu’s types of capital, a discussion of the different types of 
‘resources’ - including health, education, cash, self-confidence, and ICTs - people use 
to activate accountability relationships was included.68 It also continued to focus on 
addressing ‘power relations’ and suggested that identifying civil society organisations 
and political partners to link up should be central to programmers’ efforts.  
 
Figure 3: ‘Empowerment and accountability – step changes to enabling poor men and 
women to exercise greater choice and control over their own development’ (DFID, 
2011:2) 
 
                                                 
68 See Chapter Two. 
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Globalisation and value for money 
Two further discourses come to the fore within DFID’s more recent texts. The first 
concerns the interdependence of developed and developing countries. Within the 
texts from 2006, the development of poor countries is argued to be important for the 
prosperity of developed countries. Furthermore, it is discussed in the context of 
upbeat messages about the role of globally connected civil society organisations and 
British efforts to reform international institutions.  
By the 2009 White Paper, globalisation's pitfalls are the defining theme. Alongside 
climate change, global pandemics and economic shocks, terms such as 'injustice', 
'insecurity' and 'conflict' are regularly used to describe its outcomes (DFID, 2009). 
Moreover, the paper's authors fear that the progress that has been made in tackling 
poverty in some regions may be overridden by conflicts born of 'radicalisation' and 
'state failure' (ibid:15-16). In this framing, unaccountable and unresponsive states are 
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linked to contemporary conflicts, which due to increased interdependence are 
argued to threaten the safety of Britain’s streets (ibid:17).  
By 2009, DFID’s texts also contained another new discourse on the need for rigorous 
impact evaluations, both to demonstrate results and as a form of accountability to 
taxpayers. DFID argues that the World Bank is a leader in this area, and highlights its 
'strong culture of innovation, evaluation and continual improvement' (DFID, 
2009a:116). Given frequent references to the 2008 global financial crisis and the 
pressure Britain’s governmental departments have subsequently found themselves 
under to justify their spending, this could be understood as the introduction of ‘value 
for money’ discourse.69 Indeed, promises are repeatedly made to guarantee the 
'efficiency' and 'effectiveness' of DFID spending, with a focus on 'tangible' results.  
This discourse also permeates 2011’s report. Here, the capacities of civil societies, 
and the accountability of institutions and officials within developing countries is 
rolled into discussions of DFID’s own commitment to internal reviews and audits ‘to 
make every penny count’ (DFID, 2011:1). DFID also declares that it will seek to 
identify measurably successful initiatives that can be scaled up, with the overall aim 
of building a robust evidence base for future programmes to draw from. As if offering 
a clue as to how this should be done, two out of three of the report’s case studies of 
social accountability programmes point to randomised controlled trials as rigorous 
proofs of their impacts.  
 
Emerging evidence  
The authors of DFID’s 2011 report were able to draw upon a body of research that 
DFID had commissioned in the years leading up to its publication (McGee and 
Gaventa, 2010).70 Of this, the background paper produced on service delivery had the 
                                                 
69 This discourse is also identified by Nielsen et al's (2014) study of DFID texts from this era.  
70 This research was unconnected to that on political settlements. 
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most to say about social accountability programmes (Joshi, 2013).71 Although the 
background paper is not part of this discourse analysis and the thesis is not primarily 
interested in ‘what works’, it is worth briefly exploring it to gain a greater 
understanding of DFID’s thinking in the years immediately before it funded STAEP. 
Joshi’s paper reviewed qualitative and quantitative evidence supporting the theories 
of change underpinning social accountability programmes. This included those that 
had disseminated information on service delivery to citizens, trained them to monitor 
providers, and set up interfaces between citizens and authorities. It concluded that: 
‘The overarching lesson seems to be, not surprisingly, that the context, particularly 
the political context, matters’ (ibid:42).72 Within this she included the nature of civil 
societies, their relations with the state, the competitiveness of politics, the role of 
reform minded leaders, and the need for enabling environments created by a free 
media.  
Joshi (2013) also highlighted a major hurdle for those making connections between 
social accountability initiatives and ongoing democratising projects. Namely, that the 
era’s limited evidence offered relatively context free, static snapshots of interactions 
between citizens, service providers, and authorities. Part of the problem, Joshi 
argued, is down to disagreements over what exactly social accountability initiatives 
are meant to achieve; voice, state responsiveness, improved services, democracy, or 
a mixture of these things. This was causing most programmes to focus on measurable 
outputs, such as the activities undertaken, demands resolved or changes in the 
quality of service delivery rather than empowerment or structural changes. Put 
another way, Joshi’s review documented a confusion among the era’s practitioners 
over the means and ends of their initiatives. 
These confusions are left unexplored in the reviewed texts from DFID. Perhaps 
explaining why, within the journal article Joshi (2013) later produced from this 
                                                 
71 This reference is for the journal article that was produced from research carried out in 2010 in support 
McGee and Gaventa’s (2010) overview paper. 
72 For example, it highlights random control trials of similar community-based information dissemination 
programmes in India that returned diverse outcomes, strongly suggesting that the local context was important 
(Pandey et al., 2009; Banerjee et al., 2010).  
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research, she argues that practitioners wishing to take wider contexts seriously are 
confronted by institutional obstacles within development organisations themselves 
(Unsworth, 2010; Booth, 2011). These obstacles take two main forms: firstly, that 
many organisations still predominantly view state-society relations through the prism 
of the experience of Western countries. This causes them to concentrate on the 
development of formal governance institutions and to overlook localised, often 
informal, innovations that allow citizens to engage the state. Secondly, that the era’s 
propositions about the power of community monitoring and information to improve 
service delivery had been overstated as they fed development organisations’ need 
for simple solutions. In the process, research suggesting that often informal, messy 
political coalitions between service providers and their clients are vital for 
improvements was being side-lined due to its complexity. These issues - which are 
really about the political economy of the development sector - will be returned to in 
the thesis’ concluding chapters. 
 
A contested discourse 
So far, this chapter has explored DFID and the World Bank’s texts to uncover how 
they attempt to constitute developing countries and their citizens, their 
interdiscursivity, and positions within longer intertextual chains. However, critical 
discourse analysis also requires analysts to link their interpretations to theories of 
wider social processes. The idea is to discern whether they are challenging or 
reinforcing unequal power relations. To do this, this section argues that as 
neoliberalism has triumphed over liberalism in late modernity, the space within these 
development organisations for programmes that can support radical democratising 
projects has been contested.  
As Chapter One introduced, a number of critical authors focus on how neoliberal 
ideas of governance are reconfiguring understandings of citizenship (Gershon, 2011; 
Block and Somers, 2014; Davies, 2014; Brown, 2015). This is occurring because 
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market techniques and values are increasingly being imparted by powerful Western 
organisations and states to activities and domains - such as the family, education, and 
public life - where they have traditionally not been the primary concern. In the 
process, democracy is being hollowed out by atomised individuals acting 
competitively, in accordance with prescribed best practices, and the letter of the law.   
To illustrate how this has been achieved, Brown (2015) points to the experts, 
technical fixes and best practices that arose with the New Public Management and 
the Good Governance agendas in 1980s and 1990s Britain.73 Both doctrines look 
towards grading, benchmarking, and the transfer of approved models from one 
industry, institution, or state to another. Both have the spread of market values, such 
as individualism, competition and transactional relationships at their centre. Both 
have the increase of stocks of human capital and economic growth as their primary 
aims. Lastly, due to their propagation by powerful organisations and states, both 
enjoy significant symbolic capital with which to legitimise themselves.74  
Brown contends that to make room for these doctrines much of what the older, 
liberal civil society theorists argued was central to ‘homo-politicus’ must be 
forgotten. This includes identify formation, associationalism, public deliberations and 
messy contests between different perspectives or groups, and it encompasses acts of 
civil disobedience buttressed by social movements. In the process, democratic 
politics is reduced to deciding between different sets of techniques, templates and 
best practices recommended by the evaluations of economic experts – what Brown 
(ibid:118-9), drawing upon Weber, refers to as ‘instrumental reason’. Accordingly, 
Brown declares neoliberal citizenship and governance a ‘depoliticising epistemology, 
ontology, and set of practices’ (ibid:131).  
Brown does not discuss the ascendance of neoliberalism in powerful Western 
development organisations. Indeed, by the 2000s neoliberal macro-economic ideas 
had largely be discredited and were no longer openly propagated as catch-all 
                                                 
73 See Chapter Two for a discussion of both. 
74 See Chapter Two for a discussion of symbolic capital. 
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solutions to development (Murray and Overton, 2011). Nonetheless, adding to the 
arguments of the authors reviewed in the previous chapter, I argue that from its 
inception neoliberal ideas of citizenship have been discernible within the social 
accountability discourse’s take on civil society.  
As was shown, the authors of the World Bank’s WDR 2004 largely confined politics to 
the relationship between voting, governments and state institutions, or what they 
called the long route to accountability. Furthermore, the cause of poor or 
discriminatory services was attributed to cultural deficiencies and a lack of demand, 
understood as rationality, from poor people in developing countries. To address this, 
the Bank’s authors offered techniques that they can use to gain information and 
encouraged the cultivation of state-supported competitive markets of service 
providers. These recommendations were justified with stripped-back country case 
studies of how contemporary civil societies have challenged clientelism and driven 
institutional reforms. Throughout they were underpinned by a scepticism of mass 
political participation and leadership in young democracies.  
As they had removed much of the activity within the wider public sphere from their 
analyses, social accountability was framed as consisting of transactions between 
competing informed clients and service providers. This depicted empowered citizens 
as individual consumers, able to vote with their money or feet. In the process, the 
meanings of freedom, collective action, and popular sovereignty found within liberal 
political theory –the base for civil society theory’s radical activist version – were 
replaced with a focus on citizens’ responsibilities to monitor the state, act rationally 
and improve themselves. Within the report, it was argued that the tools and best 
practices to do this can be taught by foreign development professionals; a tutelage 
that substitutes for associationalism, democratic deliberations, political conflicts and 
disobedient social movements.  
DFID’s texts initially contrast with the Bank’s report. Indeed, they frame civil society’s 
role in accountable governance as embedded in asymmetrical, power laden and 
often confrontational political relationships. Furthermore, they suggest outsiders 
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have a valuable role to play in networking organisations, protecting them and 
supporting them to form productive relationships with authorities. Yet, as DFID’s 
texts began to encompass discourses from the WDR 2004, the organisation’s activist 
leanings increasingly shared space with neoliberal ideas of citizenship and 
governance. Accordingly, they began to take on board the Bank’s assumptions about 
the causal links between information, empowerment and accountability. 
New discourses on elite driven political settlements, the dangers of globalisation, and 
the requirement that programmes demonstrate value for money were soon added. 
As part of this, DFID’s texts also begun to make calls for measurable, scalable and 
transferable programmes, suggesting that civil society’s role in development can be 
paired down to sets of best practices, outputs and templates. These discourses have 
since been attributed to pressure on DFID from incumbent Conservative Party 
politicians – who introduced Britain to neoliberal ideology in the 1980s – that were 
keen to see the department justify its budget through an adherence to the ‘results 
agenda’ (Eyben, 2013; Valters and Whitty, 2017). This agenda can be broadly 
understood as the next step in the evolution of the principles of New Public 
Management, with cost-benefit analyses, performance related promotions, internal 
departmental competitions for resources, quantifiable results and scalable 
programmes as its defining features.  
Siding with those that suggest neoliberal ideals seek to reconfigure contemporary 
notions of citizenship, I argue that what is at stake is more than just the continuation 
of the struggle between the 1990s’ activist and neoliberal civil society theorists. 
Instead, it is the replacement of liberalism’s homo-politicus with neoliberalism’s 
homo-economicus. In this framing, the social accountability discourse posits that 
entrenched dynamics, such as clientelism, mistrust of authorities and political apathy, 
can be overcome by suite of techniques imparted by experts to poor people who, 
henceforth, individually and, less often, collectively use information to act on market 
principles. In short, it offers an all-encompassing alternative to the competing values, 
identities and visions of the good life central to politics. To be clear, the suggestion is 
not that any single element of this discourse or the practices it propagates should be 
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objected to in isolation. Rather, the problem is the work they do in combination to 
reduce the prospects of radical democratising projects.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the ‘social accountability discourse’ within texts from the 
World Bank and DFID. It suggested that whereas in the 1990s ‘social capital’ was 
positioned as the ‘missing link’ between civil society, good governance, economic 
development and democracy, by the early 2000s information and consumer choice 
was increasingly being posited to make up for its deficiencies. Nonetheless, it traced 
a discernible difference between DIFD’s earlier texts and the Bank’s original 
formulation over the degree to which accountability relationships are understood to 
be embedded in politics. And it showed how this difference was gradually eroded as 
DIFD’s more recent texts took on ideas from neoclassical economics and markets 
principles, and as the value for money and results agendas emerged as a force 
shaping programmes. I argue that this can be understood as part of an ongoing 
struggle to replace liberalism’s homo-politicus with neoliberalism’s homo-
economicus within Western understanding of civil society. This renders citizenship a 
matter of choosing between a limited number of techniques, templates and practices 
imparted by experts. In the process, the need for deliberative spaces, identity 
formation, activism and relationships with the state is reduced, limiting civil society’s 
potential to be the site of radical democratising projects. To uncover how far this 
struggle has permeated DFID and what the consequences may be, the thesis now 
turns from the social accountability discourse to a programme in Pakistan.  
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Chapter 5 
Pakistan 
 
 
‘Donors have a lot to answer for […] They encourage mediocrity, the kind of people 
that would not spend a day in the private sector are somehow celebrated by donors, 
they just learnt a few buzzwords and that was it […] you can also say that the NGO 
sector is not separate from Pakistani society, so if there is nepotism in the army, 
there is nepotism in the NGO sector as well’ 
(Senior NGO Staff Member, 2015)75 
 
 
To set the context for an exploration of the practice of social accountability, this 
chapter focuses on Pakistan’s political settlement – understood as the underlying 
informal agreement between elites on how to allocate political and economic 
opportunities – since the country’s founding in 1947 (North et al., 2009; Khan, 2010). 
I argue that it has changed as the country has become increasingly urbanised, with a 
growing capitalist middle-class. Although politically engaged, this class is largely 
uninterested in democracy as it enjoys privileged access to the state’s services and 
the benefits of an informal, untaxed economy. I then examine Pakistan’s indigenous 
civil society, the growth of professional organisations in the 1990s, and the role of 
international donor organisations. I argue that the potential for radical democratising 
projects has been consistently suppressed. This is explained by two processes: firstly, 
the ability of elites that control the state to integrate threats to the status quo into 
clientelistic networks. Secondly, drawing from a series of semi-structured interviews 
with members of Pakistan’s community of professional non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), the efforts of neoliberal international donor organisations to 
build a technically competent, corporate and, largely, apolitical civil society. It is 
shown that these processes have often overlapped and complemented one another.  
                                                 
75 Interview with Senior NGO Staff Member 1. 
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Clientelistic legacies 
The analysis adopts Fox's (2007) relational framework for exploring how civil societies 
‘thicken’ and contribute to developmental outcomes in semi-authoritarian states 
outlined in Chapter Two. I class contemporary Pakistan as ‘semi-authoritarian’ 
because elections are held and, at least nominally, state authorities are subject to the 
rule of law. However, my use of the term also encompasses Linz and Stepan's 
(1996:38-54) idea of ‘post-totalitarian’ states in which a degree of plurality allows for 
the emergence of a ‘second culture’ or ‘parallel society’ that provides a political 
alternative to dominant modes of governance, but that, as the chapter makes shows, 
is limited and routinely persecuted. 
In precolonial India, control over land, cultivators and agricultural surplus was key to 
power (Fuller, 1989). Accordingly, the Mughal emperors governed through a network 
of landlords linked to them by chains of intermediaries ranging from provincial 
governors to local level clan leaders. In return for patronage, these networks 
collected revenue, quelled descent and crushed rebellions.  
Over time, Indian society stratified along labour and kinship lines. Known as the 
jajmani system, the clearest divides were between those working the land yet 
landless, kameen (servers/artisans) and jajman (landowning patrons). Through the 
custom of endogamy - marrying only within the limits of a local community - 
members of each group gradually solidified their identities. In the Punjab, these 
occupational kin-groups became known as biraderis. Nonetheless, there is enough 
fluidity in the contemporary use of the term that one will often find that more 
affluent members of a single kameen biraderi own land or have diversified their 
income streams in other ways. Furthermore, some may have married outside of their 
biraderi or changed their name to associate themselves with a biraderi of higher 
social status.  
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Soon after the establishment of the British Raj in 1858 the colonial army began to 
heavily recruit from Northern Punjab and the parts of the North-West Frontier 
(Dewey, 1981). Muslim aristocracy from these areas had helped the British put down 
the previous year’s rebellion. They were rewarded with a new policy of governing 
with their help. At its centre was the construction of nine canal colonies between 
1885 and 1940 in the areas west of the Jhelum rivers, in what is now Pakistani 
Punjab.  
The colonies represented a top-down scheme to re-engineer the Punjab’s society. 
The economic domination of loyal landowners was assured through their acceptance 
of the state’s patronage. This included the leasing of steam driven water pumps that 
they charged others for access to (Ali, 1979). It was also cemented through a new 
loyal stratum of medium-sized landowners created by giving plots in the region to 
retiring military and bureaucratic personnel. When the domination of these elites 
was threatened by urban, mainly Hindu moneylenders, the state stepped in with the 
Land Alienation Act of 1900 that restricted property transfers.  
These elites’ grip on political life was initially achieved by granting larger landowners 
positions as lambardar or numberdar (village heads responsible for revenue 
collection), and later through more formalised roles as state contractors, magistrates, 
and commissioners (Javid, 2012:130). Among these were positions on ‘District 
Boards’ – effectively local governments – that oversaw public works and had 
discretionary development budgets. The British also continued the Mughals’ practice 
of patronising pirs (religious leaders) through land grants that assured their loyalty 
(Ewing, 1983).  
The gradual introduction of democracy and the threat of uprisings motivated by the 
Russian revolution of 1917 challenged this arrangement (Akhtar, 2006). In response, 
the British worked with landowners’ organisations – such as The Punjab Zamindar 
Association, the Jat Sikh Association, and the Muslim Association – to ensure their 
interests were secured. Many have argued that these arrangements militarised the 
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Punjab’s society and, with it, people’s understandings of democracy (Jalal, 1995; 
Yong, 1995; Ganguly and Fair, 2013). 
 
Military-bureaucracy-landed alliance 
The trauma of partition in 1947 displaced 10-12 million people and killed an 
estimated 1 million. It also birthed two countries: India, and the geographically 
separated units of East and West Pakistan. In search of power, members of Pakistan’s 
infant bureaucracy found an ally in the military. They called on it – as one of the few 
working institutions – to sort out a host of domestic challenges from civil unrest to 
cleaning up Lahore (Jalal, 1995). In return, it negotiated its own relationship with 
America which wanted a regional ally to help halt the spread of communism. This 
began the tradition of Pakistan’s bureaucratic and military elites renting out the 
country’s geostrategic position to foreign powers, and setting the army’s budgets and 
priorities independently of politicians (Hasan-Askari, 2003:77-81). In 1958 General 
Ayub Khan took over by declaring martial law as necessary to secure Pakistan from 
internal political divisions. He swiftly banned political parties, subordinated the 
judiciary and clamped down on the press. He also allowed military officers to join the 
bureaucracy in great numbers (Siddiqa, 2007:130).  
The following 15 years are important for two reasons: The first concerns the ‘Green 
Revolution’ which was changing the face of agriculture across many developing 
nations. In Pakistan it was driven by the state offering landowners technology 
packages, including subsidised tractors, tube-wells, pesticides and high yield crop 
strains (Keefer et al., 2003). It also introduced restrictions – which were often 
circumnavigated by well-connected elites –  on the amount of land that could be held 
under share-cropping arrangements (Alavi, 1973a; Ahmad, 1973). Although some 
new medium-sized landowners emerged, this created a set of largescale capitalist 
farmers, whilst reducing their need to employ large numbers of low-skilled workers. 
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Some of them also began channelling surplus capital into industrial enterprises, 
thereby, diversifying their income streams (Javid, 2011).  
The second concerns the, ironically named, ‘basic democracies’ initiative. This was a 
system of 80,000 local government positions with developmental budgets. The basic 
democrats also formed the electoral college for Ayub’s bid to become president. A 
study at the time suggested that around 62% of them in West Pakistan were affluent 
landowners and the heads of biraderis (Inayetullah, 1964). Analyses have also 
concluded that many were retired military and bureaucrat landowners (Jalal, 1994; 
Cheema et al., 2006). Furthermore, the most influential positions – the chairmen of 
Municipal Committees – were directly appointed by the government. Thus, the 
initiative can be understood as an effort to formally legitimise the rule of Pakistan’s 
military-bureaucratic alliance, whilst ensuring that the Green Revolution’s winners 
were swiftly co-opted into the young state’s clientelistic networks (Friedman, 1960).  
 
A popularist amongst landlords 
Discontent with Ayub’s thinly veiled exclusionary politics arguably led to elections in 
1970. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – a wealthy landlord 
from Sindh province – overwhelmingly won the West and the nationalist Awami 
League the East. The stark geographical division in voting rattled Western elites who 
responded by deploying Pakistan’s army to the East. This sparked a civil war in 1971, 
India’s intervention on behalf of the East’s rebels and the West’s defeat. As a result, 
the East gained independence and became Bangladesh.  
Back in Pakistan, Bhutto’s rise was significant because his popular platform pledged 
‘Islam, Democracy and Socialism’. It courted the poor with promises of land reforms, 
home ownership and the nationalisation of major industries. Jones’ (2003:2) analysis 
suggests that: 
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‘by galvanising the common man behind his programme of Islamic 
Socialism and promise of roti, kapra, makan (‘bread, clothing, housing’). 
Never before had the rural peasant or urban worker so broken with his 
customary leadership, the rural landlord and the urban union godfather, 
to assert his independent political rights as he did in 1970.’ 
 
Bhutto’s messages gained ground level legitimacy through a widespread campaign by 
the ‘Punjab Left’ in villages. This movement countered the authority of powerful 
landlords and it encouraged emerging peasant leaders to run for office. To start 
afresh, Bhutto also pledged to abandon Ayub’s system of basic democrats. So 
successful was this strategy that some observers tentatively suggested that the rule 
of the rural landed elite in the Punjab might be over (Baxter, 1974).  
Nonetheless, a body of research has since shown that the PPP failed to institute mass 
political participation and that it did not push through the changes needed to rework 
Pakistan’s political settlement (Burki, 1980; Jones, 2003; Khan, 2009). For example, 
the party quickly rowed back on sweeping land reforms. Instead, it turned to landed 
elites to prop it up as opposition grew amongst industrialists dispossessed by 
nationalisations, ethno-linguistic political parties and army officers worried about 
Bhutto’s overtures to India. These elites jettisoned the PPP’s more radical proposals 
and assured that those that did pass contained loopholes that they could exploit. 
According to Alavi (1983), the mistake that led to rioting, a military coup and Bhutto’s 
hanging in 1979 was the decision to nationalize the agro-processing industries (flour, 
cotton and rice mills).  
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Engineering a praetorian-religious state 
Whatever Bhutto’s failings, his replacement, General Zia ul Haq, was no friend of 
liberal democracy. According to Talbot (1999:256), ‘Zia was of the opinion that a 
Western-style democracy was unsuitable for Pakistan ... a presidential form of 
government was ‘nearest to Islam’… [and that] political parties were non-Islamic’. He 
was also determined to crush civil society, whilst making sure that the military was 
embedded in all areas of life - social, economic and political – so that its interests 
could never again be threatened by a popular politician. However, Zia knew that he 
had to accommodate the ambitions of the capitalist classes that had arisen in 
Pakistan’s growing urban and peri-urban areas, and the newer mid-sized landowners 
in rural regions.  
To achieve his goals, Zia began by imposing martial law. He also rolled back some of 
the land reforms instituted by Bhutto, thereby, winning the allegiance of large 
landowners. He banned political parties and repressed anything that looked like 
political activity, such as student and labour organisations (Oldenburg, 2010:143). To 
further ward-off mass political mobilisations, Zia undertook a battle for Pakistanis’ 
hearts and minds (Daechsel, 1997). It was pursued through a wide-ranging 
Islamisation programme which included adding conservative ulema (religious 
scholars) to government bodies, setting up a system of Sharia courts, instituting 
blasphemy laws, abolishing interest, supporting a madrassa (religious school) 
building programme, changing the national curriculum, purging universities of 
Marxist academics and requiring an annual 2.5% zakat (Islamic charity) donation. He 
also developed closer ties with Saudi Arabia, allowing migratory workers to flood to 
the state, and its influence, wealth and ideologies to return to Pakistan. Much of this 
took on a sectarian tone, emphasising already present political divisions between 
Sunnis and Shias (Nasr, 2000).76 
The era’s reforms also introduced laws that institutionalised the idea of women as in 
need of protection, as the repositories of family honour and as the property of men. 
                                                 
76 75-85 percent of Pakistanis are Sunni and 15-25 percent Shia. 
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Of these, 1979’s Zina Ordinance made extra-marital sex punishable by death, 
decriminalised rape, and introduced public lashings and stoning. Through advertising 
and social pressures, the chadar and chardivari (seclusion and veil) were championed 
as symbolic of the differences between good and pious Islamic, and decadent and 
immoral Western societies. In large part, therefore, Zia’s plans were realized through 
the control of women (Afzal-Khan, 2007).  
Under Zia the military emerged as Pakistan’s biggest corporate conglomerate. New 
welfare organisations for military families, further land grants for retirees and secure 
jobs in military owned companies were all part of this process. Furthermore, the 
award of government contracts to a growing middle-class of smaller traders, 
merchants, aarthis (middlemen in agricultural inputs) and builders ensured that the 
military’s patronage networks extended into urban and peri-urban areas (Jalal, 
1994:173). Siddiqa (2007) argued that this was justified within public rhetoric that 
painted the military as efficient, capable and the country’s moral guardians. Zia’s 
state was also bolstered by the support it received from America in return for making 
Pakistan a staging post for the its proxy war with Russia in Afghanistan (1979-1989).  
Like Ayub before him, Zia also sought a measure of electoral legitimacy. To get it he 
held local elections in 1979-1980 and 1983, and national elections in 1985. Both were 
conducted on a non-party basis. This, once again, meant they were largely fought 
along the lines of biraderi networks and the influence of the landed elite. This 
weened potential political opponents away from the parties they had associated with 
under Bhutto and into the auspices of the military led state from which they were 
keen to secure patronage (Cheema and Mohmand, 2004). It also enabled the regime 
to co-opt a new emerging class of urban small business owners keen to enter local 
government from which they could offer their followers state patronage.  
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Controlled democracy 
Following Zia’s mysterious death in a plane crash, Pakistan returned to democracy. 
Beginning with the election of Benazir Bhutto's PPP in 1988, this period saw an era of 
two-party electoral politics fought between the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League 
Nawaz (PML-N) led by the conservative industrialist Nawaz Sharif. From the outset, 
Benazir faced a covert operation to discredit her orchestrated by the military and 
fronted by president Ghulam Ishaq Khan whom eventually dismissed her government 
in 1990. Helped by the IJI, Nawaz became prime minster. However, he was forced to 
resign under pressure from the military in 1993 after he tried to curb presidential 
powers to dismiss elected governments. Elections once again brought Benazir to 
power. Although she courted the favour of the military this time, allegations of 
corruption led to her government’s downfall in 1996. The PML-N then won a 
landslide in 1997’s elections. However, its term was cut short by a military coup in 
1999.  
Pakistan’s democratic politics in the 1990s could be described as zero-sum. Political 
elites sought to punish their rivals upon assuming office, to strip the state of its assets 
and to reward their supporters through targeted patronage. The latter took the form 
of quick, tangible development projects, such as the building of schools or roads, and 
it included the provision of public sector jobs or help in accessing corruptible state 
institutions. Punishments were dished out by using the judiciary to exile or jail 
opponents, and, failing this, rivals were bogged down with expensive litigation. 
Allegations of corruption also became a popular way for national level politicians to 
publicly shame and occupy one another’s time.  
Wilder’s (1999) research on the Punjab suggests that these dynamics were mirrored 
locally, with voters increasingly responding to material inducements and the politics 
of thana kacheri kee siyasat (access to the police and courts). He argued that this 
reflected the practice of both the PPP and PML-N allocating ever larger discretionary 
development budgets to provincial and national level politicians, which by 2013 had 
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reached around $200,000 per representative.77 Martin’s (2015) ethnography of 
conflicts between powerful landlords in a village in Northern Punjab is illustrative. It 
shows how they appropriated state services, such as local health centres and schools, 
when their political patrons are in power. At the same time, they used the courts and 
the police to pursue local rivalries, harassing and stripping one another’s assets with 
an impunity brought through political connections.  
Despite initially being a cause for concern for Western observers, General 
Musharraf’s 1999 coup was given cover by the events of September 11th, 2001. 
Famously, the Americans asked him whether Pakistan was with them or against 
them, with the latter entailing being bombed ‘back to the stone age’.78 Opting for an 
alliance, the military once again became the recipient of American patronage. This 
took the form of aid, amounting to roughly $19 billion between 2002-10, of which 
75% was explicitly for military purposes (Zaidi, 2011). Only in 2009 did America’s 
Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill seek to ensure some of its assistance went to non-military 
causes and that, in return, Pakistan reigned in its clandestine support of jihadists. At 
the same time, as America’s main geo-strategic ally, British aid spending in Pakistan 
was dramatically scaled up from £15 million in 2000-01 to £66 in 2003-04, £87 million 
in 2007-08 to £267 million in 2011-12 (ICAI, 2012:3).79 
To legitimise his rule and solidify his patronage networks, Musharraf enacted 
constitutional amendments which turned Pakistan towards a presidential system, 
disqualified dissenting politicians and created a pro-military party; the Pakistan 
Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam Group (PMLN-Q). He also continued the trend of 
dictators holding non-party based local elections and giving new powers to the 
created local bodies (Cheema et al., 2006; Mohmand and Gazdar, 2007). Only this 
                                                 
77 Editorial ‘No need to give funds to MPs’, Dawn, 22nd August 2017. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1353135/no-need-to-give-funds-to-mps (Accessed 22/08/17) Walsh, D. ‘Political 
Handouts Thrive in Pakistan’, The New York Times, 8th May 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/09/world/asia/patronages-roots-run-deep-as-pakistan-faces-vote.html 
(Accessed 12.06.17) 
78 Goldenberg, S. ‘Bush threatened to bomb Pakistan, says Musharraf’, Guardian, 22nd September 2006. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/sep/22/pakistan.usa (Accessed 10/06/17) 
79 ‘DFID's work in Pakistan’, www.parliament.uk, 4th April 2013. 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmintdev/725/72506.htm (Accessed 01/09/17) 
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time, these elections were termed a ‘devolution of power’ to accord with Western 
countries’ and international donor organisations’ growing enthusiasm for the idea. 
Throughout his time in power, therefore, Musharraf, the reformer, could publicly 
appear to be the partner of the liberal West’s ‘War on Terror’ (Nazir, 2010).  
 
The ‘new’ clientelism 
In the post-independence era described above, Pakistan’s politics transitioned from 
the ‘old’ to the ‘new’ type of clientelism discussed in Chapter One (Hopkin, 2006). 
Whereas in the past biraderis had been the primary units for stable long-term 
personal allegiances, they increasingly became the vehicles for short-term political 
transactions. Furthermore, these transactions are now routinely conducted by 
brokers for extensive networks of linked biraderis and interest groups, sometimes 
termed ‘vote blocs’. In support of this, Wilder’s (1999:209) research shows that 
politicians’ familial linkages to individual biraderis did little to stop large vote swings 
between the two main parties over the course of 1990s. 
Mohmand (2011, 2014) explains this transition by focussing on Pakistan’s brokers, 
detailing their privileged access to politicians and the state. They include unelected 
landlords, union bosses, the heads of biraderis and other types of community leader, 
such as mullahs (local, often informal, religious leaders), patwaris (keepers of local 
land records), and nawabs (local notables). Each understands the short shelf-life of 
Pakistan’s experiments with democracy and each is unafraid to switch their 
allegiances for a better deal. Furthermore, due to politicians’ needing to gain the 
votes of multiple biraderis, brokers can demand quick, excludable benefits for their 
networks.  
The transition to this mode of clientelism has also been underpinned by the growing 
number of Pakistanis that are no longer solely reliant on patrons for their livelihoods 
or access to services. For example, Shami's research (2012) found that the proximity 
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of roads to villages in central Punjab enables some villagers to circumvent and 
challenge landlords exploitative practices. Key to this is the ability to turn to informal, 
private providers of goods such as education or health. Similarly, Chaudhry and 
Vyborny's (2013) research suggests that a small number of wealthier rural Pakistanis 
are increasingly likely to approach local state officials and politicians themselves for 
specific benefits or public goods, thereby, relying less on landlords as brokers.  
However, it can also be partly attributed to the mechanisation of agriculture and 
landlords’ diversified revenue streams. Both mean that some patrons have little need 
for long-lasting personal relationships with large numbers of clients or their wider 
families. This is reflected in ethnographic studies that suggest some rarely visit the 
areas from which their votes come, no longer know their clients’ names, and are only 
responsive to their requests for help in the run up to elections (Lyon, 2002; Martin, 
2015a). These studies also suggest that some patrons have become crueller to their 
poorer and, therefore, more dependent clients. This involves using social pressures, 
debt, threats and violence to ensure the most vulnerable remain subordinate.  
Although it is difficult to put numbers to how many Pakistanis have been involved in 
either aspect of this transition, a recent report uses a ‘combination of relative and 
absolute approaches’ to estimate the country’s class composition (Nayab, 2011).80 It 
describes 42% of Pakistanis as among a ‘vulnerable’ lower-class and 11% as members 
of Pakistan’s urban professional middle-class. Another 23% of the country’s 
population are described as middle-class ‘aspirants’ (22% urban and 24% rural), 16% 
as middle-class ‘climbers’ (21% urban and 12% rural), and 8.5% as the ‘fledgling’ 
middle-class (12.5% urban and 6% rural). This is within an estimated population of 
187 million (40% urban and 60% rural). Nelson (2016) has suggested that the rising 
wealth of the last three groups are likely to concern elites with an interest in 
maintaining the status quo. 
                                                 
80 For an introduction to the contested discipline of defining and measuring class see Table 1 in Nayab (2011:8) 
and for a discussion of the schools of thought see Wright (2003). 
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The Green Revolution and the rise of small-manufacturers partially explain the 
growth of Pakistan’s middle-classes (Ali, 2002; Zaidi, 2005; Hasan, 2009). Rising 
remittances, especially from the Gulf states, have also allowed many Punjabi families 
to buy land or to open small businesses (Mughal and Makhlouf, 2013; Siddiqui, 2017). 
At the same time, encouraged by the Bretton Woods institutions, Pakistan has kept 
taxes on exports low and encouraged the private provision of public goods (Brown, 
2016). With the tacit approval of political elites, much of the resulting activity takes 
place in the vast informal, and thereby untaxed, economy.81 It provides those that 
can afford it with everything from material goods and electricity, to education and 
health.82  
Nonetheless, it is also clear from this research that Pakistan’s middle-class is largely 
an urban phenomenon.83 Yet, as Qadeer (2000) argues , it is increasingly difficult to 
differentiate urban from rural areas’ in much of the country. Coining the term 
‘ruralopolises’, he argues that areas either sides of major roads, such as those 
connecting Multan to Gujrat, and Lahore and Islamabad, are covered by settlements 
of urban-level population densities that are intertwined with major cities. Most of 
these settlements are also built around agricultural production. 
Although the new type of clientelism makes political parties and access to the state 
more important, it does not lead to substantive political participation. Brokers – who 
tend to be richer and better connected – negotiate on the behalf of their networks, 
thereby, limiting the voice of voters, especially women and members of marginalised 
ethnic or religious groups (Javed and Rehman, 2016). Zaidi (2015) also argues that 
successive governments have fragmented and localised political issues, whilst turning 
a blind-eye to the untaxed economy that benefits the industrious middle-classes. This 
                                                 
81 0.3 percent of the population files an income tax return, which is one of the lowest ratios worldwide. Sherani, 
A. ‘Pakistan’s Taxation Crisis’, Dawn, August 7th, 2105. https://www.dawn.com/news/1198899 (Accessed 
01/05/17) 
82 Estimates suggest that the size of the informal economy was 91% of the formal economy in 2007-08 (Kemal 
and Qasim, 2012). But it is likely the figure exceeds this greatly.  
83 In a recent paper Zaidi (2014:n16) suggests that: ‘Reza Ali’s seminal, though sadly unpublished, work shows 
[…] approximately 74% of Punjab was urban, Sindh 53%, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 45%, and Balochistan, mainly 
Quetta, 12%.’ 
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negates forms of politics based on broad appeals to universal policies or debates over 
the notion of the public good. He suggests, therefore, that: 
 
‘there is no substantial real and concerted constituency in Pakistan for 
democracy, and people in general, and the urban middle-classes in 
particular, have largely been interested in fulfilling their narrow, 
economistic goals and interests’. (ibid:797) 
 
There is also little evidence that 1990’s democratic experiments have done anything 
for the accountability of or improvements to public services. Indeed, scholarship on 
Pakistan’s human development indicators uses clientelism as an explanation for why 
a country which has enjoyed good economic growth – of around 6 percent for most 
periods – consistently lags behind its neighbours (Hasnain, 2008; Giunchi, 2011; Kalia, 
2015).84 Research conducted by development organisations and ethnographers also 
argues that the efficiency of state service providing institutions has been eroded from 
the inside by politically driven appointments, a lack of funding and elite capture 
(Cheema, 2007; Mohmand and Cheema, 2007; Martin, 2015b). Governmental 
spending also did not change much under democracy, with a consistent average of 
around 1 percent of GDP on health and around 2 percent on education (UNDP, 2013).  
Summarising, Easterly (2003:465) has argued that ‘Pakistan is the poster-child for the 
hypothesis that a society polarized by class, gender, and ethnic group does poorly at 
providing public services’. Similarly, the founder of the United Nation’s Human 
Development Reports, Mahbub ul Haq (1997:38), has pointed out that Pakistan 
suffers from ‘political domination by a rentier class that pre-empts the patronage of 
the state in its own favour; and a very corrupt ruling elite’. The term ‘rentier’ is used 
by Haq to denote the periodic selling of Pakistan’s geo-strategic position to foreign 
                                                 
84 For instance, in 1997 its real per capita income was around 75 percent higher than India, yet it lagged behind 
in most social indicators (Haq, 1997). 
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powers in return for financial gains that make elites in control of the state 
unaccountable and, therefore, largely uninterested in the concerns of ordinary 
people. 
Ethnographic research amongst these national level ruling elites by Armytage (2015, 
2016) further shows how the country’s exclusionary political settlement is 
maintained and threats absorbed. She traces the stability of a core group of extended 
families, with estimated net worth’s of over $100 million, that have dominated the 
top of the political, business, military and bureaucratic spheres since partition. 
Although there have been some new entrants into this group due to the Green 
Revolution and industrialisation, it is shown that through marriages and instrumental 
‘friendships’ it has remained remarkably constant. Indeed, the information and 
favours shared amongst these elites prevents aspiring entrants from the wrong 
families from accumulating the necessary, in Bourdieu’s sense, capitals to upset the 
status quo. Armytage also argues that as Pakistan’s middle- and lower- classes have 
fractured along ethno-linguistic and religious lines, its elites have largely remained 
above such conflicts whilst symbolically referencing them to ensure they retain 
followers.   
Attempts within this era to set up local anti-corruption institutions such as Nawaz’s 
Khidemat (service) Committees or Musharraf’s efforts to create participatory 
development forums known as Citizens’ Community Boards were ineffectual. 
Ethnographic evidence suggests that local elite members of the former felt unable to 
hold state officials to account due to their shared adherence to prevailing social 
norms that require them to disperse resources to their kin (Lyon, 2002). Whilst a 
qualitative study of the latter found that due to members having to partially fund 
projects the Boards were quickly dominated by small cliques who used them to 
pursue development plans with gains for themselves and allied local state authorities 
(Gazdar et al., 2013). The studies’ findings suggest, therefore, that there remain 
significant obstacles to formalised social accountability mechanisms and participatory 
initiatives that require citizens to co-produce services with the state. 
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Nelson's (2016) recent analysis observes that Pakistan’s politics is now marked by 
low-level violence, with the potential for broader instability. At its root, he identifies 
new links between what he calls the ‘petty bourgeoisie’, the ‘petty ulema’ and ‘petty 
parliamentarians’. The first refers to the middle-classes described above, the second 
to informal local religious leaders and the third politicians. Nelson describe how the 
latter have increasingly sought to incorporate urban mafias and rural mullahs into 
their clientelistic networks. He worries, however, that sectarian identities, the trading 
of votes for patronage and the need to consistently undermine the rule of law, such 
as through bribes and by corrupting courts, dangerously reduces the legitimacy of the 
state and democracy. Indeed, he suggests these dynamics have led to a culture of 
impunity and state failure that is partially responsible for the rise of insurgent groups 
such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban).  
 
The intermediate-class 
Akhtar's (2008) thesis more directly explores what the new type of clientelism means 
for Pakistan’s democratising project. He starts with the argument that a less 
dependent ‘intermediate-class’ has gradually arisen.85 In contrast to others, he avoids 
terming them the ‘middle-class’ – with its connotations of a liberal bourgeoisie – to 
emphasize that this group has largely been uninterested in challenging the illiberal 
status quo. This is because its members, whether they be capitalist farmers, mandi 
(market) town merchants, urban business owners or militant Islamists, have been 
steadily co-opted into the state’s patronage networks by successive governments. As 
we have seen, this has been achieved through local government schemes that 
provide a veneer of democracy, the provision of public sector jobs, privileged access 
to state institutions, the informalisation of the economy, and the tacit approval of the 
activities of fundamentalists.  
                                                 
85 The idea of an ‘intermediate class’ was originally developed to explain how economic stagnation can result 
from a class that seeks to entrench its power rather than pursue inclusive growth enhancing policies (Baran, 
1957). 
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To this he adds an explanation for why those at the bottom of clientelistic networks, 
Pakistan’s lower-classes, have not engaged in mass class-based politics since the 
1960s. He argues that urban workers and landless peasants have succumb to what he 
calls ‘the politics of common sense’. This is not the Marxist idea of a ‘false 
consciousness’. Rather, it involves the subordinate classes learning to view politics as 
about what short-term gains they can get from negotiations and transactions that 
they are not privy to, rather than risk raising their own voices or challenging power. 
Akhtar describes this as ‘highly pragmatic, even cynical, as it means resigning oneself 
to the existing reality and manoeuvring within it’ (ibid:204). Discussing the 
relationship between politics and ordinary Pakistanis, one of my interviewees 
expressed a similar concern:  
 
‘what difference does it [politics] make. They don’t have education, they 
don’t have roads, they don’t have public transport, their kids don’t have 
a decent meal. For them, what? Because their political relationship is 
through an intermediary. That doesn’t change. You may have the 
People’s Party in power or Nawaz Sharif in power or the military in power, 
the relationship is facilitated, moderated by intermediaries. Those 
intermediaries remain the same. So why should they bother? […] In terms 
of your desire or urge to express yourself, it is through intermediaries. So, 
it doesn’t matter.’86 
 
To illustrate how this plays out in everyday settings, Akhtar uses case studies of 
workers from different sectors of Pakistan's informal economy. They show how the 
subordinate classes are locked into vertical patronage networks that ultimately leave 
them vulnerable to the whims of those higher up the chain. However, he suggests 
that in many instances the poor have accepted their insecurity and lack of rights. This 
                                                 
86 Interview with Senior NGO Staff Member 4 16.08.15 
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problem is particularly acute among subcontractors and day labourers, many of 
whom view work as sifarish (a favour) granted to them by members of the 
intermediary classes (ibid:222). Akhtar suggests that unequal relationships between 
workers and their bosses, combined with their distance from members of political 
society, effectively mitigates the chances of what he calls an organised ‘politics of 
resistance’ emerging in Pakistan.  
In this sense, Akhtar’s thesis suggests that the transition to the new type of 
clientelism is confined to what he calls the intermediate-classes and others the 
middle-classes. It, therefore, holds out little prospect of stoking the kind of broad 
participation in public politics that is central to democratisation. If anything, the 
incorporation of the intermediate-classes has steadily proliferated patronage 
networks that have little interest in how the state’s institutions function for the 
majority or in public deliberations over the country’s future. At worst, it is forcing 
those at the bottom of these networks into even more precarious and arbitrary 
positions.  
So far, it has been argued that as Pakistan’s capitalist middle-class has grown, the 
state has failed to broadly connect its members to organised politics through a tax 
system that can underpin a hypothetical social contract. Instead, they are connected 
to political society and the state through clientelistic networks that periodically allow 
them to bargain their own and their dependents’ votes to brokers linked to 
politicians in charge of a rentier state. Thus, although politically engaged, this class is 
largely uninterested in democracy as it enjoys privileged access to the state’s 
resources and the benefits of an informal economy. 
 
Indigenous civil society 
Although Akhtar’s (2008) idea of the intermediate-class is important, it does not 
explore the evolving role of Pakistan’s civil society in detail. To address this gap, the 
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following sections make a rough analytical split between what could be termed 
indigenous and professionalised civil society associations and networks. This 
distinction arises in the late 1980s and accelerates in the 1990s with the increased 
presence of international donor organisations.  
In the colonial period three broad types of organisations characterised indigenous 
civil society.87 The first were religiously orientated madrassas (Islamic schools) and 
khankahs (family run shrines of Sufi saints with attached mosques). Madrassas 
provided education for elite Muslim children earmarked to serve in the Mughal 
empire’s administrative institutions. However, this function became increasingly less 
relevant as a secular, British style of education delivered in boarding schools replaced 
them. In response, madrassas begun to educate poorer members of society, whilst 
Khankahs fed the poor and offered free accommodation for travellers. However, 
under colonialism they too began to change. Through increased state patronage, 
including land grants, and the practice of passing their management from father to 
son, they became vehicles for landed power and biraderi based political allegiances 
(Gilmartin, 1979; Epping, 2013). Accordingly, wealthy pirs attached to khankahs were 
important allies for both the British and, later, Pakistan’s leaders. 
The second were non-religious, nominally apolitical voluntary associations, 
particularly in urban areas. They could take a variety of forms, including literary 
societies, professional associations and an active press. Many of them sought to 
improve the status of Muslims vis-à-vis Hindus through the sponsorship of schools 
and health clinics. To do this, they were often funded by wealthy patrons with social 
or political ambitions (Bayly, 1971; Haynes, 1992).  
Thirdly, following exposure to socialist ideologies, the children of some wealthy 
families began establishing new, often more overtly political associations towards th 
end of the colonial era (Ali, 2011). These organisations often shared members with 
left leaning parties such as the Communist Party of India and non-violent ethnic 
nationalist movements such as the Pashtun’s Khudai Khidmatgar (Servants of God). 
                                                 
87 This section does not focus on Hindu civil society. 
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And many participated in the Progressive Writers Movement that advocated for 
independence, radical social change and the improvement of the condition of the 
poor. 
After partition new associations, such as the Women’s Voluntary Service founded by 
the wife of Pakistan’s first Prime Minister and various muhajirs’ (term for Muslim 
migrants) associations, were established. Pakistan’s own Communist Party was setup 
in 1948 on the belief that the country was, given its size and newness, ripe for 
revolution. However, the displacements and migrations of independence largely 
meant that the organised left, such as trade unions, had to build itself up again.  
Amongst commentators there appears to be a difference of opinion between those 
that saw the 1950s and 1960s as fostering ‘a vibrant intellectual culture’, and those 
that saw it as the beginning of more malign trends (Bano, 2012:43). The former often 
point to the activity of student unions, literary circles, the press, Rotary and Lions 
clubs, and professional associations (Qadeer, 2006). They also celebrate the 
progressive debates around issues such as the Muslim Family laws and socialism that 
were had in tea rooms across the country (Ali, 2011). This, they argue, illustrates the 
era’s plurality of associations and its relative liberalism.  
Others suggest that Ayub’s military-bureaucratic alliance quickly established 
mechanisms with which to monitor and control civil society (Mohmand, 2014). As an 
interviewee explained, it began funding loyal organisations, including local bar 
associations, the Chamber of Commerce and press clubs by giving them grants.88 ‘In 
that way, the state became the regulator of these organisations and civic spaces’. To 
further monitor the public sphere, Ayub also introduced the Voluntary Social Welfare 
Agencies Ordinance and opened offices of the Social Welfare Department in all four 
provinces. He also offered awards to pro-regime associations and journalists.  
More coercively, the state’s security apparatus banned several political parties, 
dissolved the national and provincial assemblies, and began prosecuting Ayub’s rivals. 
                                                 
88 Interview with Zafarullah Khan (Head of NGO) 24.08.15 
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It also made some peasants, labour and students’ organisations illegal, and took over 
chains of newspapers that were considered subversive. To secure the loyalty of 
religious leaders, property upon which madrassas and khankahs sat was put under 
the state’s management. Much of this was justified through rhetoric around the 
threats supposedly posed by India and Afghanistan (Oldenburg, 2010:111). Thus, a 
mixture of regulation, co-optation and nationalism was used to oppress broad 
political participation and to yoke civil society to elite interests. As Shah (2004:360) 
puts it; ‘the ruling elite purposefully depoliticised the public sphere to make it subject 
to the exigencies of an authoritarian state’. 
Nonetheless, some civic associations managed to serve as venues for rising 
discontent throughout the 1960s (Ahmad, 1973; Alavi, 1973b). In the cities, this was 
led by students, such as those in the National Students Federation, and organised 
labour that had begun calling for a return to democracy. In the countryside it took 
the form of an emerging class-based associations amongst peasants calling for land 
reforms and rights (Akhtar, 2008:196-197). They were inspired by independence 
movements in Africa and the rise of socialist governments South America. Indeed, 
with little outside help, civil society essentially morphed itself into a political protest 
movement that brought down Ayub’s regime ‘like a house of cards’ (Qadeer, 
2006:213).  
Although Zulfikar Bhutto’s PPP capitalized upon this mobilisation to win power, the 
party was no friend of civil society. Fearing its radicalism, it quickly moved to crush its 
more militant socialist supporters among urban labour organisations (Akhtar, 
2008:199). It also distanced itself from student associations that were arguing for 
vast ranging structural changes. Then party then neglected to build alternative local 
organisations with which to challenge the biraderis linked to the ‘politicised’ layer of 
retired bureaucrats and military personnel empowered by Ayub’s basic democracies 
scheme (Javid, 2012:208-309). In the case of Sindh, it even relied on them to retain 
its powerbase (Jalal, 1994:162).  
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Zia’s dictatorship arguably spelt the end of civil society’s ability to mobilise large 
numbers of people behind a political party or platform. Indeed, alongside the 
aforementioned scheme to Islamise Pakistan’s hearts and minds, Zia ran a largely 
successful campaign to oppress any organised opposition. Most notably, he accused 
the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) - an alliance of opposition 
parties and civic associations led by the PPP – of being supported by India and Russia. 
And he deployed the military to harass his opponents and violently crush a popular 
uprising in Sindh in 1983 (Jaffrelot, 2015:333).  
Over the course of the 1980s resistance once again slowly gathered steam. This time, 
however, women, who had arguably lost the most under Zia, were at its forefront. 
For example, the Women’s Action Forum (WAF) was established by foreign educated 
and upper-class women in 1981 in Karachi. It soon had branches in Lahore, Islamabad 
and, for a period, the culturally conservative Peshawar. It sought to draw attention to 
zina (pre-marital sex) cases and to advocate on behalf of the most vulnerable. To do 
so, it framed violence against women as a matter of human rights and it strategically 
used scripture to argue that harmful or discriminatory laws had little basis in Islam 
(Shaheed and Hussain, 2007). WAF had some success in restricting the ‘Law of 
Evidence’ (that the testimony of two women is equal to a single man) to financial 
matters, and in securing media coverage for its various activities and viewpoints. 
Nonetheless, Jafar (2005) argues that it was ultimately restricted by laws against 
political protests and the heavy informal penalties, including social sanctions, lost 
income, violence and rape, faced by women from lower socio-economic backgrounds 
that raised their voice. 
Alongside the WAF, other organisations were also established in the 1980s and early 
1990s, such as Aurat Foundation, Ajoka, Simorgh, Rozan, the Sungi Development 
Foundation, the Pakistan Institute for Labour Education and Research (PILER), and 
the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SPDI). Many of their leaders were 
trying to stem the widespread disillusionment amongst the left resulting from both 
General Zia’s dictatorship and the collapse of the Soviet Union. They were also 
seeking alternatives to political parties, such as the PPP, that had failed to live up to 
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their ideals. As described by my interviewees, they viewed establishing NGOs as a 
new way to continue old struggles.  
Organisations such as the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) used the 
opportunity structures provided by the state’s adherence to various international 
treaties to pursue a rights-based agenda and to advocate in the courts for members 
of the country’s marginalised groups. Others, such as Shirkatgah, combined legal 
advice to vulnerable citizens with research and analysis on the status of marginalised 
groups that could be used for advocacy. As these examples suggest, lawyers were 
often central to many of these organisations. Worried about surveillance, however, 
many would declare that they were apolitical at the start of every meeting.89  
In the late 1980s and 1990s, NGOs also began to emerge that were, at least publicly, 
primarily focused on service delivery and emergency relief. As with Pattan, many saw 
these activities as subtle routes into the communities amongst which they wished to 
deliver more rights-based and, for a few, politically focused work.90 For example, 
flood relief efforts could be combined with workshops on the political causes of 
poverty and poor services. As Pattan’s website now delicately puts it: 
 
‘The lessons learnt during this work enabled Pattan to realize that the 
community development work at the local level alone does not address 
the underlying causes of vulnerabilities of the riverine communities. 
Hence, harnessing the unleashed social and political potential of the 
marginalised riverine people became an integral part of Pattan’s work. 
This enables them to become an essential part of the decision-making 
processes that impact their lives. Since then, Pattan has been addressing 
governance and democracy deficiencies through research and awareness 
                                                 
89 Interview Senior NGO Staff Member 4 16.08.15 
90 Interview with Sarwar Bari 18.08.15 
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raising, social mobilisation and capacity building of society’s 
marginalised.’91 
 
This period also saw the rise of several large organisations funded by voluntary 
donations that provide public services or organise citizens to resolve local issues. Of 
the former, the most well-known is the Edhi Foundation founded in 1951. It provides 
everything from ambulance services to shelters for the destitute and free healthcare. 
Whilst of the latter, the Orangi Pilot Project begun in the 1980s organises Karachi’s 
slum dwellers into self-help groups to improve housing conditions, form micro-
finance clubs and interact with officials.  
There is a limited literature on the contemporary dynamics of Pakistan’s more 
localised civil society or community-based organisations (CBOs). It suggests that 
charitable and philanthropic giving, sometimes termed ‘social work / social 
development’ (salah-o-behbud), has long been an informal social safety net for those 
at the bottom of Pakistan’s stratified society. Furthermore, to be known as a ‘social 
worker’ (samaji karkun) is also a powerful symbolic means through which some 
justify their privileged positions, bring new followers into their orbit, and mark 
themselves as worthy of patronage by those socially and politically above them. 
For example, Werbner's (2015) long running ethnographies of Pakistanis that have 
emigrated to urban Manchester, England, shows how wealthy community members 
claim roles as leaders through the public sponsorship of local causes, such as 
financing the construction of mosques. She suggests that these elites are adept at 
forming associations that win them reputations for leadership and that connect them 
to British political society, but that their exclusivity ultimately gives them little 
capacity for broader political mobilisations. She also shows how non-elite Pakistanis 
form self-help groups to collect and pool community funds. These are used to pay for 
                                                 
91 Pattan Development Organisation https://pattan.org/index.php/about-pattan/ (Accessed 15/05/17) 
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expensive unforeseen events, such as funerals, and to maintain socially important 
links to Pakistan through the provision of emergency funds during crises. 
Undertaken in the 1990s, Lyon’s (2002) ethnography of rural northern Punjab 
suggests elites compete to win voluntary positions within local associations, such as 
zakat and the khidemat committees. Lyon (2002:135-7) also describes how the ‘Gujar 
Youth Foundation’ he uncovered in Rawalpindi acted as a 'favour-brokering' club for 
men that do not have sufficient personal resources or connections. Nonetheless, he 
argues that favours conducted within such associations are made up or down, thus 
the two parties commit to an asymmetrical relationship. Accordingly, over the long-
run the only party that truly seems to benefit within such associations is the broker / 
leader who gains connections to the state and leverage over the favour’s recipient.  
More recent work by Martin (2015a) details how the Punjab’s landlords seek to 
cultivate a pious image through building mosques, sponsoring Islamic education and 
providing shelter to travellers. Skilfully done, this can symbolically place them above 
the earthly and often dangerous rivalries of village politics, whilst accruing them izzat 
(honour) that can build followings. However, Martin also suggests that through these 
actions elites seek to wash over or obscure local forms of oppression, such as their 
use of the community’s resources as their private property or the debt bondage 
within which they keep their workers.  
 
Professionalised civil society 
During the 1980s some of Pakistan’s larger civil society organisations sought funding 
from the national development agencies of Canada and northern European countries, 
including the United Kingdom. However, during the 1990s a new set of neoliberal 
donor organisations, including arms of the Bretton Woods institutions, further UN 
agencies, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and state-
backed international non-governmental organisations, such as the Asia Foundation, 
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began to increase their activities in Pakistan. In contrast to the older donors focused 
on democracy and women’s rights, the newer donors focused on service delivery for 
its own sake, building markets, and direct support to the government in the form of 
funding and institutional reforms. For them, democracy could largely be approached 
through the prism of support to the procedural aspects of elections and political 
party strengthening programmes. According to interviewees, these organisations 
were also stricter about sticking to the terms of their mission statements, thereby, 
giving indigenous organisations less room to (re)interpret their agendas.  
Taking advantage of the money that came with these donors, interviewees contend 
that there was a significant increase in the number of NGOs in the 1990s.92 Ambitious 
educated Pakistanis also increasingly saw the development sector as a viable option 
for employment. Many were highly motivated by social causes and set up their own 
organisations. They generally took one of three roles: firstly, service orientated NGOs 
that implement short-term projects that provide public goods such as health and 
education or engage in disaster relief. Secondly, ‘resource centres’ or think tanks that 
focus on providing information and research to aid advocacy efforts.93 Thirdly, rights-
based and advocacy focussed NGOs. Nonetheless, many of the advocacy orientated 
NGOs also undertook service delivery projects funded by donors. 
For some of my interviewees this duality was not a problem. It earned NGOs the 
money with which to carry out advocacy activities around their core issues and 
allowed them to train full-time activists from poorer communities. Some even 
considered it novel that you could be paid to be an activist. Others relished the 
opportunities donor money gave large NGOs to become grant making bodies, able to 
financially and intellectually support CBOs with good ideas and a passion for their 
local areas. Some also celebrated how donor money enabled some NGOs to support 
                                                 
92 In 2001 the Aga Khan Foundation, in coordination with Civicus, put the number of active NGOs at somewhere 
between 10,000 and 12,000 (Baig and Sattar, 2001). Another report from an indigenous think tank suggested 
that the number of private, voluntary non-profit organisations (which includes non-registered CBOs) was 
around 45,000 (Ghaus-Pasha and Iqbal, 2002). 
93 For example, the Aga Khan’s NGO Resource Centre and the Indus River Resource Centre. 
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social movements, such as Pattan’s mentoring and training of members of the Brick 
Kiln Workers’ Movement. 
However, there were also criticisms. Many interviewees saw this period as the 
beginning of civil society’s fracturing, its corporatisation and its depoliticization. This 
contributed to a loss of legitimacy that they argued still plagues the professionalised 
sector today. The processes underpinning this set the scene for donors’ interest in 
social accountability programmes in the late 2000s, thus they are explored further 
below. 
The first concerns how some of the organisations established in response to General 
Zia’s dictatorship began to fracture, losing their focus and legitimacy once he no 
longer provided a target. Interviewees suggested that this turned individuals and 
organisations with clear messages around the status of women and democracy, into 
vehicles for the narrow interests of liberal elites in Pakistan’s major urban enclaves, 
such as Karachi and Islamabad. Accordingly, it lost them support and connections 
amongst those they claimed to speak for. It also encouraged their increasingly 
wealthy leaders to remain in these urban enclaves, close to donors’ offices. 
The fierce debates around the trajectory of women’s NGOs are illustrative. For 
example, Zia (2009) has argued that the decision of the WAF to announce its secular 
credentials in 1991 was a pivotal moment. It paved the way for the dilution of the 
wider Women’s Movement as many senior members left to found non-secular NGOs 
with the financial backing of donors. This, she argues, gave rise to a new tame form 
of ‘non-confrontational, privatized and personalized’ feminism, whose objective is to 
‘empower’ women within Islam’ (sic) (ibid:29). Activists’ traditional focus on men, 
money, mullahs and the military state has since gradually been side-lined by false 
claims of the possibility of an Islamic feminism.94 This argument has been added to by 
Jafar (2007) who suggests that women’s NGOs currently suffer from an inability to 
network amongst one another. Paradoxically, this problem has arisen both due to a 
                                                 
94 For an alternative viewpoint on the emancipatory potential of Islamic feminism see Jamal’s (2006, 2010) 
work. 
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lack, and because, of donor funding. On the one hand, funded networks often fall 
apart following the end of a programme or campaign. On the other, the competition 
for contracts disincentives NGOs from sharing information and forming collaborative 
networks. These sorts of criticisms are now common across NGOs focussed on all 
issues areas. 
Some that made these critiques during interviews are likely to have been indulging in 
the well-known activists’ pass-time of insulting rivals’ ideological purity, their 
appetites for confrontation or their grassroots credentials. Moreover, numerous civil 
society networks, such as the Advocacy Development Network and the Punjab NGO 
Coordination Council, were established without donor funding in the 1990s. 
Nonetheless, my conversations with heads of contemporary NGOs confirms that 
many were previously members of larger outfits established in the 1980s, before 
setting up on their own in the 1990s and 2000s. There is also robust evidence that 
civil society organisations that have received donor funding in Pakistan rapidly lose 
legitimacy amongst those they claim to work for. Through a study of 40 NGOs, Bano 
(2012) has shown that foreign funding contravenes societal norms that require those 
working for the public good to do so voluntarily and to demonstrate signs of material 
sacrifice. This results in drops in both the memberships of organisations and the 
efficiency of their efforts to act collectively to address issues.  
The second major process in this period concerns the corporatisation of civil society. 
As previously mentioned, some larger NGOs began to turn themselves into grant 
making bodies. This involves awarding donor funding to smaller NGOs and CBOs that 
compete for it. The grants are often for short-term projects with clearly definable 
outputs, such as the delivery of services, building of infrastructure or the holding of 
workshops. According to one interviewee, this gradually created the existing ‘class’ 
system amongst Pakistan’s NGOs, with those empowered by donors to fund smaller 
organisations calling themselves ‘national NGOs’ despite often only having offices in 
one city. It is also notable that the phrase ‘mom and pop NGOs’ is now commonly 
used to describe the rise of the short-lived, money orientated organisations that 
were established to compete for grants. The ability of their staff to survive off the 
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stipends and food provided at workshops and seminars held by larger organisations is 
now a sector-wide in-joke.95 
An interviewee further explained the form the sector’s corporatisation took in the 
1990s through the example of the requirements for those applying to the South Asia 
Partnership Pakistan’s (SAP-PK) grant making programme.96 Hopeful organisations 
had to complete a year of ‘capacity building’ trainings. These taught their leaders 
how to write proposals, keep budgets and monitor the impact of their work to 
international standards. The idea was that they would become equipped to enter the 
fierce bidding wars for donor money that increasingly characterised the space they 
operated in. Put another way, they could sustain themselves in a developing market 
for NGOs. Such trainings also meant that skilled staff were increasingly in demand. 
This has driven up the sectors’ wages, created significant barriers to entry for those 
unable to use donors’ languages or favoured discourses, and established a 
competitive employment market from which interviewees argued INGOs take the 
best talent. Lastly, corporatization has also often meant that those with the skills 
leave older NGOs to start their own initiatives. 
When applying for SAP-PK’s grants smaller NGOs also had to register themselves 
under Pakistan’s various laws for civic associations. This arguably contributed to the 
third major process effecting Pakistan’s professionalised civil society in this era; their 
depoliticization As the interviewee explained: 
 
‘These organisations were also trained on how they should go about 
registering themselves, the steps, the laws, ordinances and templates to 
it. […] Each law required them to be asked that they are not political. 
Social Welfare Law. Companies Act. Your Trust Act. They will require you 
                                                 
95 As Duncan Green pointed out, the joke ‘carpe per diem’ sums this up. 
96 Interview with NGO / INGO Worker 26.08.15 
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to be a non-partisan, non-political organisation. […] This is why Nawaz 
Sharif’s government was able to crackdown on NGOs in the 1990s.’ 
 
This requirement, then, was not about NGOs being seen or protected by the state. 
Rather, it was so that when they advocated for reforming discriminatory laws or 
against the era’s mass privatisations – actions that might challenge the status quo – 
the government could easily shut them down. In this regard, it is also notable that 
throughout the 1990s Nawaz Sharif courted conservative supporters by publicly 
decrying the supposedly immoral practices of NGOs, even claiming female workers 
slept with foreigners in return for contracts. His government also disbanded 2,500 
NGOs based in the Punjab in an effort to further appeal to conservative supporters 
(Jaffrelot, 2015:428).  
The depoliticization of Pakistan’s NGOs also occurred in more subtle ways. On the 
one hand, many interviewees pointed out that the service delivery programmes 
favoured by donors and the state had very little to do with politics unless they also 
told ordinary people why services are poor and who they should complain about it to. 
On the other, it was suggested that donors’ willingness to fund rights-based NGOs 
was not about encouraging the public’s broad participation in politics or the creation 
of transformational social movements. Rather, it provided a relatively safe activity 
that donors could support without drawing the attention of the state. As one 
interviewee argued, donors were interested in: 
 
‘allowing people the space to air their grievances but not in helping them 
to get organised, or in organising them. So, the whole NGO world had a 
very kind of narrowly defined agenda and interest. Which works both for 
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the state and NGOs […] there was no real challenge for the state the 
entire 90s.’97 
 
For many, a donor led change in NGOs’ focuses and ways of working from the 1980s 
and early 1990s was palpable. Indeed, there was a general feeling that many began 
working to agendas and standards set by someone ‘writing in Manila’ with little 
understanding of the challenges facing the country’s democracy. Looking back to the 
beginning of a career in activism, one interviewee suggested: 
 
‘Now it seems everything is tagged. If you want to do something there is 
a price tag. You have to make your project plan, you have get the funding, 
you have to monitor, you have to measure, to justify value for money. 
Back in the 1990s we weren’t worried about it. I was working as a 
research assistant doing qualitative interviews […] I had the time to do 
what I wanted to do, and the office encouraged me’.98  
 
Some interviewees argued that the state did not mind these developments. This was 
because everybody knows that substantial politics in Pakistan is done through 
brokers. Ordinary people neither approach state officials or politicians as individuals 
or in groups. Instead, as outlined, they are part of patronage networks headed by 
powerful individuals that sell their votes for short-term excludable gains. Accordingly, 
doing project-based work, fighting court cases and engaging in rights-based 
educational programmes does not register as a threat to the interests of those in 
charge. Put another way, because such work is sporadic and rarely leads to mass 
                                                 
97 Interview with Senior NGO Staff Member 4 16.08.15 
98 Interview with NGO worker 23.08.15 
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social or political mobilisations, and because it does not overtly question the status 
quo, it is ultimately inconsequential.  
Larger donor funded grant making organisations were, therefore, part of a process 
within which some smaller NGOs and CBOs increasingly corporatized and came under 
the state’s bureaucratic control. They learned to discipline themselves by sticking to 
practices and agendas set by international donors and sanctioned by domestic 
authorities. Those that could not risked making themselves uncompetitive market 
actors or being shut down. At the same time, donors’ interest in service delivery and 
the cultivation of rights-based NGOs had little effect on Pakistan’s democracy, 
changes in the way politics is done or by whom. An uncharitable interpretation might 
argue that Pakistan’s civil society was subject to the sorts of taming processes others 
have suggested some powerful donor organisations were engaged in elsewhere 
(Jenkins, 2001; Kaldor, 2003b; Lewis, 2004, 2017).99  
 
The state-donor accord 
Two episodes that were repeatedly highlighted by interviewees illustrate these 
processes. The first concerns the Anjuman Mazareen Punjab (AMP) (Tenants 
Association of Punjab) that formed among peasants working on military run farms in 
Okara district in the early 2000s. Upset that the military had decided to switch their 
payment from a share cropping arrangement to a contracted daily wage and to 
allocate itself the power to evict them, they organised to contest the ownership of 
the land.  
Within months the AMP’s movement had spread into nine other districts of the 
Punjab. As Akhtar (2006) points out, the relative absence of landlords and other types 
of coercive actors on military farms probably allowed this to happen. He goes on to 
explain that ‘gradually they became aware of the fact that they could generate panic 
                                                 
99 Although Kaldor (2003) does not argue that this is a deliberate process. 
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within the state machinery simply by virtue of the numbers involved in the 
movement’ (ibid:483). Thus, following the failure of arbitrations, they have 
occasionally engaged in acts of civil disobedience. At the same time, they have taken 
the military to court. 
For our purposes, the AMP is interesting as the British INGO ActionAid soon 
approached its leaders to offer their support (Bano, 2012:149-150). This came in the 
form of models for the movement’s institutionalisation, capacity building trainings 
and funding. However, its attention fractured the AMP along religious and ideological 
dividing lines. For example, ActionAid was particularly interested in supporting the 
Christians amongst the religiously diverse movement. This elevated their leaders and 
caused resentment from those it ignored. Some of the newly trained leaders also 
broke away to establish their own NGOs in the hope of courting further donor 
funding. As an interviewee described: 
 
‘now you go to the leadership of these peasants’ movements and you 
insist on going to their homes and you will realise that this is an upper 
middle-class home. Where is the peasantry? They have created a class 
among the peasants. These peasants, who were just fighting for the 
rights, now they realise you just raise your voice or make an NGO and you 
can get money’.100 
 
Observers suggest that the AMP remains fractured, with various groups supported by 
INGOs focussed on the rights of the movement’s minorities and a separate faction 
mentored by an indigenous NGO comprised of activists that do not take donor 
funding (Bano, 2012; Ali, 2015). The former’s interest in minorities is described as 
largely a donor driven imperative, with little legitimacy amongst the movement’s 
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members. Whilst the latter is said to be using the indigenous NGO’s links to 
international journalists and embassies to give its leaders a modicum of cover from 
the state’s oppression. It is also drawing upon their knowledge for its court battle 
with the military. The implied accusation is that alongside money wealthy donors 
bring their own divisions, bureaucratic procedures and agendas to the table. 
Moreover, they often have little interest in transformational potential of the 
peasants’ struggle. In my interviewee’s words, they are ‘killing the spirit of activism’.  
The second incident concerns the split within civil society between those that 
supported General Musharraf’s ‘bloodless coup’ and those that were dismayed at 
Pakistan once again becoming a military dictatorship. In the years leading up to the 
coup, Nawz Sharif’s increasingly intrusive regulations, his rhetoric on donors’ anti-
Pakistan agendas, and his ties to religious groups were looked upon with worry by 
much of civil society. Their concerns were confirmed when he tried to declare Sharia 
the law of the land in 1998. Accordingly, when Musharraf disposed of Nawaz many 
were happy.  
Although it is highly unlikely that Musharraf’s coup would have lasted as long as it did 
without American patronage, he, like dictators before him, had to build a domestic 
constituency. This was partly achieved through holding of a, reportedly widely rigged, 
referendum on his leadership in 2001 and, in time-honoured fashion for military 
dictators, local government elections. However, Musharraf also sought to court 
Pakistan’s professionalised civil society. To do so, he held regular dialogues, offered 
government contracts to NGOs and allowed the entrance of some its leaders into his 
cabinet.  
As many interviewees argued, Musharraf was seen by those that joined him as a 
liberal able to reverse the country’s slide towards religiosity. Indeed, in his own 
memoirs, Musharraf (2006) un-ironically justifies his coup as saving Pakistan from 
Nawaz’s ambition of becoming the ‘commander of the faithful, with dictatorial 
temporal and religious powers’. Perhaps as importantly, however, he spoke the 
technocratic development discourse. As one interviewee explained: 
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‘I realised so many of them were not pro dictatorship, they were pro 
Musharraf because they thought he was a progressive man. For them, 
Nawaz Sharif’s democracy was just an extension of Zia-ul-Haq […] So 
when he was ousted by Musharraf, who came up with the same 
vocabulary as spoken by the NGOs, enlightened moderation, oh dear 
monitoring should be done, oh dear this should be you know a 
participatory management blah blah blah. So, all that fascinating 
terminology that these NGOs had been using for all those years in their 
documents and project proposals and reports, suddenly they were 
hearing from a dictator. And suddenly they were eased out of the 
tensions that Nawaz Sharif, the democrat, had put on them. And 
Suddenly they saw a very liberal state. And suddenly they saw that on 
New Year no one would stop you and ask if you’re drunk […] because the 
liberals mostly are from the upper class or privileged class, the upper 
middle-class, these things resonate with them. It’s a very, very urban 
phenomenon. And suddenly this dictator is offering them to join him. 
That was new, that was original, no other dictator had done that.’101 
 
Musharraf was skilled at cultivating this image amongst donors. For example, at the 
risk of upsetting religious groups, he made much publicly of his local government 
programme’s reserved seats for women and minorities. He was also a regular at 
parties and ceremonies attended by donors and foreign diplomats. Suggestive of the 
success of this strategy, the writers of a volume entitled Power and Civil Society in 
Pakistan, with contributions from academics and NGO leaders, declared:  
 
                                                 
101 Interview with NGO / INGO Worker 26.08.15 
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‘after a dozen years of floundering democracy, a new breed of military 
rule seems to have emerged, hindered not by the politics of selfishness 
but by the sentiment of love of country and compatriots […] the military 
seems to be breaking new ground by assigning capable, qualified people 
to hold key positions in government.’ (Weiss and Gilani, 2001:ix) 
 
It is also notable that in his memoirs Musharraf saw himself as much more than the 
necessary savour of Pakistan. Indeed, he was a reformist and the true progressive 
force, particularly compared to the PPP under Benazir which he described as ‘a family 
cult that practiced fascism rather than liberal democracy’ (Musharraf, 2006). As 
shown earlier, this self-belief paid off in the form of increased donor funding and, for 
a while, a blind-eye to the military’s clandestine support of jihadist groups. 
Many interviewees were upset at the ease with which some of their colleagues in 
civil society could support Musharraf. They argued that for much of his time in power 
it was impossible to get them out on the street to demonstrate against state 
oppression, with some even speculating that they did not want to compromise their 
lucrative contracts. Others were angry at America for once again putting geostrategic 
imperatives ahead of their country’s democracy. A few even spoke in hushed 
conspiratorial tones of the fate of civil society leaders that had allied themselves with 
Musharraf only to be side-lined or, in some cases, violently silenced. The most 
frustrated even left NGOs and sought work within INGOs, in the private sector or the 
civil service. 
As Zaidi (2008) has argued, in the wake of Musharraf’s era all types of Pakistani NGO 
now routinely look to derive contracts from the state alongside international donors. 
This is increasingly important as they struggle to pay large staffs built up in the mid-
2000s and as they face a state willing to clamp down on those it deems a problem. 
Indeed, Pakistan, despite once again being under democratic rule, is amongst 
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countries currently closing the space for autonomous civil society activity.102 For 
many, state contracts are also likely one of the few options in a contemporary 
environment in which many foreign donors’ have increasingly advanced procedures 
around demonstrating impact and value for money.103 Many also remain unwilling to 
fund advocacy initiatives that risk upsetting their country’s diplomatic ties or do what 
they perceive the private sector can do better.  
These episodes illustrate donors’ contributions to the fractured nature of Pakistan’s 
professionalised civil society. They suggest that with their help it has transitioned 
from a broadly unified opposition to Zia’s Islamisation programme and a general 
support for democracy, to an ideologically fractured sphere that contains 
organisations willing to work with a military dictator. Moreover, it currently finds 
itself dominated by large corporatized NGOs that act as patrons for smaller NGOs and 
CBOs which operate in a competitive, largely donor-created yet state-supported, 
market. Competitors must increasingly submit themselves to donors’ favoured ways 
of working and the state’s surveillance. Failure to do so risks being financially starved 
or worse. In this sense, civil society in Pakistan should largely be understood as 
embedded in the country’s wider political tradition of compromise and co-optation in 
the service of survival, rather than as a source of confrontation and radical 
democracy.  
 
Post-Musharraf developments 
Before concluding, it is important to note that those seeking accountable democratic 
governance were likely emboldened by developments in 2008. Most notably, 
Musharraf stepped down and national elections were held. This followed mass 
protests to reinstate the Chief Justice he had sacked led by lawyers’ associations. As 
                                                 
102 ‘Civil Society Space’ Hansard, UK parliamentary debate, 26 January 2017. 
https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2017-01-26/debates/1CD71CEA-045B-4C93-9558-
97BB416EDD6C/CivilSocietySpace (Accessed 01/06/17) 
103 See Chapter Four. 
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part of this agitation, a functional alliance between the PPP and PML-N was formed 
to threaten Musharraf with impeachment. These developments rode the wave of an 
increasingly vocal independent media, which added to the cacophony of calls for a 
return to democracy.  
Furthermore, suggestive of growing widespread interest in democracy, the 2013 
elections witnessed a 15% increase in voter turnout and the country’s first hand over 
of power from one civilian government to another. A civilian-led devolution plan was 
also set in motion that year which has accorded significant fiscal powers to the 
federation’s four provinces and led to local government elections in 2015. The 
monopoly of the country’s older dynastic political parties was also challenged by the 
electoral gains made by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf’s (PTI). It ran on an anti-
corruption message, which fed into a rising public discourse around topics such as 
Pakistan’s ‘VIP culture’ or the impunity of influentials and, more tentatively, the civil-
military balance of power.  
It is also notable that in the run up to 2013’s elections Pakistan’s major political 
parties pledged to provide broad public goods. For example, the PML-N vowed to 
increase health spending as a proportion of GDP to 2% and to introduce a National 
Health Service (PML-N, 2013). Whilst the insurgent PTI ran a campaign that framed 
previous governments’ health policies as ‘for the elite, with people missing from the 
equation’.104 Broad policies of this sort arguably represent a new battleground for 
this generation of Pakistani politicians. Nonetheless, observers remain unsure as to 
whether this is the beginning of an ongoing sea-change in the way politics is done or 
if behind the scenes it is business as usual.  
 
 
                                                 
104 See: ‘PTI envisages ‘health equity fund’, Dawn, 27th September 2012. 
http://www.dawn.com/news/752368/pti-envisages-health-equity-fund (Accessed 23/01/17) 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has portrayed Pakistan as a semi-authoritarian clientelistic state. It was 
shown that it is prone to dictatorship and that its experiments in democracy have 
often been controlled by the military. Nonetheless, since its founding Pakistan has 
undergone significant socio-economic changes that have seen the rise of a growing 
capitalist middle-class. In response, those in charge of the state have sought to 
incorporate this class into the prevailing political settlement. This has largely been 
achieved through a thin veneer of democracy at the local level, the transfer of state 
wealth and property to local elites, the informalisation of the economy, and the 
creation of a public sphere characterised by religious-nationalism. In turn, it has 
caused Pakistan’s patron-client relations to gradually transition to the ‘new’ type 
found in young democracies.  
At the same time, it has been argued that Pakistan’s more activist and politically 
orientated civil society organisations have been consistently crushed. This has 
occurred through political leaders that have drawn upon their rhetoric to win power 
before abandoning and silencing them once in office. Alongside them, military 
dictators have banned their activities, de-linked them from political parties and 
sought to re-engineer the public sphere in ways that discourages broad political 
participation. Furthermore, at various points members of civil society have been co-
opted by the state so it can portray itself as liberal to its international backers.  
More recently, neoliberal donors’ financial support and agendas have led to civil 
society’s corporatisation, fracturing and depoliticization. This has created a 
competitive market within which organisations willing to discipline themselves and to 
avoid confrontations with the state benefit. With the notable exception of lawyers, 
therefore, Pakistan’s civil society was largely unable to contribute to growing calls in 
2008 for a return to democracy. Indeed, many NGOs had lost their links to CBOs, 
reformist members of political society and the media. Insiders had even begun to 
suggest that some were merely contract implementers with little in the way of 
political ideas or transformational objectives. In this sense, some donors have helped 
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to ensure the survival of the new clientelism in Pakistan. Nonetheless, by 2009 some 
of them were beginning to explore the idea of social accountability programmes as a 
way of bucking this trend. The thesis now turns to the empirical investigation of one 
of these efforts.   
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Chapter Six 
Methods and Case Study Selection 
 
 
 
This chapter introduces readers to the principles of constructivist grounded theory. It 
was used to collect and analyse data from staff and volunteers within the Supporting 
Transparency, Accountability, and Electoral Process (STAEP) programme. I overview 
the implications of its argument that data is co-constructed by researchers and 
research participants, including what this means for issues of bias, theoretical 
sampling and theory building. The claim that constructivist grounded theory can 
begin to account for how power affects the micro social processes studied by 
researchers is also explored. I argue that the approach it is suited the thesis’ aim of 
revealing how development’s discourses and practices can restrict or enable wider 
democratising projects. I also explore the reality of access and data collection once I 
entered the field, and comment upon the limitations of the method. The chapter 
ends by providing a rationale for the case selection methodology.  
 
Grounded theory 
To guide my investigation of the citizens’ groups raised and mentored by STAEP – 
herein called Constituency Relations Groups (CRGs) –, I adopted Charmaz’s (2000, 
2006, 2008a) formulation of constructivist grounded theory. I was drawn to her 
suggestion that it is suited to the critical stance of social justice research (Charmaz, 
2005). Arriving at Charmaz’s ideas was, however, something of an accident. Indeed, I 
began my search for appropriate methodologies with criticisms of grounded theory’s 
positivist roots and its difficulties with accounting for power. Only later did I conclude 
that a constructivist lens helps grounded theory to include both the insights of 
poststructuralists and the messy realities of fieldwork.  
178 
 
Grounded theory has its roots in Glaser and Strauss’s (1965, 1967) efforts to accord 
theory generation the same level of attention as theory testing. To do this, they 
sought to codify systematic methods for generating hypotheses and theories from 
data collected during evolving qualitative research, rather than logically deducing 
them from a priori assumptions. Broadly, they argued that researchers should enter 
the field with research problems that orientate their investigations and without 
testable hypotheses derived from existing literature, with the aim to have as few 
preconceived ideas as possible. Once there, they should simultaneously collect and 
analyse data, returning to the field time and again with new questions. In the 
process, false leads are checked-off and emergent theories are refined.  
Four techniques from Glaser and Strauss characterise the method. Firstly, early 
analysis of collected data, beginning with line-by-line coding. Codes describe the 
social processes and meanings given to them that are being discussed in an interview 
or observed in the field. Codes are later grouped into context-specific analytic 
categories that move an analysis from description to interpretation. Glaser and 
Strauss (1967:37) define categories as conceptual elements of theories. However, 
emergent categories ideally do not use concepts from existing theories. If they do, 
grounded theorists argue they must ‘earn’ their place in new analyses through clear 
connections to raw data (Glaser, 1978; Charmaz, 2006).  
Secondly, grounded theory calls for constant comparison. Codes should be compared 
with codes, codes with emerging categories, categories with one another, and 
towards the end of a study theories with literature. Put another way, one may 
compare participants (their actions, meanings and accounts), a single respondent’s 
answers over time, or one’s own evolving interpretations. This ensures that analyses 
have momentum and that false-leads are dropped. It also allows for the identification 
of sub-categories and variation within emerging analytical categories. Constant 
comparison, therefore, helps to ensure the thickness of descriptions and that studies 
account for the complexity of the phenomenon under investigation. 
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Thirdly, grounded theorists are encouraged to theoretically sample from among their 
population of interest. This means that research should be guided by emerging 
hunches, gaps in the data and the questions they pose. Thus, a study’s sample cannot 
be random or predefined. Instead, researchers seek out new participants (or return 
to existing participants) and further observations as their own understandings evolve. 
This helps researchers tease out difficult areas of interest and test micro-hypotheses.  
Lastly, grounded theory encourages memo writing. Memos serve as written evidence 
of a researcher’s evolving ideas, ideally justifying interpretations and supporting 
emerging theories. They often begin as the private thoughts of researchers, including 
their reflections, deliberations and conjectures. Once they have been sufficiently 
developed and tested against data, memos form the base for chapter sections and 
they become the component parts of concluding theories. In their finished public 
form, memos derive their force from a combination of analytical insight and clear 
connections to raw data. Whilst their positioning within a study’s broader argument 
speaks to their relevance.  
After their first book Glaser and Strauss never published together again. Strauss and 
Corbin’s (1990) later suggested modifications to grounded theory: firstly, they 
provided a four-staged procedure for coding data and deducing theory. In the 
process, they partially undermined the idea that theory was already in the natural 
world to be ‘discovered’ by researchers and, instead, suggested that they ‘create’ it 
through technically rigorous analyses that account for complexity. Secondly, they 
argued that creative interpretations of data can arise from engaging relevant 
literature at all stages of a study. Glaser (1992) argued that their modifications 
abandoned the idea of emergence at the heart of grounded theory. Accordingly, his 
subsequent writings have concentrated on keeping grounded theory as close to their 
original formulation as possible (Glaser, 2002; Glaser and Holton, 2004).   
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Constructivist grounded theory 
Charmaz, a former student of both Glaser and Strauss, sought to critique and update 
their grounded theory formulations by including the overlapping insights of 
constructionism and post-modernism. Her goal was to make it better suited to 
studying issues of power and inequalities, links between micro-contexts, discourses 
and structures, and social justice research. Although Charmaz is not the only 
constructivist grounded theorist, I concentrate on her work as the most complete 
formulation of such an approach (Denzin, 1994; Madill et al., 2000; A. Bryant, 2002; 
Clarke, 2014). 
Charmaz’s argues that both Glaser and Strauss hold positivistic premises (Charmaz, 
2008a:400). Indeed, within their work she identifies assumptions about researchers’ 
abilities to have unmediated contact with the world, to easily replicate one another’s 
studies by following the same methodologies, that they share the same meanings as 
their studies’ participants, and that they can approach the field unclouded by their 
previous experiences. She also worries that their write-ups are overly 
decontextualized by the efforts to generalise through abstract theories (Charmaz, 
2006:402). 
Charmaz does acknowledge a distinction between Glaser’s (1993, 2004) belief in the 
idea of researchers discovering theory, and Strauss and Corbin’s (1990, 1998) 
argument that methodological rigor enables researchers to create theory. However, 
the distinction is largely meaningless for her interest in rejecting positivist premises 
because it rests on how much emphasis each place on the potential of technical 
methods to lead to theory development. Thus, it does not question their underlying 
epistemological frameworks. She has also suggested that Strauss and Corbin’s (1990, 
1998) mechanistic coding steps and scientific terms often ‘distance’ readers from the 
experiences of both researchers and research participants (Charmaz, 2000:525). An 
issue which can lead to ‘mundane data and routine reports’ (Charmaz, 2006:15). 
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In contrast, Charmaz’s guidelines for grounded theory begin from the premise that 
researchers co-construct theories with their research participants. This suggests that 
both bring their biases, morals, priorities, experiences, and wider contextual 
constraints to every interaction. Subjectivities and power inequalities, therefore, are 
embedded in data collection and analyses, theories can only ever be interpretations 
of the phenomenon under study and they always reflect value positions. The main 
problem for researchers is in ‘identifying these positions and weighing their effect on 
research practice, not in denying their existence’ (Charmaz, 2008a:402).  
To make these claims, Charmaz draws upon the principles of constructivism and the 
insights of post-modernism. Constructivism assumes the relativism of multiple social 
realities, the social creation of knowledge, and the impossibility of researchers ever 
fully grasping participants’ meanings (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Post-modernism has 
done much to highlight the effects of power, especially in terms of the discursive 
construction of the world.105 Thus, she has described her goal as reclaiming grounded 
theory from its ‘positivist underpinnings to form a revised, more open-ended practice 
[…] that stresses its emergent, constructivist elements’ and to use its ‘methods as 
flexible, heuristic strategies’ (Charmaz, 2000: 510). 
Within her methodological guidelines, Charmaz places a strong emphasis on in-depth 
interviewing. She recommends repeated engagements with the same participants, 
with questions that explore the meanings they attribute to different social 
interactions and wider processes. This reflects the principal argument of symbolic 
interactionists that ‘society, reality, and the self are constructed through interaction 
and thus rely on language and communication’ (ibid:7). And it suggests that research 
participants’ meanings are never fixed and that they will change over time, often in 
response to new social interactions, experiences or conditions. Charmaz’s 
                                                 
105 For many, post-structuralism and post-modernism are interchangeable terms (see Chapters One, Three and 
Four). Indeed, Fox (2014) writes: ‘Postmodernism is closely associated with post-structuralism, and might be 
thought of as the “political wing” of the latter perspective, in the sense that is suspicious of, and seeks to 
undermine the grand narratives of modernist social organisation and domination including capitalism, 
patriarchy, colonialism and heteronormativity’.  
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constructivist grounded theory, therefore, specifically seeks to account for the 
fluidity of the meanings participants’ give to things and to show how they change.  
Charmaz cautions, however, that what participants tell researchers reflects their own 
biographies, their desires to shape others’ understandings of their worlds and the 
hidden contextual constraints they are subject to (ibid:68). Accordingly, what is left 
unsaid can often be as important as what is said and researchers should not be shy of 
suggesting how the context within which data is collected may have affected it. 
Charmaz also argues that the actual research one conducts will often differ from 
what was written in proposal documents (ibid:46). This is necessary if researchers are 
following emergent ideas, seeking to close identified gaps and theoretically sampling. 
In terms of coding, Charmaz (2008:168) adheres to the principles of flexibility and 
fluidity and encourages analysts to ‘tolerate ambiguity’ within their data. Thus, she 
proposes a loose two-stage technique of ‘initial’ and then ‘refocused’ coding. In the 
first, researchers occupy themselves with answering Glaser’s (1992) two key 
questions, ‘what is the chief concern of participants?’ and ‘how do they resolve this 
concern?’. This focuses analyses on the social processes participants are engaged in 
or describing, and the meanings they give to them. To aid thinking in terms of 
processes, Charmaz encourages codes to make use of gerunds (e.g. running, justifying 
or obfuscating) and the terms or phrases used by participants (e.g. showing off or 
plotting).106 The second stage involves elevating those codes with explanatory power 
over others to provisional theoretical categories. Further recoding, comparisons, 
theoretical sampling and memo writing are then used to explore their potential to 
contribute to theory generation.  
Charmaz (2006:17) also suggests researchers may use ‘sensitising concepts’ that draw 
from others’ work and theories as ‘points of departure’ for investigations and initial 
questions. However, researchers should seek to be as up front as possible about 
when they are drawing upon or importing concepts from elsewhere (ibid:76). 
Furthermore, attention should be devoted to identifying new processes and 
                                                 
106 Using a participant’s terms is often called ‘in vivo’ coding. 
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developing fresh concepts as soon as possible or, failing this, refining and justifying 
the place of others’ concepts in the final theoretical analysis. Accordingly, she echoes 
others’ suggestions that researchers enter the field with a ‘open mind’, informed by 
existing literature and their previous experiences (Strauss and Corbin, 1998; Kelle, 
2005; Giles et al., 2013). Nonetheless, to remain open, literature reviews should still 
be left until after data collection and initial anlyses have been completed (Charmaz, 
2006:166).  
Turning to writing, Charmaz and Mitchell (1996) sought to expose the ‘myth’ of the 
detached social science author and, instead, called for researchers’ voices to be 
heard. This accords with the constructivist position that researchers and participants 
co-create data, and that reflexivity should be used as a way of acknowledging and, as 
much as possible, avoiding potential biases. As part of this, researchers’ important 
decision-making processes, conjectures and ‘moral’ choices over whose voices are 
given space should be explained. Furthermore, researchers should not be afraid to 
express their perplexity at unanswered questions, dead-ends in their research 
strategies or ambiguous data. All add to the plausibility of their arguments.  
Following others, Charmaz (2000:526) also repeatedly describes her studies as 
‘stories’, and encourages writers ‘to balance theoretical interpretation with an 
evocative aesthetic’ (Jackson, 2002; Hastrup, 2004). This refers to efforts to weave 
explanations of the processes researchers observe and the theories they generate 
into the narrative. In doing so, she argues that theory becomes more accessible to 
readers and research can serve audiences from multiple disciplines or those outside 
of academia (Charmaz, 2008a:406). Thus, Charmaz recommends a style of writing far 
removed from the scientific, impersonal and often decontextualized reports common 
to positivist social science. To paraphrase Hastrup (2004:469), I would also argue that 
careful storytelling can locate and explain human agency in the face of dis-
empowering discourses.  
 
184 
 
Social justice research, power and context 
So far, I’ve explored the evolution of grounded theory from its positivist beginnings 
to its contemporary constructivist renderings. However, Charmaz (2005) has also 
argued that constructivist grounded theory is suited to the goals of social justice 
research. Social justice research implies an interest in fairness, equity, equality, 
democratic process, status, and hierarchy, and individual and collective rights and 
obligations. And it requires a critical stance towards discourses, actions, 
organisations, institutions and wider structures. It also seeks theories with 
implications for concrete policy proposals. However, as this often cannot be done 
without making value judgements and drawing upon ideals, it is acknowledged that 
researchers will bring their ‘shoulds’ and ‘oughts’ into analyses (Ibid:5). 
In putting forth her argument, Charmaz took on Burawoy’s (1991) criticisms of 
grounded theorists. He accused them of largely bracketing the context through their 
eagerness to move to abstract renderings and theoretical models. He suggested, 
therefore, that they are often blinded to how power affects the social processes and 
micro-contexts they study. This severely limits the prospects of identifying pathways 
to desired changes. For Charmaz (2005), however, these issues can be overcome 
through constructivist, as opposed to positivist, grounded theory.  
Firstly, Charmaz argues that constant comparisons between research participants’ 
own definitions of issues such as race, class and gender, and those found in the 
academic or sociological literature used by analysts can be fruitful. Indeed, as these 
issues – or categories in the grounded theorists’ language – are socially constructed, 
participants’ meanings cannot be assumed. Instead, by investigating how they are 
understood and experienced by participants, researchers can gain insights into how 
inequalities are maintained, subtly undermined or directly challenged within micro-
contexts.  
Secondly, Charmaz suggests that constructivist grounded theory can attend to the 
societal and global contexts within which people experience injustice. This requires 
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that grounded theorists link the basic social processes they identify to wider 
structures, which can include non-material factors such as hidden status inequalities, 
cultures, dominant discourses and important surrounding events. To do this, 
Charmaz (2005, 2006) points to Clarke's (2003:556) commitment to ‘situating 
interpretation’ and her use of situational maps.  
For Clarke, the methodological implications of post-modernism require reversing 
social sciences’ commitment to simplifying and erasing the context. Instead, she 
seeks to combine a concentration on research participants’ actions and meanings 
with analytic approaches that as far as possible account for ‘the full situation of 
enquiry’.107 In practice, this means mapping out the relationships between all the 
human, nonhuman, discursive and other elements in a research situation. And 
including the researcher’s interpretations of the direction of influence and causality 
between them.  
To do this, studies may use situational maps. They begin as unstructured collages of 
emerging categories from ongoing data analysis. As studies evolve, researchers 
gradually make connections between different categories and theorised contextual 
factors, many of which may lay outside of the studied micro-contexts. Indeed, one 
may connect a category emerging from collected data to a broader structure 
uncovered through previously reviewed historical materials, others’ theories or 
critical discourse analyses (ibid:559).  
For example, in my own research I might postulate that participants’ mistrust of 
money paid to NGO staff members is intimately connected to Pakistan’s historical 
experience with monetised social work and foreign agendas. The idea behind these 
visual aids, therefore, is to form hypotheses over the conditions and wider structures 
that shape the power and politics of studied social processes and the meanings given 
to them. This allows analysts to move from micro to institutional, organisational and 
macro levels of analysis. And it aids them to make visible previously hidden 
                                                 
107 Clarke (2003) credits Strauss (1987), and Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) with moving grounded theory 
towards a concern with context through their use of their conditional matrices. 
186 
 
relationships between these levels. From a social justice perspective, it also enables 
analysts to grasp how things could be different given different relationships. 
Thirdly, it is suggested that constructivist grounded theory can attend to the 
contradictions between research participants’ accounts of their actions and 
meanings, what they actually do, and how others perceive them. For example, a 
wealthy research participant may declare that he gives medical goods to the local 
community free of charge. I might later discover that when he does so he is also using 
the dispensary as a place to canvass for votes for his political patron. Charmaz (2005) 
argues that through the careful triangulation of emerging stories such contradictions 
can reveal the unstated priorities and hidden practices of research participants. And 
they likely reveal something about how they wish to represent themselves to 
researchers.  
Lastly, Charmaz’s (2005:9-10) approach to social justice research encourages analysts 
to focus on the resources, hierarchies, and policies and practices at play within 
studied micro-contexts. Resources can be economic, social, or personal, and they 
include information and access to networks. And they enable actors to control 
meanings. Accordingly, it is important to ask how resources are dispersed and used. 
Hierarchies refer to the norm that any social group will be ordered according to 
members’ access to resources. However, it is important for analysts to discern how 
hierarchies lead to injustices, such as through silencing people’s political voices and 
barring them from economic opportunities. Or, conversely, how they may underpin 
collective action, such as when leaders mobilise others to protest for their rights. 
Nonetheless, both the use of resources and the importance of hierarchies will be 
circumscribed by wider norms and practices. Charmaz conceptualises these as akin to 
the institutional ‘rules of the game’ and suggests that research participants will have 
different interests in upholding or challenging them. She also sees them as the bridge 
between studied social processes and wider structures. Thus, it is important to ask 
where participants are situated in relation to these rules. This has clear parallels with 
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Bourdieu's ideas of overlapping social fields, different types of capital, and 
individuals’ abilities to bend the rules explored in Chapter Two. 
So far, I have shown that constructivist grounded theory lends itself to social justice 
research that is interested in accounting for how power affects studied social 
processes. In the rest of the chapter, I locate myself within this methodology and 
reflexively explore how I co-created data with my research participants.  
 
Access 
As covered in Chapter One, I first gained access to STAEP as a researcher jointly 
employed by The Asia Foundation (TAF) and the Justice and Security Research 
Programme (JSRP) based at the London School of Economics and Political Science 
(LSE). I arrived in Pakistan in early 2014 to conduct three months of research on the 
programme’s ‘Theory of Change’.108 By the time I finished this short project, I was 
curious and politically stimulated by the STAEP programme. Accordingly, I secured 
permission from both TAF and FAFEN’s leadership to work on it as a PhD project. 
However, I made it clear that this time I wanted as much as possible to be 
independent from DFID and TAF. Thus, I shared my research puzzles with FAFEN’s 
senior staff, who were supportive of my project, giving me a desk in their office for 
several months, letting me access their data and initially connecting me with the 
CRGs’ mentoring NGOs. 
Nonetheless, my previous experiences and new positionality raised a number of 
issues discussed by Mosse's (2006) exploration of ethnographies of professional 
communities. Mosse has pointed out that higher education funding squeezes in the 
1980s meant many researchers now also work in the fields they investigate. Although 
this can help to secure access, ‘professional insiders’ face the problem of mentally 
                                                 
108 Theories of Change are explicit evolving narratives of how and why programmes understand themselves to 
be able to effect desired changes. They are increasingly required by donor organisations as part of business 
cases, and within monitoring and evaluation efforts (Valters, 2014).  
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exiting the fields in which they work to critically study them.109 As Mosse (ibid:937) 
comments, this includes the ‘exit from the templates of our younger ethnographic or 
professional selves’.  
For me, this problem was compounded by picking up short consultancies during my 
time in Pakistan that required me to think and report my observations of ongoing 
social accountability programmes in ways that accord with development’s dominant 
discourses. This includes focusing on measurable programme outputs, rather than 
the meanings participants give them, and as much as possible bracketing the power 
and politics of programmes, rather than explicitly confronting them. Indeed, although 
paid work gave me a broad understanding of social accountability programmes, it 
taught me to approach them as either formalised theories of change, or sets of 
inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes. As will further be outlined below, such 
struggles meant I spent a long time convincing myself that the puzzles I wished to 
explore were legitimate lines of enquiry. 
 
Case selection 
My selection of CRGs to study was guided by security considerations and a detour 
into quantitative analysis of the CRGs’ activities spurned from my reading of the ‘grey 
literature’ on social accountability.110 For the purposes of due diligence, evaluation 
and learning, STAEP took efforts to record the minutes from the CRGs’ ad-hoc 
meetings on an online database.111 Collected by FAFEN’s mentoring NGOs, this 
qualitative information provided an opportunity to quantitatively get a handle on the 
CRGs’ activities. Indeed, I was curious to see what it would tell me about the groups’ 
activities. Thus, a codebook was developed to record the number and categories of 
                                                 
109 Mosse (2006) discusses this problem with regards to anthropologists working as development professionals. 
However, it is now commonly understood that this problem affects a wide range of disciplines, such as 
economics and even the hard sciences. 
110 ‘Grey literature’ is the name given to publications from the development sectors’ donors, companies, think 
tanks and NGOs. 
111 Meetings were meant to be regular, but were ad-hoc in practice as members’ other commitments allowed. 
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issues identified by each CRG, how many of these were raised with state and non-
state authorities, and how many were satisfactorily resolved. It is presented in 
Appendix 3. To carry out the coding I employed and trained research assistants who 
had previously worked on the online database for FAFEN during the programme’s 
lifespan. 
However, simply ranking the CRGs by how many demands they resolved would tell us 
little about their experiences. Furthermore, the different contexts each group 
operated in across Pakistan and the varying issues they may have deemed important 
rule against straight comparisons. To move forward, a ranking that captures both 
CRGs’ participation in the processes deemed to be central to social accountability and 
their supposed success at them was needed. Thus, for each CRG a composite score 
was calculated that gave equal weight to the ratio of demands they identified that 
they then raised with power-holders and the ratio of raised demands they considered 
to have been satisfactorily resolved.112 This subjective weighting sought to capture 
the members’ ability to act in support of social accountability, as much as it did the 
outcomes of their actions.113 I call this the CRGs’ ‘activism’ scores. 
The coding revealed that CRGs located in the central and northern Punjab, in districts 
such as Gujranwala, Lahore, Gujrat and Sialkot, had high activism scores. While not 
quite as high scoring, many CRGs from Pakistan’s northern province of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa also fared well. However, CRGs from Sindh province and those from 
southern Punjab, such as Muzaffargarh, Multan and Bahawalnagar, were found to 
have low activism scores. Although there was a clear provincial hierarchy, the 
variation within the Punjab also suggested that the sub-provincial factors may have 
been important.  
                                                 
112 To test for the possibility that CRGs’ raised demands to give the appearance of activity when in actual fact 
they put little substantive pressure on authorities to resolve them, the weighting of both parts of the indicator 
were experimented with to assure that minor changes did not significantly affect the overall ranking of most of 
the CRGs. 
113 A focus on agency follows the work of Sen (1999:152) and others who observe that the poor often place a 
high value on ‘unrestrained participation in political and social activities’ (Narayan et al., 1999; Appadurai, 
2004). It also accords with Tilly’s (2007) focus on participation in public political life. 
190 
 
In an effort to further unpick this, the second phase turned to contemporary grey 
literature that offered broad lists of potentially relevant contextual factors for social 
accountability programmes (Foresti et al., 2013; O’Meally, 2013; Harris and Wild, 
2013). It also returned to the literature on civil society, governance and service 
delivery in Pakistan that I had reviewed for my initial study of STAEP (Kirk, 2014). 
Together, they provided hypotheses for the sub-national contextual variables that 
may have affected the CRGs’ activism scores. However, relevant constituency level 
socio-economic data is, in large part, lacking in Pakistan. Thus, the range of potential 
variables to correlate with the CRGs’ activity scores was limited to those with 
plausible proxies. The final five variables chosen for regression analysis were: multi-
dimensional poverty, violence, political competition, the number of political parties 
present, and land inequality. A fuller explanation for their choice and for how they 
were constructed is given in Appendix 3.  
Ordinary least squares regression was then used. Column 1 of Table I shows that the 
overall explanatory power of the five variables used to model the contexts in which 
the CRGs operated was low: the R2 is only 0.77. However, it did reveal that 
multidimensional poverty and land inequality were significantly, and negatively, 
related to the CRGs’ activity scores. The findings somewhat conformed to the 
hypothesis that the CRGs’ are more effective in areas with less poverty and 
inequality. However, counter to expectations, poverty and land inequality were only 
significantly negatively related to the CRGs’ activism scores in urban areas, not in 
rural ones (compare columns 2 and 3 of Table I).114 For their part, violence, political 
competition and the effective number of parties were not found to be related to CRG 
activity.  
  
                                                 
114 This was particularly surprising given the smaller number of observations for urban constituencies. 
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Table I: CRGs’ activism and sub-national contextual factors 
 
 
To further explore these results, the CRGs’ activism scores were broken down into 
their constituent parts - the ability to raise demands with power-holders and having 
them satisfactorily resolved - (see columns 4 to 7 of Table I). This exercise found that 
poverty was negatively related to the CRGs’ abilities to raise issues with power-
holders across all constituencies; whereas land inequality is not significantly related 
to raising demands in either constituency (columns 6 and 7). Furthermore, land 
inequality only seemed to affect the ability of CRGs to have their issues satisfactorily 
resolved in those constituencies with large urban areas (column 4). These findings go 
against what much of the literature on patron-client relations, collective action and 
rural populations’ dependencies might predict.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Activism 
Score 
Activism 
Score 
Activism 
Score 
Issues 
Resolved 
Issues 
Resolved 
Issues 
Raised 
Issues 
Raised 
        
Poverty -43.35** -93.65** -30.31 0.807 -0.620 -
247.7*** 
-91.76** 
 
 
(18.62) (38.07) (22.07) (1.360) (0.713) (86.41) (45.53) 
Violence -12.75 -26.89 -8.387 1.924 -0.0750 -63.49 -9.437 
 
 
(12.37) (32.28) (13.88) (1.153) (0.449) (73.27) (28.63) 
Political 
com- 
0.00771 0.0256 0.0111 0.000401 -0.00101 -0.0455 0.109 
petition 
 
(0.101) (0.134) (0.142) (0.00477) (0.00459) (0.303) (0.293) 
No. of 
parties 
2.011* 2.864 1.448 -0.128 -0.0634 7.507 3.415 
 
 
(1.179) (2.406) (1.407) (0.0860) (0.0455) (5.461) (2.903) 
Land 
inequality 
-0.109* -0.273** -0.0150 0.0123*** -0.00135 -0.469 -0.0615 
 
 
(0.0642) (0.123) (0.0839) (0.00439) (0.00271) (0.279) (0.173) 
Constant 44.69*** 67.44*** 35.17*** 2.516*** 1.214*** 119.6*** 68.03*** 
 (8.697) (16.85) (10.41) (0.602) (0.337) (38.25) (21.49) 
        
CRG 
sample 
All Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural 
        
 117 31 86 31 86 31 86 
 0.077 0.400 0.033 0.313 0.061 0.387 0.056 
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At the time of this analysis I had not conducted the in-depth review of Pakistan in 
Chapter Five which suggests that land has become less of a factor in the political 
empowerment of Pakistanis in the last two to three decades. By way of explanation, 
therefore, it may be that citizens’ contemporary capacities to engage in social 
accountability are hampered far more by a combination of their general economic 
condition and social status, than from their lack of land. However, propositions of this 
nature cannot be confidently investigated or made from presented evidence and 
likely contain many more nuances. It should also be stressed here that the CRGs’ 
memberships were not chosen at random. Instead, as described later in the thesis, 
members were purposively selected by the mentoring NGOs and one another in ways 
that I argue ultimately shaped their groups’ capacities. Thus, I hypothesize that 
contextual studies of this sort would have more utility for programmes with 
randomised participants, and treatment and control groups. 
It is arguable, therefore, that the model of sub-provincial contextual factors 
presented here could only take me so far into the messy and difficult to grasp reality 
of social accountability in Pakistan. Accordingly, it should give way to hypothesis and 
theory generating qualitative work (which may in turn uncover further quantifiable 
variables). In this sense, although limited, it helps to justify my qualitative approach 
to exploring the processes animating the studied social accountability programme. 
Rather than completely abandoning the model, however, I used its insights and 
rationale as a method of choosing CRGs for investigation. Accordingly, a matrix was 
used to plot the model’s fitted values (the predictions of how active the CRGs should 
be in each different constituency context), against the residuals (how far they 
deviated from these predications). The matrix guided me towards a focus on the 
Punjab’s sub-provincial variation in context and helped me to select CRGs that had 
been particularly active in hypothetically favourable and unfavourable contexts. 
Indeed, I was still not sure that the context did not broadly condition the agency of 
CRGs, so I sought variation. I also hoped that CRGs’ with high activism scores would 
provide rich data. Lastly, within grounded theory variation is a means of adding 
plausibility to generated theories.  
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Figure 4: CRG case selection matrix 
 
 
 
Accordingly, I selected a CRG in a predominantly rural constituency that, given my 
modelling of the context, had a higher activism score than predicted. To maintain a 
level of anonymity, it shall be called ‘Rural Gujrat’. I also selected a CRG in a 
predominantly urban constituency that had a higher activism score that was 
predicted: ‘Urban Gujrat’. Both are in the middle of northern Punjab and, 
theoretically, represent CRGs that were particularly active in contexts that the grey 
literature suggests should be conducive to social accountability. Thus, it was hoped 
that they would be rich sites of data. For comparability, these CRGs were mentored 
by the same NGO from within FAFEN’s network. 
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I also selected a CRG in a predominantly rural constituency that, given my modelling 
of the context, should have had a low activism score, but scored particularly high: 
‘Rural Multan’. And one from a predominantly urban constituency that should have 
had a low activism score, but scored particularly high: ‘Urban Multan’. Both are in 
southern Punjab, close to its border with Sindh and in areas that theoretically should 
be unconducive to social accountability. Thus, they held promise as potentially rich 
sites for data collection. Again, for comparability, both CRGs were mentored by the 
same NGO from within FAFEN’s network. 
As explored further in the next chapter, the CRGs chosen in the north of the Punjab 
are representative of regions that have benefited from the socio-economic changes 
underpinning the rise of the middle-classes covered in Chapter Five. In contrast, the 
CRGs selected in the south are in areas that are popularly thought to have largely 
remained static in terms of their social-economic development. Thus, the case 
selection methodology achieved three theoretically relevant purposes: it allowed me 
to be reasonably sure that relatively easily quantifiable contextual variables could not 
solely explain the CRGs’ activism, it narrowed my focus to contextual variation within 
Punjab province and it helped me to choose CRGs with the potential of providing rich 
data. My final selection of CRGs was also shaped by security considerations.  
 
Entering the field 
I lived in Pakistan for two years. Of this, I spent just under four months across 2014 
and 2015 in my research locations. However, before this I also spent the two weeks 
interviewing members of a fifth urban based CRG in the city of Gujranwala in 
northern Punjab. This allowed me to familiarise myself with fieldwork again, train my 
initial research assistant and trial interview questions.  
Many of the processes described by the aidnography authors (e.g. governmentality, 
depoliticization, resistance, bureaucratisation) were in my mind when I entered the 
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field.115 As were the concepts used by much of the donor literature to understand 
civil society (e.g. social capital, bridging and bonding capital, and vertical and 
horizontal links) and clientelism (e.g. vote buying, incumbent bias, patronage 
networks). I was also familiar with some of the older anthropological literature on 
Pakistan (Barth, 1965; Asad, 1972; Lindholm, 1972). Much of it focusses on how 
powerful landlords built political followings through their clients’ dependencies and 
coercion, and how bouts of democracy, capitalism and class based identities were 
beginning to change these relationships. In this sense, it described the very beginning 
of the end of the ‘old’ type of clientelism covered in Chapter Five (Hopkin, 2006). 
These ideas all served as my sensitising concepts. 
The reality that I am a young, white male from a well-known Western donor country 
was also carried with me. This often meant that research participants assumed I was 
there to assess them.116 Thus, initial meetings were spent explaining my purpose, 
reassuring them that I was not monetarily connected to FAFEN or DFID, and that I 
was not only interested in gathering ‘success stories’.117 Despite this, it was quickly 
apparent that some of the more powerful CRG members and NGO staff were often 
keen to control whom I spoke to. As has been pointed out, this is a common 
occurrence in elite interviews (Smith, 2006; Costa and Kiss, 2011; Jabeen, 2013). 
Overcoming this required gathering detailed explanations of important events from 
the CRGs’ histories and mapping relationships between members, often with a view 
to triangulating data, and uncovering contradictions and gaps. I was fortunate in that 
my youth, status as a foreigner and lack of language skills (interviews were conducted 
in English, Urdu, Kashmiri, Punjabi and Saraiki) allowed me to ask seemingly 
mundane questions about participants’ social statuses, political allegiances and 
power bases.118 Moreover, a combination of perseverance and rapport built up with 
                                                 
115 See Chapter Three. 
116 As others have found, some participants also suspected I had an anti-Pakistan agenda or was linked to 
Western security agencies (Jabeen, 2013; Martin, 2015a). There is little one can do to prove them wrong. 
117 A term frequently used by NGOs wanting to highlight impact in civil society strengthening programmes. 
118 Efforts were made to learn Urdu but due to the number of languages the study required, time, money and 
my poor progress did not get past pleasantries. 
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research participants enabled a snowballing approach that encompassed a wide 
range of perspectives within each case study location.  
I also often used FAFEN’s databases to track down some of those that had 
participated in the programme, but that were not identified by their colleagues as 
worth interviewing. Thus, as rivalries and fractures within both the CRGs and their 
mentoring NGOs revealed themselves, they guided my theoretical sampling strategy. 
Indeed, rather than taking research participants’ obstructions and attempts to 
control my fieldwork as a flaw with the chosen methodology, I sought to interpret 
such incidents as signifiers of power relations (Cramer et al., 2016).  
 
Interviewing 
The collection of qualitative data through interviewing is suited to studies that seek 
to grasp the meanings people give to social processes, relationships, events and 
structures. Moreover, interviews are especially useful in exploratory research that 
aims for hypothesis and theory generation. Accordingly, I sought to conduct 
interviews with members of the selected CRGs that would allow me to understand 
both what they did and under what conditions, and the meanings they gave their 
participation. I also interviewed staff from the mentoring NGOs in each research site 
and journalists to further understand local politics.  
For the programme’s participants, an interviewing guide was developed and 
internalised that moved from their socio-economic backgrounds and previous 
experiences of engaging in social work or activism, to their involvement with the 
STAEP programme, relationships with other CRG members and reflections on their 
experiences. All interviews began with an explanation of the purposes of the study, 
which was framed as aimed at understanding the experiences of those participating 
in the STAEP programme and local politics. Participants were also informed that their 
identities would be an anonymised and how interviews would be used for my thesis. 
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All interviews were recorded, however, participants often asked for the machine to 
be switched off when recounting details of events or relationships considered to be 
sensitive. Thus, written notes were also taken. In total 89 people were interviewed, 
with some participants interviewed a second or third time, and others informally met 
again at public venues, houses and over dinner. Often interviews would be conducted 
with more than one CRG member present, but recorded as a single interview.  
Table 2: Interview guide 
 
Introduction to my research, 
rights, process and consent 
 
  
1. Can you please tell me about 
your own circumstances before 
joining the CRG? 
Family background 
Education 
Occupation 
Affiliations 
Previous social work 
Connections to mentoring NGO 
2. Please can you tell me why you 
joined the CRG? 
Connections 
Motivations 
3. What were the other active 
members of the group like? 
Occupations 
Positions within society 
Positions within CRG 
3. Can you recall an issue that the 
CRG resolved that you were 
particularly proud of? 
Why was this issue chosen 
What was your involvement 
Who else was involved 
What were the detailed steps 
taken 
Surely it was not that easy 
Who benefitted from the issues' 
resolution 
Why did the authorities respond 
to the CRG 
Other issues of this nature 
4. Can you recall an issue that the 
CRG tried but failed to resolve? 
Why was this issue chosen 
What was your involvement 
Who else was involved 
What were the detailed steps 
taken 
Why did you not try official / 
politician 
198 
 
Who benefitted from the issues' 
resolution 
Why didn't the authorities 
respond to the CRG 
Other issues of this nature 
5. What do generally you think of 
the CRGs’ ways of working and 
aims? 
Its ways of working 
Its resolution of disagreements 
The inclusion of marginalised 
Its benefits to the community 
Its benefits to you 
Its wider aims 
6. What was the relationship 
between local politics and the 
CRG? 
What's local politics like 
How does social work fit in 
Which politicians helped or 
hindered the CRG 
Were CRG members affiliated 
with politicians 
Did the impending elections 
change anything for better or 
worse 
Why do politicians help such 
groups 
Were there rivalries amongst 
members 
7. What was the CRGs' 
relationship with the mentoring 
NGO like? 
Trainings 
Aims or instructions 
Interlocutors 
General perceptions 
Their interests 
8. Verifying points raised by other 
interviewees and interpretations 
e.g.  
Can you tell me about issue X 
What was X's role in the CRG 
Why was authority X particularly 
helpful 
I heard that, what do you think 
9. What are people's opinions of 
NGOs in Pakistan? 
Draw back to previous answers 
10. What is your opinion of 
national politics? 
Draw back to previous answers 
11. How do the CRGs or 
associations like them fit into 
this? 
 
12. What do you think the CRG 
achieved overall? 
Draw back to previous answers 
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13. Is there anything else you 
think I should know about the 
CRG or programme? 
 
  
Confirm happy, arrangements in 
case of follow-up interview 
 
 
 
One of the primary challenges of grounded theory is for interviewers not to force 
their own concepts and understandings on participants. By first focusing on 
participants’ backgrounds and then how they came to be involved in the STAEP 
programme, I gained an understanding of their own biographies and frameworks. 
This also allowed further questions to be asked in the framings used by participants 
and for me to gain an understanding of their motivations. For questions focused on 
relationships between CRG members I often introduced information learnt from 
other interviews and asked participants to comment upon it. For example, I would 
inform them that I knew that the CRG worked on the resolution of an issue and ask 
them to tell me how things played out. Such questions were often followed up by 
asking participants to reflect on such episodes, what worked and didn’t, and what 
this meant to them.  
In the latter stages of interviews, I also occasionally asked participants to comment 
upon my own evolving interpretations of their experiences. This was particularly 
important as interviewees’ answers often challenged my own understanding of civil 
society as a bounded sphere of voluntary action aimed at debating and realising the 
public good. Upon reflection, I suspect that this was gained from readings of shallow 
and idealistic development sector literature. In this sense, I followed a constructivist 
path that deliberately sought to co-construct data and interpretations with 
participants (Lynch, 2008). Most interviews ended with wider discussions about 
participants’ perspectives of civil society, NGOs, politics and democracy in Pakistan, 
and with them telling me what they wanted from future donor initiatives. 
Although I estimate that close to 50 percent of my interviewees spoke English, 
especially those within the CRGs’ core active groups, most interviews were 
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conducted in participants’ primary languages. Accordingly, I separately worked with 
two Pakistani research assistants in their mid-20s found through contacts at Quaid-i-
Azam University in Islamabad. So as not to interrupt the flow of interviews, this 
required that my assistants paraphrase participants’ answers, rather than directly 
translate. To get to this stage, the two research assistants were fully immersed in the 
research aims and my evolving interpretations were discussed with them at length. 
This was possible as we lived and travelled together whilst in the field, only parting 
company to sleep. Indeed, they became more than assistants and co-constructed 
interpretations and theoretical sampling strategies with me, often bringing new 
perspectives to the table, telling me what was being left unsaid or alerting me to 
emerging themes. They also helped me keep abreast of the evolving security 
situations in the localities we worked. Both roles were invaluable. Towards the end of 
the fieldwork I could confidently rely on them to lead interviews. 
The two assistants’ ages also helped as older men were especially keen to impress on 
them the ways of the world or to get them to tell the gora (white man) how things 
really are. Indeed, many interviewees would ask my research assistants whether they 
were meant to speak like Pakistanis or to give us sanitised versions of events retained 
for outsiders. Much of this was because particularly active CRG members had long 
worked for NGOs and were used to recounting cookie-cutter success stories for 
evaluators and visiting programme managers. In stark contrast, many of the 
interviewed women were much less instructive and often seemed keen to confide in 
someone that was interested in their experiences. Thus, they were particularly rich 
interviewees. 
My positionality also posed difficulties for my ability to co-construct shared meanings 
around the concepts and nature of volunteering and altruism in Pakistan. As has been 
extensively commented upon, researchers have ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ identities in 
relation to those groups they engage, with each bringing different challenges and 
advantages (Dwyer and Buckle, 2009; Gair, 2012). As my research progressed, I 
noticed that for those I met within the professional development sector I was often 
considered an insider. Accordingly, it was assumed that I shared certain assumptions 
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about the importance of volunteerism and altruism for cultivating empowerment, 
and that I was broadly onboard with the programme’s chosen modes of social 
mobilisation. This was good for quickly building rapport, but on occasion stilted 
critical conversations. 
In contrast, for those voluntarily participating in the CRGs I was an outsider. At first, 
this often meant I brought my own assumptions as to why people participate in such 
programmes to the table, which largely fell on the side of altruism. Later, once I had 
learnt that this was too simplistic, my outsider position meant I was often left 
frustrated when interviewees would not quickly or directly link their participation in 
the programme to their wider ambitions, such as gaining work experience or building 
a local reputation.119 This problem was exacerbated by my occasionally unskilled 
probing of interviewees which caused them to effectively shut down and to stick to 
declarations that they were involved for purely altruistic reasons. Retrospectively, I 
feel this was also often due to participants’ fear that I was judging their answers or in 
position to deny them future opportunities to participate in similar programmes. 
Overtime I learnt to build ‘semi-insider’ positions for myself and my research 
assistants. With non-elite participants, this could be achieved early in interviews by 
hinting that I fully understand that there are a multitude of reasons – altruistic and 
self-interested – for why people participate in what are often unsustainable 
programmes and that we, therefore, want to hear about theirs.120 As part of this, I 
would also sometimes mention that I too had engaged in voluntary activities to gain 
experience or get a foot in the door of some perceived opportunity. This strategy 
helped me to better reveal the relationships between participation, social work, 
economic benefits and political careers explored later in the thesis. In this sense, I 
accord with others that argue insider/outsider research positions can become fluid as 
more is learnt and interviewing techniques refined (Hayfield and Huxley, 2015).121  
                                                 
119 Ambitions explored in Chapters Seven and Eight. 
120 This mixture is highlighted in Arvidson’s (2014) study of Bangladeshi NGO workers which concludes that 
altruism is both unstainable over the long-run and that individual motivation must be understood as 
multifaceted.   
121 As discussed in Chapter Eight, my strategy for interviewing elite programme participants differed. 
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Coding, interpreting and theory generation 
The early and iterative coding of interview data was somewhat hampered. Firstly, I 
could rarely complete coding passes in the field due to living in accommodation that, 
as is normal, suffered from severe power outages of sometimes up to 18 hours a day. 
This was partially overcome by periodically returning to Pakistan’s capital city for the 
weekends and England for visits over the summers of 2014 and 2015. Secondly, the 
quality of some of the transcripts I received early on was very low. This required me 
to source additional transcribers and have them periodically check one another’s 
work, often delaying transcripts for many months. Thus, some of the coding bled into 
my literature reviews. Nonetheless, I feel that the long gaps between bursts of 
fieldwork allowed me to test my evolving ideas and, more generally, understand the 
wider context within which I was working. 
Following Charmaz’s (2008) guidelines for a two-stage coding technique, initial in-
depth coding was carried out on over half of the collected data, before a second pass 
that looked to verify emerging categories and processes was undertaken on all the 
data. The initial stage produced a long and unwieldy list of what could be called 
primary codes. Some were collated into broader categories in the second stage, 
producing a finalised codebook. The codebook and an example of a transcript coded 
using NViVo software are provided in the Appendix 4. 
Memos and situational maps were used during the analysis. The former began early, 
with memos taking coding labels as their preliminary names, including ‘According 
Credit’, ‘Somasas and Soft Drinks’ and ‘Maintaining Boundaries’. They consisted of 
collections of quotes and my emerging thoughts as to how they related to the 
observed social processes. For example, it was quickly clear that some interviewees 
were keen to maintain boundaries between what they described as social and 
political work, whilst others, saw little need to. Gradually it became clear that the 
more powerful were keener to maintain the distinction. Situational maps were often 
used later to help think through the relationships between categories, and connect 
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my interpretations of interviewees’ meanings and the uncovered social processes 
they were part of to the broader country context and the social accountability 
discourse. An example derived from my notes is given below:   
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Figure 5: Example situational map late in research  
 
 
 
A theory of ‘isomorphic activism’ derived from these techniques is given in the final 
chapter. To accord with a constructivist approach to generating theories, the 
contours of or conditions for isomorphic activism are grounded in my research on 
both the discourse and practice of social accountability. Thus, they focus on how the 
meanings and actions of participants in programmes are shaped by ‘large and, often, 
hidden positions, networks, situations, and relationships’, and they seek to make 
visible ‘hierarchies of power, communication, and opportunity that maintain and 
perpetuate differences and distinctions’ (Charmaz, 2006:130-131).  
 
Limitations 
Many CRGs, such as all those in Baluchistan, were excluded from the case selection’s 
coding process due to a lack of data or because local insecurity prevented collection. 
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This reduced the total number of analysed CRGs to 115 from STAEP’s 200. It was also 
notable that the CRGs’ advocacy efforts stretched over long periods, with demands 
often lying dormant for many months only to resurface at opportune moments. Thus, 
coding was an investigative endeavour, with the coders carefully following advocacy 
efforts to their end and periodically checking one another’s interpretations of 
randomly chosen CRGs’ ‘stories’.  
Given more time and an extended budget I would have also studied CRGs that were 
less active than my contextual model predicted in differing contexts. However, from 
my initial study and the literature, I could be reasonably sure that inactive CRGs 
either lacked the capacities of empowered activists, including resources and skills, or 
were comprised of members from identity groups whose political patrons were out 
of power (Kirk, 2014). Furthermore, STAEP, and the idea of social accountability, are 
premised on some level of citizen-state engagement. Thus, conducting research 
amongst groups that got very little done would tell me a lot about the exclusionary 
processes in Pakistan, but little about the nuances of donor supported social 
accountability programmes. 
I took the decision not to interview those on the ‘supply side’ of the governance 
equation that the CRGs’ members had engaged, including state authorities and 
elected representatives. My experiences during the initial study and within 
consultancy projects revealed that access to these individuals was difficult, often 
requiring negotiations with lengthy chains of intermediaries. Furthermore, they 
would routinely provide similar stories about how they came to view civil society 
organisations as their ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground, and how they did not consider 
the CRGs to be ‘political’ but instead engaged in ‘social work’. The limited time such 
elites allowed for interviews meant it was difficult to move past such platitudes to 
more substantive issues.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter outlined the rationale for the thesis’ use of constructivist grounded 
theory. I argued that it provides a useful method for studying the social processes, 
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relations and meanings animating micro-contexts. Charmaz’s (2005) claim that it can 
help analysts interpret how power affects micro contexts was also explored. The 
choice of cases for qualitative study was justified through a mixture of a quantitative 
analysis of the CRGs’ activities and the practical considerations of conducting 
research in a difficult context. The former helped to rule out contextual variables 
common to the literature on social accountability as sufficient explanations for the 
CRGs’ levels of activity. It also guided my choice towards potentially rich research 
sites. The latter brought in issues of the feasibility of carrying out qualitative research 
and the comparability of the findings. Lastly, issues of access, data analysis and bias 
were explored from a constructivist lens, and the limitations of the research methods 
commented upon. 
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Chapter 7 
STAEP and the Punjab 
 
 
 
This chapter re-introduces readers to the Supporting Transparency, Accountability, 
and Electoral Process programme in Pakistan (STAEP). This is done through a reading 
of the Department of International Development’s (DFID) annual review documents 
for the programme from 2011 to 2015. Following the insights of the aidnography 
authors covered in Chapter Three, these texts are approached as translations of the 
programme’s ground realities into development’s dominant discourses. In this sense, 
they are not simply records of decisions made over the programme’s lifespan, or 
even independent appraisals of its success and failures. They are insights into how 
particular actors wished it to be represented. To add another perspective, a study 
into the programme’s impact commissioned by DFID is also discussed. The chapter 
ends by further introducing the sub-national contexts within which the citizens’ 
groups selected for fieldwork resided. 
 
STAEP’s aims and structure 
Although STAEP ran from 2011-2014, its roots lie in the political atmosphere of 2009. 
As noted in Chapter Five, General Musharraf had recently stepped down and national 
elections had been held following mass protests. There was also talk of constitutional 
amendments to devolve power to the local level. Many donors were excited about 
the new possibilities under democracy. However, they were also looking for ways to 
respond to a recently defeated insurgency by the Pakistani Taliban that their 
governments worried threatened the country’s overall stability, including its ability to 
act as an ally for the West’s ongoing war in neighbouring Afghanistan. Research to 
identify possible uses for a pool of emergency donor funding found that poor citizen-
state relations and the performance of state institutions were a major underlying 
208 
 
cause of the unrest (GoP, 2010). Accordingly, many donors sought ways of 
strengthening this compact, included through empowering citizens to hold 
authorities accountable for the delivery of basic services.  
Leading up to 2008’s elections, DFID, the Embassy of the Netherlands, the Canadian 
International Development Agency and the Swiss Agency for International 
Development had all been funding and working with Pakistan’s Free and Fair Election 
Network (FAFEN) to deploy monitors to polling booths and increase voter turnout. 
FAFEN had been established in 2006 with support from The Asia Foundation (TAF) - 
an American led international non-governmental organisation with a long presence in 
Pakistan - and the British Council.122 It originally comprised of a network of 30 non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) from across the country, with a central 
coordinating secretariat in Islamabad staffed by a core group of development 
professionals with backgrounds in journalism and activism. For example, before 
working for FAFEN, one of its senior staff members had transitioned from journalism 
to helping small farmers’ associations to advocate for their land rights. Another had 
experience of working for a regional human rights network, domestic women’s 
organisations with roots in the 1990s’ proliferation of NGOs, and well-known 
international non- governmental organisations (INGOs) operating in Pakistan.123 
In 2011, DFID funded TAF and FAFEN to increase and expand on the latter’s core 
activities under the new umbrella of STAEP. Running from 2011-14 with a budget of 
£11.6 million, STAEP portrayed itself as an elections monitoring, and voice and 
accountability programme.124 It had the broad stated target of ‘More effective, 
transparent, and accountable governance that addresses the critical challenges facing 
Pakistan today’, which it hoped would lead to ‘Democratic processes in Pakistan that 
are more open, inclusive, efficient and accountable to citizens’ (TAF, 2011). Running 
through much of STAEP’s documentation is the idea of increasing trust between 
                                                 
122 For more information see: http://fafen.org/ (Accessed 12/05/17) 
123 See Chapter Five for more on the centrality of women’s NGOs to professional civil society in Pakistan. 
124 Here I use DFID's timescale, however, on the ground many FAFEN staff speak of STAEP as if it had been 
running since 2009 when the Dutch still funded many of the network’s activities. 
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citizens and the state, which initially was to be achieved through five overlapping 
outputs: 
 
Output 1: Citizens’ groups monitor performance of elected 
representatives and public institutions, and raise demands which are 
increasingly met. 
Output 2: Elections are better managed and more inclusive and peaceful, 
and political parties are better organised and more responsive to citizens. 
Output 3: Disenfranchised groups and religious leaders are increasingly 
engaged in civic affairs and political parties. 
Output 4: Media reporting is more balanced, and has greater outreach 
and use of communication maximised. 
Output 5: FAFEN organisations and associates have increased capacity to 
monitor governance issues, manage systems and accounts, access new 
funding, and have improved credibility.  
 
Although this thesis is mostly concerned with the first output, it is notable that the 
second largely represents a continuation of FAFEN’s previous work and the fifth a 
continuation of TAF’s. Indeed, in 2011 FAFEN enjoyed a good reputation among 
donors as a credible and independent voice, able to monitor elections, to contribute 
to the public discourse on Pakistan’s return to democracy, and to engage civil society 
in difficult to reach areas of the country. Many were, therefore, keen to find ways of 
continuing to see it flourish. Furthermore, it is arguable that STAEP’s focus on 
advocacy was a natural fit for FAFEN’s expanding staff of long-time political activists, 
journalists, lawyers and social science graduates. Accordingly, TAF was tasked with 
continuing to build FAFEN’s secretariat and its network members’ capacities to 
conform to Western donors’ professional standards and norms. TAF also acted as the 
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financial hub for STAEP, receiving and dispersing DFID’s funding. In this sense, STAEP 
represents both the endorsement of FAFEN by a powerful international donor and an 
effort to further bring it into line with its evolving priorities.  
It is notable that members of both TAF and FAFEN’s leadership felt that the 
programme’s aims were the product of a mutual understanding between themselves, 
a key supporter within DIFD’s Pakistan office and another from its British 
headquarters. Together, they carved out a vision for STAEP that sought to advance 
Pakistan’s turn to democracy and put accountability at its heart. As one of them put 
it: 
 
‘There was this understanding about democracy, especially among 
people who had been in Pakistan for a while, that if you want to do 
anything that isn’t just about making elections all squeaky clean, that its, 
you know, about helping people to understand that government is there 
to serve them. And helping people to understand what legitimate claims 
they have on government. How to go about identifying who can help 
them and how to hold them to account. You know, at the local level, there 
isn’t much engagement with the state’.125 
 
Indeed, it was repeatedly stressed during interviews that a few key personalities 
pushed the programme’s focus on the realisation of substantive democracy through 
voluntarism. Moreover, it was argued that such an approach was little understood 
outside of this group and had rarely been tried in Pakistan. In this sense, from its 
inception STAEP was considered experimental.  
DFID often referred to the large programme as a ‘partnership’. In practice, this meant 
that TAF was paid based on the achievement of measurable results that it had pre-
                                                 
125 Senior NGO Staff Member 3 24.08.15 
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agreed with DFID. Whilst FAFEN was paid by TAF on its achievements of its own pre-
agreed milestones. This required that both implementing partners demonstrate 
STAEP’s impact on a regular basis, effectively instituting a structure that passed 
responsibilities for activities and outputs down to FAFEN and the NGOs within its 
network, and for reporting on the programme’s progress upwards through FAFEN’s 
network and eventually to TAF. The final programme was rumoured to be the largest 
‘accountable grant’ of this kind in DFID’s history. 
To increase the department’s own accountability, since 2011 DFID has routinely 
published annual reviews online.126 These documents detail a programme’s costs, 
and its progress towards agreed upon milestones and targets. They also contain 
narrative elements detailing observations from evaluators and their 
recommendations. Programmes are scored both during and after their 
implementation. They are ranked from ‘A++’, through ‘A+’, ‘A’, ‘B’ and to ‘C’. Those 
meeting expectations will score an ‘A’ grade (DFID, 2011b). Whilst those consistently 
scoring low will be put under special measures and regularly probed or audited by 
DFID. Annual reviews are usually carried out by consultants hired for their expertise 
on the issue areas under study. Often DFID makes efforts to contract those from the 
country in which the programme is being implemented. 
A recent analysis of 600 randomly selected reviews found that during their 
implementation programmes are more likely to be scored A grades and less likely to 
be scored high or low grades.127 The study’s author speculated that this may be due 
to fear of the implications of extreme scores. It also found there is substantial grade 
inflation over time. Indeed, if current trends continue by 2018 95% of DFID’s 
completed programmes will consistently receive an A or higher. Casting doubt over 
the goals of the review process, the author further suggested that this might be 
because as they progress programmes’ get better at setting annual targets they can 
meet.  
                                                 
126 See https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/ 
127 Aidleap ‘I analysed 600 of DFID’s Annual Reviews. Here’s what I found’ Aid Leap, 4th March 2017. (Accessed 
22/05/17) 
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DFID’s annual reviews, therefore, cannot be easily treated as apolitical 
representations of a programme’s ground realities. Rather, at least in part, they 
should be approached as representations or, in Mosse’s (2005) framing, ‘translations’ 
of programme’s experiences into development’s dominant discourses and needs. 
Indeed, they are carried out by the sector’s ‘brokers’. Thus, they are designed to 
achieve the purpose of justifying, albeit often with recommended modifications, a 
programme’s practices. The following section adopts such a lens to examine STAEP’s 
annual reviews. 
 
Exploring STAEP through annual reviews 
STAEP aimed to use its inception phase to build a cadre of motivated and skilled 
citizen activists at constituency level that would enliven anticipated local elections. To 
do this, NGOs within FAFEN’s network recruited volunteers for constituency relations 
groups (CRGs). Despite their name, they were never intended to be representative of 
the make-up of constituencies, some of which had over half a million inhabitants and 
stretch across vast geographical areas. Instead, the mentoring NGOs were largely 
given a free hand in their original compositions, with many of the CRGs’ founding 
members having already worked with the NGOs on various projects. The only major 
stipulation was that they encompassed locally influential citizens, able to get things 
done, whilst avoiding people with overt political allegiances. To assure this, 
participants were often made to sign declarations of their independence and 
commitment to the programme’s values.  
Over the course of 2011, however, it became apparent that the local elections were 
bogged down in political-infighting and unlikely to be held anytime soon. Thus, in 
consultation with DFID, STAEP’s leadership focussed the CRGs on social 
accountability, which was operationalised as identifying citizens’ demands and 
bringing them to the attention of frontline service providers, state authorities and, 
when necessary, elected representatives. To support this, TAF and staff from within 
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FAFEN’s network of NGOs mentored the CRGs and provided them with trainings in 
the skills of activists. This included how to consult their wider communities, lessons 
on the responsibilities of different governance institutions, engaging the media and 
procedures for getting the attention of authorities. The latter focussed on letter 
writing, registering formal complaints and meeting authorities. Theoretically, these 
are activities that any citizen can engage in. STAEP also intended that the CRGs’ 
advocacy efforts would be enhanced by governance monitoring data on the 
performance of local service providing institutions that was to be collected by 
FAFEN’s member NGOs and, eventually, the CRG members themselves. 
The mentoring NGOs were tasked with monitoring the CRGs’ activities and, when 
needed, helping them. It was assumed that eventually their members would have the 
ability to engage frontline service providers, such as teachers or bureaucrats, 
themselves. Furthermore, they would form working relationships with them and their 
political masters, such as members of the provincial and national assemblies. 
Eventually, at an undefined time, it was presumed that the NGOs would be able to 
step-back and groups would essentially be sustainable beyond the programme’s life-
span.  
The majority of CRGs had around 25 to 40 registered members at any given moment. 
For the most part, they were given a free reign to demand what they wished. Over 
the course of the programme, they identified 45,974 citizens’ demands, of which 
26,214 were – in the language of the annual reviews – deemed to have been ‘met’. 
These demands included everything from fixing overflowing sewage pipes and 
erecting new school walls, to resolving local cases of land grabbing, improving 
security in public areas and establishing women’s desks in police stations. On 
occasion, they would also focus on procedural issues such as the issuing of national 
identification cards, the payment of state employees or the implementation of right 
to information laws. Nonetheless, the first annual review in late 2011 revealed that 
the volunteers were more interested in local problems than district, provincial or 
national level issues (DFID, 2011c). Moreover, they preferred the resolution of 
tangible problems as opposed to issues of political or bureaucratic process.  
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The first annual review is also notable for a number of other reasons (DFID, 2011d). 
Firstly, the reviewing consultants – the sector’s ‘brokers’ – recommended that STAEP 
redevelop or abandon outputs three and four as their rationales for inclusion were 
deemed unclear and progress towards them slow. Secondly, they identified that the 
information generated by the governance monitoring initiative was not being used by 
the CRGs to lobby authorities. Thirdly, although they acknowledged that the CRGs 
were never intended to be representative, they expressed concern that they were 
not doing enough to include women and members of marginalised groups, such as 
transgender people or religious minorities.  
Most importantly for our purposes, however, there is a significant difference 
between a draft of the first annual review I obtained and the final review publicly 
available online. In a number of places, the draft highlighted the tension between the 
CRGs’ efforts to direct politicians’ discretionary development budgets towards 
identified local issues and the nature of Pakistan’s clientelistic politics. A small section 
devoted to this issue was entitled: ‘Implied endorsement of patronage-based system 
of governance’ (DFID, 2011:19). It argued that programme staff and the CRGs’ 
members regarded these budgets as legitimate targets for advocacy efforts and the 
resolution of local issues important achievements. But it warned that such successes 
may simply denote the continuation and tacit endorsement of Pakistan’s clientelistic 
politics. Moreover, with respect to the attribution and value of resolved demands, 
the reviewers’ worried that the programme did not adequately acknowledge that at a 
local level the CRGs’ gains implies ‘someone else’s loss’ (ibid:3). Put another way, 
with respect to the allocation of district’s meagre development budgets, the CRGs 
were entering into a zero-sum game. In the final, public version of the first annual 
review, however, there is no mention of these tensions. 
Intrigued by this I interviewed two of the consultants responsible for authoring the 
review.128 Although they could not remember the exact reasons as to why these 
concerns were removed from the final publication, they both shed light on how 
                                                 
128 Consultant 1 interviewed 18.08.17, Consultant 2 interviewed 23.08.17. 
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annual reviews are produced.129 They suggested that, in this case, they were given a 
free hand to interrogate the programme however they saw fit and effectively told not 
to hold back. Nonetheless, it was argued that the construction of annual reviews is 
always a negotiation between consultants and their clients, which in this case was 
TAF and ultimately DFID.  Moreover, the onus is often on providing something 
constructive, rather than completely undermining the premise of an ongoing 
programme. This accords with my approach to annual reviews as representations or 
translations of programme’s experiences on the ground into development’s 
dominant discourses. 
In both the draft and public versions of STAEP’s first annual review the consultants 
framed many of the problems they had identified as an outcome of FAFEN’s rapid 
expansion in size and activities. As part of this, they suggested that it had not 
adequately socialised its members into its new focus on substantive democratic 
governance processes and that they were still mostly devoted to its long-running 
(and still ongoing) concentration on electoral procedures. Accordingly, they 
recommended that further trainings for FAFEN’s members be undertaken. This was 
to be combined with efforts to include members of marginalised communities, 
especially women, in the CRGs and a rethink of the STAEP’s internal ratings for the 
successful resolution of different types of issues through their activism. Overall, the 
first annual review scored STAEP a ‘B’ on DFID’s programme rating scale.  
By the second review in late 2012, STAEP had dropped outputs three and four, 
redoubled its efforts around the CRGs’ trainings, and devoted more resources to 
capacity building FAFEN’s network (DIFD, 2012). The review was also positive about 
new efforts to include members of marginalised groups and it praised a collection of 
success stories that suggested some CRGs were lobbying for the resolution of 
demands that would bring benefits to wide sections of their communities (TAF, 
2013a). It is also notable that the end of programme targets for the CRGs’ 
                                                 
129 The referenced draft of STAEP’s first annual review was given to the author by STAEP staff during the initial 
study carried out in 2014, but the differences were not noticed until July 2017.  
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identification, raising and the meeting of demands had already been met by this 
point.  
In terms of recommendations, STAEP was encouraged by the new reviewers to 
provide further trainings for CRG members, to find alternative ways of using the 
governance monitoring data it generated, and to begin to think of ways of sustaining 
the CRGs beyond the programme’s lifespan. Nonetheless, concerns were expressed 
that STAEP had still to articulate a ‘vision’ for the CRGs and that it did not have data 
to show how their activities contribute to improvements in democratic processes 
(ibid:6, 23). Overall STAEP scored an A. 
Similar concerns were expressed within a mid-term review conducted later that year 
(DFID, 2012). The reviewing team described the CRGs’ emerging focus on resolving 
local service delivery issues, as opposed to larger governance process issues, as 
‘depoliticised activism’ (ibid:17). Although they praised the likely positive impact of 
some of the issues the CRGs were resolving on local communities, they felt that both 
the CRGs and their mentoring NGOs were not working on improving the processes 
that had led to the issues in the first place. They suggested that this was likely the 
result of the trainings given to both the CRGs and the NGO, and also to the latter’s 
desire for ‘quick wins’ (ibid:16).130  
By the end of 2013, however, the third review’s single consultant appeared to feel 
that there was a clearly defined rationale for the CRGs’ local focus and held up their 
activities as an example of STAEP’s value for money.131 With respect to the former, 
the CRGs were portrayed as a ‘new type of popular institution’ that operate ‘quite 
differently’ from other NGO supported community organisations in Pakistan that pay 
members (DFID, 2014:23). Furthermore, the reviewer argued that they enable local 
communities to engage in ‘democratic discourse’, and suggested that ‘their very 
activism and voluntaristic drive against a background of acute need and weak state 
                                                 
130 Interestingly, a text box within this review quoted a man as saying that he, like his fellow community 
members, would want the CRG to work towards blasphemy laws and direct elections (DFID, 2012:14). 
However, he was not a CRG member and had not heard of it before meeting the consultant that interviewed 
him. 
131 In contrast to the others which had two or more consultants. 
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institutions has led to astonishing successes in raising demands, facilitating CNICs and 
voter registration’ (ibid:8).132 It was also shown how the cost of raising and resolving 
the CRGs’ demands had steadily decreased as the programme matured and, 
presumably, the CRGs gained in confidence and skill as activists.  
Nonetheless, it was noted that the CRGs were neither horizontally networked with 
one another or vertically linked to other civil society organisations (ibid:19). This, it 
was argued, kept them focussed on local issues. The need to build and to link the 
CRGs to new bodies at the district and provincial level that could communicate their 
demands upwards, and to mobilise their members to stand in the anticipated local 
elections justified an eight-month extension phase until September 2014. Overall 
STAEP scored an A+. 
STAEP’s completion report served as both a celebration of the programme and a 
chance to draw lessons (DFID, 2014a). As before, the voluntarism of the roughly 
10,000 people that participated in CRGs was held up as a significant achievement. 
Moreover, with each of the 45,974 raised demands costing £75, the reviewer was 
happy to report that this was about half of what the programme had originally 
expected (ibid:2). Much was also made of STAEP’s efforts to encourage CRG 
members to use ‘right to information’ legislation to uncover information on state 
institutions and the spill-over effects this would have on their performance.133 The 
authors declared: 
 
‘STAEP has ushered in a new dynamism in citizens’ action at the local 
level, introducing the unique idea of research-based advocacy for 
improved governance by strengthening the culture of accountability and 
transparency at the lowest tier of administration responsible for the 
                                                 
132 Although not a focus of this thesis, helping marginalised groups, such as women and transgender people, to 
register for Computerized National Identity Cards (CNICs) that allow them to access some important public 
services and vote was a major component of STAEP. It built on FAFEN’s identification of almost 8 million 
missing women from electoral rolls and was widely praised within all the annual reviews. 
133 These requests can be made to all federal institutions by interested citizens and are in the process of being 
instituted at the provincial level.  
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delivery of most public services. STAEP has enabled citizens through 
mobilisation and intensive training to develop direct engagements with 
the state, as opposed to seeking services through social and political 
intermediaries, which is the traditional model that has inhibited any 
culture of public accountability. The demands met as a result of this drive 
to mobilise citizens shows that the services being demanded carry some 
significant benefits for a wider range of people.’ (Ibid:5) 
 
The report argued that many of the CRGs successes arose due to members who are 
also active in other civil society organisations within their localities. It also argued 
that greater synergies between the CRGs and other local associations, such as trade 
unions and professional bodies, helped some to move away from a pure focus on 
local issues and towards national level issues. Turning to the numbers underpinning 
the CRGs’ activities, the programme found that the demands raised and met by 
authorities increased year-on-year (ibid:8). As before, this was interpreted as 
evidence that the CRGs’ were gaining in their abilities as activists. However, it was 
found that the number of their demands debated in the provincial and national 
assemblies by politicians was consistently below expectations. They also declined 
sharply in the run-up to the 2013’s general election. This was attributed to the 
assemblies meeting infrequently in this period. Nonetheless, the review was clear 
that this did not affect the overall positive assessment of Output One as both the 
number and low costs of demands raised, and citizens mobilised, far exceeded the 
programme’s expectations. 
In terms of how things should be done differently in future programmes, it was 
suggested a focus on socially excluded groups should begin from the start and that 
youth should be engaged through new social media tools. It was also recommended 
that regular induction sessions be conducted for new CRG members as groups were 
found to have a high volunteer turnover rate (80 percent), with many inactive 
members (40%). Nonetheless, it was noted that FAFEN’s CEO expressed reservations 
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about the inclusion of marginalised groups within the CRGs, arguing that they would 
reduce their effectiveness (ibid:9). 
As it is key to understanding how power worked within the programme, it is also 
worth briefly commenting on the completion report’s assessment of Output Three. It 
focussed on ensuring that FAFEN and its network members had the systems and skills 
with which to monitor governance issues, manage accounts, access new sources of 
funding after the programme’s end and improve their credibility. It found that the 
expectations for the Output had broadly been met. FAFEN’s continuing credibility and 
its attraction of new sources of funding was praised. And it was declared that they 
had made the transition from a single purpose organisation to a broad network 
focused on democratic governance.  
The report was less upbeat about FAFEN secretariat’s relations with the NGOs in its 
network, arguing that there was little feedback from one to another and that the 
prospects of some of the NGOs’ continuing to operate past STAEP’s lifespan was in 
doubt. It was also suggested that those outside of FAFEN often did not know that it 
was a network rather than a single organisation. Nonetheless, it was concluded that 
the three-way partnership between DFID, TAF and FAFEN had worked well, with TAF 
able to take swift disciplinary action when FAFEN members were found wanting - 
such as for financial irregularities - and to ensure value for money through capacity 
building efforts. 
In September 2014, an impact evaluation of DFID’s electoral programmes in Pakistan, 
which included STAEP, was published (Balagamwala and Gazdar, 2014b). It used a 
combination of quantitative analysis and qualitative research. The organisation that 
carried it out was also responsible for STAEP’s first annual review. Although much of 
the impact report focused on the programme’s contribution to increasing voter 
turnout in 2013’s elections, it is also interesting for three reasons directly related to 
the wider activities of the CRGs: 
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Firstly, the authors again mentioned STAEP’s implied endorsement of Pakistan’s 
clientelistic politics raised in the unreleased draft of the first annual review. Although 
they argued that clientelism far from defines all of Pakistan’s political allegiances, 
they suggested that it remains an issue. Indeed, they found that it was often used in 
combination with considerations of kinship and identity by voting bloc members in 
2013’s elections. However, they did not assess whether the CRGs challenged 
clientelistic behaviour or strengthened it through their pursuit of elected 
representatives’ discretionary funds.  
Secondly, the evaluation suggested that the NGOs within FAFEN’s network ‘were 
predisposed towards creating CRGs which would undertake lobbying for local public 
goods’, as opposed to focusing on wider issues democratic procedures (ibid:38). They 
argued this was because many of them were already established within Pakistan’s 
‘development sector’ before becoming part of STAEP. But they did not say how this 
could be avoided. 
Lastly, the evaluation suggested that the CRGs may have contributed to a 
‘strengthened democracy’ in three ways: increasing the range of voluntary citizens’ 
associations, citizens’ participation in voluntary public activities, and women’s 
participation in public life (ibid:29). However, beyond commenting on the problems 
with the CRGs’ inclusion of marginalised groups, especially women, it did not 
investigate these possibilities in any depth.134 As the report suggested, this may be 
because STAEP did not know it would be evaluated against such measures so 
therefore there was insufficient programmatic data (ibid:38).135 This left these 
potentially major contributions of the CRGs underexplored. 
Although this section has reintroduced readers to the STAEP programme and 
overviewed its official, public history, it has arguably raised more questions than it 
answered. Most importantly, why if there were concerns about the CRGs’ activities 
                                                 
134 The evaluators studied eight constituencies, interviewing at least one CRG member in each. For further 
details see - (Balagamwala and Gazdar, 2014a) 
135 The evaluation used the ‘free and fair elections’ and ‘political participation’ scores in the IDEA framework for 
assessing democracy (PILDAT, 2012).  
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from the very beginning of the programme were they largely left unaddressed? 
Furthermore, why did the programme’s evaluators and implementers seem to be 
working to different aims?136 Before attempting to answer some of these questions 
through an exploration of how the programme played out on the ground, the chapter 
further introduces readers to the sub-national contexts within which the studied 
CRGs operated. 
 
The Punjab  
Within Pakistan’s federal system, the province (e.g. the Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
Sindh etc.) is the first subnational level of governance. Provinces comprise of 
numerous districts. Within each district are numerous tehsils (sub-districts containing 
many villages or urban neighbourhoods). Below the tehsils are union councils (the 
state’s lowest level of administration).  
Should the promised local elections have been held in 2014, union councils (called 
‘municipal councils’ in urban areas), with reserved seats for women, workers, youth 
and minorities, would have been the focus of the CRGs’ demand raising activities. 
Furthermore, unlike under military regimes, these councils would have been elected 
on a party basis, thereby, linking them directly to provincial and national level 
policymakers. Theoretically, this would have given the CRGs additional opportunities 
to have their issues communicated up Pakistan’s governance architecture. 
However, arguments over the devolution of funding and responsibilities, and the 
delimitations of constituencies and compositions of local councils delayed the 
establishment of local government in the Punjab until 2015. Thus, for STAEP’s 
duration the CRGs’ members were, at least in official programmatic representations 
of their activities, focused upon engaging frontline service providers, municipal and 
                                                 
136 It is important to note that despite reviewing some of these documents for my initial study of STAEP, it is 
only after fieldwork for this thesis that I realised the full extent of some of their implications. 
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district officials. As outlined in Chapter Four, this is what the World Bank calls the 
‘short route’ to accountability (WB, 2003). As we shall see in the next two chapters, 
however, such engagements were only a small part of how they resolved demands. 
To prepare for this, further context is added to the research sites below. 
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Figure 6: Map of Punjab, Research Locations 
 
REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT 
 
Source:  Modified from World Food Programme137  
  
                                                 
137 ‘Aid professionals’, World Food Programme. https://www.wfp.org/aid-professionals/map-
centre?country=273 (Accessed 12.09.17)   
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Gujrat District 
The two active CRGs selected for study in Gujrat District in Northern Punjab were 
hypothetically located in a context more conducive to activism. Most notably, of the 
122 analysed constituencies, those within Gujrat were within the ten with the lowest 
multidimensional poverty scores. 
Members in the urban CRG mostly resided in Gujrat city. Located on the Grand Trunk 
(GT) Road, it lies between the Chenab and Jhelum rivers. They have long made the 
region a hub of agricultural activity, including during the colonial era in which nearby 
Jhelum was made into a canal colony. Nonetheless, the city is also famous for pottery 
and woollen shawls, and has rapidly grown since the 1970s with large commercial 
neighbourhoods of small industrial manufacturing businesses (e.g. metal work and 
machine parts). Although the last census in 1998 suggested it had a population of just 
under 3 million, this figure is likely to have increased. 
Participants within the rural CRG either lived in or around the town of Kharian. 
Located roughly 25 kilometres north of Gujrat on the GT Road, it is known for its large 
military cantonment (a base with family accommodation). Kharian is undoubtedly 
what Qadeer (2000) refers to as one of South Asia’s ‘ruralopolises’. Indeed, it 
comprises of tightly packed settlements located either side of the GT Road and is 
home to a variety of businesses that support the agricultural sector. It is also 
popularly known as a wealthy area, having benefitted form both the Green 
Revolution and many economic migrants’ remittances. Kharian’s wider tehsil 
(administrative unit below the district level) recorded a population of around 80,000 
in the 1998 census. 
The bulk of the two CRGs’ activities were conducted before 2013’s elections. During 
this period, two of Gujrat district’s four members of the national assembly (MNAs) 
belonged to the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), one to the Pakistan Muslim League 
Nawaz (PML-N) and one to the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam Group (PML-
Q); a party created by local elites to lend legitimacy to Musharraf’s 1999 coup. As a 
famous journalist put it, however, local politics is really about ‘Jat vs Gujjar, and 
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Chaudhry vs anti-Chaudhry’ rivalries.138 The latter pairing refers to old, aristocratic 
landowning families, popularly called Chaudhries, with considerable estates and 
those, often from newer money, that oppose them.139 The dichotomy between Jats 
and Gujjars roughly equates with biraderis that have members that own medium to 
small plots of land, and those that work on it or own small businesses.140 
This does not mean that the district’s politics is predictable. Rather, politicians 
regularly switch political parties, often taking their biraderis with them. Many of my 
interviewees also suggested that Gujrat’s politicians must work hard for their votes. 
This requires that they deliver local development projects, government jobs and that 
they intervene in potentially destabilizing disputes. Participants also argued that 
Gujrat city’s relatively recent expansion means that amongst the elite everyone 
knows everyone. This requires politicians to be regular attendees at local leaders’ 
funerals and marriages. Although such sentiments probably unrealistically 
exceptionalise Gujrati politics, they were another way of saying that local leaders 
have not completely lost touch with the needs of their followers. Cross-cutting 
religious identities have also become more salient as sectarianism has created 
another fracture in recent years (Zaman, 1998; Nelson, 2016).  
 
Multan District 
The particularly active CRGs selected for study in Southern Punjab were in 
constituencies located within Multan district that is hypothetically less conducive to 
activism. Indeed, they were within the worst 40 for multidimensional poverty scores 
and the worst 50 for land inequality scores. 
                                                 
138 Almeida, C. ‘Focus on Punjab-II An old elite survives and thrive’, Dawn, 12th November 2011. 
https://www.dawn.com/news/672852/focus-on-punjab-ii-an-old-elite-survives-and-thrives (Accessed 
01.05.16).  
139 Confusingly, however, many of those that had more recently come into money through means other than 
land also took on the name Chaudhry, putting it above their shops or on their business cards. Chaudhry is also 
often used as an insult for someone that acts as though they have local influence or wealth, but who are really 
considered to be social climbers.   
140 Within this rivalry’s contemporary manifestation other biraderis are also subsumed, such as the Arians and 
Butts (also described as landowners), Rehemanis (originally potters) and Ansaris (urban businessmen). 
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Whereas Gujrat’s political dynasties are based on a mixture of land ownership, 
patronage from military regimes and a newer class of businessmen, in Multan old, 
rich landowning families have dominated. Furthermore, many of them combine their 
political personas with statuses as Makhdooms (descendants of saints) (Epping, 
2013). As with the Qureshis and Hashimis, these families symbolically perform their 
lineage through the maintenance of large shrines to their ancestors. The shrines are 
places of pilgrimage for thousands of worshippers every day, some of which are fed 
as a form of religious charitable giving. Although this is said to give them relatively 
stable vote banks, Multan’s political ‘shrine families’ must also assure their followings 
are converted to votes through patronage in the form of money, government jobs, 
development projects and services. Indeed, most people I spoke to talked fondly of a 
local politicians’ recent efforts to build numerous flyovers and a metro service across 
the city. 
In the 1970s, Multan district was a hotbed of support for the PPP’s rise to power.141 
Although many of the locals I met only had a vague idea of the socialist ideology that 
animated that era, they often still talked of Bhutto with reverence. Furthermore, 
some also added that they, as saraikis (ethnolinguistic group found in southern 
Punjab), could never support politicians from what they saw as northern Punjabi 
parties, such as the PML-N. Whilst sincere, these allegiances did not bear fruit in 
2013’s elections after which the PPP went from holding three of the district’s six 
national assembly seats to none. Furthermore, the election ushered in two Pakistan 
Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) MNAs, one of which was former PPP politician, Shah Mehmood 
Qureshi, and the other, Abdul Ghaffar Dogar, a new face from a family that had 
previously supported the PPP. This suggests that during the period that the CRGs’ 
were most active Multan’s old order was being challenged.142 
This challenge, however, cannot easily be taken as an indication of the break-down of 
clientelistic networks. Instead, the general perception of Southern Punjab and the 
                                                 
141 See Chapter Five. 
142 Zaidi, B. ‘A Look at Pre-Election Theories from the Comfort of Hindsight, or What Were We Thinking?, 
Tanqeed, 22nd May 2013. http://tafaddal.tech/tanqeed2/2013/05/a-look-at-pre-election-theories-from-the-
comfort-of-hindsight-or-what-were-we-thinking-bushra-zaidis-blog-elections-2013/ (Accessed 03.05.16). 
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neighbouring province of Sindh is that they largely remain in the grip of large landed 
families (with the exception of Karachi). Alongside their aforementioned religious 
followings and patronage, these families gain votes from the thousands of 
dependents they employ as daily wage labourers, those that live on their land and 
those that have outstanding inter-generational debts with them (Martin, 2009). For 
these dependents, landlords are often their only route of access to state institutions, 
loans or informal dispute resolution mechanisms.143  
Members of Multan’s urban CRG were mostly located in and around a dense 
neighbourhood on the outskirts of the city known for its Bihari community. Biharis 
are Urdu speakers that migrated to Pakistan following partition in 1947 and again in 
1971 following Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan. The first wave has 
established businesses and joined the civil service, whilst the latter are often said to 
have struggled to settle or climb out of the lower-classes due to the state’s 
reluctance to take them. As we shall see in the following chapters, there was tensions 
between these two groups of migrants. The members of the rural CRG were spread 
across a vast – over 50km – area containing many difficult to reach villages dotted 
along the district’s canals. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the most active members lived in 
settlements closer to Multan city. 
In sum, the two Punjabi regions are both popularly considered to be in the grip 
clientelistic politics. However, they are divided by their levels of poverty and the 
dependencies of their lower-classes. Furthermore, Multan’s politics is characterised 
by the opposing legacies of class-based mobilisations and the continuing influence of 
landed power buttressed by religious followings. Whereas Gujrat’s concerns a 
mixture of local enmities between small land and business owners, and what 
happens in Islamabad (Pakistan’s capital) and Lahore (the Punjab’s capital). Broadly, 
therefore, it could be further hypothesized that Multan is closer to older forms of 
                                                 
143 During my research, I was generously hosted on the estate of one of Multan’s political shrine families. Every 
morning I would awake to the sound of large groups of men petitioning the landlord’s right-hand man to 
resolve their issues under a large tree outside my bedroom window. These debates would extend into the 
night, with both sides periodically fed. The landlord or members of his family would only appear to greet 
particularly important petitioners or to intervene in seemingly intractable pursuits. Fortunately, my research 
was not located in areas under their influence. 
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clientelism based on personnel relationships, long-standing allegiances and 
dependencies, whilst Gujrat is representative of the more transactional new form of 
clientelism found in young capitalist democracies described in Chapter Five.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter reintroduced readers to STAEP. This was done through a reading of its 
publicly available annual review documents from 2011 to 2015. These texts were 
approached as translations of the programme’s ground realities into development’s 
dominant discourses. In this sense, they were not simply treated as records of 
decisions made over the programme’s lifespan, or even independent appraisals of its 
success and failures. They were analysed as insights into how particular actors wished 
the programme to be represented as it evolved. This uncovered a tension between 
the programme’s aim of improving democratic processes in Pakistan and the CRGs’ 
focus on resolving tangible development problems within their members’ immediate 
localities. Nonetheless, as the programme progressed these doubts about the 
purpose of the CRGs were gradually replaced with praise for their inclusivity and their 
value for money. To add another perspective, a study into the programme’s impact 
commissioned by DFID was also discussed. It continued to highlight the tensions 
addressed within the early reviews, but ultimately appeared to hold the programme 
to outcomes it was not designed to fulfil. The chapter concluded by further 
introducing the sub-national contexts within which the CRGs selected for study 
operated. 
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Chapter Eight 
Getting Things Done 
 
 
 
‘I am not an ordinary man and since I belong to the business community, as the 
president, I have to stay in touch with all these people. They also know that if they 
refuse something that I say, it can result in strikes in front of their offices or we could 
go to DPO or file a complaint against them. This is the reason they give respect to me. 
If I was an ordinary person, they would pay no heed to whatever I have to say.’ 
(Chaudhry Jahanzaib Derawal, CRG Member)144  
 
 
This chapter begins to explore the practice of social accountability through the 
Supporting Transparency Accountability and Electoral Process (STAEP) programme. It 
shows how the programme’s Constituency Relations Groups (CRGs) generally 
functioned with most of their activities undertaken by a core group of wealthier and 
educated volunteers. For them, social accountability involved pooling their pre-
existing identities in attempts to access, pressure and form relationships with 
authorities. It had little to do with the sanctioning power of information. To increase 
their potentials and make them known to local authorities, some members also 
sought to institutionalise their CRGs as local associations distinct from their individual 
identities. However, I argue that such ambitions were ultimately unsuited to the 
programme’s projectized vision of civil society mobilisation. Through three vignettes, 
I then reveal how some of the groups’ most elite members used their privileged 
positions within political networks to secure some of the CRGs’ most prestigious 
successes. However, these actions were often undertaken in private, out of sight of 
both their fellow programme participants and the non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) mentoring them. This gave them opportunities to further legitimise their 
roles as local leaders and to augment their power by appropriating their colleagues’ 
                                                 
144 Chaudhry Jahanzaib Derawal, male, 40-50, member rural Gujrat (29/03/2015 & 17/06/2015). 
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efforts. Thus, I argue that through their involvement, the studied CRGs often came to 
reflect the clientelistic politics that characterises much of Pakistan. 
 
Elites and elite interviewing 
To aid this chapter’s analysis of how the CRGs functioned, I draw on Chapter Two’s 
discussion of social capital. There it was shown that the idea was embraced by 
powerful donor organisations’ in the 1990s. Critics argued, however, that they 
decontextualized and depoliticised the concept to position it as the ‘missing link’ in 
development (Harriss and Renzio, 1997; Fine, 2010b). To reverse these trends, many 
have since focussed on Bourdieu’s (1977, 1986) older, more complex vision 
(Bebbington, 2007; Coburn, 2011; Baiocchi et al., 2011). For them, social capital 
allows individuals and groups to draw upon the cultural (education and skills), 
economic (material resources) and political (mobilizable followers) capitals of those 
they have durable or institutionalised relationships with. I follow them by showing 
how the CRGs’ members used their reserves of various types of capitals to access 
authorities and resolve local issues. In the case of elites, I argue that this did not 
advance Pakistan’s wider democratising project. 
Before beginning, it is also necessary to explain what I mean by elites. I build upon 
Woods' (1998) argument that elites possess the following characteristics: privileged 
access to or control over resources, links to one another through, often purposively 
obscured, networks of social and professional relations, and that they are discursively 
constructed as elites by themselves or others. I pair these characteristics with 
Bourdieu’s capitals, allowing research participants to be further understood as social, 
cultural, economic and political elites, or as a mixture of these (Musgrave and Wong, 
2016). This focuses my analysis on how they maintain, use and build upon their 
advantages through different activities and for different ends. 
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Lastly, a note on interviewing STAEP’s elites. Broadly, I agree with Smith's (2006) 
argument that the challenges of ‘interviewing up’ are likely to be contextually 
specific. As alluded to in Chapter Six, many of my elite interviewees initially viewed 
me as connected to centres of power, such as national level NGOs or the Department 
for International Development’s (DFID) country office. Thus, depending on their 
interests, I was variously considered a threat or a possible source of future 
opportunities. To address this, I would inform them that the thesis would be publicly 
available, and all were told that their identities and affiliations would be an 
anonymised. 
Two other factors shaped my interviews: Firstly, STAEP required its participants to 
commit to not working in the interest of political parties. Secondly, as the 
anthropological literature documents, Pakistan’s local leaders often seek to cultivate 
images as apolitical men of modest means (Lyon, 2002; Werbner, 2015; Martin, 
2015a). These factors made some elite interviewees hesitant to link their statuses 
and advantages to their voluntary roles as CRG members. As mentioned in Chapter 
Six, for non-elite interviewees I sought to adopt an semi-insider position by discussing 
my own reasons for undertaking voluntary work. However, for elites this strategy did 
not suffice, and I often had to conduct multiple interviews. I believe that this 
gradually disassociated me with their interests. Thus, over time they revealed more 
about their involvement in the programme and wider society, and the meanings they 
gave it. To help my interpretations, I also triangulated data from other interviewees. 
 
The CRGs’ activities and compositions  
I first explore how the CRGs generally functioned. As shown in Chapter Four, much of 
the literature describes social accountability as raising citizens’ voices, with the goal 
of realising their rights, eliciting responsive governance, improving public goods 
provision and state-society relations (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012). I unpick how the 
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CRGs’ members went about this, the obstacles and risks they faced, and how they 
sought to overcome them.  
STAEP’s 200 CRGs identified 45,974 citizens’ demands, of which 26,214 were – in the 
language of the annual reviews – deemed to have been ‘met’. Although ‘met’ was 
never defined, my own coding of STAEP’s meeting minute database suggest that 122 
CRGs had 416 of their raised demands resolved.145 To be considered ‘resolved’, 
evidence that a demand had been satisfactorily addressed by authorities was sought. 
This could mean that an explanation as to why it could not be resolved was accepted 
or something tangible took place, such as the building of a footbridge, the release of 
funds or an increase in police patrols.  
Apart from one outlier, no CRG had more than 14 demands resolved. Yet, their 
abilities to do this varied greatly, with many resolving none or only 1 or 2 demands. 
Of the four particularly ‘active’ groups studied for this thesis, all resolved 13 or 14 
issues. However, Multan city’s CRG resolved 18 percent of the issues it raised, whilst 
the others only resolved 4 percent. Across all the studied CRGs, infrastructure, such 
as roads, street lighting or parks, accounted for around half of the issues they raised. 
Whilst, usually unresolvable, issues marked as miscellaneous, such as local divorce 
rates or the poor image of Pakistan in the international press, accounted for just 
under the other half. Beyond this, the CRGs rarely raised issues of security or health 
and they did not often use Pakistan’s Right to Information laws. Only Gujrat’s CRGs 
devoted just under 10% of their raised demands to educational issues, such as 
missing teachers or poorly equipped schools. 
Although the four studied CRGs’ groups waxed and waned, it is possible to broadly 
characterise them by their most active members: Gujrat’s urban CRG was led by a 
mixture of businessmen, lawyers, teachers and political party workers. Many had 
established their own welfare organisations before joining and there was clear cohort 
from a common biraderi. In contrast, Gujrat’s rural CRG was dominated by the rival 
heads of two local trade unions and their allies, which included members of their 
                                                 
145 See Chapter Five. 
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unions, teachers, the owner of a prominent community-based organisation (CBO) 
and an influential currency trader. Within both of Multan’s CRGs former local 
government Councillors during Musharraf’s era were the most active participants. In 
the urban CRG these were mostly women with long established relationships. 
Nonetheless, as explored in the next chapter, the CRG eventually fractured along 
geographical and identity lines. In contrast, in Mutlan’s rural CRG the former ex-
Councillors were mostly men, with the most active located in a union council on the 
edge of the city. This CRG also had a lot of younger members who were former 
students of one its senior members. 
As covered in Chapter Seven, STAEP was not originally designed to directly empower 
Pakistan’s marginalised groups, such as labourers, women, non-Muslims and 
transgenders. Rather, it sought to engage influential locals, training them in the skills 
of activists and data collectors, and linking them to authorities with responsibilities 
for service provision. Whilst many of the mentoring NGOs publicly advertised the 
CRGs’ formation and conducted interviews with applicants, they also drew upon pre-
existing relationships with locals they had worked with or employed on other 
programmes. The informally held theory of change was that these actors would be 
best placed to identify and raise demands; they merely needed the guidance or 
‘trusteeship’ of experts from the world’s wider professional development sector 
(Cowen and Shenton, 1996).  
The CRGs’ activities usually began with all the members, including the marginalised 
they engaged in the programme’s second year, participating in regular meetings to 
identify demands to raise with authorities. This would most often be done on the 
basis of union councils, with votes taken to decide which issues to work on. Although 
uncovering the hidden power dynamics in these meetings would require a separate 
study, some interviewees described them as cordial and as giving participants 
opportunities to talk freely.146 For example, a young woman told of how she grew in 
confidence, eventually feeling able to converse with the men and later working for 
                                                 
146 I attended three of these meetings, but they were organised by the mentoring NGOs as check-ins and 
trainings. Thus, they were quite different to the bulk of the CRGs' ad hoc meetings organised by members. 
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the CRGs’ mentoring NGO.147 Some also described broader enlightening discussions, 
such as debating the political role of Pakistan’s military with a retired army officer.  
Nonetheless, especially in the rural CRGs, younger members often suggested it was 
difficult to publicly disagree with their elders. Furthermore, some from marginalised 
groups said they did not understand why they were in these meetings, what was 
being discussed or, in a few cases, even what the CRG was for. As a young man that 
periodically went to rural Gujrat’s CRG meetings declared: 
 
Yes, I was interested but whenever I asked Abby to explain to me the work 
the CRG was doing she would tell me that “It is just a formality nothing 
else, you just have to show up to the meeting, spend some time there 
and go home”.148   
 
Questioned about this, staff from the mentoring NGOs argued that they were under 
pressure to make up the meetings’ numbers due to the CRGs’ high participant 
dropout rates. The suggestion was that regular members would bring acquaintances 
along without telling them what was going on. One lady also argued that: 
 
[…] there were about eight to ten people who were the most active. The 
rest of the people who came were uneducated and it was harder to 
explain things to them. The ones who had passed at least their matric 
[qualification] could understand quicker and easily. Every class of person 
was involved in CRG, which included illiterate people, transgenders, day 
labourers. It was very difficult to explain things to these people and I think 
                                                 
147 Abby Bajwa, female, 30-40, member rural Gujrat and later staff (17/06/2015). 
148 Babar Kirmani, 20-30, member rural Gujrat (24/03/2015). 
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they used to attend two to three meetings but could not grasp the 
concept of what was being explained so they weren’t very active.149 
 
Within the studied CRGs, therefore, attempts to include those from marginalised 
groups proved difficult. Indeed, with the notable exception of wealthier women, their 
involvement in the programme was confined to the identification and debate of 
demands, and could be described as ‘shallow’ (Kirk, 2014).   
 
The core groups and the ‘proper procedures’ 
Following the identification of demands, a small core active group of six to ten 
members with the time, means, and skills led advocacy efforts. Skills deemed 
relevant included an understanding of the chosen issue, the legislation and 
bureaucratic procedures needed to resolve it, links to the media and confidence.  
As trained by the programme, these core groups would begin by pursuing the World 
Bank’s (2003) ‘short-route to accountability’.150 This meant formally putting their 
demands to frontline service providers and bureaucrats, something they referred as 
‘the proper procedures’. Many interviewees described repeated letters, phone calls 
and attempts to meet authorities in their offices. They also suggested that they often 
sought to prepare the ground for their advances by creating a buzz around issues 
through newspaper articles:  
 
                                                 
149 Ayesha Nanda, 30-40, member and staff rural Gujrat (17/06/2015). 
150 See Chapter Four. 
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When it’s published in the newspaper, pressure is built up. Even if they 
[authorities] don’t respond, at least they behave properly. Whether or 
not they solve the problem, at least they meet you on time.151 
 
This work was usually carried out by the mentoring NGOs and educated members 
that could not attend meetings with authorities for economic or cultural reasons, 
such as a lack of money for transportation or purdah [Islamic seclusion of women]. 
Although mundane and often frustrating, some saw it as a valuable learning 
experience. For example, a young female that joined the CRG with an older relative 
argued that: 
 
It was a really good experience for me, I learnt a lot from the CRG 
members. I learnt a lot from them as they inspired and motivated me to 
work for the society. Previously, I was just running after a job but then 
after I started working here, I realized that it is good for me. I wrote many 
letters, made calls, wrote articles.152 
 
Later she added that she now knew that authorities often had to be ‘shocked’ into 
action through media coverage.  
Despite the help of the mentoring NGOs, the proper procedures often failed to 
secure meetings or pry information from institutions. When this happened the CRGs 
generally turned to members with active relationships with relevant authorities. The 
closer and more personal the relationship the better. As an older, male member of 
                                                 
151 Ayesha Nanda, 30-40, member and staff rural Gujrat (17/06/2015). 
152 Abby Bajwa, female, 30-40, member rural Gujrat (17/06/2015) 
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northern Punjab’s rural CRG explained: 
 
The Free and Fair Election Network [FAFEN] and the CFCB [Centre for 
Capacity Building – the local NGO mentoring the CRG] organized a 
programme here in a Kharian. They explained the basic aim of the work 
they were planning on doing. I told them that no one would let you do 
anything like this here. Unless there is an identity that people can 
associate with. If I want to go find out crime rates at the police station or 
records of the hospital, they won’t give it to me. They will abuse me. Same 
with rates at the market - you only find out the real rate of things when 
you bargain and buy something. I told them they won’t be successful. 
Without contacts or relationships, you can’t do any of this. After I pointed 
out all of these things they started having monthly meetings. Members 
from FAFEN or the CFCB would come to me and I would help them with 
hospital visits or other department visits. I had an identity in the area.153 
 
A younger member that went on to work for the mentoring NGO also suggested that 
the strategy was often to use personal connections:  
 
When I joined CRG, the CFCB was also looking for such people who had 
access to information that could only come from being a certain political 
party worker. This was a strategy CFCB was using because if they did not 
do this, it would become really difficult to get the issues heard and 
resolved. You need to have an inside person to get things running. Every 
                                                 
153 Jahanzaib Derawal, male, 40-50, member rural Gujrat (29/03/2015) 
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CRG group did this to overcome difficulty. In Gujrat, this was easy for 
us.154 
 
Within the studied urban CRGs it was often suggested businessmen were key to 
brokering introductions to state authorities:  
 
All the businessmen in the city are similarly connected. Any new 
appointee on the post of District Coordination Officer (DCO) or District 
Police Officer (DPO) in Gujrat will first be introduced to businessmen. 
Businessmen just go to the government official and give them their 
business cards and introduce themselves. Then when they want to get 
something done it is easier for them to have a subsequent meeting. They 
start the conversation by referring back to the original meeting. This is a 
small city, so contacts are well-developed.155 
 
Whilst in rural locations members that had previously been Union Councillors during 
Musharraf’s era or that were active in state mandated bodies often fulfilled this role. 
For example, one of the CRG’s main interlocutors in Kharian had long served as the 
voluntary Chairman of the wider district’s senior School Council body. Over the years, 
he had built strong personal working relationships with a variety of district level 
bureaucrats concerned with education.156 These were repeatedly drawn upon by his 
CRG which raised over 20 education related issues over STAEP’s course.  
                                                 
154 Wasif Wassan, male, 20-30, member urban Gujrat, later staff CFCB (22/05/2015) 
155 Subhan Sarpara, male, 40-50, member urban Gujrat (01/04/2015) 
156 Since the early 1990s, the Punjab government has, with mixed results, supported a system of School 
Councils with the idea of involving communities in schools’ management (Asim and Dee, 2016). This includes 
the handling of budgets, the raising of additional funding and monitoring performances. 
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In practice, therefore, the programme’s attempts to use official channels 
theoretically open to the public only got so far. Instead, members with relevant 
backgrounds and existing networks often played a leading role in shaping the CRGs’ 
focus and early relationships with authorities.  
 
Acting collectively  
Most CRGs arrived at meetings with authorities with anything from a few to ten or so 
members, with staff from the mentoring NGOs often joining them. Together, they 
would apply pressure on those they met. Interviewees described this as consisting of 
several elements: firstly, the sheer numbers that went to meetings would make them 
physically hard to ignore. Secondly, they often made it clear through articles 
published in the weeks beforehand that the issue was known to the wider 
community and that the CRG had the ability to ‘spread bad publicity’.157 Lastly, each 
would lend their identities to the engagement.  
This last element required members to pool their capitals. Indeed, it often involved a 
performance within which each member would layout their personal business card 
on the desk of whichever authority they met. As the programme’s original design 
intended, most were also members or heads of other more established and well-
known local organisations, some of which were also active at the national level. For 
example, within Gujrat city’s CRG, some members also served on Zakat Committees, 
another was associated with the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HCRP), 
another with the local Journalists’ Association, and another with the Association of 
General Councillors.158 As explored further in the next chapter, across all the studied 
groups many were also political party workers. As a CRG member who was later 
employed by Gujrat’s mentoring NGO explained: 
                                                 
157 Anam Bhatia, female, 40-50, member urban Gujrat (01/04/2015). 
158 More accurately ex-councillors. 
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The group doesn’t really have any real authority. It gets its legitimacy 
from people gathering together and working, as well as getting influential 
people together. […] These people already had access to power, we tried 
to combine these people’s power and use it to address our problems. On 
a district level, there is a committee that allocates funds. They devise 
schemes annually that are not made keeping in mind the needs of the 
people. Some influential person or a politician who is abroad directs 
people to use funds to build some road somewhere instead of an area 
which needs it the most. Our aim was to involve and motivate those 
people to use their power to reset the priorities of fund allocation by 
combining these people’s influence and power. They already have access 
to these places. If we motivate them they will benefit people.159 
 
The importance of these pre-existing identities and memberships was also confirmed 
by interviewees who gave me their own business cards. Most had more than four or 
five titles and affiliations. In one case, a member’s card had over ten on it.  
  
                                                 
159 Jarrar Shaikh, male, 50-60, member urban Gujrat and later staff (06/06/2015) 
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Photo 2: CRG members personal business cards 
 
 
 
 
REMOVED FOR COPYRIGHT 
 
 
Source: Author’s own 
 
Publicly displaying one’s affiliations to get things done is common to Pakistanis. 
Indeed, political billboards, bumper stickers, identification cards and officially headed 
stationary act as a form of cultural currency. Without them, one must often resort to 
paying an informal broker or wallah (a person involved with a specified thing or 
business) to open doors, make introductions or smoothen bureaucratic processes.160 
This was illustrated by two female CRG members who suggested that should the 
Prime Minister’s son attempt to meet with state authorities in Gujrat without 
someone vouching for his credentials, he would be ignored and accused of being an 
imposter. 
As my research progressed, it became increasingly clear that to members ‘acting 
collectively’, as they often put it, was as much about combining their capitals as it 
was the physical act of attending a meeting or rally. Indeed, each brought their pre-
existing identity to meetings with authorities, including the external, non-CRG related 
                                                 
160 Such everyday necessities are arguably at the root of the new clientelism that characterises Pakistan. 
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networks they were part of and the followers they could potentially mobilise. Clearly, 
much of this was symbolic and relied on efforts to present a united front: 
 
[…] all these people had good connections and good reputation in the 
society. We always worked in a team, older people were there, and 
younger people were there, people with medium age, so it was easy for 
us to work. We always go to meetings as a team. If we had a meeting with 
a government representative or a local representative, we would go as a 
team with one another. Every person knew that we all belonged to 
different parties, but everyone was clear that we were working on the 
CRG platform.161 
 
Some members even paid for others to attend meetings with authorities or held 
them on their properties. This was necessary as, for the most part, the voluntary 
programme did not cover such costs. By doing so, these members added to the 
numbers that could attend meetings and provided learning opportunities to less 
fortunate participants. As a young member of urban Gujrat’s CRG described:  
 
[…] I came to know how to speak in front of government officials, public 
representatives, MPAs, MNAs and how to speak with other influential 
people. The credit goes to the CRG. This is the reality. The CRG teaches us 
to speak openly on every platform. Before joining the District Youth 
Assembly and the CRG, I didn’t have concept of governance, democracy, 
transparency, accountability – I didn’t even know these words, I didn’t 
know about human rights either. After joining, I learnt all these things.162 
                                                 
161 Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member urban Gujrat, later staff CFCB 
162 Ibid 
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In short, acting collectively often meant CRG members pooling their identities and 
capitals during efforts to engage authorities. This was intended to increase the ability 
of the CRGs to have their voices heard by establishing the groups’ embeddedness in 
wider networks of power and influence. It also provided some members valued 
opportunities to learn from one another.  
 
Between information, homework and relationships 
As Chapter Four illustrated, ‘information’ somewhat replaces social capital in the 
social accountability discourse’s take on civil society. Citizens able to extract and 
interpret data on the performance of their local institutions and politicians are 
posited as having the leverage to illicit responsive and accountable governance. In 
the studied CRGs, however, the role of information obtained through the CRGs’ 
extensive monitoring of local service providers was notable for its absence. Indeed, 
when asked what led to the successful resolution of issues, it was rarely mentioned. 
Undoubtedly, however, the exercise of gathering information occasionally began the 
train of events that led to the resolution of issues. For instance, interviewees would 
often recount how governance monitoring made them aware of issues, such as 
missing staff or poor facilities in schools, that were later taken up by the CRGs. Yet, 
the information members collected was quickly subsumed within the more complex 
stories of the own capacities and relationships, and the wider power and politics of 
their communities. It was not used as evidence or as a threat. Indeed, what seemed 
to matter more for getting things done was congenial relationships between 
individual CRG members and authorities. 
It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that many interviewees were more interested in 
recounting when this occurred, often fondly talking of specific officials. Some even 
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argued that they would help one another to understand the bureaucratic and 
political obstacles preventing the resolution of issues and what to do to overcome 
them: 
 
So, we were just highlighting the issues which related to his department. 
When there was the issue of a pavement or any road or the construction 
of any wall, like there was the problem of the wall of the park, we 
highlighted it. He would say when he didn’t have funds and tell us when 
to connect with any MPA [Member Provincial Assembly] or MNA 
[Member National Assembly]. So, he would always guide us as to what to 
do.163  
  
Interviewees also argued that they needed good relationships with authorities after 
the programme ends: 
 
It’s not like we just bash them. If they do something good, we praise them 
as well and give them the courage to do further good work. Basically, our 
aim is to coordinate and collaborate with them. We raise the issues with 
them through the media and we thank them when they do something 
about it through the media as well. We don’t want to use newspapers as 
a threat because we have to live here as well. They can kick us out 
whenever they want. [Laughs]164 
 
                                                 
163 Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member urban Gujrat, later staff CFCB. 
164 Abby Bajwa, female, 30-40, member rural Gujrat and later staff (17/06/2015). 
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Towards the end of the programme there was a drive to encourage the CRGs to use 
Pakistan’s Right to Information laws. However, this did not feature in many accounts. 
Only one suggested that it would occasionally be deployed as a threat, whilst another 
argued that any evidence they might have uncovered of corruption or malpractice 
was unlikely to lead to any sanctions.  
In contrast to extracting information from state institutions, one CRG came up with 
the idea of ‘Problems Camps’, which were opportunities for members of the public to 
openly discuss local issues with CRG members.165 Although this identified issues they 
felt unable to work on, such as local divorces, it also led to some they were, including 
local gas shortages. Others talked of doing their ‘homework’.166 This usually meant 
collecting additional information or evidence once a problem was identified through 
citizens or governance monitoring efforts. For example, women from Multan’s CRG 
collected statements from people that had been unfairly dismissed from government 
paid jobs. These were combined with letters they had written to the concerned 
departments and newspaper clippings of rallies they had organised, and presented to 
a politician they engaged to ensure he had no excuse to delay action. Doing one’s 
homework, creating a file on an issue and not having overt allegiances to the rival of 
whoever you were engaging was a model divulged in several stories.(Asim and Dee, 
2016) As an interviewee remarked: ‘[…] if you have a file and are clean people would 
listen to you’.167 
This re-contextualises the role of information in social accountability programmes in 
countries such as Pakistan. Rather than being data upon which poor performance or 
malpractice is proved and sanctions based, it suggests information can be used to 
create the space for productive conversations and relationships with authorities and 
wider communities. Indeed, its use as a threat may be counterproductive in states 
                                                 
165 Tariq Langah, male, 30-40, member urban Gujranwala (18/03/15).  
166 The frequency of this phrase suggests it must have featured in the trainings CRG members received.   
167 Asad Kharal, male, 40-50, member rural Multan (04/10/2015). Positing colonial legacies as a possible 
explanation, Hull's (2012) ethnography of the materiality of Pakistan’s urban bureaucracy highlights the 
symbolic importance of signatures, paperwork and files to getting things done, dispersing responsibilities and 
maintaining power in Pakistan. 
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with few formal accountability mechanisms, and in societies within which authorities 
and activists often personally know one another. 
 
Appropriation and institutionalisation 
Interviewees often argued that they aimed to build their CRGs’ ‘reputations’ as local 
associations. They wanted institutional identities that authorities would recognise 
and around which productive relationships could be built. However, the repeated 
pooling of participants’ capitals necessary to do this could be a risky process. For 
example, activating one’s existing relationship with an authority on behalf of a CRG 
has the potential for efforts to be dismissed, creating a loss of face. Collective efforts 
may also be effectively appropriated by other members or authorities that seek to 
take the credit for successes. This could be done by monopolising relationships with 
authorities or through publicly claiming credit in the media.168 
Most of the bad words members had to say about one another and STAEP’s aims 
stemmed from such attempts. Some directly named their colleagues as undertaking 
the CRGs’ work for themselves and others generally complained that their groups 
were spoiled by such things. As one disgruntled participant argued: 
 
If you want to bring change, you have to bring change in the society, in 
the hearts of the people, in the hearts of the CRG members. Many times, 
it happened that CRG members, you know the wealthy people, they never 
demanded this change because they were using other CRG members for 
their sake, to show their power. This is reality. If anybody would say that 
this is not true, they would be lying because it is true that every person 
                                                 
168 This is what Bourdieu (1986:251) meant when he wrote that associations always contain ‘the seeds of an 
embezzlement or misappropriation’. 
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was using it for themselves.169 
 
Turning to the role of politicians, another interviewee argued that: 
 
They want credit because they want votes and publicity. This is the sad 
reality in Pakistan that politicians want to take credit for things even if 
they have not done anything. This is a huge issue. The politicians want to 
be credited for the smallest of things.170  
 
She illustrated this through the example of a woman the CRG had helped during a 
court battle with her neighbour who has siphoned off electricity from her connection. 
After the case’s successful resolution, a local politician tried to claim the credit for 
helping the woman when ironically it was his influence on the electricity department 
that had landed her with the bill in the first place. As the interviewee put it:  
 
What I am trying to say is that the politicians are involved in even small 
issues like these. Their connections are everywhere, and they take credit 
for everything. Since they have power no one raises a voice against them.  
 
During interviews such problems would often be raised. The previously quoted 
member even described them as arising from Pakistani culture: 
                                                 
169 Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member and staff urban Gujrat (16/06/2015 & 22/05/2015) 
170 Minahil Khan, female, 40-50, Gujranwala (20/03/2015)  
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Arif: Look, I think that it is human instinct. In Pakistan, we don’t like to 
share credit. 
Tom: [Laughs] It’s not just Pakistan. 
Arif: I know, but I am just talking about Pakistan as it is where my 
experience lies. I am just talking about my localities. We want shortcuts 
and we want to take credit off each other. Like for example, he will do the 
work, but I will say that I have done it because I want to be known as the 
good person in the society.171 
 
One woman bluntly argued that: ‘Obviously, everyone wants to get credit for 
things’.172 Whilst another suggested that the risks of having the groups’ collective 
efforts appropriated arises from the patriarchy: ‘In the men, they have this tendency 
to want to do things on their own and take the credit for them.’173 
Some CRGs sought to address such issues through membership cards. Theoretically, 
they had two purposes: They would help the groups carve out reputations as local 
associations and they would arm less well-known members with clear markers of 
their newly obtained social capital. In this sense, the cards also sought to work with 
wider norms that require Pakistanis to display their affiliations. However, FAFEN 
worried that members with cards risked bringing their entire nation-wide network 
into disrepute. This was a legitimate concern given FAFEN’s other activities include 
monitoring elections and scrutinising Pakistan’s assemblies.  
Of my studied research sites, therefore, only urban Gujrat’s and Gujranwala’s GRGs 
had them. A member from the latter argued that the cards brought them a modicum 
                                                 
171 Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member and staff urban Gujrat (16/06/2015 & 22/05/2015) 
172 Rue Khokhar, female, 40-50, member rural Multan (14/10/2015). 
173 Mariam Bhatia, female, 30-40, member urban Gujrat (01/04/2015). 
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of respect when visiting authorities. Whilst, a NGO staff member mentoring the 
former argued they fell-foul of misuse:  
 
Some members would use their cards to get help for their personal 
problems as well, according to me. For example, if in your local area you 
are unable to get your gutter line fixed, we would request MPAs to divert 
their funds to those areas. Some sharp members, using the privilege 
provided by their cards used them to get personal matters resolved. An 
ordinary person’s induction caused these problems. Although, the 
problem of recognition was resolved, people began widely using 
membership information in their biographies.174  
 
As shown in the next chapter, the cards also became a contentious issue between 
rival groups in urban Multan’s CRG, with one side accusing the other of trying to 
protect their monopoly of relationships with authorities by blocking the issuing of 
cards. 
Several interviewees also complained that, as part of an effort to institutionalise their 
groups, they should not have had internal elected positions. Indeed, most were 
aware of the power differentials between members. Thus, some wanted the CRGs to 
make them indistinguishable from one another, thereby, creating an even playing 
field and mitigating the risks of the groups’ efforts being appropriated: 
 
They should have an authority letter to reach institutions. The authority 
should have influence. It should not be that you just go to an institution 
and say you are so and so, and they ask you what is the CRG. It should 
                                                 
174 Maqbool Ahmed, male, 40-50, mentoring NGO staff Multan (06/06/2015). 
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have had enough recognition and people should have known it was doing 
work. People only take interest in things when they see them working. It 
should be apolitical. There should be no hierarchical positions, president, 
etc.175 
 
This is also perhaps unsurprising for a country in which elected offices are widely 
thought to be inherited, brought or bargained. 
More generally, members suggested that the best way to overcome the risks of 
appropriation that come from creating an association was time. For example, a 
member from urban Gujrat’s CRG explained how in STAEP’s first few years some of 
his colleagues used their personal and political connections to secure meetings with 
authorities. Although this initially unfairly accorded them credit for any of the group’s 
resulting successes, it was tacitly approved by their mentoring NGO and other 
members as they lacked confidence. He argued that overtime – and presumably 
through such processes – other members grew in confidence and the CRG itself 
gradually came to be recognised by authorities as a local association. He continued: 
 
Then a time came when even though around five or six of us had personal 
relations with people in the government, we agreed amongst ourselves 
that we will not use these relations. We had to establish a system that 
anyone of us can go and get information or approach government 
officials. And if we don’t get the information then we would go to the 
court. Instead of using personal relations, we established a system and 
became successful in that.176 
 
                                                 
175 Momna Nizamani, male, 40-50, member rural Multan (17/10/2017). 
176 Arif Ramy, male, 20-30, member urban Gujrat (30/03/2015 & 12/08/17) 
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The member’s suggestion was that his CRG needed time to become an institution, 
distinct from its members’ individual identities and distinct from its mentoring NGO. 
As a woman from the same CRG put it: 
 
Basically, the motto for CRG was that it shouldn’t just operate for the 
CFCB, like there was an organisation called Lukaati Group, we wanted us 
to be like that group, one that can operate without the CFCB, Aurat 
Foundation or any other [NGO] for that matter, to resolve their issues.177 
 
Others also added that it took their CRGs a few years to weed out those with malign 
intentions, which can be understood as a process of becoming distinct from their 
individual interests. However, most suggested that they did not get to this stage until 
programme was ending: 
 
The people who made the platform, they lost interest and stepped back. 
When the CRG finally became recognized, that’s when they stepped back. 
Like this solid waste management issue that comes under the Municipal 
Corporation, there came a time [near to the end] that whenever we 
would point out to the officials where to clean they would immediately 
clean it.178 
 
This members’ analysis is supported by the programme’s annual reviews that found 
that the CRGs were not widely known within their constituencies by either ordinary 
citizens or authorities (DFID, 2014:8).  
                                                 
177 Aafea Kathia, female, 20-30, member urban Gujrat and later staff (16/06/2015).  
178 Sana Mirani, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (06/10/2015 & 09/10/2015). 
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The reasons some sought to appropriate credit for their CRGs’ actions will be 
explored further in the next chapter. Here the point is that efforts to build public 
associations that can productively interact with clientelistic states are difficult and 
prone to appropriation from within and without. Where they manage to overcome 
such risks, it is likely to happen through innovative and contextually specific methods 
such as the CRGs’ identity cards. It is also likely to be a lengthy process of 
institutionalisation, unsuited to the average four- or five- year ‘projectized’ 
programme span. 
 
The role of elites 
So far, I have explored how the CRGs generally functioned, the limits of the 
programme’s proper procedures, the risks of collective action and members efforts 
to overcome them. Nonetheless, Gujrat district’s CRGs also contained elites. They 
were distinguished from their fellows by their leadership roles within far larger, 
politicised networks and by their wealth. The former gave them pre-existing 
connections to authorities and political capital to leverage in meetings with them. 
The latter the ability to physically host the CRGs’ and mobilise their members. These 
elites also brought their local allies into the groups to bolster their positions and 
continue external rivalries. 
Despite this, the CRGs’ elites were consistently referred to in deferential terms by 
other members and staff from the mentoring NGO. They were described as ‘good 
men’, ‘great social workers’, ‘nawabs (Muslim prince or respected powerful 
landowner)’ and ‘sahibs (sirs)’. For much of the programme, they also won internal 
votes that allowed them to occupy their CRGs’ honorary positions. This positioned 
them as interlocutors between the groups, the mentoring NGO and the authorities 
they sought to engage.  
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In interviews the elites often suggested that they stood apart from or above the 
CRGs’ day-to-day activities. Indeed, they framed their participation as a favour to 
other members and the mentoring NGO and were only actively involved with a small 
number of issues that they were confident their interventions could resolve. 
However, they were the two CRGs’ most talked about, public and, therefore, 
prestigious successes. Moreover, they required the extraction of funds from local 
politicians’ discretionary development budgets and took the form of targeted 
infrastructure.  
Although the elites rarely directly linked these successes to formal politics, through 
an examination of their backgrounds, what they did and the meanings they gave to it, 
I show how they brought Pakistan’s clientelistic mode of politics into STAEP. In the 
process, they used their powers in private ways that contravene the requirements of 
publicness common to visions of civil society and democratisation. Furthermore, due 
to elites’ desires to maintain and augment their own positions, they limited what 
their respective groups worked on. Thus, their involvement stood in direct tension 
with the efforts of the other members to institutionalise the CRGs and curtailed the 
groups’ overall potentials. 
Before proceeding, a note on Multan’s CRGs: Although some of their most active 
members also had considerable wealth and political connections, they did not have 
large followings that were of use during their time within the STAEP programme and 
they did not have clear political patrons. Furthermore, their fellow members did not 
suggest that they were particularly powerful. Instead, as explored in the next 
chapter, their efforts to get things done were often unsuccessful and challenged by 
their rivals within the CRGs.  
 
Vignette one: Noman Riasani 
254 
 
We first turn to one of the two elites within urban Gujrat’s CRG, Noman Raisani. I met 
Noman three times. He described himself as a martial arts educator, a homeopathic 
doctor, and a social worker. He was the founder of the district’s Sports Excellence 
Society and its Voluntary Medics Association. He was also the Chair of the Society for 
Islamic Youth. Alongside these roles, Noman was a leader within Gujrat’s local branch 
of an Islamic political party that won 3.2% of the vote at 2013’s elections and the 
long-running Vice President of the city’s Rehmani Association, a large biraderi based 
organisation. Despite these roles, he described himself as a ‘lotta’ (literally a small 
drinking vessel – but used to denote someone who is without a permanent political 
base). 
Noman was invited by the CFCB – STAEP’s local mentoring NGO – to be amongst 
Gujrat city’s CRG’s founders. He attributed this to his local connections and influence. 
For these, he highlighted two main sources: the first was his Sports Excellence 
Society. As he explained, it acts as an umbrella organisation for Gujrat’s various 
specialised sporting Associations: 
 
There are twenty-four sports associations in Gujarat. Weightlifting, 
football, cricket, hockey, etc. So, we have made heads in each of these. 
President and General Secretary. All these associations have members 
from every walk of life. All the people who play sports are members of 
their respective sporting associations. So, if there is a problem we just 
need to call the President and he can gather all the members at one time. 
This is a private organisation. Members of these organizations have 
connections and are members of different organizations. 
 
Flipping through a registrar of the Society’s affiliates, Noman explained that honorary 
positions within each organisation were often filled by locally powerful people. 
Furthermore, the Society gave him a say in how they were awarded. For example, he 
255 
 
declared that he made Gujrat’s Executive District Officer (EDO) for the Water and 
Power Development Authority (WAPDA) the President of the tehsil’s Badminton 
Association. The Society also gave Noman a platform from which to invite them to 
events at which they would be the guests of honour and receive publicity. Noman 
suggested that through these apportionments and activities they eventually became 
his friends. Thus, Noman was also a cultural elite. 
The second, more overtly political, source of Noman’s local influence came from his 
seniority within Gujrat’s Rehmani Association. As with most Pakistani cities, Gujrat 
has several large biraderi based associations. Noman argued that the majority of 
Rehmanis are landless workers, with many making a living as Gujrat’s famous potters. 
Furthermore, he distinguished them from Arians, which he suggested are mostly 
landowners and investors, adding that although they are sharp and intelligent, local 
wisdom suggests you should never trust them in business. 
Gujrat’s Rehmani Association was founded relatively recently by rich men from 
within the community and it had a large sister organisation in nearby Gujranwala. On 
the societal level, it engages in what Noman refers to as ‘social work’. This includes 
dispensing money and everyday household items to poor Rehmani families, funding 
their weddings, sending children abroad for education, and finding good jobs for 
those returning to Gujrat. For Noman, these ‘little things’ are worthy causes and 
should be contrasted with the ostentatious events put on by the Arian’s Association.    
Whilst on a more overtly political level, when necessary, the Association’s members 
mobilize en masse to address community wide issues. For example, Gujrat’s potters 
had recently been hampered by a lack of Sui gas supplies.179 To resolve this, the 
Rehmani Association held joint strikes and blocked the GT Road with the Potters’ 
Association.180 This built up pressure for local Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-
N) Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA) Haji Imran Zafar’s trip to Lahore to 
                                                 
179 Sui gas field is the biggest natural gas field in Pakistan. It is located near Sui in Baluchistan. 
180 An extremely common occurrence on Pakistan's major roads. 
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discuss the problem with the Punjab’s Chief Minister. Noman added that Imran was 
particularly keen to do so as his own investments were also suffering. 
Somewhere in-between these levels, the Association’s senior members also act as 
interlocutors between individual Rehmanis, state officials and politicians. For 
example, Noman recounted how he had recently visited Haji Imran Zafar to get a 
young community member’s Rs 25,000 (£180) fine quashed. He declared that ‘he saw 
me and saw the papers, and just signed without asking a question’. This last purpose 
is reminiscent of Lyon’s (2002) description of the favours powerful members of 
Rawalpindi’s ‘Gujar Youth Foundation’ do for their less fortunate members.  
Over the course of our interviews, it became increasingly clear that Haji Imran Zafar 
and his family were the Rehmani Association’s political patrons. They are themselves 
Rehmanis and Zafar’s uncle Haji Nasir Mehmood was the Association’s Chairman. 
Noman argued that this meant the Association’s members always lent them their 
political support. It would be unusual if this did not mean votes. It is also notable that 
Noman referred to the MPA as ‘his chief patron’ and suggested that he had built up a 
good relationship with his family. Indeed, in Pakistan relationships between elites 
and their political patrons generally contain a personal element. In this sense, Noman 
was also a political elite. 
The resolution of two issues illustrate how Noman harnessed these relationships in 
pursuit of the CRG’s aims. The first concerns an accumulation of electricity cables on 
a pole in a residential area. In Pakistan, it is quite common to see electricity poles 
heavy with cables as they are added to by the state or, just as likely, those looking to 
illegally siphon off energy. However, the poor workmanship of both can pose a 
danger to those living nearby.  
To resolve the issue, the CRG’s members first approached staff within the district’s 
WAPDA office. Following several failed requests, Noman activated his 
aforementioned connection within the office to secure a quote for the required 
work. However, rather than waiting for WAPDA to do it, Noman took the quote to 
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Haji Imran Zafar. The MPA immediately instructed one of his political workers to pay 
for the pole’s modifications from his own pocket. As Noman argued; ‘Our problem 
was resolved. If we went to the government, it would have been a lengthy thing. If 
we had done it like that, it may not have gotten done. There may have been 
arguments.’ For Noman, therefore, drawing upon his connections was the rational 
thing to do. 
The second issue concerns the placement and construction of a major public park. 
The issue was repeatedly highlighted by other CRG members as their most notable 
achievement. Although the park was not originally the CRG’s idea, they suggested 
that they had been influential in finding a suitable venue and lobbying the district 
administration to see the project through. This required members’ repeated visits to 
local authorities within both the military, who own much of the district’s land, and 
the rail department that owned a possible alternative site, and it included directing 
the media’s attention towards the issues.  
Once again, however, Noman suggested that his relationship with Haji Imran Zafar 
was the pivotal factor. He recounted how the MPA lives near to one of his sports 
clubs and he would often sit with him to discuss various development projects. 
Noman argued that it was during one of these occasions that he suggested to him 
where the park should be placed and persuaded him to find the funds to complete 
the project.  
It is highly unlikely that Noman, even given his considerable reserves of social and 
political capital, could solely influence such a decision. Indeed, other Gujratis 
suggested that a lot more was at stake than the park’s placement. For instance, the 
contract to build it was awarded to a local businessman who had recently defected 
from the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) to the PML-N. The park was also named after 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s brother Shahbaz Sharif and opened by his son. For 
powerful members of Gujrat’s political society, therefore, the park represented a 
project with high economic and symbolic stakes. Indeed, its construction attached 
Noman and the CRG to centres of power beyond the city.  
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Nonetheless, it is notable that Noman chose to highlight his own private efforts and 
connections as the reason for the resolution of this issue. He did not mention the 
repeated visits to bureaucrats other CRG members had made to locate a suitable 
venue for the park. Nor did he discuss how they had kept the issue alive through the 
local media. In this sense, Noman effectively hijacked the efforts of his fellow 
members. Indeed, it is arguable that, as before, he drew a collective, public struggle 
into the private and personal realm. In the process he associated himself with the 
park’s construction and prevented the CRG from capitalising upon an opportunity to 
build a public relationship with the politician who pushed it through. Discussing his 
involvement in the CRG’s work more broadly, Noman suggested: 
 
We never had to struggle too much. It is due to these links as I have told 
you before. We never had to put in too much effort because either the 
work that was doable would get done right away or if it was not, it would 
not. 
 
Later I uncovered that the Punjab government made up for a shortfall in the park’s 
construction costs through offering private contracts to run it. Furthermore, an 
interviewee revealed that Noman owned a business that operates facilities, such as 
public rides and confectionery stalls, in the city’s other parks. However, I could not 
connect this to the issue of the park’s placement or its construction. Nonetheless, in 
a sign that most accepted Noman’s leadership of the CRG, other members repeatedly 
argued that he did not work in his own interests and that his power was due to his 
social work, rather than his cultural, political or economic capitals. 
Noman eventually fell out with the CFCB and left the CRG in 2012. An episode that 
contributed to this illustrates how his willingness to use his connections for the CRG’s 
aims was ultimately limited by his interest in maintaining his position within Gujrat’s 
wider patronage networks: 
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It occurred in 2010 following a by-election that was held following Haji Nasir 
Mehmood’s disqualification from his seat as an MPA due to forging his degree. On 
the day of the by-election, FAFEN mobilised local CRG members to monitor voting 
booths. They reported numerous issues across the district, prompting FAFEN to 
release a damming preliminary report that suggested all sides were involved.181 
Despite winning and the accusations of misconduct eventually leading nowhere, Haji 
Imran Zafar declined several post-election invitations to meet with the CRG’s 
members to discuss various issues. Furthermore, when he eventually did, he gave 
FAFEN and Noman a ten-minute public dressing down.  
Although Noman was highly respected by his fellow CRG members and he secured 
their most prestigious success, the programme’s wider ambition to improve 
democratic procedures ultimately clashed with his wider interests. This eventually 
placed him in an awkward position, forcing him to choose between his various 
identities. In the end, his pre-existing allegiances to his political patron won out. 
Perhaps further indicative of how Noman viewed his involvement with the CRG, 
during one of our interviews I asked him whether the skills required of a senior 
Rehmani Association member made him a good choice for its leader. He replied: ‘I 
wouldn’t say that skills matter, I think it is your relationships that matter.’ 
Vignette two: Umer Mirza 
Urban Gujrat’s CRG’s other elite member, Umer Mirza, stood out for the skill with 
which he managed to get things done for the group. At the same time, however, he 
appropriated credit for some of their achievements. This increased his ability to 
occupy positions within wider economic and political patronage networks, whilst 
reducing the CRG’s own efforts to institutionalise.  
Umer’s business bought and sold urban real estate from a small air-conditioned office 
in a half-built, upper-middle class neighbourhood on the outskirts of Gujrat. As I 
                                                 
181 Staff Writer. ‘Gujrat By-Election Marked by Fraudulent Voting, Police Interference: Observers’. Maverick 
Pakistanis.com, March 2010. http://www.maverickpakistanis.com/2010/03/gujrat-by-election-marked-by-
fraudulent-voting-police-interference-observers/ (Accessed 07.02.17) 
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waited with three or four other men on one side of a partition designating a 
reception area, newcomers would enter and everyone would quietly shake hands. 
Formalities over, some would give their seats to the arrivals and retreat without 
discussion to benches outside. When we were eventually beckoned to the other side, 
I found Umer behind the sort of large, heavy wooden desk common amongst the 
bureaucrats I had encountered. Furthermore, the walls were adorned with pictures 
of him with various local influentials, including army officers and politicians. 
Umer explained to me that as a young man he had first got involved in social work 
following 2005’s Kashmir earthquake. This involved collecting supplies from his 
community to send to those in need. It was commonly argued that the state reacted 
slowly to this tragedy and that citizens such as Umer had risen to meet its failure.182 
To Western commentators’ horror, many were mobilised by Pakistan’s well run 
religious parties. However, Umer was not fond of them and considered himself to be 
an educated liberal.  
In the run-up to 2008’s elections, Umer was contacted by a member of the PML-N to 
put his degree in Mass Communications to work for them. As he put it:  
 
Basically, you see I have a lot of contacts in the community so what 
happens is that all these politicians need people like us who have good 
ties in the community so that they can get votes. It was around 2008. You 
can see some pictures as well on the wall. I was a supporter of PML-N. I 
believed in their projects like the motorway etc. So, they approached me.  
 
Umer described his work during this period as organising physical meetings between 
politicians and potential voters and as running the party’s local social media 
                                                 
182 McGrik, J. ‘Kashmir: the politics of an earthquake’. OpenDemocracy, 19th October 2005. 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-india_pakistan/jihadi_2941.jsp (Accessed  20.06.17) 
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campaign. His efforts helped his cousin and the Rehmani Association’s Chairman, Haji 
Nasir Mehmood, to win a seat as the PML-N’s MPA. They also catapulted Umer up 
the ranks of the party’s local political workers, earning him the position of the PML-
N’s ‘Secretary Information’ for all 15 of Gujrat’s municipal union councils. 
A few years later, Umer was approached by his sister’s husband who needed 
someone to help run the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) in Gujrat. Partly 
funded by DFID, BISP is the state’s direct cash transfer programme that targets 
women. It uses data collected through poverty scorecards to identify beneficiaries 
and, thereby, aims to bypass the patron-client relations that have dogged other social 
welfare initiatives. Nonetheless, in popular discourse, the BISP is said to be a way that 
the Pakistan’s People’s Party, who started it, buy votes. Umer was to be paid to 
establish a team to collect this data. Once again, he attributed this invitation to his 
social and political connections, and his ability to collect the data the programme 
required. Thus, by this time, he could be considered both a cultural and emerging 
political elite. 
Umer became a member of the CRG after learning of it from people within his social 
circle. Like many of those I met, he was frustrated with his experiences and confused 
as to why I would want to study it. His frustrations were not with the other members 
but with the CFCB’s management. He argued that they were only interested in filling 
in paperwork and data collection. Moreover, he suggested that the CFCB’s staff did 
not work towards the resolution of members’ identified issues. Instead, they 
preferred to hold meetings in expensive hotels. Despite this, it became clear that 
Umer had greatly benefitted from his time with the CRG.  
The episode that best illustrates this concerned the state of a local school that had 
neither drinking water or a washroom. Umer explained the problem as one of fear 
rather than straightforward corruption. As he saw it, school staff and members of its 
governing council were afraid to approach state authorities for missing funds. 
Furthermore, bureaucrats within the district’s administration avoided spending funds 
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allocated for schools’ infrastructure as it would attract the wrath of those above 
them who wanted to use them for patronage 
Umer, who by this point was the CRG’s Vice-Chairman under Noman, began by 
holding meetings between its members, teachers, the School’s Management 
Association and the school’s Council. They decided that they needed to approach the 
EDO for Education and, his senior, the District Coordination Officer (DCO). By this 
time, Umer argued that his continuing role as Information Secretary for the PML-N in 
the run-up to 2013’s elections enabled him to ask Haji Nasir Mehmood to secure 
these meetings.  
As mentioned above, Nasir had recently been disqualified from his seat as an MPA 
due to forging his degree. Despite this, he still commanded significant clout within 
Gujrat and called the bureaucrats to meet Umer within his own offices. During this 
private meeting, he promised something would swiftly be done and committed to 
visiting the school the following morning. After this some funding was swiftly 
realised, but the CRG had to look to other sources to make up the shortfall.  
It was around this time that Umer established and officially registered his own NGO 
called the People’s Welfare Organisation (PWO). As this is a difficult and lengthy 
process, Umer reactivated a dormant local NGO, changing its name and those of its 
office bearers on government records. He filled its wider membership with a mix of 
his old colleagues from BISP and members of the CRG he had introduced after 
joining. He also made Noman one of WPO’s board members. Umer estimated that by 
the time he left the CRG around two thirds its members belonged to both 
organisations. 
Umer argued that: ‘if my business is booming then so is PWO, if not, then things are 
slow at PWO too’. As business was good, Umer and some other PWO members 
contributed their own funds to the shortfall in the school’s renovation. Following this, 
they attended its annual prize giving ceremony at which they awarded certificates to 
teachers and pupils. They also gave out uniforms and money which Umer repeatedly 
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informed me came from his own pocket. To ensure both Umer and his political 
patron received the credit for the school’s renovation, the event was publicised 
through the local press. In clippings Umer showed me a banner made for the 
ceremony was clearly branded with the PWO’s logo, but there was no indication of 
the CRG’s involvement. Shortly after 2013’s elections Umer declined an offer to 
become the CRG’s Chairman and promptly left the group, telling the CFCB that he 
needed to look after his business. 
Accounts by other CRG members leave little doubt that Umer’s involvement greatly 
benefited some of the poorest members of his union council. However, when asked, 
they knew nothing of the private relationship with Nasir he had activated to secure 
funds for the school’s renovation. Instead, many discussed the issue’s resolution as if 
their efforts at the ‘proper procedures’ had paid off. This, once again, shows how 
well-connected elites can privately appropriate the CRG’s efforts.  
Another member revealed that after this episode the PWO swiftly moved from 
voluntary social work to bidding for paid projects from larger NGOs. This arguably 
completed Umer’s transition from a social worker to a politically connected NGO 
owner. In this sense, his story is also illustrative of the extra opportunities that can 
accrue to powerful members of programmes when social accountability is narrowly 
conceived of as getting things done. 
Vignette three: Chaudhry Jahanzaib Derawal  
The chapter’s last vignette focuses on Gujrat’s rural CRG. It shows how rivalries 
between powerful elites can seep into the associations the programme created and 
how this shaped the activities they undertook. Furthermore, it suggests that where 
the mentoring NGOs had few prior links, elites could mediate their understanding of 
the local context and, thereby, dominate the CRGs. 
I first met Chaudhry Adnan Bhutta on the forecourt of a petrol station on the side of 
the GT Road as it entered Kharian. Next to the forecourt was a small busy tyre 
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changing shack. As I would discover later, it was one of many that the sixty plus years 
old owned over the next three or four kilometres. As we talked, groups of people 
would approach Adnan. Often there would be handshakes and pleasantries before 
they would depart, but sometimes he would take them off to one side where they 
would engage in animated discussions and exchange documents. Confused as to 
what was going on, I asked Adnan whether he was also an official of some kind, 
perhaps a village head or land registry officer? He laughed and explained that he was 
merely a well-known local social worker whose signature held weight with state 
authorities.  
Adnan declared his social work began at an early age and that it consisted of 
resolving issues in his village outside Kharian, such as gas and electricity shortages, 
and registering villagers for national identification cards. In the 2000s, under 
Musharraf’s devolution scheme, Adnan successfully fought local elections to become 
a Councillor. As a Councillor, he specialised in education. He described his role as 
collecting data on schools’ performance and taking their issues to the responsible 
EDO, a task that he argued won him a wide reputation for social work. After 
Musharraf, Adnan sought to continue his social work through his Presidency of a 
friend’s local NGO and through his role as the Chairperson of the district’s School 
Council body. 
Long before this, in 1986, Adnan had been one of the founders of the GT Road 
Business Owners’ Union. He described the Union as providing physical security to 
businesses along Kharian’s portion of the GT Road, negotiating rent rates and helping 
owners during engagements with tax authorities. Indeed, he saw the road’s small 
business owners as ‘workers’ that should not pay taxes, which he contrasted with 
‘investors’ that should. In his own words: ‘I have saved them from the oppression of 
income tax; I have protected them from the abuse of the administration’.183 By the 
time I met him, Adnan had enjoyed an uninterrupted sixteen-year incumbency as the 
Union’s President and his son had recently been made its General Secretary.  
                                                 
183 Chaudhry Adnan Bhutta, male, 50-60, rural Gujrat (15/03/2015, 25/03/2015 & 29/03/2015) 
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Questioned about his experiences within the CRG, Adnan made it clear that although 
he approved of its aims, it got very little done. Over the course of our three 
interviews, it became apparent that Adnan was most frustrated by the CRG’s inability 
to resolve issues pertaining to the areas within his sphere of influence. For instance, 
he complained that much of the stretch of the GT Road where his union’s members 
had businesses was missing a service road (narrow roads that run either side of the 
main road). It also needed street lighting and the removal of a dangerous u-bend. 
Furthermore, he wanted signs upon which local politicians announced their good 
deeds taken down.  
Despite approaching state authorities and politicians to address these issues in the 
name of the CRG, for Adnan and his close allies within the group their repeated 
failures were due to unspecified corruption, which went ‘from top to bottom’. 
However, other members revealed that addressing many of them would have directly 
conflicted with a local politician’s stake in a mall located on the aforementioned 
stretches of the GT Road. For much of STAEP’s duration, therefore, Adnan and his 
allies within the CRG were locked out of productive relationships with authorities. 
Accordingly, he spent most of his time raising educational issues with relevant 
members of the district’s administration that he had long had a good relationship 
with through his previous roles on state mandated bodies and within a nationwide 
educational NGO. 
As I met the CRG’s other members, however, other successfully resolved issues kept 
being mentioned. Furthermore, another name was consistently associated with 
them: Chaudhry Jahanzaib Derawal. Interviewees variously described him as a great 
social worker, as the powerful head of another of Kharian’s union and as the CRG’s 
politically connected leader. It occurred to me that Adnan had not mentioned 
Jahanzaib or any of his close allies during our first meeting. Thus, towards the end of 
our second I asked him about Jahanzaib. He replied: 
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Jahanzaib Derawal is also a shopkeeper but his place is at the market. He 
is the President of the Market Stallholder’s Union. I was the one who 
created the GT Road Business Owners’ Union. Jahanzaib Derawal kind of 
conspired. He sat with eight guys in a room and created a Central Union 
of Kharian [effectively an umbrella union for all Kaharian’s unions] 
without any kind of elections and called himself the President of that as 
well. Whilst we, on the other hand, did a complete electoral process for 
the GT Road Trade Union. I have contested it not just once but many 
times. The shopkeepers love me. Whatever kind of elections there are, I 
am not worried as I don’t have an issue. Even in the Market Stallholder’s 
Union he didn’t contest any elections and just became the President. It’s 
funny because the Vice President of his Central Union lost in the elections 
for the GT Road Business Owners’ Union.  
 
Adnan also denied any knowledge of Jahanzaib’s contributions to the CRG or his 
leadership of it. Furthermore, he suggested that whatever I’d been told must be a lie. 
To further understand this rivalry, it is necessary to explore Jahanzaib’s position with 
Kahrian’s society and his contributions to the group. 
As the quote at the chapter’s beginning illustrates, Jahanzaib attributed his local 
influence and connections to his leadership of the Market Stallholder’s Union and his 
later creation of a Central Union for Kharian. Indeed, he boasted of how he had 
occasionally led their memberships to strike. He argued, however, that usually the 
mere threat of mobilisation was enough to resolve most of the issues they faced. As 
we spoke further, it also became clear that Jahanzaib was the interlocutor between 
his union’s members and politicians. He explained that: 
 
There is an office of PML-N on the road my union is located around here 
in Kharian. The MNA had a meeting there where he asked the people to 
highlight the issues they were facing. The people that went to that 
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meeting told him that our President will tell you the issues, which is me. 
The MNA invited me to the office and inquired about the problems. He 
said people told me you had some problems to share with me. 
 
When pressed on the extent of his power, however, Jahanzaib would frequently deny 
having any. He even declared that he does not really want to be the President of the 
Stallholder’s Union but that the members kept voting for him. Instead, he would 
describe his role as helping them to understand the worth of their vote and the rights 
they had to hold authorities to account. Indeed, using the programme’s language of 
voice, votes and citizenship, he depicted his union as fulfilling a similar role to the 
CRG. 
Turning directly to his involvement with the CRG, Jahanzaib described how he used 
his own political connections to get things done. For example, he was routinely able 
to get district level state authorities and local politicians to physically accompany him 
on visits to run down schools or to inspect faulty electricity transformers. Shortly 
after they would address the issues he had highlighted. When they would not, he 
would personally go to Gujrat or Gujranwala to track down those he deemed 
responsible. Jahanzaib also declared that he would not involve himself in issues that 
he was not sure he could resolve. As he described: 
 
[…] we never got involved in any issues that we knew we could not get 
resolved. I knew my limits, so I never tried to tackle something that I could 
not. I would not go and try to break down a mountain by banging my head 
against it. As far as the local government or federal government is 
concerned, the MNA and MPA were both acquaintances. The MPA has 
come in our CRG meetings as well. Even the MNA has also come once or 
twice. 
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As another member of his CRG revealed, Jahanzaib also personally handled the 
groups’ relationships with authorities: 
 
He is a well know person. He is a member of the Chamber as well. Also, 
he is popular in his village. As far as other members are concerned, they 
were just like me, they were not really doing anything because Jahanzaib 
would handle everything. You need members when there was an issue 
that could not be solved but Jahanzaib was able to solve all the problems 
very easily. So, the members would just show up on meetings and mark 
their attendance.184 
 
Although the CRG did raise many unresolved issues, in this way Jahanzaib’s 
involvement limited the group’s horizons, and shaped its relationships and local 
identity. It was also notable that many of the issues Jahanzaib declared that he 
worked on were in his village or the part of town where members of his union have 
businesses. Moreover, apart from one issue to do with the local motorway rescue 
service that his rival, Adnan, addressed, there were no examples of successfully 
resolved issues he was not somehow personally involved with.   
Jahanzaib’s grip on the CRG and his significant political capital was confirmed by 
several other interviewees. As a staff member from the CFCB explained: 
 
So, every person wanted to get credit. But, on the whole, the practice in 
Kharian was that Jahanzaib Derawal had all the power and he was dealing 
like a commander there. This was the reality. Whenever there was any 
                                                 
184 Ameer Paracha, male, 60-70, member rural Gujrat (28/03/2015) 
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issue, he would call the MNA or MPA and get it sorted. It is even going on 
right now.185 
 
The interviewee added that Jahanzaib’s good relationships with local politicians 
stemmed from his ability to mobilise his union’s members on their behalf. For 
example, should one want to hold a rally or strike in the tehsil Jahanzaib is who they 
call. The worth of such mobilisations – which are often rumoured to be paid for – 
cannot be underestimated in Pakistan. Indeed, I spent much of my time on the GT 
road waiting for the police to disperse protestors staging sit-ins on the behest of 
some politician’s pet issue. 
When asked how he worked with others, Jahanzaib claimed he had mobilised his 
union to march alongside Adnan’s to raise awareness of Pakistan’s newly enshrined 
Right to Information law. However, this was the only instance of collaboration I could 
uncover. Moreover, it was denied by Adnan. Instead, Adnan suggested that 
throughout he had no support from Jahanzaib who purposively made it difficult for 
him and his allies to attend the CRG’s meetings by locating them in his own house. 
Although I saw pictures of the two sitting together at the CRG’s early trainings, if, as 
my research suggests, Jahanzaib dominated the CRG, he would have little reason to 
visit or hold meetings in Adnan’s union council.  
It was also clear from other members that – beyond Adnan and his allies – Jahanzaib 
had largely built the CRG’s membership. He himself attributed this to CFCB’s lack of 
local knowledge when the programme first began in Kharian and its failure to 
properly research who is who within the tehsil. This put him in the advantageous 
position of an interlocutor between its staff and Kharian’s society. This was 
demonstrated in three ways: Firstly, interviewed staff from CFCB confirmed that 
Jahanzaib was their main point of contact. Secondly, it was implied that he had got 
one of the CRG’s members a job within CFCB in return for his continued support of 
                                                 
185 Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member and staff urban Gujrat (16/06/2015 & 22/05/2015) 
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the programme. Thirdly, Adnan claimed that shortly after 2013’s elections CFCB 
effectively cut him off, whilst Jahanzaib continued to enjoy a relationship with them 
until the STAEP’s end in late 2014. 
The rivalry within rural Gujrat’s CRG did not so much hamper its work, as it skewed it 
towards the more powerful Jahanzaib’s interests and what he thought he could 
expect to get done. Indeed, he was responsible for its major successes and as the 
programme progressed he found ways of marginalising Adnan. It is also notable that 
this was, in part, attributable to the mentoring NGOs’ lack of local understanding. 
This suggests that failures to first understand Pakistan’s local power and politics 
allows it to seep into spaces donors nominally create to change it.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter showed how the CRGs generally functioned through the efforts of their 
most educated and wealthier members. They led their groups’ attempts to follow the 
‘proper procedures’ laid down by STAEP. Many also used their personal connections 
to authorities to create opportunities for their groups’ voices to be heard. As these 
moments of collective action were prone to appropriation, some members also 
aimed to gradually institutionalise their CRGs and to make them known to local 
authorities. I argued, however, that such ambitions were ultimately unsuited to the 
programme’s vision of projectized civil society mobilisation.  
Through three vignettes it was also shown how elite members of Gujrat’s CRGs used 
their positions within political networks to influence the spending of politicians’ 
discretionary development budgets. Although this secured their CRGs’ most 
prestigious successes, I argue that their private actions meant that they effectively 
appropriated the programme’s opportunities to participate in public politics, and the 
relationships and credit that can arise from doing so. Moreover, their groups came to 
reflect the clientelistic politics that characterises much of Pakistan, with local political 
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rivalries even seeping into rural Gujrat’s CRG. In this way, the elites’ involvement 
limited their groups’ scopes and potentials, and strengthened local undemocratic 
networks. Despite this, their actions were often legitimised by both their fellow CRG 
members and by the mentoring NGOs that needed them to get things done.  
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Chapter Nine 
Competing Visions  
 
 
About your question, a nation’s life isn’t made in two to three years. Look at the 
Western countries that they [donors] represent, they have had years of history and 
different experiments that they have done. From this they learned that democracy is 
there, there is a code of conduct, everyone is equal. They learned this after a long 
practice. In Pakistan, there are gaps and breaks in democracy. If we say that we are in 
our thirteenth or so year of democracy, we need to understand it needs a long period 
of time. At least thirty years to learn that some policies weren’t effective or were 
biased. We will only understand after practice. Similarly, after three to four years 
there can’t be revolution. 
(Jarrar Shaikh, CRG Member)186 
 
 
The previous chapter explored the role played by elites in the Supporting 
Transparency Accountability and Electoral Process (STAEP) programme. This chapter 
switches the focus back to the most active, non-elite participants. It begins by 
drawing out the meanings they gave to the programme; examining it in their 
vernaculars. I argue that many did not distinguish between its aims and prevailing 
understandings of social work. Accordingly, their Constituency Relations Group 
(CRGs) often became platforms through which they also sought places within local 
social and political networks. However, tensions arose when members believed their 
colleagues were appropriating their collective efforts for their own gains. I argue that 
this problem was compounded by the programme’s contradictory stance towards 
harnessing private political relationships. The chapter then turns to three vignettes 
that suggest some participants sought to shape the programme in ways that 
countered these trends. They did this by taking its lessons, techniques and aims, and 
creatively blending them with their own pre-existing identities and aspirations. This 
resulted in public efforts to resolve issues with broad impacts across the 
constituencies their CRGs served. I argue that this demonstrated that the CRGs could 
                                                 
186 Jarrar Shaikh, male, 50-60, member urban Gujrat (06/06/2015). 
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be vehicles for radical democratising projects. Nonetheless, their visions were pushed 
to the margins of the programme as they had to compete with its dominant image of 
depoliticised, non-confrontational social accountability. 
 
The CRG’s non-elites 
Chapter Eight showed how STAEP’s elite participants used their privileged positions 
within wider patronage networks to get things done. This gave them opportunities to 
dominate some of the CRGs, whilst legitimating their roles as local leaders. Much of 
this activity took place in private, out of sight of both their fellow programme 
participants and the NGOs mentoring them. Thus, the elites’ involvement 
contravened norms of publicness, debate, persuasion and collective action common 
to ideals of civil society and democratisation.187 This allowed Pakistan’s clientelistic 
mode of politics to seep into STAEP. 
In contrast to elites, the programme’s most active non-elite participants did not have 
vast reserves of capitals (economic, cultural, social or political).188 Furthermore, they 
were not defined by their memberships within exclusive patronage networks and 
they regularly had their claims to leadership or authority contested by others. In this 
sense, they had more to gain from their participation within STAEP than elites. In 
order to re-politicise understandings of social accountability, this chapter shows that 
alongside doing social work to benefit their communities, members also aspired to 
build their personal political reputations and networks. This also helps to avoid 
romanticising their reasons for partaking in the programme and acknowledges the 
multifaceted nature of their motivation.   
Lastly, a note on interviewing STAEP’s non-elites. Compared to elites, they often 
appeared to be less interested in overtly shaping my understanding of the 
                                                 
187 See Chapter Two. 
188 Ibid. 
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programme and I soon learnt to adopt a semi-insider position to build rapport. 
Reading interview transcripts back, however, in some instances my research assistant 
and I unwittingly fell into the role of their fellow travellers, pre-empting their views 
and sympathising with their positions. This speaks to Charmaz’s (2006) argument that 
researchers and the researched co-construct data, and is an eminent pitfall of 
immersing oneself in intense periods of fieldwork. ‘Saturation’ – understood by 
grounded theorists as the point at which research participants regularly give similar 
or no new answers to questions – somewhat mitigated this bias (Kenny and Fourie, 
2015). 
 
Politics and patronage  
Chapter Five discussed Pakistan’s transition to the ‘new’ type of clientelism through 
the creation of a capitalist middle-class. Although politically active, commentators 
have argued that its members are largely uninterested in democratising projects that 
threaten to redistribute political and economic opportunities. The chapter also 
argued that the state and some powerful donor organisations have unwittingly 
colluded over the depoliticization and taming of Pakistan’s civil society. The former 
by weakening its links to political parties and the latter through the creation of 
professionalised foreign funded non-governmental organisations (NGOs). To setup 
the argument that two broad competing visions of CRGs’ potentials were discernible 
within the studied groups, this chapter’s first half examines these themes through 
their members’ vernaculars. It begins with the meanings they gave to politics and 
patronage. 
As one interviewee put it: ‘no one in Pakistan can be apolitical, be it poor or rich’.189 
Amongst my interviewees, however, being political placed one on a spectrum.190 At 
one end are those that merely follow and debate politics. This often included the 
                                                 
189 Ismail Samejo, male, 40-50, member and later staff urban Multan (07/10/2015). 
190 Of course, it is likely more ‘politically minded’ citizens were interested in the programme. 
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younger CRG members that were particularly interested in the dharnas (protests) 
held by Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) which the media portrayed as 
public parties for glamorous and rebellious youngsters of both sexes. It also included 
those that claimed they had never been interested in supporting a specific party. 
For slightly older members of the CRGs being political meant working in the interests 
of the local branch of a party. Often this consists of canvassing family and kinship 
networks for support. More formally, it means being a party worker, organising 
events, asking one’s social and professional networks to publicly pledge their 
allegiance, and collecting information on local issues that could win over potential 
supporters. It was also widely argued that although political party workers can often 
access and, in some cases, socialise with politicians, only a few ever run for provincial 
or national offices. As an interviewee described: 
 
[…] a politician is one whose father can further his political purpose. If I 
want to become a politician, I would have to face thousands of problems 
if I don’t have power, I don’t have money or people as my support.191 
  
At the other end of this spectrum were even older CRG members that had last been 
politically active in the 1970s and 1980s. Many now saw themselves as unaligned 
democracy or human rights activists. They argued that due to historical experiences 
of oppression, disaffection or simply their age they preferred to comment from the 
side-lines through roles as journalists or as advisors to NGOs. Multan’s urban CRG 
had a close cohort of these older activists, many of whom had once been leading 
members of Pakistan’s various disbanded socialist parties in the 1970s.  
                                                 
191 Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member and staff urban Gujrat (16/06/2015 & 22/05/2015). 
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Across all age groups, few of my interviewees held positive views of contemporary 
politicians. For most, running for political office was about individual self-interest, 
requires being a member of Pakistan’s famous dynastic political families and entails 
corruption. As a CRG member put it: 
 
In Pakistan, if you have your political background, a political family, then 
you can get many feathers in your cap, there is no problem. But if you do 
not have any political background, you suffer in many ways.192 
 
Thus, interviewees would regularly argue that Pakistanis had lost faith in national-
level party politics and that ideologies, of all stripes, were not a factor. Indeed, 
beyond some of Multan’s diehard supporters of the Pakistan’s People Party (PPP), 
few of those I met valued the idea of long-term political loyalties. Furthermore, 
identifying as a socialist was understood to be short-hand for opposing landlords, 
rather than subscribing ant specific distributional policies. This meant that even for 
many of my younger interviewees, one’s political attentions were, and should be, 
largely confined to one’s locality:  
 
Asad: […] If they have voted for PTI, it is because they are voting for Imran 
Khan and are not seeing that his local candidate is someone like Aleem 
Khan.193 We have no relationship with anyone. We have not gotten any 
benefits from Imran Khan, Nawaz Sharif or Zardari.  
Sajid: Nor will we ever receive any benefit from them. 
                                                 
192 Azeema Karlal, female, 40-50, member urban Gujrat (04/06/2015). 
193 A local politician believed to have unduly benefited from sales of government owned land. 
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Asad: Everyone is selfish, so we voted based on our area.194 
 
However, local politics was not widely considered to be much better than national. 
As Martin’s research (2015) also found, it was understood as a zero-sum game. Areas 
that support the party in power were thought to be the recipients of development 
projects and other benefits such as jobs, whilst those that do not are known to be 
locked out of productive relationships with the state’s institutions until the next 
election. Interviewees argued that these exclusions even extended to the ability to 
approach or raise issues with politicians from rival parties: 
 
Hatred and biasness is there. Suppose I belong to PML-N and we want to 
raise an issue about an area which belongs to PPP or PTI, if I speak with 
them, it is possible that they will not speak to me, in my experience. What 
I have learnt is that only a person belonging to the same party will be able 
to speak with that person. If I go, it will be difficult for me to get that work 
done.195  
 
For their part, contemporary political party workers were often contrasted with those 
of the past that fixed people’s problems for little or no personal gain. Although this 
was likely a romantic retrospective, older interviewees often attributed this change 
to General Zia’s era in which parties’ local branches were crushed:  
 
[…] the motives of today’s political workers are different. Previously they 
used to fight for the public, but today they are only interested in their 
personal gains. All the political parties are drowned in corruption from 
                                                 
194 Asad Khan, male, 20-30, member rural Mutlan (15/10/2015). 
195 Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member and staff urban Gujrat (16/06/2015 & 22/05/2015). 
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top to bottom. The leadership and workers, everyone is involved in it. […] 
So now the public also prefers to take their issues to these guys instead 
of coming to people like us. They know that the political party worker may 
charge them for his services, but he will get the job done. In this situation 
what can we do? Today all the political workers are busy filling their own 
pocket and they are least bothered about public issues.196 
 
Further suggestive of a broad cynicism of contemporary party politics, interviewees 
would often laugh when I raised topics such as targeted development projects, voting 
with one’s landlord or how biraderis fitted in, intimating that I was either naïve or 
new to Pakistan. Some would also declare that they would happily tell me how 
everything worked locally, but only with the recorder off.197 Nonetheless, as a 
middle-aged lawyer explained for the population of the neighbourhood in which 
urban Multan’s CRG did most of its work: 
 
They vote like a kinship. The head of the family will cast the votes for all 
of the family to one party. […] For these people the criteria to vote is that 
the candidate comes to them and lets them present their demands. This 
is a poor class and they don’t have roads or sewerage or schools. They 
demand that roads are made or tiles are given. ‘Give us a primary school 
for the children. Even if you are not in the government you do it now and 
if you do it now then we will give you our votes’. It is up to the politician 
to continue doing it when they win. So, they will fulfil their needs before 
the elections and then the whole kinship gives votes to them. It is same 
in all of the Pakistan.198 
                                                 
196 Salman Malik, male, 60-70, member urban Gujrat (21/05/2015) 
197 These conversations inform my analysis. 
198 Sobel Nanda, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (08/10/2015). 
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There was also a distinct fatalism about this way of conducting politics, as if things 
were ingrained or the natural order and, therefore, beyond any reasonable 
expectations of change:  
 
Our problem is that we are too political. We have no strategies and no 
plans. We can only talk the talk but when it comes to walking the walk we 
fall short. Even if we do one thing for people, we publicize it so much that 
we have done such a big thing but at the end of the day it is just chatter, 
there is no enforcement.199 
 
At the same time, many interviewees were clear about the causes and sources of 
their disempowerment. Indeed, they often framed them in the social accountability 
discourse’s focus on voice and opportunities to engage authorities: 
 
Many people want to bring some change in the society, they want to 
speak but they don’t know how to. They don’t have a forum where they 
can raise their voices and speak in front of people because the European 
or American system is entirely different. The Pakistani system is feudalist. 
Landlords are always dominant over people. Sometimes, in our villages 
the Chaudhry, feudal and the landlord own the lives of the people.200 
 
                                                 
199 Abby Bajwa, female, 30-40, member rural Gujrat (17/06/2015).  
200 Ayesha Nanda, female, 30-40, member rural Guhrat (17/06/2015). 
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These findings suggest that STAEP’s participants generally had the same diagnosis of 
Pakistan’s political problems as many of the commentators discussed in Chapter Five. 
They depicted politics as about self-interest and parties as family-controlled 
businesses. They were also under few illusions as to how the structure is maintained 
through politicians’ local, informal representatives and the ways they gather votes. 
For the most part, their solution was to confine their political attentions to the local, 
both directing their expectations towards local politicians and advocating for more 
chances to engage them. In this sense, they broadly agreed with STAEP’s theory of 
how to change the way Pakistan’s politics is done and by whom. Yet, as we shall see, 
they saw little reason not to combine it with their own identities and aspirations. 
  
Social and political work 
As in most societies, civil and political society permeate one another in Pakistan. 
Indeed, the anthropological literature is full of examples of Pakistanis using ‘social 
work’ (salah-o-behbud), such as funding local mosques, holding feasts or contributing 
to poorer families’ funerals, as a way to claim party-political leadership roles (Lyon, 
2002; Werbner, 2015). However, there are no clear rules for those wishing to use 
their gains or reputations in one field in another. For example, after years of trying, 
the well-known philanthropist and sports star Imran Khan has recently become a 
populist party leader. Whereas the deceased human rights activist and charity owner 
Abdul Sattar Edhi failed at his various attempts to enter politics at the local and 
national levels (Durrani, 1996).201  
Nonetheless, the close relationship between social and political work was reflected in 
interviewees’ own narratives. For many of the wealthier CRG members, especially 
those from rural areas, social work was often something they learnt from their 
                                                 
201 Thanks to Haris Gazdar for pointing this out to me. 
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fathers long before their involvement with STAEP: 
 
My father was also a very well-known social worker and the people in our 
village trusted him. I believe this was passed down to me from my father. 
I had a drive to make a difference for the community I live in.202  
 
This often took the form of helping their kin and members of their immediate 
communities with the expenses of funerals and weddings, or through offering low-
interest loans during times of hardship. They also mediated disputes and acted as 
interlocutors between the poor and authorities, helping them to obtain national 
identification cards or to renegotiate utility bills. As an interviewee from rural 
Multan’s CRG argued: 
 
People don’t understand that for rural dwellers getting an ID card or a 
birth certificate is a big and difficult task. Helping out the common villager 
with these things is social work. Getting a marriage certificate is also 
painfully complicated.203 
 
Less often, some would describe collecting donations from wealthy community 
members to pool for small public projects, such as repairing drains or roads. They 
would reason that this was an easier and quicker root to solving problems than 
turning to the responsible authorities. 
                                                 
202 Chaudhry Jahanzaib Derawal, male, 40-50, rural Gujrat (29/03/2015 & 17/06/2015). 
203 Bilal Tiwana, male, 40-50, member rural Multan (17/10/2017). It is perhaps notable that of the few activities 
prescribed by STAEP to the CRGs, securing national identification cards for marginalised groups was one. 
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Interviewees generally framed these activities as a form of duty and loyalty to their 
localities, and described their work as a ‘passion’, motivated by a ‘soft spot’ or due to 
a ‘weakness’ they have for others. When describing those they admired, they would 
sometimes conjure the image of the lone, older social worker helping his community 
and standing up to impersonal, distant state authorities: 
 
He was a very active man who only did social work. He did a lot of work 
for his union council. He didn’t ask for anyone’s help. He established a 
sewing school in a village called Jindhawala which is right next to Kharian. 
He was retired but I don’t know if he was from the army. He did not have 
any paying job, he only did social work. He would go wherever he had to, 
even to Islamabad to get his work done.204 
 
Such descriptions were often given to the CRGs’ most active and senior members, 
with emphasis placed on their dedication to social work and their major local 
achievements. However, several younger interviewees also directly linked their own 
social work to the accumulation of political capital. As one from a landed family 
described: 
 
I was doing this from before. I was working in my area from the beginning. 
It has been about thirty-five to forty years. We know about every 
household. How many members live there and what their problems are. 
[…] My maternal uncle was a numberdar [village head responsible for tax 
collection] and my other maternal uncle was a Councillor. We had to work 
for them to help them secure votes. He just got elected.205 
                                                 
204 Ayesha Nanda, female, 30-40, member rural Guhrat (17/06/2015). 
205 Nazar Abbas, male, 20-30, member rural Multan (16/10/2015). 
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Similarly, another described how her localised social work had led to competing in 
elections under Musharraf: 
 
Basically, I had been working at a bank and doing this side by side. I have 
lived in Lahore and Muzaffarabad. Over here I started helping out in my 
neighbourhood, like asking one girl to live with another who is alone. 
These were the small things that I started doing, which resulted in people 
coming to me over time. It gave me confidence when people started 
saying ‘oh, she does social work’. So, if some girl is getting married I would 
go and help out in the wedding, buy things and give her them. These small 
things resulted in 2001’s election.206 
 
More generally, it was argued that well-known social workers (samaji karkun) act as 
intermediaries between politicians and communities in the run-up to elections. They 
were said to be familiar with the needs of those they live amongst and to be able to 
communicate them to politicians:  
 
The social worker, they sit with the local representatives and the local 
people as they know their problems. They put the problems of people in 
front of them. So, if a layman cannot present their problems, they can 
present their problems better. They can also guide the people as to which 
party would be better for them: ‘This candidate will be better for you’ and 
‘what are the problems of your area?’ and ‘these are the people who we 
have already voted’ and ‘these did not’ and ‘you should change the faces’ 
                                                 
206 Hajra Mirwani, female, 30-40, member urban Gujrat (03/06/2015). 
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and ‘you should change your party’ etc. The social worker has a very vital 
role and gives awareness.207 
 
Interviewees also argued that in these periods well-known social workers with 
connections to politicians would be given resources to disperse in return for votes. As 
three female members of Multan city’s CRG explained: 
 
[…] what these parties do is that during elections they hire women just 
like us. They use influential women or local social workers. Most often 
social workers. They go there and meet the social worker and give them 
rations and food items to distribute to the poor in the area. This will make 
them famous and the party can get their votes. The candidate will say to 
them ‘you are my elder sister, I want your vote.’ He will bring gifts that 
could be money or other gifts. Normally they would give them some 
funding or arrange medical camps or food rations. The social workers will 
do the social work and get famous, and in return they will advocate for 
votes for their benefactors.208 
 
For the most part, those that undertook such activities on behalf of politicians were 
still considered to be social workers. Indeed, few objections were raised to 
harnessing one’s identity as a social worker in this way. It was notable, however, that 
a journalist from Multan suggested that when similar activities are undertaken by 
those with direct family ties to politicians, they fall outside of people’s general 
understandings of social work: 
                                                 
207 Rana (Advocate / Multan) 
208 Sana Mirani, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (06/10/2015 & 09/10/2015). 
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In Ramzan they will give flour bags to the needy at the private level. They 
would not say that it is some kind of social work. Like in Multan the former 
district nazim’s [elected mayor] mother has a list of all the poor 
households and she would send food to them for the month.209 
  
Turning to the role of community-based organisations (CBOs), some argued that 
alongside providing social and welfare functions, they are often platforms upon 
which the ambitious launch political careers. For example, a CRG member told of how 
a Multani politician had built a following through his sponsorship of cricket clubs for 
poorer community members. Whilst another recalled how he had once tested the 
size and allegiance of the following he believed he had built through running his own 
CBO by competing in local elections. Although he lost, he was happy to find that his 
efforts could be translated into votes: 
 
I wanted to see the result of my work. Do people like me or not? And 
people did like me, just because of my work. My camps and the services 
I rendered for them and for the poor children to whom I have done 
admissions to university.210 
 
It was also often suggested that state mandated welfare organisations, such as 
Musharraf’s Citizens’ Community Boards or the Benazir Income Support Programme 
established by the PPP, were politicised. As an interviewee explained, her own roles 
within such organisations indicated her involvement in political society: 
                                                 
209 Imrana Sharif, female, 30-40, journalist, Multan (04/10/15). 
210 Asad Kharal, male, 40-50, member rural Mutlan (04/10/2015). 
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I am a member of District Zakat Committee and that is only because I was 
in politics. That is only a political seat, if you are not in politics you can’t 
get a seat. It does not matter if you are working for poor people or not, 
this is only a political matter. Secondly, I am member of District Peace 
Committee because I am District President from PML-N District Gujrat. So 
that’s why I can do many things with my own power being District 
President.211 
 
Further illustrative of the links between CBOs and politics, after the recorder was off, 
a female interviewee from Multan city revealed that in the run up to the 2013’s 
elections she had been approached by the PTI party to run on their ticket. They asked 
that in return she give up her own CBO and work in a new one established by the 
party. She refused, telling them that this was simply a political stunt on their behalf 
and that they would close the organisations they have established soon after the 
elections.212 
There was, however, little in the way of animosity towards those that used social 
work, whether undertaken as an individual, through CBOs or state bodies, to build 
their political reputations. Rather, it was generally understood as fulfilling multiple 
purposes. As suggested in the previous chapter, it was only when those claiming to 
be social workers sought to appropriate the efforts of others that they were 
criticised. This may partly explain why some members of Urban Gujrat’s CRG 
disparagingly linked the organisation established by Umer Mirza to his political 
ambitions:213 
                                                 
211 Azeema Karlal, female, 40-50, member urban Gujrat (04/06/2015). 
212 Nabila Anjum, female 30-40, member urban Gujrat (23/05/2015). 
213 See Chapter Eight 
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[…] People’s Welfare Organisation? It belonged to one of our CRG 
members, Umair Mirza, he used to take the assistance of the CRG a lot 
and take the credit for it. There were some issues that we, the CRG, 
resolved, but when this was reported in the newspapers, it would have 
the name of WPO on it. He used to be with us in the meetings [with 
authorities] obviously.214 
 
Through my research, therefore, the contours of the relationship between civil and 
political society began to reveal themselves. On the one hand, it was clear that for 
many social work consists of helping one’s kin and immediate community through 
the provision of tangible goods and access to the state. Whilst on the other, being 
widely known as a social worker encompasses owning CBOs and periodically acting as 
politicians’ local representatives, including gathering them votes. Interviewees also 
acknowledged that social work could serve as launch pads for one’s own political 
careers. Yet, there was little in the way of rules or animosity for those doing it unless 
they sought to appropriate others’ efforts. This point is returned to below. 
 
Donors, NGOs and volunteerism 
Across all the studied CRGs participants had a cynical attitude towards donor funded 
NGOs. As with politics, it was suggested that they were essentially self-interested 
businesses staffed by the same small cliques of well-connected people. They were 
also generally thought to be riddled with corruption and beyond salvation: 
 
                                                 
214 Afea Kathia, female, 20-30, member urban Guhrat (16/06/2015). 
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Another thing I have noticed at these meetings is that every single NGO 
that you go to, you will see the same people at their meetings. That is 
their problem, they do not attract new people. They are merely going 
through the motions so that they can show that they organized a meeting 
to their donors. […] I know what exactly goes on in this NGO business in 
Pakistan, having run my own organization for such a long time. Here’s the 
thing, even if Americans themselves come here and audit these NGOs, 
they would still not be able to find out where the money is going because 
the web of corruption here is so dense.215 
 
For many, NGOs were assumed to be blindly following their donors’ agendas, which 
were often portrayed as subversive to local cultural norms or harmful to Pakistan. 
NGOs were also argued to be largely unaccountable to the people they claimed to 
serve:  
 
[…] people who send money to Pakistani NGOs they have their motives. 
They use these NGO’s for their benefits. In this way, the NGO does not 
remain independent. They follow the orders from the donors. For 
example, NGOs will only work on those issues which their donor wants 
them to work and they will not work on any other issue.216 
 
Although not a view expressed by others, an older interviewee even argued that the 
proliferation of donor funded NGOs in Pakistan was a plot by Western powers to 
reduce the power of the nation’s political parties. These views would be familiar to 
anyone acquainted with the conspiratorial public discourse around NGOs in Pakistan. 
                                                 
215 Babar Kirmani, male, 20-30, member rural Gujrat (24/03/2015). 
216 Salman Malik, male, 60-70, member urban Gujrat (21/05/2015) 
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They also accord with Bano’s (2012) finding that donor funding delegitimises 
Pakistani NGOs by contravening social norms that require social workers to display 
material sacrifice. 
Despite this general negativity, some participants suggested that NGOs still attract 
people as they provide opportunities that are rarely found elsewhere. For example, 
for older, disaffected former political party workers, the donor money and symbolic 
protection provided by NGOs was framed as a way to maintain their oppositional 
political activities. Whilst for younger people participating their programmes present 
exciting opportunities to socialise and explore life outside of one’s immediate kin or 
community. For others still, they are a source of money and future employment, with 
many CRG members later occupying paid roles with the mentoring NGOs. As an 
interviewee put it: ‘Our culture is that people think that in NGOs there will be girls 
and fun, and there will be programmes and tours and money’.217 
Within STAEP, however, such enthusiasms often did not extend to the programme’s 
mentoring NGOs. Instead, across all the research sites, it was often argued that they 
did little of substance and only engaged in endless discussions. As one interviewee 
complained: 
 
Yes, they did nothing, their only thing was tea, samosas and cold drinks. 
They were getting money and they had no worries as they were using 
cars, but I feel pain. I am a social worker. I do people’s work. You [NGO 
staff] should take care of me, you have been given a thing you have to 
support, you have money, but you still don’t work. I got nothing, I don’t 
lie, I am a worker. Whatever the thing that was given to me or the work 
asked of me, I gave them a report, then what did they do with it?218 
                                                 
217 Hassan Qureshi, male, 30-40, member urban Multan (04/10/2015). 
218 Asad Kharal, male, 40-50, member rural Multan (04/10/2015). 
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Another interviewee also proudly recounted how she had confronted a foreign 
trainer about such things, asking him why he doesn’t donate his flight and hotel 
money to the participants who need it more than his lessons. 
For many, there was an unexplained and, therefore, often unjustified discrepancy 
between the programme’s expectation that they voluntarily undertake social work, 
whilst staff from the mentoring NGOs are paid. This manifested itself in the often-
heard complaint that the staff are only interested in data collection and paperwork or 
‘kaghaz kaaley karna’ (blackening the paper). Many also suggested that NGOs, 
including the CRGs’ mentoring organisations, fake their reach and ability to mobilise 
people. As an old former political activist explained: 
 
A lot of societies and NGOs, when they are keeping their meetings, keep 
them at five-star hotels and invite their laborers, people who are working 
day and night to make ends meet, to attend. This is wrong because they 
are just doing it to show the people that they have so many people 
working through pictures and videos. What is this nonsense?219 
 
Asked to sum up their thoughts on STAEP, many praised the programme’s ambitions, 
but suspected its implementers’ real aims lay elsewhere:  
 
[…] you can change the mindset of the society when a worker goes with 
you shoulder to shoulder. You appreciate him and so this brings the 
change in the society. But they did not need such a change, they just 
                                                 
219 Shahid Fiaz, male, 60-70, member urban Gujrat (21/05/2015). 
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needed the reports. I was really straightforward with them, when they 
came I said to them that ‘you should be sincere if you really want to solve 
the issues of people. We do not ask for money from you. You are on 
salary, we are not on salary, we are simple, but you do not give attention 
to this.’220  
 
As another participant summarised: ‘The final impression of CRG was that they used 
us. They just used us for their paperwork.’221  
I suggest that this was, in part, attributable to the common practice of paying 
participants in donor funded programmes and, in part, STAEP’s own misguided 
attempts to inculcate its voluntary, citizen-led spirit. Indeed, the reoccurring criticism 
of the programme was that it held meetings in expensive hotels and took data from 
participants, whilst not paying for their travel or leading efforts to resolve raised 
issues. In this sense, the programme failed to create an identity for the CRGs as either 
collectives of social workers with legitimate political ambitions, CBOs or as NGOs. 
Instead, they occupied an ambiguous grey area, disconnected from wider societal 
norms. Below I further explore the affects this had. 
 
Contradictions and tensions 
For most of the programme’s duration, the Punjab was expected to hold local 
elections on a party basis. This meant that many of the CRGs’ most active members 
were in a constantly preparing to run for office. Indeed, one interviewee confided 
that he was encouraged by his uncle to continue his social work under the banner of 
the CRG to gather ‘more of a name’ for the anticipated contest.222 This was 
                                                 
220 Asad Kharal, male, 40-50, member rural Multan (04/10/2015). 
221 Waqas Kalwar, male, 40-50, member urban Multan (07/10/2015). 
222 Bilal Tiwana, male, 40-50, member rural Gujrat (17/10/2017). 
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particularly notable in Multan where the local mentoring organisation had called 
upon former Councillors it knew when forming the CRGs, many of which intended to 
return to politics.  
Unlike with the everyday social and political work described above, however, when 
members mixed their roles within the CRG with their political ambitions it often 
caused anxieties and resentment. Indeed, they would accuse one another of only 
taking part in the programme to build their political reputations and connections. For 
example, one participant from urban Multan argued: 
 
The CRG wanted to be the bridge between the political government and 
local areas. Some people in the CRG wanted to use this and become a 
part of the politics. They wanted to take political advantage of it. But our 
purpose was to instil awareness in ourselves and create awareness in 
others.223 
 
He explained that politically ambitious members with money or links could pervert 
the programme’s ways of working:   
 
The problem with CRG was that it wanted to get things done legally 
through public pressure. But there were some people in the CRG who 
were [ex] Councillors. They used to tell us that we can get it done for you. 
It’s not difficult to get things done if you use influence or bribes. But CRG 
wanted the public to become aware of how to get their problems 
                                                 
223 Waqas Kalwar, male, 40-50, member urban Multan (07/10/2015). 
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resolved and how to demand their rights. You can always bribe someone 
but it is not your right.224 
 
An interviewee from rural Gujrat’s CRG declared that some of his colleagues had 
‘blurred the distinctions between what is appropriate and what is inappropriate’.225 
Although he claimed the older and more educated amongst his group considered this 
to be their personal matter or choice, others suggested it caused rifts and fractures. 
For example, a member in Multan city’s CRG told of how his group had been 
effectively split by another’s political ambitions: 
 
She wanted to make herself known politically for future elections. She 
thought if the meetings were held there, her area would get more 
benefit. After separating, her group used the CRG to get benefits for their 
area.226 
 
Asked how participation in the programme helps the politically ambitious, an 
interviewee highlighted how her colleague’s bid to become the CRG’s Chairman 
would build her local political reputation: 
 
Politically speaking it has the benefit that if she stands next time she 
would have people she knows in every department and links with the 
ordinary people. She would find it easy to ask for votes. Also, there is a 
dignity in the designation. It counts in the area. She held the [CRG’s] 
                                                 
224 Ibid. 
225 Bilal Hanif, male, 30-40, member rural Gujrat (29/03/2015). 
226 Umair Minhas, male, 30-40, member urban Multan (05/10/2015) 
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meetings in her school so it also would give popularity in the area. So, 
these four, five things mix.227 
 
Such benefits were also present in the stories of members of Gujranwala’s CRG that I 
tested interview questions with before studying my four selected cases:  
 
There are also a lot of people in the CRG who are members of political 
parties. So, when the CRG gets something done, these members try to 
pass it on as something their political party did instead of the CRG.228 
 
Nonetheless, it was also apparent that some of the CRGs were actively courted by 
local politicians who sought to use their members as their intermediaries. As one 
participant explained:  
 
They used to meet us because they saw us not as a group who could do 
work for the area but as a group who could get votes for them in the 
future. We met the MNA Rana Mahmood-ul-Hassan. We told him that 
you do not come to the area ever since you got elected. He said he will 
come and he was eagerly waiting for someone to take up the issues of 
this area, although, it is his own task to come and address the issues. He 
told us to arrange a meeting or a small rally and ‘I will attend it’. His aim 
was to have a rally.229  
                                                 
227 Subhan Mirani, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (06/10/2015 & 09/10/2015) 
228 Tariq Langah, male, 30-40, member urban Gujwranwala (18/03/15). 
229 Waqas Kalwar, male, 40-50, member urban Multan (07/10/2015). 
295 
 
 
As other interviewees argued, the concern was that their fellow members used the 
CRGs’ growing reputations to directly collect votes for local politicians, thereby, 
further perverting the groups’ aims:   
 
Arif: […] some CRG members used their influence to bargain votes for 
political parties, bringing in members of such parties. You know I was an 
observer at that time, I think two or three members were involved in such 
activities.  
Tom: What do you mean? I am a little confused. 
Arif: You know they were just bargaining for votes for special parties. 
Tom: Their own votes or their communities? 
Arif: Yes, they were convincing everyone to vote for certain parties. 
Actually, they knew each and everything about the political system, they 
knew the democratic system, they were well known about all of these 
things. So, they played such a role. But we stopped them, we kicked them 
off of the programme because they were compromising our Free and Fair 
Election Network.230 
 
It was also notable that the sense that Pakistan is locked into a selfish and monetised 
form of patronage politics often extended to members’ own political ambitions. For 
example, when one CRG member from urban Multan was questioned about her plan 
to compete in local elections for a general seat she argued that ‘the vice-
                                                 
230 Arif Mir, male, 20-30, member and staff urban Gujrat (16/06/2015 & 22/05/2015). The reference to Free 
and Fair Election Network is indicative of how many participants also saw themselves as FAFEN’s 
representatives.  
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chairmanship is not affordable to me’.231 When another was asked about her decision 
to run as an independent, she calmly explained the bargaining process that begins 
between independents and parties seeking their allegiance if they win. As she put it: 
‘If everyone is going to earn, then why would I not earn’.232 In this sense, within the 
studied CRGs, there was not widespread evidence that the programme had changed 
participants’ pre-existing understandings of the routes into and benefits from 
political participation.  
These issues forced the CRGs’ mentoring NGOs to remain vigilante. Indeed, they had 
to assist their members to engage politicians to activate the ‘long-route to 
accountability’, whilst avoiding being perceived as vehicles for the interests of 
specific members, politicians or parties (WB, 2003). STAEP’s policies sought to do this 
by officially disavowing its members’ political identities. For example, the programme 
required those with political affiliations to publicly denounce their allegiances upon 
joining the CRGs. Whilst those that subsequently become involved with formalised 
politics, such as in the run up to 2013’s elections, had to leave.  
In practice, however, these measures were unworkable. Indeed, as the last chapter 
suggested, much of the programme’s activity took place outside of the CRGs’ official 
meetings. Furthermore, staff members from the mentoring NGOs argued they could 
not monitor the CRGs at such a granular level. This created problems: 
 
[…] after we profiled CRG members, we found out that the active 
members of political parties lied and didn’t disclose. They signed the 
declaration that they aren’t political party members. […] Some people 
would say I’m some local coordinator with some union council for the 
PML-N and then a woman sitting next to them would say oh no you aren’t 
supposed to disclose that. Similarly, the same thing happened in 
                                                 
231 Rafa Memon, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (05/10/2015) 
232 Subhan Mirani, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (06/10/2015 & 09/10/2015) 
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Gujranwala. I had a chance to learn and teach people that you can be 
affiliated with political parties because it benefits us and helps us 
pressurize them so don’t hide this fact. But this became a problem as 
these things were hidden from the CRGs’ leaderships. People were 
selective about what to disclose to whom. It could be that if some 
observer comes, for example if Tom [the author] comes, they would 
disclose selectively.233 
 
To address them, some programme staff unofficially encouraged members to keep 
political affiliations out of the deliberative spaces STAEP directly supported and to 
only use them as a last resort to gain access to authorities. Others suggested that the 
CRGs actively threw out overtly political members themselves and refused the 
symbolism of accepting invitations to attend meetings with politicians. Whilst the 
general idea was to depoliticise the CRGs, this unofficially endorsed the use of 
personal pre-existing political relationships if they were activated outside of the 
programme’s gaze, in private. Perhaps indicative of the difficulty of operating with 
this contradiction, during STAEP’s second year FAFEN fired one of the CRGs’ 
mentoring NGOs from the programme for being too close to a political party. 
This section has shown that the ambiguous relationship between social and political 
activities within the CRGs, their internal hierarchies, and the wider programme’s 
official policies and unofficial ways of working caused tensions. I surmise that this 
was the main reason why the appropriation of credit for the CRGs’ successes and the 
forging of relationships with politicians was a cause of anxiety for many 
participants.234 Indeed, they were paradoxically required to publicly separate their 
social and political work, including their own aspirations to run for office, whilst still 
occasionally using private political relationships to get things done. Although such 
tensions were the norm within the studied CRGs, the remainder of the chapter 
                                                 
233 Maqbool Ahmed, male, 40-50, mentoring NGO staff Multan (06/06/2015). 
234 See Chapter Eight. 
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argues that some members did not allow them to dilute their own visions for their 
groups. 
 
Radical visions 
So far, it has been shown that the overlap between social and political work is 
generally not a problem in Pakistan. However, within the programme it often caused 
tensions between the CRG’s most active, non-elite members. Many were anxious 
that their colleagues would effectively appropriate their groups’ efforts to fulfil their 
political ambitions. The programme’s policy of disavowing participants’ political 
identities compounded such problems, forcing members’ to privately use their 
political connections to kick-start the resolution of issues.  
The chapter now turns to three vignettes. They show how some participants took the 
programme’s lessons, techniques and aims, and creatively blended them with their 
own pre-existing identities and aspirations. Through the public ways they worked and 
the issues they sought to address, they resolved injustices with broad impacts across 
their constituencies. They also challenged the CRGs’ dominant way of privately 
getting things done through personal and political relationships. In this sense, they 
showed that there are alternatives to the programme’s paradoxical efforts to 
depoliticise social accountability and that the CRGs could be vehicles for radical 
democratising projects.235 
Nonetheless, my findings suggest that their visions had to compete with the local 
political struggles the CRGs were embedded in and the wider political economy of 
professional development programmes in Pakistan. Indeed, in one case, the 
members’ vision for their CRG threatened the interests of other, more powerful 
participants and their actions proved too risky for their mentoring NGO. Thus, those 
                                                 
235 See Chapter One, Note 3. 
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propagating such visions were often pushed to the margins of the CRGs or outside of 
the programme altogether.  
 
Vignette one: Anam Bhatia and Mariam Kharal 
Sisters Mariam Kharal and Anam Bhatia live in the heart of Gujrat city in a large family 
house nestled behind a busy commercial street. They declared that most of the 
district’s prominent politicians kept properties in the old neighbourhood and that 
everyone knew everyone else’s business. Like others I met, they claimed that this was 
still the case despite Gujrat’s recent expansion into a city. As they spoke they would 
often finish off one another’s sentences, adding details to explanations or 
embellishing stories: 
 
Mariam: Candidates win based on biraderi. It is not that we think one 
party is better than the other.  
Anam: They are all bad. 
Mariam: Whoever gains power begins to abuse it. We tried to do a lot of 
things from our end.  
 
This synergy was also reflected in their biographies. Both had long worked for the 
state’s school system, local and national NGOs. The older sister, Anam, owned a 
private school within which the other often taught. Whilst Marian owned a beauty 
salon that specialised in mehndi (henna) body-art. She had also established her own, 
self-funded CBO that put on free mehndi classes for women wishing to go into 
business. This was a source of pride for both sisters who remarked that they did not 
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mind that their revenue was falling year by year as their former students’ set up rival 
salons.  
Throughout our discussion the sisters thought little of openly deriding politicians and 
the country’s political system. For instance, they suggested that the President of the 
one of the major party’s Women’s Wing, whom they argued may be ‘mad’, had 
inherited the position instead of gaining it through merit. This instigated a lengthy 
explanation of the Pakistani saying; ‘The son of a politician is a politician’. More 
widely, they suggested that the form of democracy imposed on Pakistan in the 
colonial era and contemporarily maintained by America encourages nepotism and 
greed. 
Both sisters were also keen to speak of their fifteen year-long associations with the 
Aurat Foundation. As mentioned in Chapter Five, Aurat is one of the nationwide 
NGOs established during General Zia’s era to fight against his patriarchal social 
engineering project. Since then Aurat has taken on a variety of initiatives to empower 
women, including training them to compete for local council seats and the creation of 
a national network of activists. The sisters described Aurat as the platform from 
which they first learned to work for the betterment of women. As Anam put it: 
‘Whatever we could do for women to help them legally we did.’ Marian also 
impressed that she had been Aurat’s District Coordinator for many years.  
Although Anam and Mariam were involved in many of the CRG’s activities, they took 
the lead on the successful resolution of one of the demands most often highlighted 
by interviewees.236 The CRG’s governance monitoring activities uncovered that state 
schools within the sisters’ union council suffered from several issues. Some were 
using children to clean classrooms and others were pressurising their families to 
contribute to the costs of furniture. The schools were supposed to have budgets for 
both.  
                                                 
236 Separate from that resolved through Umer’s contacts in Chapter Eight. 
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Due to the good relationships that the sisters had built up over the years prior to and 
during the CRG with the heads of local schools they decided to ask them how they 
could help. This was considered a better course of action than pursuing potentially 
unprovable and socially destabilising allegations of malpractice. Accordingly, they 
arranged meetings between themselves, the schools’ staff and the schools’ Councils. 
Rather than embezzlement by staff, it was soon discovered that they were not 
getting the correct level of funding from the Education Department.  
Given the absence of local government, the nearest tier of responsible state 
authorities was at the district level. Following the ‘proper procedures’ passed down 
in STAEP’s training sessions, the sisters decided to first document the missing staff 
and furniture. They did this themselves and then approached the responsible 
authority with other CRG members. Nonetheless, the Executive District Officer (EDO) 
for Education told them that they should take their issue to the more senior and 
powerful District Coordination Officer (DCO). After several failed attempts to meet 
with the DCO, the sisters knew they had to come up with an alternative plan. 
Using personal connections to lesser bureaucrats within the district’s administration, 
one of whom was the President of Mariam’s CBO, they persuaded the 
aforementioned EDO to attend a planned ‘walk’ (peaceful march). He was told it was 
to raise awareness for Aurat Foundation’s general aims, such as the enrolment of 
girls in schools, and that it would end outside the DCO’s office which was located 
opposite Gujranwala’s Press Club.237 Across Pakistan, Press Clubs act as venues for 
political campaign launches, press conferences and protests, and in-between are 
used by journalists to rest, gossip and work. For the most part, they are also open to 
ordinary citizens that wish to contact a journalist. In this sense, compared to the 
state’s institutions, they serve as one of the few public arenas within which citizens, 
elites and their go-betweens meet.238  
                                                 
237 Female education is no longer a controversial topic in parts of the urban Punjab. Gujranwala is home to 
much of the Gujrat district’s administration. 
238 Perhaps alongside mosques and political rallies.  
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On the day of the walk, the sisters rounded up their fellow CRG members, local Aurat 
Foundation activists and the EDO. Once they arrived at the DCO’s office they unfurled 
hidden banners that highlighted the issue of the missing school facilities and children 
working as caretakers. This, they argued, publicly put pressure on both the EDO that 
had walked with them and the DCO that had emerged to meet them outside the 
Press Club. Although it did not immediately illicit resolutions, the situation generated 
newspaper coverage and linked the DCO to the issues.  
The sisters sought to swiftly capitalise on this momentum by turning to the long-
route to accountability. Firstly, they secured a meeting with Haji Imran Zafar, a local 
Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) Member Provincial Assembly (MPA). This 
was achieved through his wife who is friends with their youngest sister. However, he 
told them that as they were not workers for his party, and as it was close to 2013’s 
elections, he would be unable to help. Next, they turned their attentions to inviting 
Khadija Farooqi, a MPA for the Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam (PML-Q) and 
the President of the party’s Women’s Wing, to a meeting at their house.239  
In response to my surprise at the ease with which they contacted another MPA, 
Mariam informed me that she is an active worker for the PML-Q and that Khadija was 
known to be a friend of Aurat Foundation. Furthermore, she proudly declared that 
she is regularly invited to family events of local senior party members, such as a 
recent wedding. She argued that it was because of these links that Khadija was willing 
to meet with them. The sisters also sought the assistance of a member of the CRG 
who was a local journalist that often favourably covered events Khadija attended. 
On the day of the meeting, Mariam again mobilised Aurat’s local network. This time 
she arranged for over 30 women and CRG members to be present at her house. She 
told the women that if they were considering voting this was their chance to engage 
Khadija and another PML-Q politician that was due to attend. On the sides of the 
wider meeting the CRG members petitioned Khadija for help resolving the schools’ 
issues. Their efforts were successful and shortly afterwards the CRG was informed 
                                                 
239 Actually ‘Khadija Umar’, but the sister’s used her mother’s surname. 
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that the schools’ problems would be taken care of. This also led to a productive 
relationship with the EDO who attended some of the CRG’s subsequent meetings and 
helped resolve future issues.  
Explaining their success, the sister’s offered several contributing factors:  
 
Mariam: Women get ignored in this society unless we take people along 
with us. Nobody wants to give women credit for anything. No matter 
what we would have done, the matter would not have been resolved 
without Khadija Farooqi’s intervention. This was a women’s success. 
When we were making our group, we knew there had to be women in it. 
Without women the meeting would not have taken place.  
Anam: When Khadija saw us, she knew some of those people were 
workers of her own party. Now let me tell you, political parties will never 
give credit to a CRG or any other organization.  
Both: All the work that is meaningful is the work we did together.  
Anam: The work we do with each other, like stitching or cooking, we 
acknowledge that this is our individual work. We don’t say this is a 
collaborative. But if something is a collaborative effort we acknowledge 
it to be so. 
 
The sisters also stressed the importance of timing, arguing this would never have 
happened after the election and was a direct result of the politicians’ need to court 
potential voters. 
It is arguable that a creative combination of personal and political links, and collective 
and public pressure enabled the sisters to resolve the schools’ issues. To do this, they 
used members of the CRG and their pre-existing networks to physically show their 
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numbers and links to potential voters. Furthermore, through the CRG’s journalist 
they incentivised the politicians they engaged with the promise of favourable 
publicity at a crucial time. In the process, they blended their existing identities as 
programme participants, activists for the Aurat Foundation and as party workers. 
Perhaps most importantly, they did not seek to keep their relations with politicians 
private and gave their fellow members opportunities to meet them. Indeed, it was 
notable that the sisters were not accused by any of their colleagues of abusing the 
CRG. 
 
Vignette two: Arif Ramy 
Arif Ramy joined urban Gujrat’s CRG in his mid-twenties having recently moved to the 
city from a nearby village. He diligently learnt its data collection techniques and 
proper procedures. He formed lasting bonds with other members and was involved in 
some of the group’s major successes. He also established his own organisation to 
continue his social work. Indeed, Arif’s involvement in the CRG appeared to be a 
textbook case of the social accountability discourse’s depoliticised notion of 
empowerment.240 However, exploring it further suggests he also learnt valuable 
lessons on how to skilfully tread the line between social and political work. 
Like the other members of his CRG’s core, active group, Arif was privileged in 
comparison to the marginalised citizens STAEP eventually sought to mobilise. As he 
put it, his farming family were amongst the wealthiest landowners in his village. He 
suggested they had, in part, maintained this position for over 300 years by staying 
out of local politics. Elaborating, he argued that politics requires a level of cruelty that 
they could not tolerate. Furthermore, through this strategy they sought to avoid the 
                                                 
240 See Chapter Two. 
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‘jealousies and enmities’ common to the landed.241 Instead, Arif argued that his 
family were avid social workers, dedicating their spare money and time to the poor: 
 
[…] my family went in the other direction where we chose to give back 
and do social work. We would give parts of the land to the poor and tell 
them they can use it to grow crops and consume them. We help orphans 
and give charity. We built the mosques and help out poor people in 
funerals. 
 
As a teenager, Arif and his friends in the village had founded a CBO named the Quaid-
i-Azam (Great Leader) Welfare Society.242 Through collecting money from wealthy 
households, it conducted small local projects such as fixing the village’s bus shelter. 
To legitimise its work, Arif gave locally influential men positions within the 
organisation such as Chairman and Vice-Chairman. He argued that it made them ‘feel 
honoured and respected, and hence motivated’. However, Arif decided not to involve 
his own family’s money, suggesting it would make his organisation unsustainable. 
Although initially sceptical of the CRG’s connections to foreign donors, Arif joined 
after discovering it was about holding the state to account and compelling it to act. 
Furthermore, he came to view the CRG as a way through which he could settle into 
his new life. As he put it: ‘[…] when I came from the village I had a passion for social 
work, but I didn’t have a platform and I didn’t have any networks’. By the time I met 
him, Arif argued that the CRG allowed him to address the ‘root causes’ of the 
problems its members identified without involving the ‘personal greed’ of wealthy 
influentials.  
                                                 
241 Such enmities are found within much of the ethnographic literature on rural Pakistan (Barth, 1959; Lyon, 
2002; Martin, 2015a).  
242 ‘Great Leader’ is an epithet often used to refer to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan’s first leader. 
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Soon after joining the CRG, Arif also became involved with Umer Mirza’s People’s 
Welfare Organisation (PWO) described in Chapter Eight and quickly rose to become 
its General Secretary. Indeed, he oversaw its growth from a self-funded CBO, to an 
NGO that competed for development contracts from larger national level 
organisations funded by donors. Arif was keen to impress upon me that the PWO’s 
success stemmed from its ability to keep ‘proper records of everything’ and its 
professional internal procedures. As he described: 
 
[…] we have elections, meetings, media coverage, everything. We have 
project plans and make reports, which are verified, and then we also get 
audited and then submit them to the government. So, whenever some 
other organization comes, they require these things. In Gujrat, there are 
over 225 organizations but very few that do proper documentation. 
Around 10-15 organizations and we are one of them.  
 
However, when asked, Arif had little knowledge of how Umer had ultimately 
leveraged his political connections to get things done whilst a CRG member. Nor did 
he know how he had sought to publicly claim the credit in the name of the WPO. He 
also appeared to be unaware of how the CRG’s Chairman, Noman Riasani, had called 
upon his biraderi’s political patron to push through the construction of Shahbaz 
Sharif park.243 Nonetheless, he confided that he knew some individuals within the 
CRG used such connections, but he had never been privy to such practices. Instead, 
he described the CRG’s operations as ‘democratic’ and enthusiastically recounted the 
opportunities he had to debate national level politics with the group’s elders. Put 
another way, despite being one of the CRG’s most active members, engaging in the 
proper procedures, visiting authorities and taking part in its election monitoring 
                                                 
243 For both see Chapter Eight. 
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efforts, Arif, like most his colleagues, was barred from the meetings in which its most 
prestigious successes were secured. 
Despite this, in the CRG’s final year Arif established his own NGO called New Fields. 
New Fields conducts workshops among the Punjab’s farming communities on the 
latest techniques for small landowners wishing to keep profit and loss records. At the 
same time, it teaches them how to approach state authorities to demand 
improvements to local services. Arif had learnt to run the workshops whilst working 
for a multinational farming supplies company. Whilst the idea behind New Field’s 
advocacy trainings came from his time in the CRG. Arif declared that he had spent a 
year thinking about how he could run his NGO without seeking funds from donor 
organisations which he mistrusted. His solution came when he realised that he could 
approach village heads, which he described as powerful landlords, to host his hybrid 
workshops. Using his own knowledge of the power and politics of rural communities, 
he suggested that this drew upon their desires’ to be perceived as benevolent 
leaders.  
In short, Arif combined the things he had learned within the CRG with his own 
background as a wealthy landlord’s son. Specifically, he creatively mixed the CRG’s 
focus on accountability, Umer’s organisational skills and his own knowledge of rural 
power structures. In this sense, the CRG could be thought of as a finishing school for 
the young and motivated Arif. Indeed, he entered it looking to learn about holding 
the state to account and to make connections in Gujrat city, and he left it with new 
social networks and his own organisation.  
However, I felt Arif’s story was incomplete. I wondered how someone under the 
tutelage of Umer could have so little to say about the overlap between social work 
and politics. I also knew from our original interviews and Arif’s social media accounts 
that they had both remained close friends and become party workers for the PTI 
following 2013’s elections. Accordingly, two years later in 2017, I conducted a follow 
up interview to further explore Arif’s time with and since the CRG. 
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Since we had last spoke, Arif’s activities with Umer’s PWO had decreased as it had 
relocated outside of Gujrat.244 However, New Fields had begun taking on contracts 
from the district government. As he put it: ‘we try to extract as much as we can from 
them. But we are not dependent on them’. This had allowed him to hire additional 
personnel. Nonetheless, New Field’s still generally relied on the model of 
incentivising local landlords to host their meetings: ‘So in simple words, you can say 
that we use them to reduce expenses’. Arif also informed me that, despite offers, he 
still avoids donor funding because the sector is notoriously corrupt, and, first and 
foremost, he and his colleagues ‘believe we are social workers’. 
Asked about his political activity, Arif declared that he had become increasingly 
inspired by Imran Khan’s fiery speeches. Thus, he had joined the PTI’s Youth Wing, 
even taking up positions on its local policy council.245 Without prompting, he directly 
linked these roles to his continuing social work: 
 
The first thing I will tell you is that no one from my family ever went into 
politics and I am the first person who ever took this step. The reason 
behind this is that until one joins politics or some power-game no one will 
hear you. You can become a professional social worker and do the whole 
nine to five thing, and you can go to all the government offices and put in 
requests and run after government officials, but I am not a full time social 
worker because I don’t have the time and I don’t take a salary. All I can 
do is pursue something for a few days. Hence, it becomes a necessity that 
one needs to be part of a power-game because otherwise your work 
doesn’t get done or it is very challenging to get things done in time. 
 
                                                 
244 Sadly, Umer had also fallen ill and had to resign his stewardship of PWO. 
245 I am being deliberately vague here to preserve Arif’s anonymity.  
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Arif also suggested that he had been in line for the party’s ticket to run in 2015’s local 
elections. However, he confided that he had no real intention of standing. Rather, it 
had all been part of a strategy to support his social work:  
 
In our society, political affiliations matter a lot, especially for social 
workers. Often people, friends or relatives fight with each other or end 
relationships based on party affiliations. That’s how important they are. 
So even for a social worker it is a natural that at one point he or she will 
need a party affiliation. 
 
For Arif, politics had become part of the game social workers must play to ensure 
they get things done. Explaining this, he distinguished between political parties’ 
various wings – Youth, Women, Labour etc. – and what he called the ‘mother party’ 
that put candidates forward for the provincial and national elections. He argued that 
the mother party was only open to those from the right families and with the 
resources to run an election campaign. In contrast, parties’ wings are where they put 
social workers such as himself so that they can control them. Entering required 
proving that you have the potential to cause problems if you were to work against a 
party’s local interests.  
Given his new-found cynicism, I asked whether he still viewed his time in the CRG as 
the positive experience he once did: He replied: 
 
[…] I told you that the work we are doing is that we tell people which 
government department to approach and how and what are the 
processes. How to build pressure to get these things done. I learnt all of 
that from CRG only. The CRG has mentally groomed us and enabled us in 
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securing our rights without fighting. So, I believe that the impact of CRG 
has been great for me.  
 
Broadly viewed, Arif’s story is illustrative of the types of education that can take place 
within and around social accountability programmes such as STAEP. Through those 
he met within his CRG and the experiences he had, he learnt what it means to be a 
social worker in the Punjab. Broadly, as with the first vignette’s sisters, it means 
skilfully straddling the line between social and political work. Not shying away from it. 
Nonetheless, it is also notable that for Arif, social work should, as much as possible, 
remain disconnected from outside influences, whether that be from politicians, the 
state or donors. This is a far more complex picture than the idea that information and 
tutelage on the proper procedures will lead to depoliticised activism and responsive 
governance.  
 
Vignette three: the ex-Councillors 
On the surface, urban Multan’s CRG accorded with the general model outlined in this 
and the previous chapter. Indeed, a core group conducted most of its activities and 
its members often sought to simultaneously build their political reputations. 
However, its story is interesting for three additional overlapping reasons: firstly, its 
core group of active participants was largely comprised of female former Councillors 
that were already politically savvy. Secondly, none of them had strong relationships 
with provincial and national level politicians that they could rely upon to resolve the 
issues they took up. Lastly, over the course of the programme a clear rivalry emerged 
amongst them over competing visions for the CRG, not just its appropriation for 
political purposes. Exploring them further provides insights into the potential and 
limitations of social accountability programmes in clientelistic states. 
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I met three of the members from the CRG’s core group together in late 2015, a year 
after STAEP’s end. Nonetheless, they still introduced themselves as its President, 
Secretary General and Secretary General Finance, and they all spoke as if the group 
was still a functioning entity. It also transpired that they all lived in the same 
neighbourhood and were from families that had fled India during the chaos of 
partition. The President, herein Sofia, had been a General Councillor under 
Musharraf’s regime from 2001-2005 and then a Town Councillor until 2008. Although 
the elections were conducted on a non-party basis, she was then affiliated with the 
PML-N and Jamiat Ulema-e Islam parties. One of the other ladies was a teacher in a 
school owned by Sofia and another worked in security.246 
By their own and others’ admissions, the three had been central to the CRG’s most 
talked about achievement: the construction of a pedestrian bridge across a busy road 
bordering their neighbourhood. The issue had first been raised in 2008 before the 
CRG’s establishment and following the death of several locals on the road, including a 
senior Jamiat Ulema-e Islam leader. According to CRG members, the bridge had not 
been completed since as it was at the intersection of three national level politicians’ 
constituencies.247 Thus, its resolution was unlikely to attract a sizable vote bank for 
whoever saw the work through. 
Consulting a folder stuffed with records, Sofia and her two friends argued that with 
the help of the CRG’s mentoring NGO – the Southern Punjab Resource Centre (SPRC) 
– they had pressured the National Highway Authority (NHA), a federal body, to 
release funds for the bridge. They also contacted local politicians to ensure things 
kept moving. However, no single politician was identified as instrumental; an element 
of the story corroborated by others. In the end, the bridge’s construction took two 
years and was completed in the months immediately before 2013’s elections. One of 
the three ladies summarised that: 
                                                 
246 Owning schools was a common theme amongst the CRGs’ active women. 
247 The delimitations of provincial and national constituencies have changed frequently in Pakistan and are a 
source of significant disputes. 
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One thing that we learnt from the CRG, which you can say was part of our 
training, was which issue is related to which department. This thing we 
really learnt from them, although we had a little bit of knowledge before. 
They would also tell us the right procedures, like who to phone, who to 
meet again and again. It is clear that if you take time and go, sometimes 
they meet and sometimes they don’t, but overall it was good for us.248 
 
On the surface, this looked like a text-book story of social accountability enabled and 
supported by STAEP. However, during preparations for the bridge’s opening 
ceremony tensions within and from outside of the CRG surfaced. From without, a 
local MPA tried to take credit for the bridges’ construction and a politically ambitious 
headmaster began telling community members he’d been instrumental to its 
completion. Reflecting on this, Sofia’s group complained that the SPRC and FAFEN 
would not let them hang banners from the bridge highlighting their efforts to get it 
built. To resolve the problem, Sofia and her allies within the CRG cancelled the official 
opening ceremony they had planned.  
From within, Sofia’s group argued that their success was resented by other members 
whom were jealous that they had worked towards the issue’s resolution. This 
resentment was said to have been compounded when Sofia’s and her friends won 
the CRG’s internal elections. They argued that their opponents were ‘lazy’ ‘illiterates’ 
that were only interested in stirring trouble in the courts and though protests. Some 
of their allies also suggested that Sofia’s rivals they had constantly complained to the 
SPRC, pestering them for membership cards. This, they argued, was really a delaying 
tactic to excuse their own lack of effort and connections.  
                                                 
248 Bisma Longi, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (02/10/2015). 
313 
 
Asked about these tensions, they argued that Sofia and her supporters did not want 
to build up an independent identity for the CRG and feared the empowerment of 
other members through the issuing of membership cards. To back up their claims, 
they suggested Sofia’s group had used some of their own money to fund the bridge’s 
construction and pointed to her past use of a position on a local Zakat Committee to 
effectively buy votes in Musharraf’s era. One also accused her of being a ‘drawing-
room politician’ that would sell her allegiance to the highest bidder, as opposed to a 
social worker that moves amongst the community. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, unaligned interviewees argued that both Sofia’s group and 
her rivals had used the CRG to further their local political ambitions. They described 
how each would try to ensure meetings were held in their homes and compete over 
providing refreshments. They also overruled one another’s decisions – in their words, 
‘leg-pulling’ – as to which issues to take up. Some accused them of being more 
interested in seizing the CRG’s internal positions than getting things done and 
suggested they often tried to introduce new members to meetings to ensure they 
won votes. As an interviewee put it; both groups were really ‘making themselves 
strong instead of the CRG’.  
With SPRC’s endorsement, the CRG’s internal rifts were addressed by splitting it into 
two groups with separate activities and hierarchies. After this SPRC gradually stopped 
contacting Sofia’s rivals. Whilst, for their part, Sofia and her allies continued to 
convene the CRG, and were invited to join the district and provincial level 
organisations STAEP sought to establish in 2014. This essentially made them the 
‘official’ CRG.  
As I analysed my transcripts of interviews with Sofia’s rivals, however, it became clear 
that the division was about more than just their personal political ambitions. They 
were also led by three women, two of whom were sisters. One of the sisters had 
been a General Councillor during Musharraf’s era and the other was a young lawyer. 
The third lady, Rafa, had also been a Councillor and was now doing ad-hoc project 
work for national level NGOs. Rafa lived in Sofia’s neighbourhood, yet, unlike her, she 
314 
 
belonged to a community of refugees that had fled to Multan from East Pakistan 
(Bangladesh) following 1971’s civil war. 
For much of the period before the CRG’s split, these ladies had worked towards 
securing the reinstatement of 446 local Lady Health Workers (LHWs) that had been 
told to stop reporting for duty. Created in 1994, Pakistan’s state run LHWs 
programme is its flagship healthcare initiative at the primary level. Research suggests 
it has had good results in treating women and children in their homes where 
conservative social norms and a lack of services limit their options (Zhu et al., 2014). 
As with other public-sector jobs, however, anecdotal evidence also suggests that 
roles as LHWs are often handed out by politicians as patronage. Indeed, the three 
CRG members argued that a local MPA had stood Multan’s LHWs down as he wanted 
to replace them with those he had selected.  
To address this, the group’s lawyer first registered the issue with the local courts, 
arguing that the new crop of LHWs did not receive their roles on merit. Together, 
following the programme’s proper procedures, they also wrote formal letters to the 
Punjab’s Chief Minister and did their own ‘homework’, collecting statements from 
laid off LHWs. At the same time, they held protests and press-conferences across the 
city, and organised the LHWs into an association that they connected to those in 
other districts.249  
Fearing the consequences, however, many of the LHWs were too afraid to attend 
public gatherings. In a creative act of deception, the two sisters drew upon CRG 
members and other lawyers they knew to play their parts, even getting them to wear 
the LHWs’ white uniforms at rallies and press conferences. The issue was eventually 
resolved with the LHWs’ reinstatement and a pay-rise. Reflecting on their success, 
one of the ladies commented that ‘there was power in the CRG’. Nonetheless, 
throughout this struggle, the group argued that they got little help from other CRG 
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members or from the SPRC. They added that the other members were ‘scared’ of the 
being arrested, whilst the NGO preferred to ‘stay silent’ on the issue. 
In 2013, around the time of the CRG’s split, this group of ladies and members of 
Multan’s branch of Aurat Foundation encouraged Rafa to run for MPA as an 
independent candidate. Although Rafa had previously successfully contested local 
elections, she argued that she knew she never had a real chance of becoming an 
MPA. Rather, as she put it: 
 
[…] I wanted to win without using money to back me up, my approach 
was if you want to give me the votes on your own then great, otherwise I 
don’t care. I will follow the laws and do things properly. I said I’ll run for 
MPA, get their work done but have no money to back me up. Instead, I 
said [to her friends in the CRG] spend money on my campaign, make my 
advertisements and campaign posters – you all are rich farmers and 
doctors, what are you all doing?250 
 
Rafa also revealed that she ran to protest the treatment of her fellow refugees that 
had fled from East Pakistan to Multan in 1971. She explained that the majority – who 
lived in the neighbourhood Rafa shared with Sofia and her allies – had not been given 
property rights to their homes despite a government order in 2006. She attributed 
this to ongoing arguments between local politicians’ that wanted to monopolise the 
credit for the issue’s eventual resolution.  
To make her point, Rafa sought to pry votes away from a local MPA whom had 
ignored the plight of her fellow refugees. As she put it: ‘He did not resolve our issue. 
He promised us and humiliated us for five years.’ Although she lost, she argued she 
                                                 
250 Rafa Memon, female, 30-40, member urban Multan (05/10/2015). 
316 
 
was happy as the MPA failed in his bid to be re-elected. As with the LHWs issue, once 
again SPRC did not involve itself in her scheme as it was STAEP’s policy for CRG 
members to exit the programme if they ran for election. Furthermore, Sofia and her 
faction did not lend Rafa their help. Indeed, by this time, they were rumoured to be 
allies of the MPA she had targeted. 
As mentioned, after 2013’s elections SPRC stopped contacting the break-away group. 
Nonetheless, their attentions had turned to another broad cause: this time they 
sought to organise Multan’s home-workers (women that work in the garment 
industry from home) into an association to demand their rights to old age benefits. In 
this struggle, they were being symbolically supported by a global network of Mill 
Workers and shortly before we met in 2015 they had been visited by a representative 
from Japan.  
Rafa had also once again been persuaded by her friends to compete in the 
forthcoming local elections.251 This time she was to directly take on Sofia as both 
were courting the PTI’s ticket. Although she was unsure of her prospects and believed 
Sofia to be using money from the area’s Zakat Committee to buy votes, she framed 
this as a continuation of her struggle for refugees from 1971. Furthermore, she 
suggested that due to her time within the CRG local market traders she had met 
during governance monitoring exercises were backing her. 
Summing up their thoughts on STAEP and the NGO’s that implement donor funded 
programmes, one of Rafa’s group remarked:  
 
These people only work according to their project period and then they 
close their programmes and run away. The work should be done in such 
a manner that even if you do a small project you complete it and they 
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should be in touch regularly. Even SPRC closed this project. They should 
have told the high command [donors] that in Pakistan we need the kind 
of projects that continue for some time, as recently all the institutions 
have started to know and understand us [the CRG]. It was when things 
started to work that they closed the project.252 
 
It is difficult to doubt that achievements such as the footbridge helped many of 
Multan’s residents. However, it is arguable that the split represented different visions 
for the CRG and, by extension, the programme. One sees them as platforms for 
extracting resources from the state for use on local development projects. Adherents 
view such aims as both worthy social work and an expression of loyalty to their 
communities. Moreover, if it helps the individuals leading the efforts to forward their 
own political ambitions, then that is, depending on whether you’re a participant or 
staff within a mentoring NGO, either an added benefit or the inconvenient price of 
getting things done.  
The other sees the CRGs’ as vehicles through which to address broader injustices. As 
part of this, members find creative ways to blend their own identities with the 
programme’s lessons, and to work with others to give them identities and voices. 
Where possible, they also aim to depersonalise and institutionalise the CRG through 
tools such as membership cards and the use of formal accountability mechanisms 
such as the courts. If opportunities to publicly engage political society or to enter 
party politics arise, they seize them as another means for affecting wider changes in 
the way and by whom politics is done. 
Although it would be disingenuous to declare that any of the actors within my 
vignettes fully represent either vision, I have sought to show that their disagreements 
and fractures were often about more than just their political ambitions or allegiances. 
They were about the types of issues to work on and the ways of doing so. Ultimately, 
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however, Rafa and her group’s vision was side-lined by the CRG’s mentoring NGO 
through a mixture of the programme’s own policies and its own silences. Although it 
was difficult to ascertain precisely why, I surmise that this was in part because their 
activities did not fit the depoliticised and projectized model of social accountability 
propagated by donors.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter delved deeper into the meanings that STAEP’s non-elite participants 
gave to the programme. It was shown that many did not distinguish between its aims 
and dominant ways of understanding social work in Pakistan. In practice, this meant 
their CRGs often became platforms upon which they sought to build their political 
reputations. However, tensions arose when members believed their colleagues were 
appropriating their groups’ efforts or building private relationships with politicians. 
They were compounded by the programme’s paradoxical attempt to both deny and 
harness members’ political identities to get things done. The chapter then turned to 
three vignettes that suggest some participants countered these trends by taking the 
programme’s lessons, techniques and aims, and creatively blending them with their 
own pre-existing identities and aspirations. In some cases, this dragged the resolution 
of issues back into the public domain and gave voice to oppressed groups, in others it 
harnessed political relationships to work towards the resolution of injustices with 
broad, non-targetable impacts. In this way, they showed that the CRGs could be 
vehicles for radical democratising projects. Nonetheless, it was argued that their 
visions were pushed to the margins of the programme as they did not fit within its 
dominant image of depoliticised, non-confrontational social accountability. 
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Chapter Ten  
Power, Politics and Ideological Struggles 
 
 
‘You can see that in the modern world, in the world we have known since the 19th 
century, a series of governmental rationalities overlap, lean on each other, challenge 
each other, and struggle with each other: arts of government according to truth, art 
of government according to the rationality of the sovereign state, and art of 
government according to the rationality of economic agents, and more generally, 
according to the rationality of the governed themselves. And it is all these different 
parts of government, all these different types of ways of calculating, rationalising, 
and regulating the art of government which, overlapping each other, broadly 
speaking constitute the object of political debate from the 19th century.’ 
(Foucault, [1978/9] 2008:313) 
 
 
This chapter returns to the thesis’ overarching research question: Why do civil society 
programmes in clientelistic states have so little impact on democracy? In response, I 
argue that powerful development organisations’ attempts to harness the idea of civil 
society render activism a technical exercise, depoliticising it and blinding themselves 
to both its democratic and undemocratic potentials. To unpack this, the chapter first 
explores the limits of the Supporting Transparency Accountability and Electoral 
Process (STAEP) programme’s efforts to engage in depoliticised activism in Pakistan. I 
argue that this ultimately failed under the weight of its own contradictions. This 
allowed powerful actors to strengthen their clientelistic networks and pushed 
processes with radical potentials to the programme’s margins. Furthermore, by 
translating these ground realities into its donor’s discourses, the programme missed 
opportunities to re-politicise the emerging idea of social accountability.  
To begin to salvage them, I use this discussion to outline the contours of a theory of 
isomorphic activism. I argue it is needed to account for how elites can appropriate 
the opportunities such programmes provide to participate in public politics. I then 
build an argument that a refocus on the aspirations of programme participants and 
the micro-politics of clientelistic states would help donors to redefine their notions of 
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what counts as success. In conclusion, the chapter turns to the more recent literature 
on social accountability, commenting on how far it accounts for the issues the thesis 
highlights. I argue that to ensure programmes productively and sensitively engage 
the power and politics of the places in which they are implemented, analysts must 
continuously uncover and challenge neoliberal understandings of civil society. 
 
Depoliticised activism  
The authors of STAEP’s mid-term review argued that the Constituency Relations 
Groups (CRGs) were limited by the programme’s efforts to engage in ‘depoliticised 
activism’ (DFID, 2012:17). They suggested that this was the reason participants 
preferred to focus on resolving tangible, local demands, rather than wider problems 
with service delivery or democratic process. In contrast, I argue that the CRGs were 
far from depoliticised. Indeed, despite the best efforts of STAEP’s official policies, 
they were vehicles for their participants’ political ambitions and their conflicts. Thus, 
depoliticised activism is a fallacy. Acknowledging this will help social accountability 
programmes to begin to address the power inequalities that permeate them, and to 
distinguish between the democratic and antidemocratic processes they support. 
Chapter Eight showed how the CRGs generally got things done. Most of their 
activities were undertaken by a core group of better educated and wealthier 
members that used the ‘proper procedures’ taught by the programme to raise and, in 
some cases, resolve demands. Although these core groups were not large, often with 
around ten active members, they understood that the idea was to challenge the 
corruption, nepotism and personalisation of Pakistan’s clientelistic politics by 
engaging and pressuring authorities through channels theoretically open to ordinary 
citizens. For them, acting collectively to secure accountable governance meant 
periodically pooling their identities as locally influential members of their 
communities. Many also sought to gradually depersonalise and institutionalise their 
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CRGs by appearing at meetings with authorities en masse, using membership cards 
and by conducting their advocacy efforts in public.  
Nonetheless, politics was often instrumental to their efforts. Indeed, interviewees 
regularly told of how they had used personal and political connections to access 
authorities, to assure communications reached the correct office or to expediate the 
release of state funds. One reason this occurred was because the CRGs’ members 
knew they were unlikely to change Pakistan’s political system overnight. However, as 
this went against the spirit of the programme, the studied mentoring non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) turned a blind eye to such practices if they took 
place outside of the forums STAEP directly supported. Moreover, as one interviewed 
member of staff explained: ‘We have had such examples, but we couldn’t document 
them because a detailed investigation would have to be carried out’.253 For their part, 
CRG members also often reasoned that using their political connections was better 
than suffering repeated frustrations and failures, and that it kick-started their paths 
to being recognised as local associations. 
As shown in Chapter Nine, another, more quotidian, reason politics seeped into the 
CRGs concerned the overlaps between social and political work in Pakistan. As 
interviewees made clear, social work is a means through which the politically 
ambitious build their reputations as individuals concerned for their communities and, 
most importantly, that can get things done. Furthermore, much of what social 
workers do – helping people to navigate corrupt bureaucracies and persuading 
authorities to undertake small local development works – was what STAEP asked of 
them. However, because such work often requires engaging the state and securing its 
resources, many of the CRGs’ most active members were already affiliated with 
politicians before joining the programme. In return for their local reputations, 
information, and, in some cases, gathering votes, these relationships helped them to 
continue their social work on a grander scale. They also enabled some of them to 
prepare for the anticipated local elections. 
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As it is difficult to distinguish such relationships from clientelism, STAEP’s official 
policies tried to deal with them by asking participants to declare their political 
neutrality upon volunteering for the programme or to leave when they sought to run 
for office. The idea was that depoliticised participants would not activate their 
political connections or work in the interests of a politician or party whilst raising and 
trying to resolve the CRGs’ demands. Yet, I found little evidence that this worked for 
anything other than the most overt attempts to politicise the CRGs. 
Instead, the overlaps between social and political work, and the mentoring NGOs 
paradoxical attempts to both officially deny and unofficially harness them, caused 
significant tensions. Thus, bad comments about other participants and fractures 
within the CRGs generally concerned members’ attempts to build political 
reputations, especially in the runup to 2013’s elections. However, it was not so much 
that participation in the programme should not be used for this purpose. Indeed, 
social work, community based organisations (CBOs) and NGOs are all understood to 
legitimately serve dual roles. Rather, CRG members objected to their colleagues’ 
efforts to appropriate the credit for what were believed to be collective successes 
and the opportunities the platform provided to engage authorities. This is why issues 
such as membership cards, the CRGs’ internal elections, publicity in the media and 
the location for the groups’ periodic meetings were of such importance to some 
members.   
These findings support the aidnography authors’ arguments that programmes’ 
discourses, favoured ways of working and even their aims are often appropriated by 
participants. Indeed, it is arguable that STAEP’s ideals were largely confined to CRGs’ 
efforts to use the proper procedures and that, beyond this, local norms, participants’ 
identities and political realities took over. This is not to say that the groups never got 
things done through the proper procedures; there were many examples of 
authorities with which they formed productive, working relationships that led to 
resolved demands that would benefit their communities. Nor is it to claim that every 
raised demand was designed with the dual purpose of enhancing a member’s 
political profile. The point is that the programme often had to fit into dominant ways 
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of accessing authorities, its participants’ understandings of what they were being 
asked to do and their wider interests. In development discourse, the programme had 
to ‘work with the grain’ of local power and politics (Booth, 2011; Levy, 2014).  
Officially, however, the programme disavowed both Pakistan’s prevailing 
understandings of social work and its participants’ political identities. Instead, it 
sought a mythical version of civil society. Indeed, despite casting its net to 
community leaders, members of professional associations, unions and former elected 
councillors, STAEP’s policies sought to reinforce the debunked image of civil society 
as a bounded realm of apolitical and, in the language of the World Bank, ‘altruistic’ 
activities (WB, 2003:104).254 On the ground, this had the effect of officially denying 
much of the potentially useful capitals (social, cultural, economic and political) CRG 
members brought to the programme and it often forced their use of them into the 
shadows. This caused animosities to arise and some of the CRGs to fracture along 
political lines.   
It might be suggested that it is reasonable to expect participants within social 
accountability programmes to put aside their political identities and relationships 
whilst undertaking activities. I argue, however, that in clientelistic states such as 
Pakistan with few or compromised formal accountability mechanisms, and with long 
histories of personalised bureaucracies and political systems, it is simply 
unrealistic.255 Such calls are also premised on individualistic Western notions of 
political identity alien to a culture within which kinship is a primary organising unit.256 
They are also likely unworkable as liberal understandings of society as comprised of 
separate spheres (economic, social or civic, political and private) are uncommon in 
Pakistan. Most importantly, however, they contradict the very notion of the ‘social’ in 
the idea of social accountability as formulated in the Department for International 
Development’s (DFID) 2008 Briefing Paper (DFID, 2008).257 There, social 
accountability relationships were understood to be necessarily embedded in cultures, 
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power relations, and, often contentious, politics. The idea was not that programmes 
could immediately overcome this, but to acknowledge and use this reality in gradual, 
contextually sensitive processes that lead to the depersonalisation of politics, 
increased political participation and institutional reforms. In this sense, depoliticised 
social accountability falls foul of the same criticisms levelled at its predecessor; social 
capital.258 
If this is accepted, the challenge becomes acknowledging participants’ political 
identities and aspirations. I argue that doing so requires returning to ideas of identity 
formation, public deliberations, debate and the strength of the better argument at 
the heart of what Chapter Two called ‘activist’ theories of civil society. In them, 
emphasis is placed on a double movement: First, the creation of shared identities and 
opinions free from domination by coercive authorities or economic interests. Second, 
the public engagement of political society and the state by organised groups or their 
representatives. The emphasis on the publicness of the second movement is what 
ensures young associations’ identities and energies are not appropriated or dismissed 
by more powerful actors negotiating privately amongst themselves. Furthermore, it 
should be acknowledged that when the activist theorists talked about rejecting 
politics, they did not mean that politics should be denied altogether. Rather, they 
sought alternatives to dominant modes of politics that they perceived as oppressive 
and unjust. In this sense, they were calling for radical democratising projects that 
challenge prevailing notions of progress or development.  
In practice, welcoming programme participants’ political identities into the spaces 
donors support risks further introducing power inequalities and entrenching opposed 
identities. This is especially true in clientelistic states where the lines between social 
work, politics and clientelism are blurred, and power inequalities are often hidden. 
Methods and ways of addressing this must ensure that all participants have a voice, 
including the opportunity to scrutinise and challenge one another’s actions. However, 
they are likely to be contextually specific. Indeed, my findings suggest that within the 
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studied CRGs less powerful members wanted the groups’ internal elections to be 
abolished, meetings to be held in neutral locations, the groups to be organised along 
the lines of union councils, and their travel expenses to be paid.259 These ideas were 
all aimed at creating a more even playing field and drawing members’ activities into 
the public sphere. Thus, the search for suitable ways to address power inequalities 
should begin from the insights of programmes’ participants. They are best placed to 
identify when power is negatively permeating the supposedly democratic spaces 
programmes support.260 
 
Rendering technical 
Aidnography authors often argue that development programmes depoliticise the 
problems they face by framing them in technical terms, making them amenable to 
measurement, assigning them values, prices and targets (Ferguson, 1990; 
Abrahamsen, 2000; Li, 2007).261 These practices also define who are the experts, able 
to make other cultures visible and intelligible, and to render ground realities 
technical, and who is in need of their tutelage. In the case of the voluntary STAEP 
programme, however, I argue that the usual responsibilities for such efforts shifted 
from development’s professional experts to the programme’s most powerful 
participants. This helped it to maintain what could be termed an ‘official fiction’ 
within its annual reviews. In the process undemocratic practices were obscured and, 
in some cases, legitimised. 
As indicated in the programme’s annual reviews and through my own research, The 
Asia Foundation (TAF) and the Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) were not in 
favour of what they called ‘paid activism’ (DFID, 2014:9). They reasoned that it both 
ruins the chances of sustainability and attracts the wrong sort of self-interested 
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participant. Instead, they paid members of FAFEN’s existing network of NGOs to 
persuade citizens of the worth of its activities and aims. These NGOs were also to be 
their eyes and ears on the ground, and to help ensure that STAEP fulfilled the 
milestones and goals it had agreed with DFID. 
From the beginning local politics proved central to these tasks. For example, the 
programme often sought to build CRGs in places the mentoring NGOs had little 
experience of. Accordingly, the studied groups were in large part the creations of 
influential members who were already embedded within political networks. Gujrat’s 
mentoring NGO heavily relied on the efforts of the heads of two local unions, a 
former spokesman for the party in power and a biraderi leader. Although there were 
no clear elites in Multan’s CRGs, they were led by groups of allied ex-councillors that 
the mentoring NGO had last engaged during Musharraf’s era. These members often 
saw themselves as the gatekeepers to their communities and, in some cases, as 
working for the mentoring NGOs. Due to the programme’s high drop-out rate, they 
increasingly took on these roles as they were called upon to find new participants to 
attend meetings and carry out activities. To do this, they often called upon their 
relatives, business acquaintances and political allies. By the end of the programme 
they had also occupied the CRGs’ internal hierarchical positions. Nonetheless, 
STAEP’s completion report declared that it had built a ‘support base of citizen 
volunteers numbering more than 10,000’ (ibid:5). 
The second major way politics proved useful in rendering the programme technical 
was through efforts to collect governance monitoring data; the ‘information’ that is 
central to much of the social accountability discourse. Here too the responsibility for 
generating this data was, following training, passed down to participants. In practice, 
however, the difficulty of doing so once again meant that powerful, politically 
connected members of the CRGs played a pivotal role. As rural Gujrat’s elite 
Jahanzaib suggested, this started early: 
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If the CRG members had to check market rates, I already had the rate lists 
of the market committee through TMO [Tehsil Municipal Officer] office 
because I am the President of Trade Union. The rates that were required 
by the CRG members, I would go to any of the shops and get the rates for 
them. If they wanted to go to the District Headquarter Hospital, I would 
call the relevant MS [a qualified health worker] and tell him to provide 
the information required by the CRG members. If they wanted to meet 
someone in the police station, I would call the relevant SHO [Station 
House Officer] and get the CRG members whatever information they 
required.262 
 
STAEP’s first two annual reviews expressed concerns over whether the information 
the programme generated was being used to lobby authorities (DFID, 2011d; DIFD, 
2012). My own research also found that the act of collecting information and 
subsequent relationship building was more important than its use in holding 
authorities to account. However, beyond a limited qualitative study and tracking of 
‘Right to Information’ requests, the programme did not track when or how 
governance monitoring information led to raised or resolved demands (TAF, 2013b). 
Instead, its generation was mostly used as a way of monitoring the CRGs and 
ensuring they were doing something. Within the completion report STAEP was 
praised for introducing ‘the unique idea of research-based advocacy for improved 
governance’ (DFID, 2014:5). 
The last major way in which politics was useful for rendering the programme 
technical was in getting things done. Indeed, members often drew upon political 
relationships to access and pressure authorities. In some cases, this ensured the CRGs 
members could lobby them en masse, in others advocacy efforts took place in 
private, between powerful members and authorities, and out of sight of sight of the 
majority of the programme’s participants. When elites were involved this often led to 
                                                 
262 Chaudhry Jahanzaib Derawal, male, 40-50, member rural Gujrat (29/03/2015 & 17/06/2015). 
328 
 
the CRGs’ most prestigious successes, winning them publicity and recognition 
amongst their communities. As the draft of STAEP’s first annual review and my own 
interviews with staff from the mentoring NGOs suggest, however, the private nature 
of their relationships risked the; ‘Implied endorsement of patronage-based system of 
governance’ (DFID, 2011:19). Nonetheless, by STAEP’s completion report, such 
processes were collated and represented as value for money: 
 
[The] CRGs were able to raise 45,974 demands with government for 
improved service delivery and reforms (almost 60% met) at a cost of £75 
per demand (significantly lower than the £144 per demand anticipated in 
the original budget). (DFID, 2014:2) 
 
Taken together, this suggests that some of the CRGs’ most powerful politically 
connected members were crucial to DFID’s ability to render STAEP’s ground realities 
technical. Indeed, their voluntarism was drawn upon to build the CRGs, and to 
produce reams of data and figures that were used to monitor them and represent 
STAEP’s ‘pioneering and successful model’ in the DFID’s public texts (ibid:5).  
In this way, the programme’s most powerful participants became its ‘experts’, 
occupying pivotal positions amongst the chain of actors responsible for both enacting 
the programme’s solutions to poor governance and translating its messy ground 
realities into DFID’s technical discourses (Kothari, 2005). In the process, however, 
difficult questions around the clientelistic practices they were involved in were 
obscured. My thesis, therefore, contributes to the aidnography literatures’ 
understanding of how programmes are rendered technical and depoliticised. 
Specifically, it suggests that powerful and politically connected participants may take 
part in such processes. Moreover, in doing so, they may gain opportunities to further 
legitimise their positions within undemocratic political networks, whilst undermining 
programmes’ wider democracy enhancing aims. 
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I would add, however, that interviewed CRG members’ repeated disdain for the 
mentoring NGOs’ reporting procedures or, in their terms, ‘paperwork’, their requests 
for additional participants, and the identification of ever more issues points to a 
deeper malaise. It concerns the need to maintain an official fiction that substituted 
attendance for mobilisation, identified and raised issues for voice, and generated 
information for local political insight. This fiction washed over the difficult questions 
raised in the programme’s formative years and by its end was used to justify the 
replication, albeit with ‘adaptations’, of STAEP’s model within other initiatives in 
Pakistan (DFID, 2014:5). 
 
Neoliberalism and new clientelism 
Chapter Four argued that the struggle between an activist and neoliberal version of 
civil society theory is discernible within the social accountability discourse. Broadly, 
the former concerns itself with issues of identity, power relations, contentious 
politics and alliances that straddle conceptual state-society divides; the latter with 
the accumulation of transactions between informed, rationally acting clients and 
competing service providers. However, I also argued that the social accountability 
discourse – as seen through texts from the World Bank and DFID – is part of wider, 
more recent attempts to impart a depoliticised, market based notion of citizenship to 
people in the West and elsewhere (Block and Somers, 2014; Davies, 2014; Brown, 
2015).  
To some degree, the local elites that helped bring STAEP to life both on the ground 
and in its technical annual review documents became part of this. However, for most 
participants little changed. Indeed, they did not become the neoliberal theorists’ 
ideal citizens, making decisions based on cost-benefit calculations and looking from 
the state’s inefficient services to those provided by the private sector. Rather, they 
saw the programme as an opportunity to continue their social work and build their 
political reputations. This was not so much an act of resistance as the some 
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aidnography authors understand it, as it was an attempt to live ‘side by side’ with the 
programme’s neoliberal vision of citizenship, civil society and governance (Peck, 
2013:135). In Foucault’s terminology, the programme’s attempt to change its 
participants’ ‘conduct of conducts’ was clearly limited.263 Moreover, many CRG 
members dropped out or decided that they were unwilling to spend their capitals 
monitoring either the state or one another. As my case studies suggest, many also 
grew frustrated with the domination of their groups by powerful and politically 
connected members.  
Participants’ reactions to the programme ranged from angry and disappointed, to 
emboldened by what they had learnt and the new networks they had formed. 
However, there is a wider danger that the official fictions found within programmes’ 
annual reviews become the standard way of assessing them. The risk is that through 
sanitised, technical documents with impressive figures and depictions of year-on-year 
progress, organisations such as DIFD institutionalise the idea that holding meetings 
and getting things done are sufficient proxies for empowerment and accountability. 
In this sense, the problem may be less about neoliberal development programmes 
limiting their participants’ political horizons and more about entrenching a market-
based logic amongst those that fund them. As Mosse (2004:14) suggests it is often 
‘donors who are disciplined by their own discourse’. I join others that have argued 
this issue has been compounded in recent years through political pressure on DFID to 
demonstrate ‘value for money’, reducing every action it supports on the ground to a 
price and, in the process, washing over the power and politics in the places it works 
(Eyben, 2013; Bächtold, 2014; Valters and Whitty, 2017). 
Given this, it is arguable that an additional reason the appropriation of STAEP’s 
opportunities went unchallenged by donors is that neoliberal models of citizenship 
and governance are difficult to distinguish from the ‘new’ mode of clientelism that 
characterises young democracies such as Pakistan (Hopkin, 2006).264 Both understand 
democracy as about, sometimes monetised, transactions between citizens and 
                                                 
263 See Chapter Three 
264 See Chapter Five. 
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political elites. Both also view service provision as the result of competitions between 
citizens vying for the attentions of authorities, with collective action as periodically 
necessary for the maximisation of individual gains. Accordingly, they both pass the 
responsibility for welfare to individual citizens that must either make the right 
choices in markets of service providers or position themselves within the right 
networks. In this sense, neoliberalism and new clientelism can both be understood as 
totalising ideologies as to how politics should be done. 
Although they accord important roles for information and state-society interactions, 
there is little room for the meanings of freedom and popular sovereignty found 
within liberal political theory. Furthermore, gone are the processes of public 
deliberations, identity formation, civil disobedience and society-state coalition 
forming at the base of activist understandings of civil society. The danger is that 
analysts of programmes’ potentials to contribute to wider democratising projects are 
stripped of a conceptual vocabulary with which to explore them. This further reduces 
them to the sorts of quantitative assessments I have argued characterised STAEP’s 
annual reviews.  
Even if this critique is accepted, it remains important to be able to identify the spread 
of neoliberal models of citizenship and governance, and to distinguish it from the 
forms clientelism takes in different contexts. This is not because one is imposed by 
developed countries on developing, or even because each may require different 
solutions. Rather, this thesis has shown that it is because they complement one 
another, eroding citizens’ abilities to participate in the public sphere in subtle ways 
that are often written out of donors’ dominant discourses. This can help powerful 
actors and networks to maintain and legitimise their privileged positions, and it 
justifies reductive visions of civil societies that misrepresent how they have 
historically contributed to ongoing democratising projects through processes that are 
embedded in power and politics. The challenge for analysts is to consistently uncover 
how and why this occurs in different programmes. 
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Radical potentials  
The aidnography authors argue that researchers must go beyond the perverse 
pleasure of exposing ‘another example of neoliberal devastation, or neo-imperialist 
dispossession, or capitalist exploitation’ (McKinnon, 2017:2). In addition, they must 
view development programmes as sites of experimentation and uncover how 
participants strive to forge their own emancipatory paths. Chapter Nine sought to do 
this by outlining two competing visions that were discernible within the CRGs. In one, 
members saw them as platforms upon which to build political reputations and for 
extracting resources from the state for use on targeted local development projects. 
Put another way, business as usual. In the other, as vehicles through which to 
challenge broader injustices. Adherents to this vision sought to organise and raise the 
voice of oppressed groups. They also used their personal political connections to 
create opportunities for others to publicly engage members of political society, and 
they entered election races as another means through which to challenge Pakistan’s 
clientelistic politics.  
As Chapter’s Two’s discussion of case studies of ‘actually existing’ civil societies 
showed, there is already a body of literature that explores how clientelism has been 
eroded in diverse South Asian contexts. Taking the long view, much of it focuses on 
‘synergies’ between citizens and states that arise from ties and coalitions that cross 
society-state divides. The suggestion is that these are as important for the formation 
of new identifies, and economic and political outcomes as the density of and 
horizontal links between civic associations. This is because they create opportunities 
for each to learn about the others’ needs and wants, permeate one another 
organisations, and for citizens to hold authorities to account. Adherents to this idea 
call for research that uncovers instances and arrangements that connect 
communities, NGOs and social movements with reformist individuals and 
organisations inside the state. Furthermore, they are clear that they are likely to be 
part of, and to develop through messy and often regressive cycles of conflict and 
cooperation among rival political groups.  
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More recently, Tilly (2007) has argued that in young democracies clientelism can have 
an ambiguous relationship to democracy over the long-run. To illustrate, he turns to 
mid-19th century America. He shows how a proliferation of fraternal orders, benefits 
societies, fire companies and ethnicity based immigrants’ clubs advanced parochial 
and special interests within the growing nation. Furthermore, they used violence and 
intermediaries to displace rivals and to sell their votes to the highest bidder. 
Nonetheless, as these associations and their wider trust networks had more public 
dealings with the state’s bureaucracy and political parties these characteristics were 
gradually eroded.265  
Through such interactions, previously exclusionary associations began to frame 
themselves as unexclusive official membership organisations, aligned their practices 
with the rule of law, and started to rely on public services. Gradually, this gave them 
ever greater stakes in the state’s functioning. This included an interest in the health 
of its ongoing democratising project, which provided them with a public sphere 
within which to non-violently engage their rivals, a voice in decisions that would 
affect them, and confidence that underperforming institutions or politicians would be 
held accountable. In some cases, they even disbanded to join or create newer 
associations and networks that could further legitimise their participation in such 
public processes.  
Tilly shows that these processes were somewhat paradoxically facilitated by existing 
clientelist networks (Tilly, 2007a:98). They gave reformist leaders in political society a 
plethora of ready-made and well organised associations to interact with. They also 
gave potential civil society leaders wishing to establish newer, less exclusive and 
more public networks the initial identities, skills and connections to do so rapidly. 
Tilly, therefore, challenges the view found within much of the donors’ social 
accountability discourse that clientelistic networks are artefacts of previous eras or 
distortions of market-based rationalities to be brushed aside on the way to liberal or 
neoliberal governance models. Instead, he argues that ‘however much we may 
                                                 
265 This process is told through the protagonist’s story in the film Gangs of New York. 
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deplore political participation on the basis of personal ties and group prejudice, the 
absorption of newcomers into politics through patronage facilitated the integration 
of previously segregated trust networks into public politics’ (2007a:104).  
Although Tilly’s nuanced vision complicates investigations of civil society’s 
relationship to clientelism and democratisation, it accords with others’ macro and 
historical visions of how clientelistic democracies operate, and how they can 
gradually begin to change through broad, public political participation (North et al., 
2009; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; WB, 2016). Furthermore, it joins recent state 
and city level relational studies that explore how societal groups, including NGOs, are 
connected to one another, political society and the state, and why they may choose 
to take-part in, capture or exit deliberative public processes that contribute to 
democratising projects (Heller and Evans, 2010; Baiocchi et al., 2011; Boulding, 2014).  
There is not, however, a vast complementary body of literature that illustrates what 
such processes look like inside donor funded development programmes, at the local 
level, between individuals, small groups and political society in young clientelistic 
democracies. Indeed, the aidnography literature tends to offer critiques from the 
perspective of social justice and to uncover acts of resistance to imported modes of 
governance, but it does not often theorise challenges to or the breakdown of 
clientelism. Whilst the contemporary social accountability literature (explored further 
below) is mostly quantitative, approaching programmes as experiments in which 
information and/or citizens forums are conceptualised as the ‘treatment’, and 
improvements in service provision or perceptions of the state the desired outcomes. 
Thus, neither uncover the micro-processes programmes, intentionally and 
unintentionally, support that could be said to challenge clientelism or to contribute 
to wider democratising projects that change how politics is done and by whom.  
My thesis, therefore, contributes a case study of how participants within a social 
accountability programme challenged the power relations that sustain Pakistan’s 
clientelistic politics. Although this is most clear in the cases of Multan’s ex-councillors 
and their protests on behalf of those wronged by patronage politics; it was also 
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discernible through the way in which the sisters in Gujrat city publicly drew upon 
their private political connections to get things done and gave opportunities to others 
to engage those authorities for their own ends. The difficulty of both within a country 
in which women are de facto barred from the public sphere should not be 
underestimated. However, I also argue that the education Arif received from the 
programme and his fellow CRG members in how to skilfully straddle the line between 
social and political work, neither succumbing to patronage politics or rejecting 
political participation altogether, constitutes a challenge to clientelism. Indeed, if 
there were more Arifs in Pakistan the route from social work to patronage politics 
would begin to look less like an accepted cultural norm and more like an illegitimate 
perversion of democracy.266 Additional research would be needed to gauge the 
lasting impacts of these challenges. 
The next two sections aim to further aid future thinking on social accountability 
programmes in clientelistic states. The first outlines the contours of a theory of elite 
capture that is needed to refine understandings of how the radical democratic 
potential of programmes is undermined. The second comments on the idea of 
empowerment within the social accountability discourse to better help practitioners 
recognise and support it.  
 
Isomorphic activism  
The problem of elite capture came to the fore in the early 2000s through evidence 
reviews of participatory and community driven development programmes 
(Bierschenk et al., 2002; Platteau and Gaspart, 2003; Mansuri and Rao, 2004; Beard 
and Dasgupta, 2007).267 It was argued that these programmes – which often seek to 
                                                 
266 A recent paper from Collier (2017) explores ways changes in political cultures can be quantitatively 
modelled.   
267 Bierschenk et al. (2002) do not use the term ‘elites’. Instead, they create the category of African 
‘development brokers’, which denotes local entrepreneurs with the skills and connections to drain off rents 
from what they call ‘decentralised aid’ projects. Beyond commenting on the fracturing of power at the local 
level, they do not explore what the rise of these actors may mean for programmes’ wider aims.  
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provide part of the funds for communities to engage in collectively agreed local 
development projects – can effectively be dominated by elites who target the 
material benefits towards themselves and their supporters. This can occur through 
their control of decision-making processes, embezzlement or the awarding of jobs 
and contracts.  
More recently, a distinction has been drawn between elite capture and elite control 
(Lund and Saito-Jensen, 2013; Warren and Visser, 2016). The latter is portrayed as 
situations within which elites’ monopolisation of processes does not necessarily 
make other programme participants or community members materially worse off 
and may even be deemed legitimate by them. For some, elite control is necessary in 
contexts within which only the better off and connected can contribute money, 
navigate local bureaucracies or mobilise others. This is perhaps what the authors of 
2004’s World Development Report had in mind with their suggestion that in some 
cases donors may have to settle for the ‘benevolent capture' of their programmes 
(WB, 2003:209). 
I argue that notions of elite capture and control that focus on the material benefits 
and quantifiable aspects of social accountability programmes are inadequate for 
exploring their potentials to contribute to wider democratising projects. Instead, I 
propose a theory of ‘isomorphic activism’ that describes how elites reduce 
programmes’ democratic potentials by appropriating the opportunities for other 
participants to engage in public politics. Before formally exploring the theory, it is 
necessary to outline the meanings and use of its constituent words. This should also 
give readers a better idea of my inspiration for this turn of phrase.  
‘Isomorphism’ and ‘isomorphic mimicry’ have been terms used in biology since the 
19th century. They denote ‘the process by which one organism mimics another to 
gain an evolutionary advantage’ (Krause, 2013:1). They have since been taken up 
within other fields to describe situations in which individuals, organisations or entire 
systems take on similar shapes, forms and sizes to others. Within development, the 
idea of isomorphic mimicry has been used to cast doubt on the success of large, 
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donor funded top-down institutional reform programmes (Pritchett et al., 2010; 
Andrews, 2012). Critics’ research suggests that recipient states are often incentivised 
to take the forms prescribed by experts without adopting the attendant mind-sets or 
developing contextually sensitive practices. This, they argue, is why years of 
development programmes aimed at institutional reforms have had ambiguous 
results. Such arguments have given rise to calls to ‘do development differently’ by 
acknowledging and carefully working with the social and political norms that animate 
societies (Ramalingam, 2013; Levy, 2014). These calls are explored further later.  
Perhaps due to its overtly political or disruptive connotations, ‘activism’ is not 
currently a popular term amongst Western state based and multilateral development 
organisations.268 I use it here instead of social accountability as it better captures 
what programme participants actually do in young clientelistic democracies with few 
or compromised formal accountability mechanisms.269 Indeed, as my research 
suggests, rather than using information to activate formal procedures or blindly 
trying unresponsive official channels, they engage in an assemblage of practices. 
These will often include creative combinations of actions that draw upon their 
existing identities, aspirations, networks and political connections, and, in some 
cases, will encompass civil disobedience. This enables them to build new collective 
identities, raise their voice and publicly engage authorities. The common thread is a 
shared idea of the public good and a commitment to realising it through actions in 
the public sphere. The longer-term goal is often building public relationships with 
state-based and political authorities that enable them to consistently have a say in 
types of lives they want to lead.270  
I theorise that: isomorphic activism occurs when elite participants in social 
accountability programmes use their positions within wider clientelistic networks to 
publicly adopt the form and shape of activism, whilst privately appropriating the 
                                                 
268 This does not include international non-governmental organisations, such as Oxfam or ActionAid, who 
routinely describe their activities as activism. 
269 A similar point is made by Boulding (2014) in her study of Bolivian NGOs. 
270 In this sense, social accountability in states such as Pakistan is, albeit on a micro-level, much closer to what 
civil society theorists described as happening in Eastern Europe and South America in the 1970s and 1980s. See 
Chapter Two. 
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opportunities programmes promise other participants to participate in public politics. 
Furthermore, I hypothesize that isomorphic activism is more likely in vastly unequal 
societies, when programmes rely on a small number of intermediaries to act as 
interlocutors with participants, and when they have predefined, often quantifiably 
measurable, templates of what civil society mobilisation, responsive governance and 
democratic political participation – in short, ‘success’ – looks like. 
The conditions for isomorphic activism outlined below do not need to occur in a 
specific order and they will be present in different contexts to different degrees. 
However, all should be understood as limiting the potential of social accountability 
programmes to contribute to democratising projects in clientelistic states. 
The first condition of isomorphic activism concerns the ability of one or a group of 
powerful programme participants to build associations within which most members 
are connected to them in some way.271 This can hinder the idea of identity formation 
central to activism. In STAEP this process occurred from the start and accelerated as 
the programme sought new entrants to fill its targets for mobilisation. It was also 
aided when some of the CRGs split due to rivalries. 
The second concerns the ability of elites to drive the processes, bargains and 
decisions that lead to desired outcomes or successes into the private sphere.272 This 
contravenes the requirement of publicness common to visions of activism and 
democratisation. Within STAEP, this was most clearly demonstrated by the way some 
elites used private meetings with politicians to gain their CRGs’ most prestigious 
successes. This was confirmed by other participants’ lack of participation in these 
meetings or knowledge of what went on.  
The third condition of isomorphic activism is the ability of elites to convince others, 
including programme participants, implementing organisations and donors, that they 
are not engaged in the previous two activities.273 Within STAEP this was discernible 
                                                 
271 Drawing from Bourdieu’s ideas of different sorts of capitals.  
272 Drawing from Bourdieu’s idea that some will have the ability to bend the rules.  
273 Drawing from Bourdieu’s idea of symbolic capital. 
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through the way in which other participants would speak of the CRGs’ elites in 
reverent terms and when the mentoring NGOs rubber stamped their positions as the 
groups’ leaders. It was also evident from the annual reviews’ official fictions.  
The last condition concerns the ability of elites to appropriate the energies of, and 
opportunities intended for, other programme participants. This distinguishes 
isomorphic activism from theories of elite capture or control that concentrate on 
material benefits. Instead, the emphasis is on the political reputations participants 
can individually and collectively accrue through their efforts to raise their voices, and 
the public relationships they can form with authorities through repeated 
engagements. This recognises that challenging clientelism and the advancing 
democratising projects requires the formation of new individual and collective 
political identities, and of new mutually supportive public relationships that straddle 
the conceptual society-state divide. Indeed, I argue that this double movement is 
more important for democratic outcomes than the provision of information or 
getting things done. 
Before moving on, a brief comment on my hypotheses. They all suggest that the 
more powerful an elite relative to other programme participants the easier they will 
find it to dominate associations and drive crucial engagements into the private 
sphere. Moreover, the less likely they are to be challenged when doing so. However, I 
would add that my research indicates that some donors’ continued enthusiasm for 
rendering what are political programmes technical provides additional opportunities 
for elites to engage in isomorphic activism. Indeed, where programme’s reporting 
routines and outcomes are reduced to quantifiable activities, wealthy and educated 
elites will have an advantage in occupying positions as their frontline ‘experts’, able 
to fulfil donors’ reductive images of what civil society activism looks like. This 
problem will likely be compounded when they are also the primary interlocutors 
between a programme’s implementers and the communities it seeks to work in.    
Although isomorphic activism is always likely to be an issue, efforts to address it 
require better understandings of local politics, including individual programme 
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participants’ positions within political networks. The first requires programmes to 
conduct thorough appraisals of the places they work, at both the societal and 
governance levels they want to work at (e.g. neighbourhoods and district 
administrations). Here I join others that argue that the context matters and that tools 
such as political economy analyses must be mainstreamed, that they cannot just be 
conducted at the national level, that they are best conducted by locals, and that they 
must be updated throughout a programme’s lifespan (Menocal and Sharma, 2008; 
O’Meally, 2013; Grandvoinnet et al., 2015). However, I also argue that programmes 
that seek to engage and draw upon the capacities of locally influential non-state 
actors have an additional responsibility. They must be able to account for how their 
participants are positioned within wider, potentially clientelistic, networks and how 
they may be able to use these positions to subvert the programme’s broader aims, 
whilst still achieving its measurable outputs.  
The use of Bourdieu’s ideas of capitals (social, economic, cultural, political, and 
symbolic) in Chapter Eight suggests that those with the potential to drive the 
processes underpinning isomorphic activism are likely to derive their power from a 
range of contextually specific sources. This makes cut-off points based on indicators 
such as wealth or political party membership for who is and is not allowed to take 
part in programmes arbitrary. Moreover, there is no predefined reason why one elite 
would use his or her power in such ways and another not. Instead, I would argue that 
alongside political economy analyses, three overlapping things can be done to detect 
and limit the chances of isomorphic activism:  
Firstly, very rough and ready social network analyses. Although the methodology has 
long been used to model elites and their relations, I do not think statistical analyses 
are required (Lauman and Pappi, 1976; Knoke, 1990). Rather, simply asking 
participants in programmes about their backgrounds, memberships and affiliations, 
and combining their answers with political economy analyses should give astute 
programmers an idea of their potentials to engage in isomorphic activism. This will 
also allow for an understanding of the political representativeness – whichever way 
that is defined – of the groups programmes support. Employing NGOs and 
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programme managers from the places in which programmes are implemented can 
greatly help these aims. 
Secondly, if outsiders aim to support people to engage authorities, a minimum 
requirement must be that they do so in public. As stressed, by driving advocacy 
efforts and negotiations into the private sphere elites both undermine and gain 
opportunities to appropriate others’ collective efforts. They also deny them 
opportunities to object to their actions, to engage authorities, and to form their 
individual and collective identities. In this regard, it is notable that Chapter Nine’s 
vignettes showed how personal political relationships may still be drawn upon to 
create opportunities for other members to publicly engage authorities. Alongside 
such opportunities, I suggest that the wider group must be told what occurred in 
private meetings and given the opportunity to overturn decisions.  
Lastly, Joshi (2014) has called for programmes to adopt a ‘causal chain’ approach to 
understand how the context affects desired outcomes. Broadly, this means unpicking 
each step of a programme’s theory of change, asking questions such as: Is the 
information provided to participants useful? Is the information credible? Can citizens 
mobilise? Which citizens mobilise? Will their actions have any impact? Who will be 
their allies and opponents outside of and within the state? Who benefits from the 
outcomes? What are the likely long-term results?274 I suggest social accountability 
programmes could usefully adopt such a strategy to follow participants from an 
issue’s identification to its resolution. This could be done randomly or be targeted at 
specific groups. These ideas might seem like a high bar for programmes, but without 
them there is a significant risk of missing opportunities to contribute to ongoing 
democratising projects or strengthening undemocratic networks. 
 
                                                 
274 Not all of these are Joshi’s (2014) questions. I have added some to address the problem of isomorphic 
mimicry in social accountability programmes in clientelistic states. Moreover, the list is by no means 
exhaustive.  
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Politicised empowerment 
This section uses the thesis’ empirical research findings to argue that deeper 
understandings are needed of people’s reasons for participating within donors’ 
programmes, including their political aspirations, and how these are embedded 
within the wider power and politics of the places they live. Doing so should 
encourage a rethink of what success looks like in voluntary programmes 
implemented in young clientelistic democracies with few formal accountability 
mechanisms. 
In its chapter on empowerment, 2004’s World Development Report referenced 
Appadurai's (2001, 2004) idea of the ‘capacity to aspire’. However, I took it to task in 
Chapter Four for leaving his work unexplored. Had the report’s authors not done so, 
they may have seen his suggestion that to support the empowerment of people in 
developing countries outsiders should think in terms of a ‘cultural map of 
aspirations’. These maps detail the social norms that either limit or expand what 
people view as possible. Appadurai argues that, when directly asked by researchers 
or authorities, poor people’s maps will mostly be concerned with very immediate and 
day-to-day needs. Furthermore, if these maps remain unconnected to wider 
structures, such as discourses and status inequalities, outsiders are likely to 
incorrectly assume that they have little desire for transformational changes. This risks 
an undue focus on the ‘science’ and ‘calculation’ of poverty and disempowerment, 
and it can limit support to efforts to change participants ‘conduct of conducts’. To 
avert this, he concludes that development programmes should place their proposed 
‘techniques’ or ‘material inputs’ inside their participants’ aspirational maps and view 
them against their wider contexts. In what follows, I use my research to do this, 
drawing out the meanings of empowerment for STAEP’s participants. 
Before proceeding, a caveat: aside from women, STAEP tried but, in practice, often 
failed to include those belonging to Pakistan’s marginalised groups. Furthermore, my 
research suggests that unless programmes seek to raise small groups of activists by 
paying for their time and expenses, especially in the country’s vast rural regions, they 
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are unlikely to be able to include poorer participants in any substantive way. Thus, I 
do not claim any broad generalisability for the following observations. Instead, I 
provide a snapshot of members of Pakistan’s middle-classes that volunteered for a 
largely experimental programme, at a particular time in the country’s history. 
Nonetheless, I hope it will be of use to others working in similar contexts. 
My research highlighted that participants join voluntary programmes such as STAEP 
for a variety of reasons, many of which have little to do with its declared aims. For 
example, within the studied CRGs some participants joined out of curiosity about 
what goes on within NGOs, some valued the opportunity the programme provided to 
socialise, and others were persuaded by their kin and acquaintances to attend a few 
meetings as a favour to them, to make up numbers. There was also a significant 
element that saw the programme as an opportunity to gain skills and contacts that 
could lead to future employment. Indeed, many went on to work for the CRGs’ 
mentoring NGOs. In this sense, my interviewees’ reasons for joining the voluntary 
programme were as diverse as one would expect them to be in other contexts. 
However, I also found that many of the most active participants saw the CRGs as an 
opportunity to continue their localised social work and to realise their political 
ambitions. With regards to the first, my research suggested that within Pakistan there 
is a section of society, often referred to as ‘social workers’, that play a valuable role 
helping the less fortunate and less educated to engage and navigate the state’s 
bureaucracy. This, many suggested, is a necessary feature of life under a state with 
opaque institutions and procedures, and prone to everyday exclusions and 
corruption. The most respected social workers were often talked of in reverential 
terms, with interviewees praising their lack of other motives, personal or political. 
Amongst some of the programme’s participants, there was a desire to learn how to 
become social workers, which it was generally suggested requires free time, a 
familiarity with the state’s institutions and relationships with authorities.  
The social accountability discourse’s promise of depersonalised, efficient state and 
private services seeks to do away with the need for such actors. However, within 
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states such as Pakistan this is a long-term, generational goal. Thus, programmes that 
want immediate, quantifiable impacts should support those that wish to become 
social workers ‘in the meantime’. Broadly viewed, STAEP did this, providing trainings 
on the workings of the state, including such basic information as different 
departments’ responsibilities, bureaucratic procedures and their internal hierarchies. 
Many interviewees spoke of the value of such knowledge, which should not be 
confused with efforts to make people aware of their rights. However, the link 
between the everyday work of social workers and wider democratising projects is far 
from clear.  
Providing the start of an answer, it was notable that many of the CRGs’ most active 
members saw their participation in STAEP’s social work as a way to build their 
political reputations and relationships. As long as they did not attempt to appropriate 
collective efforts or credit, this was not widely considered to be a problem by 
others.275 Nonetheless, donors often view political parties or politicised associations 
as something to be avoided or denied. Although part of the reason may be fear of 
being seen to interfere in foreign countries’ affairs and laws that prevent them from 
doing so, I have argued that another is due to their unpredictability and the difficult 
of quantifying their activities. Indeed, there is little room for political ideas or 
identities within neoliberal ideals of citizenship and governance. Thus, even when 
they aim to change how it is done, programmes often proceed with an official fiction 
that they stop where politics begins.  
Despite this, towards its end, STAEP sought to acknowledge its participants’ political 
aspirations. This was done in a number of ways, such as through the creation of 
Citizens’ Charters that presented lists of local demands and wider policies to 
candidates in 2013’s national elections, and the training of 20,000 women to 
compete in the anticipated local elections. Although these initiatives are to be 
welcomed, I argue that to fulfil their claims to support ongoing democratising 
projects, programmes must acknowledge participants’ ‘day-to-day’ political 
                                                 
275 Upon reflection, I suspect that one of the reasons this was initially difficult for me to grasp is that Western 
conceptions of charity and the third sector call for such overlaps to be masked or denied. 
345 
 
aspirations and identities. Indeed, rather than denying politics and, thereby, giving 
powerful actors opportunities to capture programmes, it should be embraced as the 
primary means of affecting change. 
On the one hand, this would require that the spaces donors support allow these 
aspirations to be publicly aired and debated, with rules devised to minimise the 
operation of overt and hidden power. As Chapter Two’s discussion of the 1990s civil 
society theorists suggested, this requires an effort to ‘unbracket inequalities in the 
sense of explicitly thematising them’ through no-holds-barred discussions and 
various levelling mechanisms such as voting, agreed upon rules of argumentation or 
defined spaces for marginalised groups (Fraser, 1990:64). Nonetheless, as already 
argued, such efforts must be contextually specific, with participants’ preferences and 
innovations generally given precedence over Western normative ideals of internal 
elections, transparency or communicative procedures.  
On the other hand, it would mean acknowledging that political identities and 
aspirations will be leveraged in efforts to get things done. What is important is that 
this occurs in public or, failing this, that it leads to opportunities for others to publicly 
engage political authorities. Some of the CRGs’ members suggested that the 
programme encouraged them to create the latter. For example, a female participant 
from Multan city described how her CRG held ‘corner meetings’ for which politically 
connected members invited politicians from different parties.276 At the gathering, 
members of the public were given opportunities to make demands of the politicians. 
The same CRG would also find out where politicians planned to hold their own 
gatherings and turn up en masse with local women and the press to raise issues. It is 
perhaps no coincidence that this interviewee was part of the group of female ex-
councillors that encouraged one of the CRGs’ members to publicly challenge a local 
politician by running for his provincial assembly seat despite having little reason to 
believe she would win. 
                                                 
276 Sana Mirani, female, 40-50, member urban Gujrat (06/10/2015 & 09/10/2015). 
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The role of information in social accountability programmes in clientelistic states with 
few formal accountability mechanisms should also be re-examined. My research 
found that the participants’ use of ‘information’ was less about sanctioning 
authorities or even tracking improvements in service provisions, and more about 
beginning conversations that could lead to the resolution of specific demands and 
relationships with authorities. Furthermore, governance monitoring data was often 
augmented with CRG members’ own efforts to do their ‘homework’ and create a ‘file’ 
on specific issues containing additional information, statements and press clippings 
before approaching authorities. This detective like work is much closer to what 
activists do when campaigning on local issues.277 It is also far more political in the 
sense that it often points to the specific causes of problems and highlights those that 
are suffering in more granular ways than institutional performance measures. It is 
notable that a raft of state institutions in Pakistan are now producing publicly 
available performance data. However, this data is rarely linked to political decisions 
in the press and quite difficult for most to interpret. Thus, there is a danger of 
information overload, with programmes and states producing data that is rarely used 
to hold them to account. Donors could support both the more detective type of data 
collection and the use of state produced data with trainings in basic analysis 
techniques to activist groups and the media. 
Amongst the most active members of social accountability programmes in states 
such as Pakistan, many are likely to already be close to or positioned within political 
networks. As Tilly (2007) suggests, these identities can paradoxically lead to 
opportunities to have their members interests debated and challenged in the public 
sphere; essentially, put to the test. If this was the goal of social accountability 
programmes, indicators that track their progress and evaluate them would not just 
focus on demands raised through official channels or, as is increasingly common, 
institutional performance. Instead, they may be assessed on creating opportunities 
for public deliberations, the formation of public relationships with reform minded 
authorities, or the politicisation of issues and institutions that were previously 
                                                 
277 The frequency with which this occurred across research sites leads me to believe this was part of the CRGs’ 
training but I could not confirm this. 
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dominated by networks of power and privilege. They may also directly seek to 
support new entrants into political society and track their progress, whether that is 
informally as leaders of their own associations or formally as candidates in elections. 
These are difficult suggestions that require more complex and contextually situated 
understandings of what empowerment and democratic ‘successes’ might look like at 
the micro-level in clientelistic states and from the perspective of programmes’ 
participants. They are also unlikely to be achieved within the average span of 
development programmes which often begin and end over a single parliament.  
Acknowledging the political identities and aspirations of participants would further 
help counter reductive visions of civil societies as somehow apolitical or as tabula 
rasas that programmes are implemented upon. Instead, those that seek to contribute 
to wider ongoing democratising projects may devote more energy to supporting 
existing networks that are already struggling to create opportunities for people to 
participate in public politics, addressing political injustices and challenging clientelism 
by exposing its moral and material foundations. My research suggests that in Pakistan 
women that were affiliated with groups, such as the Aurat Foundation, that grew out 
of struggles for rights and democracy in the 1980s provide a promising start. Indeed, 
those connected to them had more radical visions for their CRGs’ than their fellow 
participants and were already plugged into political networks that helped them 
achieve their aims.  
Efforts to identify and work with such participants and networks may be particularly 
important for voluntary programmes and for those that want to see ‘new’ faces enter 
formal politics. International actors may also help to link them with others working 
on similar issues at home and abroad, and play a protective role when allies cannot 
be found within the state to shield groups from coercive opposition (Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998; Appadurai, 2001; Kaldor, 2003a). Such an approach also seems far 
more realistic than efforts to artificially create civil society from the top-down in 
places that outsiders know little about. However, a note of caution: As discussed in 
Chapter Five, in countries such as Pakistan foreign fingerprints have, on occasion, 
proved harmful to civic organisations and nascent social movements (Akhtar, 2006; 
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Bano, 2012). Thus, the form and visibility of outsiders’ support must be carefully 
negotiated on a case by case basis, with locals setting the agenda and identifying 
windows of opportunity to push for desired changes.    
It may be argued, however, that stories such as those in the Chapter Nine’s vignettes 
are too contingent on seemingly uncontrollable factors, such as participants’ pre-
existing identities and the availability of ‘worthy’ causes, for donor organisations to 
support. Moreover, this makes throwing their expertise and symbolic weight behind 
them a risk that could end in failure or embarrassment. It might also be argued that 
their sporadic, localised nature means they are unlikely to have broader or lasting 
impacts in clientelistic states. In response, I reply that if donors wish to social 
engineer state-society relations, in any way, they have a duty under the ‘do no harm’ 
principle to understand their programmes’ participants’ identities and aspirations. 
This includes understanding how the processes they support play out in the long-run, 
after funding has ceased. Doing otherwise risks contributing to unintended processes 
such as isomorphic activism.  
Before moving on, it is necessary to briefly further comment on the challenge of 
mobilising poorer voters to participate in programmes that seek to raise their voice. 
Addressing this, Blair (2005) argues that in ‘patronage democracies’ such as 
Bangladesh and Pakistan, where Wood’s (2003) ‘Faustian bargain’ characterises the 
lives of large numbers of poor voters, efforts to support civil society advocacy 
programmes should proceed with caution.278 For the most part, they should seek to 
mobilise coalitions of more secure poor and middle-class activists to advocate on 
issues that have universal appeal and are unlikely to induce immediate repression 
from elites or the state. For example, Blair argues that advocacy organisations 
focused on improvements to education services and, perhaps, crime could unite 
voters across Bangladesh, whilst also avoiding issues with elite capture due to the 
minimal rents that can be accrued in the sector. Only later, when such campaigns 
have provided safe training grounds for poorer voters and forged working 
                                                 
278 See Chapter Two for detail on patronage democracies (Chandra 2007). 
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relationships across class divisions can issues which more directly affect the poor’s 
welfare be taken up, such as labour rights or land reforms. Such an approach seems 
sensible, but it calls for programmes to play out over decades and successive 
governments rather than the four- or five- year life spans that are currently common 
to the international development sector.  
In findings that echo my own, Blair (2018) has recently used a review of social 
accountability initiatives in India argue that civil society advocacy efforts should be 
combined with more formalised, tools-based (e.g. scorecards, right to information 
and participatory budgeting) programmes, especially when policy changes are the 
goal. Indeed, he argues that the country’s ongoing democratisation project has 
benefited from the ‘rise of the plebeians’ by which he means a new strata of lower 
caste political activists and politicians able to use such tools and raise their voices to 
hold authorities to account (Jaffrelot and Kumar, 2009). He warns, however, that 
when focussed on local-level goals or service provision, the middle-classes and elites 
will often still dominate the public sphere and, thereby, disproportionately accrue 
benefits of the plebeians’ efforts. Blair concludes, therefore, that more research is 
needed to discern which combination of social accountability tools and modes of 
advocacy are most effective at helping the poor. Whilst I agree with this call, there is 
little sign of a similar ‘plebeian’ class in contemporary Pakistan.  
 
Enabling what? 
This section briefly comments upon the implications of my research for the 
contemporary literature on social accountability. Broadly characterised, the field is 
grappling with a growing consensus that information is not sufficient for 
accountability relationships or for wider desired changes, such as institutional 
reforms or democratisation. It is also coming to terms with the difficulty of engaging 
the power and politics of the places within which programmes are implemented. I 
argue that the recent focus on supporting ‘enabling environments’ for accountability 
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must mean more than reforming or establishing state institutions. I also suggest that 
efforts to ‘vertically integrate’ programmes by connecting them to different levels of 
governance risks falling foul of isomorphic activism. Lastly, I comment on the 
accountability of programmes themselves. 
In a recent paper on social accountability programmes, Fox (2015) – a long proponent 
of the idea that accountability relationships are embedded in politics – argues that 
calls for an expanded evidence base as to ‘what works’ are largely misguided. His 
argument is premised on systematic evidence reviews that all broadly conclude that 
the context is as important, if not more important than, the types of accountability 
tools programmes adopt and the information they provide (O’Neil et al., 2007; 
O’Meally, 2013; Grandvoinnet et al., 2015). He supports his argument with re-
readings of influential impact evaluations of programmes in Indonesia and India that 
suggest that practitioners often miss or overlook the unique contextual factors that 
lead to or block accountability (Olken, 2007; Banerjee et al., 2010). These often 
include ongoing efforts by states to improve services and to institutionalise formal 
accountability mechanisms, and the establishment of regular, public interfaces 
between citizens and responsible authorities. Fox concludes that we need deeper 
analytical concepts and tools to understand programmes’ prospects in any given 
context. 
In many ways, Fox’s work is an effort to take seriously the World Development Report 
2004’s suggestion that its own somewhat simplistic foundational model of 
accountability relationships ‘is not reality because it portrays only one direction in the 
relationships between actors. Rather actors are embedded in a complex set of 
relationships, and accountability is not always the most important’ (WB, 2003:53). 
Indeed, even at the time, some were quick to argue that it had little to say about how 
the ‘chain of delegation’ that links citizens and authorities is often more complex in 
clientelistic states (Joshi and Moore, 2004). Thus, much of the subsequent literature 
has sought to show how accountability programmes are affected by a limitless list of 
contextual variables. 
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Amongst it, a recent effort from the World Bank stands out for according 
‘information’ equal importance alongside opportunities for ‘citizen-state interfaces’ 
and ‘civic mobilisation’ (Grandvoinnet et al., 2015). It views these three elements as 
the ‘levers’ for encouraging collective and collaborative state and citizen actions. It 
also recognises that coalitions of state and non-state actors have proved central to 
successful transitions towards accountability in many developing countries. This 
includes the role played by political parties, trade unions, professional associations, 
social movements, and CBOs that are able to work towards the improvement of 
state-society relations and, importantly, across the state-society divide. However, in 
an acknowledgement of the way power is often spread in developing countries, the 
framework places the state above citizens, and suggests that developments in any 
one of its three elements will constrain or enable opportunities in the others. For 
example, mobilisation might result in a backlash from the state constraining 
opportunities for interfaces. Thus, the framework seeks to provide an understanding 
of the power and politics of accountability grounded in historical experiences, rather 
than the reductive governance models long favoured by Western development 
organisations. 
My research is broadly supportive of efforts to unpick contextual conditions. 
However, it suggests that in states such as Pakistan where politics is often highly 
localised, with different dynamics from union council to union council, the focus on 
the context must also be situated at this level. Indeed, although limited by a small 
number of cases, my quantitative analysis of the CRGs’ activities suggested that even 
district level contextual features, such as violence and political competition, were not 
that influential for their abilities to engage in activism. Instead, my qualitative 
research found that they were enabled or restricted by the localised forms politics 
and clientelism takes across Pakistan, and by the identities of individual programme 
participants.  
Given this, Joshi's (2014) ‘causal chain’ studies may have to be carried out at the sub-
national, local level. They will also have to account for the evolving range of actors 
involved in potentially hidden clientelistic processes, from union bosses to leaders of 
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CBOs, and those in potentially democratic processes, such as women’s networks and 
energetic youth. This requires fine-grained understandings of local contexts, with 
assumptions as to the democratic or undemocratic intentions of different actors and 
associations consistently tested. Some programmes are approaching such challenges 
by slowly rolling out their activities, rather than beginning at scale. Nonetheless, 
there remain great incentives for many to expand fast by seizing upon evidence of 
what works to create replicable models. I would suggest this is unwise in diverse and 
fast changing places such Pakistan and, instead, programmes of this sort should be 
afforded longer durations to understand each new context they wish to work in. 
Fox’s (2015) work also distinguishes between ‘tactical’ and ‘strategic’ social 
accountability programmes. Tactical programmes are bounded interventions that 
assume citizens will be spurned into collective action by the provision of information 
or what could be called the old way of thinking about social accountability. Thus, they 
are limited to society- or demand- side efforts to amplify citizens’ voices and often 
focus on the generation of information through specific accountability tools, such as 
citizens’ score cards or participatory budgeting. In contrast, strategic approaches 
'deploy multiple tactics, encourage enabling environments for collective action for 
accountability and coordinate citizens’ voice with governmental reforms. This often 
involves the use of coordinated activities, such as efforts to combine media 
campaigns and information on service provision with activist trainings to citizens and 
the enshrining of new legislation. Strategic programmes are posited as more 
promising than tactical because they work on both vertical accountability or citizens’ 
‘voice’, and the mechanisms and institutions able to sanction underperforming 
authorities, which Fox terms ‘teeth’. However, it is worth exploring these sorts of 
programmes further. 
Firstly, they call for the creation of enabling environments for social accountability 
within which citizens’ have reasons to believe that the benefits of challenging the 
status quo outweigh the potential costs. This is crucial to broader democratising 
projects because the decisions, actions and risks citizens that participate in public 
politics face vary from country to country, province to province, or, even, from village 
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to village. For example, studies of India’s right to information laws have shown that 
voice can be fatal in some contexts, whilst in others it can expedite access to welfare 
programmes (Peisakhin and Pinto, 2010; Pande, 2014). At the same time, authorities’ 
willingness to respond to citizens’ issues differ, with some seemingly incentivised by 
reforms that stand to materially benefit themselves or their supporter base, and 
others fearful of potential sanctions for poor performance or abusive behaviour. This 
has caused programmes to begin exploring ways that they can combine mobilisation 
efforts with the establishment or reform of formal accountability institutions, such as 
by working with local police forces, ombudsman or right to information laws. As my 
research suggests, the lack of such institutions and a belief that they were 
compromised was a major reason STAEP’s participants did not pursue sanctions 
against authorities. Thus, if programmes can avoid the pitfalls of institutional 
reforms, such efforts seem well judged. 
Other commentators have sought to expand the meaning of an enabling 
environment. For example, Hickey and King (2016) argue that awareness of how 
social norms and political ideologies shape social accountability initiatives is needed. 
As my research suggests, this can be particularly important in states where 
clientelistic practices are broadly considered legitimate. Understanding social 
accountably programmes in such contexts as efforts to (re)negotiate a community’s, 
administrative unit’s or country’s hypothetical ‘social contract’ is one way of 
combating such norms (Joshi and Houtzager, 2012; Hickey and King, 2016). This 
requires programmes to be as much about fostering societal discourses around 
citizens’ entitlements, the state’s obligations, its legitimacy and the way politics is 
generally done, as they are about the technical tools of accountability, information, 
and institutional reforms. Furthermore, as part of the former, programmes should 
seize opportunities to politicise – by attaching them to politicians, policies or 
clientelistic networks – citizens’ demands and issues when they arise. I argue that 
programmes that acknowledge and seek to harness their participants’ political 
identities in the ways already outlined would have an advantage in such efforts. 
Indeed, studies of actually existing civil societies suggest individuals and groups with 
links to political parties that publicly ‘politicise the pothole’ are able to turn local 
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issues into healthy contests with broader ramifications and spill-over effects (Abers, 
1998, 2002).  
Secondly, it has recently been argued that strategic programmes require the creation 
of vertically integrated citizen-state interfaces at multiple governance levels, such as 
with front line service providers, departments responsible for service delivery and 
national oversight institutions (Fox and Aceron, 2016). In its last year, STAEP sought 
to vertically integrate its CRGs with similar, but smaller, citizens’ groups created at 
the district and provincial levels. These groups consisted of the most active and 
influential members of the existing CRGs who were elected by their colleagues to 
participate in the new forums. The idea was that they could act as conduits, allowing 
identified demands and issues to be passed up and pressure applied at higher levels 
of the state’s administration. It was also hoped that this would encourage the 
programme’s participants to take up issues of legislation, democratic process and the 
efficient provision of broad, non-targetable public goods. However, the programme 
ended shortly after the groups were established, providing little time to see how they 
would function in practice. Nonetheless, the model has been adopted by similar 
programmes in Pakistan (Kirk, 2017). 
I would caution, however, that efforts to build vertically integrated forums at 
different levels of a state’s governance apparatus risk the creation of additional 
channels for existing patronage networks. Indeed, using my theory of isomorphic 
activism as a model, it is possible to imagine situations within which powerful and 
politically connected actors dominate entire chains of citizen-sate interfaces, 
ensuring who participates, on what terms, and which issues are tabled. Moreover, if 
the success of these structures is measured in terms of what they get done, rather 
than the opportunities they create for broad participation in public politics, 
programmes that create them risk taking anti-democratic processes and networks 
into the heart of the state. In this way, the promise of the social accountability 
discourse to contribute to democratising projects would be given over to the same 
sort of searches for replicable models that programmes devoted to institutional 
reforms are now widely understood to have succumbed to. Avoiding this requires 
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nuanced, contextually grounded understandings of the overlaps between power, 
clientelistic politics, and donors’ programmes.   
Lastly, my thesis contributes to ongoing debates within a movement amongst 
development practitioners that proposes to ‘do development differently’. Its 
members call for a rethink of how the political determinants of persistent 
underdevelopment can be tackled (Hickey, 2012; Carothers and de Gramont, 2013; 
Devarajan and Khemani, 2016).279 They begin from the aforementioned studies that 
argue that a long succession of top-down, donor driven institutional reform projects 
have failed because of states’ abilities to mimic donors’ prescribed forms (Pritchett et 
al., 2010; Andrews, 2012). However, echoing the aidnography authors, they often 
add that donors seek to define the problems their programmes address without 
understanding the cultures or histories of the societies they intervene in. This leads 
to a lack of ownership and, in some cases, unintended consequences. Some voices 
within this movement suggest that a major part of the remedy is a renewed focus on 
‘bottom-up’, ‘adaptive’, ‘politically smart’ and ‘locally led’ projects (Booth and 
Unsworth, 2014; Wild et al. 2015; MC and IRC, 2016). 
Proponents of this way of working often argue that the citizens closest to the actors 
and institutions responsible for service delivery are best placed to identify the 
enablers and obstacles to the problems they face. Furthermore, they are more likely 
to act collectively, to form synergistic coalitions with power-holders, and to challenge 
the status quo if they have a say in which problems to tackle first. They suggest that 
such an approach requires both a hard-nosed realism as to what may be possible and 
when given the way power is spread within each society, and a measure of idealism 
that encourages issues of social justice to be addressed and that supports the 
advance of radical democratising projects. In many contexts they also argue that such 
goals are likely to require that outsiders be willing to work at ‘arm’s length’ so as not 
to delegitimise the actors and processes they seek to support (Booth, 2013).280 
                                                 
279 See also: ‘The ‘Doing Development Differently’ Manifesto’. http://doingdevelopmentdifferently.com/ 
(Accessed 14/06/16) 
280 For more on this see: ‘The Sidekick Manifesto’ http://sidekickmanifesto.org/ (Accessed 20/10/16) 
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Strategic social accountability programmes that seek to generate information that is 
actionable and to create an enabling environment for well-timed collective action 
accord with many of these principles. Indeed, they aim to empower citizens to 
mobilise and identify their own problems, thereby, promising to address the 
accusation of neo-imperialism or trusteeship levelled by some commentators. In 
doing so, they seek to change how politics is done and by whom in clientelistic states. 
These are lofty goals that this chapter has argued require both more empirical 
evidence of how such efforts are met by actors on the ground, and better 
understandings of the roles donors’ programmes play in opening or closing 
opportunities for radical democratising projects.  
I argue, however, that beyond participants identifying problems, local ownership 
requires creating opportunities for them to have their voices heard in monitoring and 
evaluating efforts. This is not new, with calls for self-assessments, stakeholder 
evaluations, and joint evaluations arising in tandem with the turn to participatory 
projects (Campilan, 2000; Fawcett et al., 2003; Chouinard and Cousins, 2015). They 
suggest programmes should harness tools that allow participants to assess them in 
their own vernaculars, such as through story-telling, social mapping exercises and 
diagramming. The idea is to overcome the distance between participant and expert 
discourses. They also seek to create room for the identities and aspirations of 
participants to sit alongside the goals of donors. My research suggests that given the 
way social accountability programmes’ opportunities to participate in public politics 
can be appropriated by hidden power inequalities such calls must be heeded. Indeed, 
they are likely to be the best way programmes can identify issues such as isomorphic 
activism and they are the only way they can claim internal accountability. Including 
participants’ voices in monitoring and evaluation efforts will also challenge the 
domination of quantitative measures that I suggest blind donors’ programmes to 
their full democratic potentials. 
Efforts to allow participants to evaluate programmes could be usefully 
complemented by Bair’s (2004) ‘advocacy scale’ for measuring the impact of civil 
society focussed democracy programmes. Aimed at addressing the limits of 
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programme assessments that count outputs, it judges when participation (indicated 
by mobilisation, voice and representation) leads to accountability (by transparency, 
empowerment and constituency benefits) and finally contestation (understood as a 
systemic increase in the plurality of competing political actors).281 It does this by 
asking evaluators to use qualitative methods, including participant and key informant 
interviews, to asses when these three components of democratisation are plausibly 
being added to. Blair’s scale also draws a distinction between mass-based civil society 
organisations or movements and trustee-based organisations, recognising that the 
latter may not always be representative of those they claim to speak for. Thus, they 
may have success at securing their constituencies’ benefits, whilst doing little to 
increase participation and, ultimately, plurality.  
Blair’s scale allows for rough comparisons of individual organisations and the diverse 
range of advocacy activities they may engage in that may contribute towards 
democratisation. It may also help outsiders to identify areas within which their 
programmes can have added value, such as when a well-intentioned elite dominated 
association is found to lack connections to the poor, or a CBO is struggling to forge its 
own connections with state and political authorities. This will assure that 
programmes offer support that is appropriate to the environments they work in and 
the challenges actual civil societies face. Although Blair’s scale is over a decade old, 
the prevailing trend in assessments of civil society and democracy programmes 
remains quantitative. Moreover, there appears to be little appetite within large 
development organisations for the sort of contextually sensitive research it requires 
of evaluators.282 
Before concluding, I want to address a question that some readers may by now have: 
put simply, is the idea of social accountability the latest of development’s long list of 
Deus ex Machinas? My answer is that it could be. Whilst at first this may seem weak, 
                                                 
281 Blair (2004) frames this problem as arising in programmes implemented by the United States Development 
Agency following a general drive to quantify government departments’ performances in the mid-1990s (the 
British experience with the managing for results agenda is discussed in Chapter Four).  
282 ‘Buzzwords and tortuous impact studies won't fix a broken aid system’, Guardian Online, 16th July 2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jul/16/buzzwords-crazes-broken-aid-system-poverty 
(Accessed 17/07/18) 
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the point, which I hope this thesis has shown, is that that the ideas development 
organisations espouse are often battle grounds for ideological struggles. Indeed, I 
have argued that the idea of social accountability is at risk of being subsumed within 
reductive neoliberal notions of governance and citizenship. Analysts can only get 
rough handles on the state of these struggles by exploring both the discourses and 
practices underpinning them. Doing so can uncover how certain ways of seeing and 
understanding the world are propagated and who benefits from them. It can also 
show how experts’ plans and techniques often have little effect on how people 
actually behave and what they aspire to. Yet, perhaps most importantly, it can reveal 
radical democratic alternatives that are grounded in the power and politics of actual 
civil societies.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter argued that donors’ attempts to harness the idea of civil society as a 
component within neoliberal visions of governance and citizenship render activism a 
technical exercise, depoliticising it and blinding themselves to both its democratic 
and undemocratic elements. I used my research on the STAEP programme to 
illustrate this in a contemporary clientelistic state. I argued, however, that due to a 
combination of the programme’s own contradictions, and its participants’ identities 
and aspirations, its efforts to depoliticise its activities were limited. Nonetheless, by 
harnessing the energies of its most powerful and politically connected members, the 
programme was able to translate its ground realities into its donor’s reductive 
discourse. This created an official fiction that is represented in its annual review 
documents.  
I theorised this process, terming it isomorphic activism. I argued that it results in the 
strengthening of undemocratic networks on the ground in places such as Pakistan, 
and that it risks the entrenchment of counter-productive neoliberal understandings 
of citizenship and governance within donor organisations. I then built an argument 
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that a focus on the aspirations of programme participants, how they actually use 
information and mobilise for change, and the micro-politics of clientelistic states 
would help donors to redefine their notion of what counts as success. In conclusion, 
the chapter turned to the more recent literature on social accountability, 
commenting upon how far it engages with power and politics. I argue that if 
development organisations wish to continue down this path, they must continuously 
challenge neoliberal understandings of the role of civil society in development and 
accord participants greater roles in evaluating their programmes. 
 
Thesis limitations  
Closing the distance between the thesis’ discourse analysis and fieldwork has been 
challenging. Indeed, it was not until the write up that I realised that approaching the 
programme’s annual reviews as representations of its donors’ discourses was a 
potentially valuable endeavour. As others have pointed out, this speaks to the 
difficulties faced by those studying and trying reconcile neoliberalism as a discourse 
and as bundles of practices with its observed effects in specific contexts (Peck, 2013). 
Indeed, even with two rigorous methodologies, analysts must often make a 
conceptual leap from one to another. They then face the additional challenge of 
bringing readers with them. I am interested to know how far the annual reviews 
represent a bridge for my readers. Given further time, I would also be interested to 
explore what other texts, perhaps including DFID’s brochures or write-ups of the 
programme in other material, could add to my analysis and further fill the 
interpretative gap. 
Although I stand by my early decision not to interview the authorities responsible for 
service provision - they often have little time and are unwilling to give their candid 
views - there is perhaps other ways to capture their perspectives. For example, it may 
have been possible to speak to those in their inner circles, such as political party 
workers, rather than the authorities themselves. Alternatively, I found local 
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journalists a wealth of information on local politics. Such methods are something I 
would like to explore as a way of understanding further why those within clientelistic 
networks may choose to have their interests publicly debated and why they may 
withdraw from such opportunities.  
It may be clear from the fieldwork chapters that I did not obtain as good an 
understanding of the story of rural Multan’s CRG. I attribute this to three main 
factors. Firstly, I failed to impress upon my research assistant for this stage the style 
of interviewing that gives participants the space to tell their stories. I take this as a 
lesson for future projects. Secondly, the group was located across a large rural area, 
with some interviewees taking several hours drive to reach. This cut down the 
number I tracked down and interviewed. Lastly, an unfolding security situation meant 
I could not return to Multan after my initial research stint. This was a major barrier as 
my best data came from conducting multiple interviews with those I identified as 
pivotal to the CRGs’ activities, often through going to dinner or simply hanging out 
with them. 
As befits a constructivist approach, I have sought to reflexively comment on my own 
positionality as a researcher throughout the thesis. Nonetheless, it is important to 
once again state that I consider my interpretations to be co-constructed with my 
research participants. Furthermore, they are of a particular programme, in a 
particular time and place. This means that my theory of isomorphic activism and 
comments on politicised empowerment are to be tested and judged by others. I 
sincerely hope that this would prove to be a useful exercise.  
 
Future research 
I would be interested in conducting further research in states characterised by 
clientelistic politics with weak formal accountability mechanisms, such as Nigeria or 
Afghanistan. Two areas would be of interest to me: Firstly, exploring the evolution 
361 
 
their civil societies, with a view to how donors’ discourses have shaped them. I 
believe the influence of decades of donor engagement of civil societies in such states 
is not very well understood, including the incentive structures they put in place and 
the opportunities they open or close down for radical democratising projects. 
Secondly, turning to activists themselves, I would like to conduct more work on how 
they see the political opportunity structures in the places they live, with a focus on 
how they use information and existing alliances with political actors to draw 
clientelistic networks into the public sphere. I believe that too often programmes 
assume that civil society actors are in need of instruction or techniques, rather than 
uncovering what they are already doing. In Pakistan there is a movement of Brick Kiln 
Workers and in recent years a few new political parties connected to civil society 
associations have emerged.  
I am also aware that there is an effort by researchers in Sussex University to use 
diaries to understand how people gain accountability relationships in developing 
country contexts. The idea is that people keep records of their efforts to demand 
responsive and accountable governance over extended periods. I believe it is 
theorised this will give researchers a better understanding of the ‘causal chains’ 
between citizens and governance, hopefully avoiding the problem of peoples’ 
reluctance to discuss the power and politics of the places they must live in with 
outsiders (Joshi, 2014). I would be keen to do something similar with participants in 
an ongoing social accountability programme. Such research could, I hope, reveal the 
inner workings of programmes, what happens outside of the gaze of implementers or 
foreign experts. It could also better understand the aspirations people actually have 
when they participate in programmes, as opposed to assuming their versions of the 
good life approximate those of its planners. 
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Personal reflections 
Researching and writing this thesis was in equal parts testing and rewarding. It was 
undertaken part-time over seven years. During this time, I fell ill and I spent the best 
part of two years away from my partner. Those around me picked me up time and 
again, despite the distance, self-doubt and introversion the process led to. 
I also feel I grew to understand my chosen industry – I use that word on purpose – in 
ways that a more idealistic, younger me did not. For the most part, this encompasses 
the realisation that development is not an altruistic calling, engaged in by a subset of 
enlightened people. Indeed, like all sectors, it is embedded in the interests and 
ideologies of wider networks, and those that work in it at all levels often have more 
immediate and pressing interests than radical democratising projects. This realisation 
has at times both depressed and motivated me, and I look forward to where it will 
take me in the future. 
Lastly, I have developed an affinity with Pakistan and its people. Throughout my 
research I did not experience the kinds of horror stories the Western press seems to 
enjoy printing about them. Instead, I often found myself wondering why so much 
attention is given to a few thousand violent extremists when there is a country of 
over 188 million inhabitants to understand. At the same time, however, I have come 
to realise that power really can be all pervasive, limiting the chances of the vast 
majority in overt and hidden ways. Despite this, I firmly believe that challenges to it 
will only come from the bottom-up and that outsiders that wish to support them 
should be both curious and humble.  
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Appendix 1 – Codebook developed for critical discourse analysis and coding 
samples 
 
Below is the codebook developed for the critical discourse analysis of the World 
Bank’s World Development Report 2004 and the texts from the Department of 
International Development (DFID). It includes the primary identified discourses and 
their subcategories. Not all of the discourses appeared within all of the analysed 
texts, but they represent the most forceful in my reading. 
 
PRIMARY DISCOURSE SUB-DISCOURSES 
  
Anti-State 
 
Ascribing Agency 
 
Civil Society Discourse Civil Society Discourse\Activism and Advocacy 
Civil Society Discourse\As space 
Civil Society Discourse\Bad Civil Society 
Civil Society Discourse\Capabilities 
Civil Society Discourse\Capture 
Civil Society Discourse\Citizenship 
Civil Society Discourse\Coalitions 
Civil Society Discourse\Community 
Civil Society Discourse\Co-production 
Civil Society Discourse\Global Civil Society 
Civil Society Discourse\Innovation and Experiments 
Civil Society Discourse\Media 
Civil Society Discourse\Mobilisation 
Civil Society Discourse\NGOs Service Delivery 
Civil Society Discourse\Non-Traditional CS 
Civil Society Discourse\Participation 
Civil Society Discourse\Social Capital 
Civil Society Discourse\Voice 
Clientelism 
 
Complexity 
 
Context Matters Discourse Context Matters\History 
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Context Matters\Relationships 
Context Matters\Transitional environments 
Corruption Discourse 
 
Consultation Discourse 
 
Cultural Discourse Cultural Discourse\Class 
Cultural Discourse\Gender 
Deleting Agency 
 
Democracy Discourse Democracy Discourse\Deliberations 
Democracy Discourse\Empowerment Discourse 
Democracy Discourse\Inclusion Discourse 
Democracy Discourse\Social Contract 
Democracy Discourse\Substantive Democracy 
Economics Discourse Economics Discourse\Consumer Discourse 
Economics Discourse\Corporate Social Responsibility 
Economics Discourse\Entrepreneurial Discourse 
Economics Discourse\Growth 
Economics Discourse\Inequality and Fairness 
Economics Discourse\Information Discourse 
Economics Discourse\Reasonable 
Evidence Discourse 
 
Formalising 
 
Global Voices and 
Participation 
 
Globalisation Discourse 
 
Good Governance Discourse Good Governance\Decentralisation Discourse 
Good Quotes 
 
Horizontal Accountability 
 
Human Development 
Discourse 
 
Unequal Distribution 
Discourse 
 
Long Route to Accountability 
 
Making Markets Discourse Making Markets Discourse\Limits of Markets 
Making Markets Discourse\Privatisation 
Management Discourse Management Discourse\Results Agenda Discourse 
Management Discourse\VfM Efficiency Discourse 
Metaphor 
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Morality Discourse 
 
Politics Discourse Politics Discourse\Identity Politics 
Politics Discourse\Legitimacy 
Politics Discourse\Political Competition 
Politics Discourse\Political Participation 
Politics Discourse\Political Parties 
Politics Discourse\Political Settlement 
Poverty Discourse 
 
Power Discourse Power Discourse\Disciplining 
Power Discourse\Exclusion 
Power Discourse\Material 
Power Discourse\Surveillance 
Responsibility Discourse Responsibility Discourse\Blame 
Responsibility Discourse\Sub Contracting to Citizens 
Responsibility Discourse\Supporting Leadership 
Rights or Social Justice 
Discourse 
 
Role of Outsiders Role of Outsiders\Partnership with CS 
Role of Outsiders\Working Politically 
Security Discourse Security Discourse\Risk 
Short Route 
 
Spillover Discourse 
 
Technical Discourse Technical Discourse\Binary Problem Solution Discourse 
Technical Discourse\Governmentality Techniques 
Technical Discourse\Social Engineering 
Technical Discourse\Theory 
Technical Discourse\Trade Off 
Tone Tone\Ambiguity 
Tone\Conversational 
Tone\Middle Ground Conciliatory 
Tone\Newness 
Tone\Pragmatic 
Tone\Self-Critical 
Tone\Stewardship 
Tone\Utopian 
Uniqueness of DFID 
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WDR 2004 Discourse in DFID 
 
Welfare State Discourse 
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NVivo coding sample 
Below is an example of NVivo coding of DFID’s texts. It shows highlighted pieces of 
text and their codes on the right-hand side of the page. 
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Appendix 2 - Codebook for CRGs’ meeting minutes data 
 
This represents the codebook (next page) developed to investigate the CRGs’ 
meeting minutes. The purpose was to gain a quantitative and comparative 
understanding of their activities. This was done by coding the categories of issues 
identified by the CRGs, how many of these were raised with authorities, and how 
many were resolved to the satisfaction of the groups’ members. Only 122 of STAEP’s 
CRGs were coded. Those with incomplete data or located in Baluchistan were 
excluded from the analysis. The data was coded by research assistants. 
 
CODE BREAKDOWN ACTUALS 
Issue raised 
with authority  
Education Department 
9689 
Health Department 
District Police Officer 
Community Development Authority 
IT Department 
Works and Services 
District Coordination Officer 
Social Welfare 
Revenue 
Tehsil Municipal Officer 
Town Municipal Administration 
Agriculture department 
Member National Assembly 
Member Provincial Assembly 
Water and Power Development Authority 
Trade Union Representatives 
Finance and Planning Department 
Health 
Repairing of facilities 
752 
Absenteeism of staff 
Provision of basic facilities  
Appointment of staff 
Cleanliness  
Equipment 
Education 
Repairing of boundary wall 
1281 
Construction / renovation of facility 
Teachers / student absenteeism 
Upgrading of facility 
Other issues regarding facilities 
Electricity  
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Construction and repairing of roads / paths near facility 
Security  
Provision of mechanism for the implementation of law 
and order 
55 
Issues of women harassment 
Street crimes 
Right to 
Information 
Issues faced while getting information from state 
institution 
27 
General 
Infrastructure 
Construction / Repairing of roads 
3558 
Pavement or streets 
Irrigation channels 
Sewage issues 
Bridges 
Elections Issues related with identity card and voter registration 79 
Miscellaneous 
Removal of garbage 
3937 
Sewerage issues 
Encroachment issues 
Installation of water filtration plants 
Cleanliness and renovation of parks 
Installation of street lights 
Provision of transformers and connections of electricity 
Display of price list on shops 
Low wages of labours 
Appointment of sanitary works 
Absenteeism of sanitary workers 
Committee for monitoring 
Resolved Total no of issues resolved satisfactorily   416 
Unresolved Total no of issues not resolved satisfactorily   9273 
 
 
The coding did not record meetings with members of civil society (e.g. other citizens 
associations or local leaders). Furthermore, only meetings in which identified issues 
were clearly raised or discussed were recorded. Thus, general meetings, such as 
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courtesy calls between CRG members and authorities or those with mentoring NGOs, 
were not recorded. 
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Appendix 3 - Operationalising the CRGs’ contexts 
 
At the time of my research, it was increasingly being recognised that the local context 
- whether it be the village, constituency, or district - is particularly important to the 
prospects of social accountability initiatives.283 Indeed, national-level governance 
factors, such as constitutional frameworks, can only reveal so much about the 
enabling conditions for civil society within clientelistic or young democracies. 
Furthermore, mainstream comparative tools, such as the World Governance 
Assessment (WGA) and Strategic Governance and Anti-Corruption Assessment 
(SCAGA), tell analysts little about within country differences in service delivery or the 
accountability of responsible state institutions.  
To fill such gaps commentators were increasingly seeking methodologies that can 
help analysts to identify the sub-national factors that affect developmental outcomes 
(Snyder, 2001; Woolcock, 2013). In this vein, two efforts from development think 
tanks surveyed the pool of available literature and evidence on social accountability 
initiatives to create broad lists of potentially relevant contextual factors (O’Meally, 
2013; Foresti et al., 2013; Harris and Wild, 2013). While they were by no means 
exhaustive, but they informed the contextual variables chosen to interrogate the 
CRGs ability to engage in activism: 
O’Meally’s (O’Meally, 2013) report for the World Bank identified six broad 
‘contextual domains’ that matter for social accountability: i) civil society, ii) political 
society; iii) inter-elite relations and the political settlement; iv) state-society relations 
and the social contract; v) intra society relations and issues of social inclusion; vi) and 
global factors. These are further broken down into features that constrain or enable 
the potential for social accountability. For their part, researchers at the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) identified six relevant ‘governance factors’: i) the 
                                                 
283 The importance of context has long been understood. Indeed, there are many frameworks that attempt to 
identify which contextual factors, and at which level analysis, are relevant to the success of development 
interventions. While they have different names that suggest their focus, including ‘drivers of change’, power 
analysis, and political economy analysis, they share a concern with how social, economic and political factors 
interact to impede or support development. For a good overview see: Hudson and Leftwich (2014). For an 
example of ‘drivers of change’ analysis for Pakistan, with a focus on civil society, see Khan and Khan (2004). 
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credibility of political settlements, which refers to the ability of politicians to make 
believable promises; ii) the strength of oversight systems, such as audit commissions 
and the judiciary; iii) the degree of coherence in policies and processes for 
implementation, meaning how clearly roles and responsibilities of governance 
institutions are defined; iv) capacities for local problem solving and collective action, 
or the ability of civil society actors to organise; v) the presence or absence of moral 
hazard, as when states neglect to provide services because NGOs do it for them; vi) 
and the presence or absence (and severity) of rent seeking, which can divert or erode 
services (Foresti et al., 2013; Harris and Wild, 2013). 
The growing literature on civil society, governance and service delivery in Pakistan 
also suggests sub-national contextual variables that may have affected the agency of 
the CRGs to engage in the activities central to social accountability.284 However 
relevant constituency level quantitative data on factors such as land inequality, 
informal societal structures and institutional performance is, in large part, lacking. 
Thus, the range of potential variables to correlate with the CRGs’ activity scores was 
limited to those with plausible proxies. This section briefly overviews the rationale for 
the five chosen: 
 i) Multi-dimensional poverty: The literature on social accountability reveals that 
multidimensional poverty, encompassing levels of education and health, living 
conditions and asset ownership, can be vital to citizens’ capacities for collective 
action. At its most basic, citizens that are less concerned with their livelihood have 
more free time to organise to demand their rights. Indeed a previous study of the 
CRGs found that many of less economically secure members struggled to regularly 
commit to group activities (Kirk, 2014). Thus, it was hypothesized that constituencies 
with higher multidimensional poverty scores would be less favourable contexts for 
the CRGs’ activities. This variable took advantage of a new dataset that looks at 
multidimensional poverty at the district level in Pakistan (Naveed and Ali, 2012). 
                                                 
284 For an exploration of this literature and how it is related to social accountability please see Kirk (2014). 
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 ii) Violence: While civil society plays a vital role in challenging violence, 
collective action in public spaces, to some extent, requires contexts in which the fear, 
and actual incidence, of violence is low (Pearce, 2004; Dörner and List, 2012). 
Furthermore, although the thesis does not include CRGs’ from war-torn Baluchistan 
or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, my original study of STAEP had uncovered 
that ongoing conflict, terrorism and political violence were key concerns for CRG 
members and reportedly hampered their work (Kirk, 2014). Thus, it was hypothesized 
that levels of violence ad insecurity would affect the CRGs’ activities. This variable 
used data from recent research that quantitatively codes newspapers to record 
incidents of political violence at the district level from 1998-2011 and population 
estimates of corresponding districts to arrive at violence per capita figures (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2014). 
 iii) Political competition: Key (1949) long ago wrote of how ‘anxiety over the 
next election pushes political leaders into serving the interests of the have-less 
elements in society’. Following an established political science literature, this anxiety 
was operationalised by examining changes in political competitiveness – investigated 
through changes in vote share – between the 2008-2013 elections (Holbrook and 
Dunk, 1993; Donovan et al., 2010; Christensen, 2011; Afzal, 2014). Data from 2008 
and 2013 elections was used to calculate the changes in vote shares. It was 
hypothesized that decreasing political competitiveness in a constituency would have 
created a harder context for the CRGs’ activities as representatives confident of their 
election victories would have been less likely to have entertained the CRGs’ issues. 
This hypothesis was inspired by suggestions from CRG members in the first study that 
the 2013 election created a window of opportunity for their lobbying activity as 
candidates fought to engage voters.  
 iv) Number of parties: This variable used the effective number of political 
parties competing for each constituency in the 2013 elections to capture the CRGs’ 
potential options for playing power-holders off against one another (Greene and 
Benvan, 2013). Drawing upon anecdotal evidence from the previous study of the 
CRGs and ethnographic evidence of local politics in Pakistan, it was hypothesized that 
374 
 
citizens would have more bargaining options, or, at the very least, opportunities to 
engage in the activities central to social accountability, in contexts with more 
effective political parties vying for power. In this respect, the variable seeks to 
account for the health of constituency’s political society. 
 v) Land inequality: Those interested in Pakistan’s developmental potential have 
often focussed on the willingness of landowning political elites to equitably provide 
public goods. Indeed, a common refrain suggests that rural Pakistan’s agrarian 
society is ‘feudal’.285 Although this is an un-nuanced characterisation, over 70% of the 
national assembly have consistently been held by large landowners and in some 
areas studies suggest village politics remains dominated by a hereditary landed elite 
(Shafqat, 1998; Cheema et al., 2008; Javid, 2012). Evidence also suggests that rural 
populations are often socially excluded through dependencies on this elite for their 
livelihoods and access to state services (Mohmand and Cheema, 2007; Shami, 2010; 
Chaudhry and Vyborny, 2013). Therefore, it was hypothesized that in areas with high 
land inequality civil society groups, such as the CRGs, may have been less willing or 
able to demand to engage in activism. Land inequality is often measured by the Gini 
index, however, it has been criticised for being unable to show ‘patterned’ or 
‘bifurcated’ inequality, conceptualised as land concentration patterns between large 
and small landholders (Brockett, 1992). Thus, I use Brockett’s measure (% of land 
with large land holders + % of land with smallholders / average size of smallholding). 
While there is no constituency level ownership data available for Pakistan, the district 
level 2010 Agricultural Census was used to provide proxies.     
 While these five variables are far from exhaustive, they sought to capture sub-
provincial contextual factors that may have affected the ability of the CRGs to engage 
in activism. Following Hudson and Leftwich’s (2014) call for analysts to draw upon a 
                                                 
285 Mohmand (2011:n6) describes ‘feudal’ as a ‘term used in public rhetoric in Pakistan to signify a multifaceted 
relationship of extreme social, political and economic inequality between landlords and other rural classes’. 
However, she finds that feudalism do not adequately explain voting behaviour in the Punjab, rather the need to 
access public services and other social relationships are more important factors. For a contemporary example 
of the continuing use of this term see: Mustafa, A. ‘Pakistan’s fight against feudalism’, Aljazeera, August 2014. 
(Accessed 20/04/15) 
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range of disciplinary techniques, they were constructed using established ways of 
interrogating contexts from the political science and development literatures.  
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Appendix 4 - Codebook for interview data and coding sample 
This represents the codebook developed from the analysis of CRG participant and NGO staff 
interviews. 
Category Sub-category 
According Credit   
Activism Acting Collectively 
Activism as Opposite of Patronage 
Civil Disobedience 
Cost of Activism 
Following Activism Procedure 
Incentivising Activism 
Learning Activism 
No Space for Activism 
Belonging Belonging as Impunity 
Biraderi Politics   
Brokers   
Building Reputation   
Capitalism Harmful   
Community Boundaries 
(Political) 
  
Contradictions with Stories   
CRG - PS Relationship   
CRG Function CRG as Aspirational 
CRG as Benefit for Influentials 
CRG as Democratic 
CRG as Ideas Sharing 
CRG as Job 
CRG as Localisation 
CRG as Relationship Building 
CRG as School for 'Hopeless' 
Political Workers 
CRG as School of Deliberations 
CRG as School of Development 
Sector 
CRG as School of Politics 
CRG as Self-Improvement 
CRG as Social Work 
CRG as Transitory 
CRG as Umbrella Org 
CRG as Voice 
CRG School of Patronage 
CRG School of Politics 
CRG Impact   
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CRG Internal Hierarchy   
CS & PS Permeating   
CS Hierarchy   
CS-Econ Permeate   
Culture Culture (Gender) 
Culture (Politics) 
Democracy Democracy & Vote as Valuable 
Democracy as Compromised 
Democracy as Imperialism 
Learning Democracy 
Mistrust Democracy 
Procedural Democracy 
Demonetising   
Depoliticising   
Describing Civil Society   
Development is a Political 
Game 
  
Disavowing Power   
Disciplining   
Elite Capture Political Capture 
Social Capture 
Empowerment Changing Mindsets 
Empowering (Personal) 
Empowering (Women) 
Empowerment (Group) 
Narrating Disempowerment 
Exceptionalising Exceptionalising (Geography) 
Exceptionalising (Linkages) 
Exceptionalising (Local Culture) 
Exceptionalising (Politics) 
Excpetionalising (Social Work) 
Favours   
Funding Civil Society   
Gender (Politics)   
Getting Things Done GTD (Accountable for Obligations, 
No Money) 
GTD (Activism Techniques Taught) 
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GTD (Communication) 
GTD (Cunning) 
GTD (Division of Labour) 
GTD (Free-time and Resources) 
GTD (Horizontal Links) 
GTD (Loads of Memberships) 
GTD (Mixing, V & H) 
GTD (Obstacles) 
GTD (Patronage Politics) 
GTD (Persistence, Personal Effort) 
GTD (Recognition) 
GTD (Self-help) 
GTD (Social Pressure) 
GTD (Status) 
GTD (Timing) 
GTD (Vertical Links) 
Identity Identity Already Fixed 
Identity Formation 
Identity 
Incentivising 
Responsiveness 
Identity Already Fixed 
Identity Formation 
  
information   
IP NGOs IP NGO Ticking Boxes, Faking SW 
IP NGO-CRG Relationship 
IP NGO-CSO Comparison 
IP NGO-PS Relationship 
IP NGOs 
Issue Identification Personal 
IP NGO Ticking Boxes, Faking SW 
IP NGO-CRG Relationship 
IP NGO-CSO Comparison 
IP NGO-PS Relationship 
  
Maintaining Boundaries Between SW & Business 
Maintaining Boundaries 
Maintaining Relationships 
Between SW & NGOs 
Between SW & Politics 
Between SW & Religion 
  
Maintaining the Fiction   
Middle Classes as Force for 
Change or Not 
  
Mixing SW & Business   
Mixing SW, Politics & 
Religion 
  
Mobilisation Mobilisation Marginalised 
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Money as Harmful to CSO   
Mutual Dependence   
Narrating Patronage Politics Challenging Patronage Politics 
Overlooking Patronage Politics 
Patronage Politics (Outside CRG) 
Patronage Politics (Within CRG) 
Narrating Patronage Politics 
Narrating Politics 
Challenging Patronage Politics 
Overlooking Patronage Politics 
Patronage Politics (Outside CRG) 
Patronage Politics (Within CRG) 
Fatalism 
Mafia Politics 
Narrating Change 'Before it wasn’t 
like this' 
National Reflect Local 
Party Loyalty 
Politicians Mistrust 
Politics as Harmful to Civil Society 
Politics as Local Loyalty 
Politics as Reputation 
Politics as Self-Interest or Business 
Politics for Public Good 
PS Hierarchy 
'Social' Distance from Politics 
Narrating Politics 
Narrating Social Work 
Fatalism 
Mafia Politics 
Narrating Change 'Before it wasn’t 
like this' 
National Reflect Local 
Party Loyalty 
Politicians Mistrust 
Politics as Harmful to Civil Society 
Politics as Local Loyalty 
Politics as Reputation 
Politics as Self-Interest or Business 
Politics for Public Good 
PS Hierarchy 
'Social' Distance from Politics 
Paid SW as Ok 
SW as Biraderi 
SW as Broad Public Good 
SW as Business 
SW as Elite Duty 
SW as Empathy 
SW as Local Loyalty 
SW as Negotiating Power 
SW as 'Noble' 
SW as Opposition to State 
SW as Passion 
SW as Politics 
SW as Pure or Opposite of Politics 
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SW as 'Real' 
SW as Relationships 
SW as Religious 
SW as Reputation 
SW as Rights 
SW as Self Improvement 
SW as Self-Sacrifice 
SW as Solving Problems 
SW as Stepping Stone 
SW as Struggle 
SW as Voice 
Narrating Social Work 
Negotiating Power 
Paid SW as Ok 
SW as Biraderi 
SW as Broad Public Good 
SW as Business 
SW as Elite Duty 
SW as Empathy 
SW as Local Loyalty 
SW as Negotiating Power 
SW as 'Noble' 
SW as Opposition to State 
SW as Passion 
SW as Politics 
SW as Pure or Opposite of Politics 
SW as 'Real' 
SW as Relationships 
SW as Religious 
SW as Reputation 
SW as Rights 
SW as Self Improvement 
SW as Self-Sacrifice 
SW as Solving Problems 
SW as Stepping Stone 
SW as Struggle 
SW as Voice 
Abuse of Power 
Bureaucratic Power 
Locating Power 
Negotiating Power 
NGOs 
Abuse of Power 
Bureaucratic Power 
Locating Power 
NGO as Ineffectual 
NGO Business 'Greed' 
NGO link to Centre & Power 
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NGO Priority 
NGOs as Corrupt 
NGOs as Distance from Reality & 
Ground 
NGOs as Filling Political and State 
Gap 
NGOs as Foreign Agendas 
NGOs as Identity 
NGOs as Self Interest 
NGOs 
PE of Aid 
NGO as Ineffectual 
NGO Business 'Greed' 
NGO link to Centre & Power 
NGO Priority 
NGOs as Corrupt 
NGOs as Distance from Reality & 
Ground 
NGOs as Filling Political and State 
Gap 
NGOs as Foreign Agendas 
NGOs as Identity 
NGOs as Self Interest 
  
PE of PS   
PE of SW   
PE Rural Gujrat   
PE Rural Multan   
PE Urban Gujrat   
Plurality of CS   
Projectisation (Bottom-up) Management 
Rendering Technical 
Responsibilities 
Results before Substance 
Trans to Donor Discourse 
Projectisation (Bottom-up) 
Projectisation (Top-down) 
Management 
Rendering Technical 
Responsibilities 
Results before Substance 
Trans to Donor Discourse 
Reporting & Verifying Activities 
Stewardship 
  Reporting & Verifying Activities 
Stewardship 
  
Radical 
Appropriation   
Relationships Importance of Relationships (Economic) 
Relationships (Personal) 
Relationships (Political) 
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Relationships Building 
Relationships State 
Relationships Importance of 
Remittances 
Relationships (Economic) 
Relationships (Personal) 
Relationships (Political) 
Relationships Building 
Relationships State 
  
Resistance to STAEP   
Risk   
Rivalry   
Samosas & Soft Drinks   
Seeking Recognition   
Spreading Markets   
STAEP Changes   
Sustainability   
Synergy   
The State Capture of State Institutions 
Distance from State 
Fear of the State 
State as Prestige 
State as Resource Pile 
State Authorities Respect 
The State 
Violence 
Capture of State Institutions 
Distance from State 
Fear of the State 
State as Prestige 
State as Resource Pile 
State Authorities Respect 
  
Volunteerism   
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(Example of coded interview data from NVivo) 
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Appendix 5: Interviewees 
 
Urban Gujranwala 
  
 
Urban Gujrat 
 
  
Pseudonym Sex Estimated Age Interview Date Estimated Class Occupation CRG Role Mentoring NGO Role
Tariq Langah
Hamza Langah
M
M
30-40
30-40
18/03/15
18/03/15
Middle
Middle
Physiotherapist
CBO Owner
Member
Mamber
Benish Nanda F 30-40 13/03/2015 Middle (Background missing)
Saif Rajput M 20-30 13/03/2015 Upper-Middle Paid Parrty Worker Member Staff
Saima Leel F 40-50 14/03/2015 Upper-Middle Advocate Member
Javed Duggal M 30-40 14/03/2015 Middle NGO Owner Member
Aatif Sial M 40-50 14/03/2015 Upper-Middle Business owner / CBO Owner Member
Ramin Mahar M 40-50 17/03/2015 Middle Journalist Member
Chand Satti M 50-60 18/03/2015 Middle Union boss Member
Adeena Tiwana F 40-50 19/03/2015 Middle Former Teacher Member
Ibrahim Arain M 40-50 19/03/2015 Upper-Middle Architect / CBO Owener Member
Minahil Khan F 40-50 20/03/2015 Middle (Background missing) Member
Pseudonym Sex Estimated Age Interview Date Estimated Class Occupation CRG Role Mentoring NGO Role
Anam Bhatia F 40-50 01/04/2015 Upper-middle School owner Member
Mariam Bhatia F 30-40 01/04/2015 Upper-middle Teacher Member
Subhan Sarpara M 40-50 01/04/2015 Upper-middle Business owner Member
Noman Raisani M 40-50 02/04/2015 Upper-Middle Social Worker / Homeopathy Member
Hajra Mirwani F 30-40 03/06/2015 Middle Service sector Member
Jarrar Shaikh M 50-60 06/06/2015 Middle Business owner Member Staff
Azeema Karlal F 40-50 04/06/2015 Upper-middle Advocate / Principal Member
M 40-50 06/06/2015 Middle NGO Staff Staff
M 30-40 06/06/2015 Middle Member
F 20-30 16/06/2015 Lower-middle Staff
F 30-40 16/06/2015 Lower-middle Member
M 60-70 21/05/2015 Middle-Upper Journalist Member
M 60-70 21/05/2015 Middle-Upper Retired Member
Arif Mir M 20-30
16/06/2015
22/05/2015 Middle Service sector Member Staff
Wasif Wassan M 20-30 22/05/2015 Middle NGO Staff Member Staff
Momna Bangial F 30-40 23/05/2015 Middle CSO Owner Member
Kashif Kalyal M 40-50 27/05/2015 Middle Journalist Member
Asad Bhabra M 30-40 30/03/2015 Middle Public Sector Lecturer Member
Arif Ramy M 20-30
30/03/2015
12/08/2017 Lower-middle Service Sector Member
Umer Arain M 40-50 30/03/2015 Upper-Middle Estate Agent Member
Hadier Vani M 30-40 31/03/2015 Middle Member
Salman Malik M 60-70 21/05/2015 Middle-Upper Journalist Member
Maqbool Ahmed
Shahzad Bhutt
Shahid Fiaz 
Rashid Chaudhary
Aafea Kathia
Sajida Dar
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Urban Multan 
 
Pseudonym Sex Estimated Age Interview Date Estimated Class Occupation CRG Role Mentoring NGO Role
Abby Bajwa F 30-40 17/06/2015 Middle Service Sector Member Staff
Chaudhry 
Jahanzaib Derawal
M 40-50 29/03/2015
17/06/2015
Upper-Middle Union Leader Member
Chaudhry Adnan 
Bhutta 
M 50-60 15/03/2015
25/03/2015
29/03/2015
Upper-Middle Union Leader Member
 Zahid Dhillon M 50-50 26/03/2015 Middle Journalist Member
Ayesha Nanda F 30-40 17/06/2015 Middle Service Sector Member Staff
Usama Minhas M 40-50 24/03/2015 Middle Retired Former Migrant Member
Babar Kirmani M 20-30 24/03/2015 Middle Student Member
F 40-50 25/03/2015 Middle Teacher Member
F 30-40 25/03/2015 Middle Teacher Member
 Ayun Satti  M 50-60 25/03/2015 Middle Teacher Member
 Junaid Khan M 20-30 28/03/2015 Middle Student Member
Ameer Paracha M 60-70 28/03/2015 Middle Retired Army Member
Hafiz Sargana M 20-30 29/03/2015 Middle Student Member
Bilal Hanif M 30-40 29/03/2015 Middle Lawyer / NGO Staff Member
Naveed Jamal M 50-60 30/03/2015 Lower-Middle Vet / CBO Owner Member
Chaudhry Ali 
Husnain
M 40-50 30/03/2015 Middle Unemployed Member
Chaudhry 
Muhammad Nasir
M 50-60 30/03/2015 Middle Retired Landowner Member
Dua Langah
Zakia Ramay
Pseudonym Sex Estimated Age Interview Date Estimated Class Occupation CRG Role Mentoring NGO Role
Bisma Longi F 30-40 02/10/2015 Upper-Middle Teacher Member
Sofia Bangial F 50-60 02/10/2015 Upper-Middle Principal Member
Hina Kayani F 30-40 02/10/2015 Middle State Security Member
Asad Kharal M 40-50 04/10/2015 Middle Garage Owner Member
Hassan Qureshi M 30-40 04/10/2015 Upper-Middle Landowner / Businessman Member
Sobel Nanda F 30-40 08/10/2015 Upper-Middle Lawyer Member
Umair Minhas M 30-40 05/10/2015 Middle
Rafa Memon F 30-40 05/10/2015 Middle NGO Staff Member
Waqas Kalwar M 40-50 07/10/2015 Middle Union Leader Member
Ismail Samejo M 40-50 07/10/2015 Middle NGO Staff Member Staff
Sunny Chachar M 20-30 07/10/2015 Middle Unemployed Member
Sana Mirani
Subhan Mirani
F
F
30-40
40-50
06/10/2015
09/10/2015
Upper-Middle Teacher
Lawyer
Member
Member
Tasir Lakhani M 30-40 09/10/2015 Middle NGO Staff Member
 Raza Lodhra M 50-60 09/10/2015 Upper-Middle Bakery Owner Member
Moheem Machi M 50-60 10/10/2015 Middle Retired Principal Member
Leah Gill F 30-40 11/10/2015 Middle NGO Staff Staff
Imrana Sharif M 30-40 04/10/2015 Journalist 
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Civil society leaders 
 
Annual review authors 
  
Pseudonym Sex Estimated Age Interview Date Estimated Class Occupation CRG Role Mentoring NGO Role
Imran Gujjar M 20-30 12/10/2015 Middle NGO Staff Staff
Karen Jarral F 40-50 12/10/2015 Middle School Owner Member Staff
Areeba Rafiq F 40-50 13/10/2015 Middle Party Worker Member
Fiaz Mughal M 50-60 14/10/2015 Upper-Middle Property Dealer Member
Amer Siddiqui M 40-50 14/10/2015 Middle Party Worker Member
Ahmed Khokhar
Rue Khokhar
M
F
40-50
40-50
14/10/2015
14/10/2015
Lower
Lower
Salesman
Housewife
Member
Member
Asad Khan
Sajid Sharif
Kashif Bhutto
M
M
M
20-30
20-30 
20-30
15/10/2015
15/10/2015
15/10/2015
Middle
Middle
Middle
Student
Student
Student 
Member
Member
Member
Nazar Abbas M 20-30 16/10/2015 Middle Phone Shop Owner Member
Noor Kohli
Zainab Mahar
F
F
30-40
30-40
16/10/2015
16/10/2015
Middle
Middle
Teacher
Teacher
Member
Member
Saeed Minhas M 40-50 16/10/2015 Upper-Middle Retired Member
Bilal Tiwana M 40-50 17/10/2017 Upper-Middle Landowner Member
Momna Nizamani
Saeed Shah
F
M
40-50
40-50
17/10/2017 Middle
Middle
Teacher
Business Owner
Member
Member
Interviewee Anon Pseudonym Date 
  Yes Senior NGO Staff Member 1 14/08/2015 
  Yes Senior NGO Staff Member 4 16/08/2015 
Sarwar Bari (Founder 
PATTAN) 
No   18/08/2017 
Naheed Aziz No   20/08/2015 
  Yes Senior NGO Staff Member 2 21/08/2015 
  Yes NGO worker 23/08/2015 
  Yes Senior NGO Staff Member 3 24/08/2015 
Zafarullah Khan (Head of 
NGO) 
No   24/08/2015 
  Yes NGO / INGO Worker 26/08/2015 
 
Interviewee Date 
Haris Gazdar  23/08/2017 
Ben Schonveld 14/08/2017 
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